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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 183 Records
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1978 (2) TMI 214 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n behalf of the contending parties we have no doubt that we shall have exceeded our narrow and circumscribed authority. Before closing, we would like to mention that the petitioners rushed to this Court too precipitately On the heels of the Price Control Order. Thereby they deprived themselves of an opportunity to show that in actual fact, the Order causes them irreparable prejudice. Instead, they were driven through their ill-thought haste to rely on speculative hypotheses in order to buttress their grievance that their right to property and the right to do trade was gone or was substantially affected. A little more patience, which could have been utilised to observe how the experiment functioned, might have paid better dividends. The impugned Price Control Order is, therefore, valid and the challenge made thereto by the petitioners his to fail. These are our reasons in support of the order passed earlier that the Petitions be dismissed with costs. S.R. Petitions dismissed.
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1978 (2) TMI 213 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... onsignment resulted only due to the aforesaid illegal demand, the defendants have to pay to the plaintiff at least the price of the said consignment together with the freight paid on the same with interest. The value of the goods in the consignment as is seen from Ext. E, the consignment note, was ₹ 700/-. Admittedly, the plaintiff paid ₹ 93.90 to defendant No. 2 on 11-6-1971 towards freight and other charges on the said consignment. There is no evidence on record regarding other loss or expenses incurred by the plaintiff due to the non-delivery of the said consignment. Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for realisation of the aforesaid two amounts (Rs. 700/- ₹ 93.90), i. e. ₹ 793.90, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from 11-6-1971 up to the date of realisation of the same from the defendants. A decree in favour of the plaintiff-appellant be drawn up accordingly. 10. The appeal, therefore, is allowed, with costs.
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1978 (2) TMI 212 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ourt refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution and did not order the continuance of the criminal proceeding any further. In Food Inspector, Calicut Cororation v. Cherukattil Gopalan and anr.( 1971 Suppl. S.C.R. 721.) this Court said at page 730 -- "But in view of the fact that the appellant has argued the appeal only as a test case and does not challenge the aquittal of the respondents, we merely set aside the order and judgment of the High Court. But we may make it clear that apart from holding the respondents technically guilty, we are not setting aside the order of acquittal passed in their favour." For the reasons stated above, we dispose of these appeals by merely laying down the correct proposition of law but do not make any con sequential orders setting aside the acquittal of any of the respondents or sending back the cases to the Courts below or convicting any of them by an order of this Court. Appeals allowed.
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1978 (2) TMI 211 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ng the name of the assailants of Babu Ram or for detailing the circumstances under which he was killed because that was not germane for the proceedings. In these circumstances, therefore, the absence of the name of the assailants in this application cannot put the prosecution out of Court. Learned counsel for the appellants made certain comments against some of the witnesses which have been carefully dealt with by the Courts below. The discrepancies relied upon by the appellants do not appear to be of great consequence and do not merit serious consideration. On a careful consideration of the entire facts of the case we are clearly of the opinion that the prosecution case against the appellants has been proved beyond reasonable doubt and we find no reason to interfere with the judgement of the High Court upholding the conviction and the sentences passed on the appellants in both the appeals. The result is that the appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed. Appeals dismissed.
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1978 (2) TMI 210 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... should get a decree for specific performance of that contract. The High Court examined this contention meticulously. ,So have we done here. In fact, it prominently appears that the plaintiff put off performing her part of the contract presumably because she had not the necessary wherewithal to take the conveyance when she would be obliged to pay the balance of consideration and having obtained possession struck on to it without meeting her obligation. If in this background the High Court interfered with the decree of the trial court, we see nothing objectionable in it. The decree for specific performance in this case has been rightly refused and this appeal is liable to be dismissed. Al one stage Mr. Chatterjee wanted us to work out the equities of ’the situation but as, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for specific performance of the contract, we need not examine the same. Accordingly, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1978 (2) TMI 209 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... writ petitions and declare the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976 void as offending Article 31, clause (2) of the Constitution and issue a writ of Mandamus directing the union of India and the Life Insurance Corporation to forebear from implementing or enforcing the provisions of that Act and to, pay annual cash bonus for the years 1st April, 1975 to 3 1 st March, 1976 and 1 st April, 1976 to 3 1 st March, 1977 to, Class III and Class IV employees in accordance with the terms of clause 8(ii) of the Settlement dated 24th January, 1974. The respondents will pay the costs of the writ petitions to the petitioners. ORDER We agree with the conclusion of Brother Bhagwati but prefer to rest our decision on the ground that the impugned Act violates the provisions of Article 31(2) and is, therefore, void. We consider it unnecessary to express any opinion on the effect of the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in W.P. No. 371 of 1976. Petitions allowed.
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1978 (2) TMI 208 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... l in respect of the Excisable goods sold or contracted for sale. This discount is not to be included in the assessable value. I further observe that the trade discount is allowed on the normal price of goods under Section 4 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. In other words, the normal price is inclusive of the discount and the Excise duty along with other items. Therefore, the discount should be deducted from the normal price before excluding from the same the Excise duty. All the above ten orders are, therefore, set aside and the appeals against the same are admitted.
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1978 (2) TMI 207 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y the industry to the consumer? Would there be a justification, a substantial benefit was passed on to the industry with an illusory one to the consumer as a mere eye wash? We have decided the Petition, but these questions still remain unanswered, our pointed questioning of the Government counsel notwithstanding. It is not for us to suggest as to whether the circumstances in which the notification was issued and in the way it was framed would call for appropriate administrative action, but there is little doubt in our mind that the matter would deserve attention and even an appropriate inquiry, if for no other reason, at least for the reason that no suitable machinery exists today to protect the interests of the consumer. It is high time some one in authority considered the propriety of introduction of the institution of Ombudsman in Industry as a watchdog over the cost-price relationship and quality control to protect the vital consumer interest, as indeed, public interest.
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1978 (2) TMI 206 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ch are essential for creating the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and that there is no usurpation of any power, as in the nature of the breach of the statutory function by a Tribunal by neglecting or refusing to act,the right of civil action accrues to the aggrieved person. For if it were not so, the statute shall be wholly ineffectual. This Court has, therefore, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the dispute arising between the parties. Issue No. 11 is accordingly decided in favour of the Plaintiff and against the defendant. Issue No. 12 42. As a result of the above findings of the various issues, this suit is bound to succeed. 43. In the result, I grant a decree for the recovery of ₹ 7,31,153.08 in favour of the Plaintiff Company and against the defendant. The Plaintiff shall also be entitled to future interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of the institution of the suit to the date of realisation. 44. Costs to follow the event.
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1978 (2) TMI 205 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... constitutes another factory. It cannot be said, therefore, that the so-called calcium carbide made by the petitioner is removed from the factory in which it is made. A perusal of Rules 9 and 49 makes it clear that the question of collection of any excise duty cannot arise unless and until the goods are removed from the factory. 8. emsp We may conclude, therefore, that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that for some reason or the other the calcium carbide made by the petitioner is goods and is, therefore, assessable to excise duty still the actual collection of the excise duty on these goods cannot be made unless and until these goods are removed from the factory of the petitioner. 9. emsp For the above reasons, the writ petition succeeds, the impugned orders of the Superintendent, dated 5th January, 1972, of the Appellate Collector, dated 25th November, 1972 and of the Central Government, dated 16th September, 1975 are quashed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1978 (2) TMI 204 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d that in its wide sweep the word service is intended to include service however rendered in whatsoever capacity and for whatsoever reason. We must, therefore, consider where the line should be drawn and what limitations can and should be reasonably implied in interpreting the wide words used in s. 2(j) and that no doubt is a somewhat difficult problem to decide. In view of the difficulty experienced by all of us in defining the true denotation of the term industry and divergence of opinion in regard thereto-as has been the case with this bench also-we think, it is high time that the Legislature steps in with a comprehensive bill to clear up the fog and remove the doubts and set at rest once for all the controversy which crops up from time to time in relation to the meaning of the aforesaid term rendering it necessary for larger benches of this Court to be, constituted which are driven to the necessity of evolving a working formula to cover particular cases. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (2) TMI 203 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the amendment brought About in the year 1929 could revive a right which was extinguished, dead and gone prior to 1929?
Held that:- Appeal dismiised. The lost right to this property long before 1947 could not be saved and revived in the year 1955 or 1961 by section 52A of the Act. Therefore, hold in agreement with the High Court that the suit was barred by limitation in regard to the property.
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1978 (2) TMI 202 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , it was held that if timber logs are cut into sizes to facilitate transport, stacking, etc., it cannot be said that commercial articles different from timber logs emerge and that only if the logs sized were then converted into sleepers, different commercial articles would emerge. In this case we have no evidence to show that the timber cut from trees after sizing was again cut into sleepers of different sizes and sold as such commercial articles. In the absence of such evidence, merely from the fact of sizing of the timber cut from the trees in order to facilitate easy transport would not make it a commercial article so as to make the assessee a dealer in that commercial article. We respectfully follow the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case referred above and hold that the timber sized would not be liable to sales tax under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act and we accordingly dismiss this tax revision case with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1978 (2) TMI 201 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that is so, one wonders whether one would be able to say that fish would apply to dried fish but not to dead fish, or fish would apply to boiled fish. There is no qualification like that in the notification. All fish are excluded excepting canned fish. There is no case that the fish masi with which we are concerned is canned fish. Excepting canned fish, fish in any other form is exempt by the notification. There is no justification whatever to reopen the assessments that have been made for the years 196667 to 1971-72. We, therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the order of the Board of Revenue and hold that the turnover relating to masi is not liable to be taxed. We have disposed of these six tax cases by a common judgment because the matter has been disposed of by a similar order of the Board of Revenue, Commercial Taxes, and the same question arises on the same facts. The appellant in these cases will have costs-one set, including counsel s fee Rs. 500. Appeals allowed.
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1978 (2) TMI 200 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the appellate court, the appellants had deposited a sum of Rs. 59,000 with the Registrar, Appellate Side of this Court, in discharge of their obligations to be enforced by the writ issued by the trial court, we would now allow the respondents to withdraw out of the aforesaid sum the amount of excess of taxes refundable to them, such amount being in total a sum of Rs. 58,535.56 (Rupees fifty-eight thousand five hundred and thirty-five and paise fifty-six) together with the interest which has accrued thereon on the investments made by the Registrar, Appellate Side of this Court. These amounts, the respondents would get in discharge of the appellants liability for refund as it arose on the reassessments dated 21st October, 1965, 6th November, 1965, and 8th December, 1965. The balance amount, if any, would be paid back to the appellants by the Registrar, Appellate Side of this Court. A consolidated order may be drawn up accordingly. CHAKRABARTI, J.-I agree. Appeals dismissed.
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1978 (2) TMI 199 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rnover of a dealer, The provision contained in section 4(1) of the Act is to be read subject to the charging section and the definitions of dealer and turnover , because it provides for exemption from tax. As we have emphasised above, the liability to, or imposition of, tax is very much different from the payability of tax. For determination of liability to tax, therefore, the entire turnover of a dealer in respect of sales either effected by him directly or through the commission agents is to be taken into consideration. In this view of the matter, the sales of sugar made by the assessee through the commission agents were to be aggregated in order to find out the turnover liable to tax. For the reasons given above, we answer the question in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case and further in view of the fact that nobody appeared for the assessee, we make no order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1978 (2) TMI 198 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o the ground to make it as part of the building itself. Clause 8 of the special terms and conditions relied on by the learned counsel for the assessee only refers to an obligation on the part of the assessee to remove any of the defective materials within a period of 12 months from the date of erection. But it does not make it obligatory on it to erect the chairs in the auditorium as part of the building itself. In fact, the Tribunal pointed out that the assessee had not produced the relevant records and correspondence that passed between the assessee and the department to determine the nature of the contract in this particular case. In these circumstances, we are unable to hold that the contract in this case was a composite contract for the sale of the chairs as also the erection of the same in the auditorium, making it a works contract. This revision is, therefore, liable to be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 200. Petition dismissed.
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1978 (2) TMI 197 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on to show that the turnover in respect of value of the gunny bags was also liable to sales tax. We think the Tribunal was correct and there is no ground to interfere with the reasoning or conclusion. 2.. As far as the turnover in respect of bran is concerned, the Tribunal noticed that there was no case for the assessee that the bran obtained in the process of milling was delivered back to the principal. Milling was essentially an operation of which the assessee was in-charge. The paddy was delivered by the assessee to the millers, and so long as the bran generated in the process of milling was not delivered by the assessee back to the principal, there was enough material to conclude that the turnover in respect of the bran was also assessable in the hands of the assessee. 3.. We see no ground to interfere in revision with the conclusions reached by the Tribunal. We affirm the same and dismiss these tax revision cases. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1978 (2) TMI 196 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rily to use for human consumption and nothing more. In other words, the test seems to be not the actual use, but the potentiality of use and capability for use for human consumption. Not infrequently, vegetables purchased for use for human consumption are diverted for feeding cattle or dogs or other pet animals and sometimes cattle and pet animals do have a go at vegetables stored and meant for human consumption. We do not think that the quantum of exemption for vegetables must depend on the proportion in which they are used for human consumption or for feeding cattle or animals. The test of ordinary user for human consumption and potentiality and capacity for such user must determine the issue. On this ground again, we think the assessee must succeed. We allow this revision petition, set aside the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and also of the Deputy Commissioner and restore the order of the Sales Tax Officer. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1978 (2) TMI 195 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the findings. It also appears to us that the relevant portion of the aforesaid notification specifies the area within which the said officer can exercise his powers and perform his duties. The language of the notification is Areas within which powers and duties are to be exercised and performed. It does not, in our view, specify the area in respect of which the powers and duties of the specified officer can be exercised and performed. The expression is within that only specifies and limits the area of operation of the officer concerned. In other words, the area within which the officer concerned can act or exercise his power and discharge his duties under the Act. The area does not mean the area where the transactions which are the subject-matter of assessment are to take place. In the above view of the matter the judgment and order appealed against should be upheld. Hence, this appeal is dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs. GHOSE, J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed.
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