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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 774 Records
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2009 (2) TMI 907 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... because the minutes of meeting of 5.8.2002 were not reduced into writing and, therefore, the same cannot be used for giving the benefit of the same to the plaintiff. No useful purpose is going to be served by keeping this suit alive because the alleged acknowledgment is not in writing so as to bring the suit within the purview of Section 18 of the Limitation Act. 11. In my opinion, this suit filed by the plaintiff on 18.12.2003 with regard to cause of action that allegedly arose prior to three years of filing of the suit, is liable to be dismissed as barred by limitation. 12. In view of the above and having regard to the submissions made by the counsel for the parties, IA No.10765/2007 filed on behalf of the defendants is allowed and the main recovery suit of the plaintiff is hereby dismissed as barred by limitation leaving the parties to bear their own costs. 13. Any observations in this order will not influence the decision of the suit pending before the Civil Judge, Delhi.
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2009 (2) TMI 906 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e freedom to go into the whole gamut of the allegations and to reach a conclusion of its own. Pre-emption of such investigation would be justified only in very extreme cases as indicated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal AIR 1992 SC 81 (Underlined for emphasis) 9. These aspects were not considered by the trial Court and, therefore, the High Court should not have in a summary manner dismissed the appeal after having recorded that a criminal case may arise even when breach of contract is also there and there is no bar for prosecution under the criminal law. Having said so, the High Court came to an abrupt conclusion because two views are possible as to whether the allegation made was of a civil dispute or of a criminal nature no interference was called for. The approach is clearly erroneous. Therefore, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and remit the matter to it for fresh consideration in accordance with law. 10. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
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2009 (2) TMI 905 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Code. The condition imposed by the High court directing the appellant to pay a sum of ₹ 12,500/- per month as maintenance to his wife and child is onerous, unwarranted and is liable to be set aside. 9. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal succeeds. The direction contained in order dated August 07, 2007 rendered by Learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court in Bail Application No. 423 of 2007 requiring the appellant to pay a sum of ₹ 12,500/- per month by way of maintenance (both past and future) to his wife and child is hereby deleted. Rest of the directions contained in the said order are maintained. It is however clarified that any amount received by the wife of the appellant pursuant to the order of the High Court need not be refunded by her to the appellant and will be adjusted subject to the result of application for maintenance filed by wife of the appellant under Section 125 of the Code before the appropriate Court. 10. The Appeal is accordingly disposed of.
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2009 (2) TMI 904 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f expenditures. This is purely a finding of fact and therefore, question of law as framed would not arise. 2. In so far as Question No.5.4 is concerned, the same is covered by the Judgment of this court in the case of the Commissioner of Income Tax-3 Vs. Reliance Utilities & Power Ltd. in Income Tax Appeal No.1398 of 2008 decided on 9.1.2009. Considering that, this question also would not arise. Consequently, appeal dismissed.
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2009 (2) TMI 903 - SUPREME COURT
Reversal of acquittal passed by High Court - Whether the High Court is justified in interfering with the order of acquittal passed by the ld trial Court? - Conviction of accused persons u/s 147, 307/149, u/s 323/149 I.P.C. and imprisonment for life u/s 302 r/w Sec. 149 of I.P.C. by the trial court - incident taken place between the accused and members of the complainant party over share in plot No. 165/2 measuring 1.88 decimals - Chhakkoo and his brother Panchu were original tenure holders of the said plot along with some other plots - members of the complainant party tried to forcibly dispossess them.
HELD THAT:- The High Court came to the conclusion that PW.3 Sahadeo and PW.4 Narayan cannot be said to be totally independent witnesses as the defence had filed documentary evidence to show that Lalloo, the father of the accused persons had lodged an FIR against these witnesses for an offence u/s 308 IPC. These witnesses were, therefore, also somewhat inimical to the accused persons and their evidence cannot be given due weight especially with regard to the use of Lathi and Danda by the prosecution witnesses, particularly when such an important fact had not been stated by them in their statements recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. and the statements being contradictory to each other with regard to the use of Danda by the prosecution witness. The High Court arrived at the conclusion that the injuries of the accused persons have not been satisfactorily explained.
This Court, in a recent judgment in Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2008 (7) TMI 951 - SUPREME COURT] considered earlier cases and laid down that the appellate court should, therefore, reverse an acquittal only when it has "very substantial and compelling reasons".
Following are some of the circumstances in which perhaps this Court would be justified in interfering with the judgment of the High Court, but these are illustrative not exhaustive.
i) The High court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position;
ii) The High court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record.
iii) The entire approach of the High court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice;
iv) The High court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case;
v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court.
vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.
When we apply these parameters laid down by a number of cases decided by this Court to the facts of this case, then conclusions become irresistible and no interference is warranted by this Court. Consequently, the appeal filed by the State of UP being devoid of any merits, is accordingly dismissed.
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2009 (2) TMI 902 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ecial Court is illegal, contrary to law and are wholly without jurisdiction and therefore their acts and the notifications issued which are impugned in these writ petitions cannot be sustained. Hence, I pass the following order.- (a) All the writ petitions are allowed. (b) The impugned notifications are hereby quashed. (c) Liberty is reserved to the respondents to act in accordance with Section 3 of the Act and to protect the interest of the depositors. (d) The petitioners herein, even if they are not served with notice by the Special Court, have a right to appear before the Special Court and object to any request by the Competent Authority for making an order of attachment absolute. (e) It is open to all the petitioners herein to urge all the grounds which they have urged on merits including the ground that the Act is not applicable to the sale or agreement of sale in question in their favour and Special Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate these claims. Ordered accordingly.
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2009 (2) TMI 901 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Dishonour of Cheque - acquittal of the accused - amount advanced was an ''unaccounted amount'' which was not disclosed to the Income Tax Authority - cheques issued towards discharge of legally enforceable debt or not? - 1st respondent accepted the liability to repay the loan but denied her signatures on the bill of exchange as well as the cheque - presumption u/s 139 - HELD THAT:- The presumption u/s 139 regarding existence of debt or liability is not rebutted, in order to attract Section 138, the debt or liability has to be a "legally recoverable" debt or liability. As held by the Apex Court in the case of Krishna Bhat [2008 (1) TMI 827 - SUPREME COURT] there is no presumption u/s 139 that the debt is a legally recoverable debt. In the case of Goa Plast (P) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula D'Souza [2003 (11) TMI 336 - SUPREME COURT], the Apex Court reiterated that a debt or liability subject-matter of Section 138 means a legally enforceable debt or liability.
Admittedly the amount allegedly advanced by the applicant was entirely a cash amount and that the amount was "unaccounted". He admitted not only that the same was not disclosed in the Income Tax Return at the relevant time but till recording of evidence in the year 2006 it was not disclosed in the Income Tax Return. By no stretch of imagination it can be stated that liability to repay unaccounted cash amount is a legally enforceable liability within the meaning of explanation to Section 138. The alleged debt cannot be said to be a legally recoverable debt.
Considering the admission of the applicant, the conclusion recorded by the ld trial Judge that the applicant has failed to establish that the cheque was issued towards discharge of a legally recoverable debt is correct.
Therefore, Application is rejected.
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2009 (2) TMI 900 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and or dispossession of the farmers to whom full sale consideration has not been paid so far. The Collector, Yamuna Nagar is accordingly directed to look these aspects into consideration and take necessary and prompt action so that every victim-farmer is not compelled to rush to the Court. Similarly, the Additional Director General of Police, Crime Branch, is directed to constitute a Special Investigating Team (SIT) which shall comprise of an officer not below the rank of Dy. Superintendent of Police and with two officers in the rank of Inspectors. The SIT shall investigate into not only the allegations made by the petitioners/other farmers who have already approached this Court, but of the others as well. The SIT is expected to conclude the investigation in a fair, impartial and dispassionate manner and as early as possible, but not later than three months. Disposed of. Copy of this order be handed over to Mr. R. D. Sharma, DAG, Haryana, for information and necessary action.
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2009 (2) TMI 899 - COMPANY LAW BOARD NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... s ₹ 10 lakhs. In so far as Vatsalesh is concerned, the company has not commenced business and therefore I determine the value of her holding of 5,000 shares as ₹ 5 lakhs. In case the petitioner is willing to accept the said values, she should communicate, in writing to the companies/the second respondent, her willingness to accept the valuation. Within one month from the date of receipt of her letter of willingness, the companies or the second respondent, at his choice, shall be bound to purchase the shares held by the petitioner at ₹ 10 lakhs and ₹ 5 lakhs, respectively. Adityesh should also refund ₹ 12 lakhs given by the petitioner as unsecured loan with an interest of 10 per cent from the date of investment till the date of payment. In case the petitioner does not accept any of the above alternative reliefs, then the petition will be deemed to have been dismissed. 24. Both the petitions are disposed of in the above terms. No order as to costs.
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2009 (2) TMI 898 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... a’ to be applied in vacuum in all cases. The question as to what extent, the principles of natural justice are required to be complied with, will depend upon the facts of the case. They are not required to be complied with when it will lead to an empty formality (See State Bank of Patiala vs. S.K. Sharma (1996 (3) SCC 364) and Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation vs. S.G. Kotturappa (2005 (3) SCC 409). The impugned order is, therefore, liable to be set aside. 11. For the foregoing reasons the appeal succeeds. The order dated March 24, 2008, passed by the learned Single Judge of High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore, in Criminal Revision No. 1362 of 2006 cancelling the bail granted to the appellant by the learned Judicial Magistrate is hereby set aside and order dated December 1, 2006, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indore, M.P., in Criminal Complaint No. 1604 of 2005 is hereby restored. 12. The appeal accordingly stands disposed of.
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2009 (2) TMI 897 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Ltd., as that was limited to ₹ 1.75 lakhs from Oceanic Investments Co. Ltd. 7. Considering these facts, in our opinion and considering that in the earlier years also the interest had not been disallowed the Tribunal in its ultimate conclusion was right in holding that the loan taken was not used to give a loan to the sister company. Admittedly the loans advanced were from the surplus with the company. Even otherwise it is open to a company on the ground of commercial expediency to advance a loan to its sister company. See S.A. Builders Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) & Ors., (2007) 288 ITR 1 (S.C.). Here a finding of fact has been recorded that the loan was given for ’commercial expediency’. 8. For the view taken we do not propose to go into the issue as to whether the loan advanced to 100% subsidiary companies were for the purpose of commercial expediency. 9. For the aforesaid reasons we find no merit in these appeals which are dismissed.
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2009 (2) TMI 896 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... find out an inexpensive method or methods of converting saline water into fresh water. (ii) To find out an inexpensive and practical method of utilizing the water, which is in the form of ice, in the Himalayas. (iii) To find out a viable method of utilizing rain water. (iv) To utilize the flood water by harnessing the rivers so that the excess water in the floods, may instead of causing damage, be utilized for the people who are short of water, or be stored in reservoirs for use when there is drought. 48. In my opinion the Central Government should constitute such a body of scientists immediately and give them all the help failing which the hardships of the people of India will further increase causing great suffering and social unrest everywhere. The problem brooks no delay for being addressed not even for a day. 49. In the end I would like to quote the couplet of the great Hindi poet Rahim Rahiman paani raakhiye, bin paani sab soon Paani gaye na oobrey, moti, manush , choon
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2009 (2) TMI 895 - ITAT, LUCKNOW
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... ... ..... stimate. This ground is also rejected. Ground No. 6 relates to disallowance of standard deduction of ₹ 12,000 from salary income. As no evidence is furnished as to whether assessee has actually earned salary income and TDS thereon has been made, the disallowance is confirmed. Ground No. 7 relates to charging of interest under s. 234B and initiation of penalty under s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. We have decided these issues in the case of Shri Ramendra Vikram Singh. Following our order in that case, this ground is also rejected. Ground No. 8 is general in nature, requires no specific adjudication. In the result, appeal is dismissed. In the case of Shiv Pratap Singh (ITA No. 79/Luck/2008) ground Nos. 1 to 6 relate to computation of capital gains. This issue has been discussed in detail in the case of Shri Ramendra Vikram Singh. Following our order in that case, all these grounds are rejected. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. In the result, all the appeals are dismissed.
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2009 (2) TMI 894 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... facts on record clearly discloses inaction on the part of the appellant in pursuing the proceedings before the authorities under the Income Tax Act. Having regard to the period of delay and on account of inaction on the part of the appellant we find that these are not the fit cases in which inordinate delay of 1754 days in filing appeals deserves to be condoned. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission of Mr. Bhattad that considering the facts and circumstances of the case the limitation should begin to run from the date of knowledge i.e. from June, 2008. 10. In view of the above discussion, we find no merit in these applications. Accordingly, all the applications are dismissed. Income Tax Appeal St. Nos. 16191/2008, 16193/2008, 16195/08, 16197/08, 16199/08 & 16201/08 (Senior Bhosale Estate (HUF) vs. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax) In view of the dismissal of the civil applications for condonation of delay in filing appeals, the appeals are dismissed.
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2009 (2) TMI 893 - SUPREME COURT
Disqualification of Membership under Rule 25 of the Delhi Co-operative Societies Rule, 1973 - `deemed' - without availing the statutory remedies available under the Act and the Rules, the respondent No. 2 filed a writ petition - Allotment of plot or in alternative to refund money paid - respondent No. 2 submitted that she has been fighting a battle for getting her legitimate right and after having accepted the prayer for transfer, the Society cannot turn around and take a stand that since Anoop Singh was disqualified, the order of the High Court is indefensible - HELD THAT:- We find that before the High Court there was no appearance on behalf of the present appellant. For the purpose of the present case Sub-rule (2) of Rule 25 is of paramount importance. There is a deemed disqualification. The effect of it has not been examined by the High Court.
"The word `deemed' is used a great deal in modern legislation. Sometimes it is used to impose for the purposes of a statute an artificial construction of a word or phrase that would not otherwise prevail. Sometimes it is used to put beyond doubt a particular construction that might otherwise be uncertain. Sometimes it is used to give a comprehensive description that includes what is obvious, what is uncertain and what is, in the ordinary sense, impossible."
"Deems" means "is of opinion" or "considers" or "decides" and there is no implication of steps to be taken before the opinion is formed or the decision is taken.
Ld Counsel for the appellant is right that normally when a statutory remedy is available, the same should be availed. In the instant case that aspect has also not been examined by the High Court. We are therefore of the considered opinion that the writ petition needs to be heard by the High Court afresh to be decided keeping in view the applicable legal provision.
Since no counter affidavit had been filed by the present appellant before the High Court we permit it to do so within a period of one month. Till the disposal of the writ petition by the High Court afresh, no third party rights in respect of the plot which is stated to have been allotted to respondent No. 2 shall be created by the appellant.
The appeal is allowed.
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2009 (2) TMI 892 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ound which had been held against him to support the order on any of the grounds decided against him. If the issue of jurisdiction is held in favour of the appellant then even though on merits the order may have been against the assessee appellant, yet the appeal preferred by the Revenue will have to be dismissed if lack of jurisdiction is established. 6. In our opinion, therefore, considering both Rule 27 and the general principles namely that no Court or authority can assume jurisdiction if it had no jurisdiction the Tribunal was bound to consider, hear and decide the said controversy. We may make it clear that the issue has to be decided on materials on record and not by leading new or additional material before the Tribunal unless a proper application is made, parties are heard and the new material is allowed to be brought on record. 7. Considering the above, we set aside the entire order and remand the matter back to the Tribunal for denovo consideration according to law.
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2009 (2) TMI 891 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... cised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (1992 (4) SCC 305), Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar (AIR 1964 SC1 ) and Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar (2006 (4) SCC 359). (See (2008) 11 SCALE 20) Consequently, the appeal deserves to be allowed. The proceedings in Criminal Petition No. C.C.No. 385/2000 pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Palladam, are quashed. The appeal is allowed.
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2009 (2) TMI 890 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... d canvassed, by cryptic and non-reasoned order, has dismissed the writ petition. In our view, this is not the way a petition filed under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India is to be disposed of. The duty to give reasons for coming to a decision is of decisive importance which cannot be lawfully disregarded. The giving of the satisfactory reasons is required by the ordinary man's sense of justice and also a healthy discipline for all those who exercise power over others. This Court in the case of Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar and Ors. MANU/SC/0783/2003 2003CriLJ5040 has stated Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. Without the same, it becomes lifeless. 8. In view of above discussion, we have no other alternative but to set aside the impugned order and remit the matter to the High Court for a fresh consideration of the writ petition. In the present facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs. The appeal is disposed of.
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2009 (2) TMI 888 - SUPREME COURT
Demanding and accepting gratification by Inspector of Central Excise - convicted the appellant u/s 7 and 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act - Test of preponderance of probability - Whether the recovery of the tainted money itself is sufficient to convict the appellant u/s 7? - Accused No. 1 and appellant both was working as Inspector of Central Excise - HELD THAT:- The appellant at the earliest point of time explained that it was not the bribe amount received by him but the same was given to him by PW-10, saying that it was towards repayment of loan taken by his Manager-PW2 from the Accused No. 1. This is evident from the suggestion put to PW-2 even before PW-10 was examined. Similar suggestion was put to the investigating officer that he had not recorded the version given by the appellant correctly in the post trap mahazar-Exhibit-P9 and no proper opportunity was given to explain the sequence of events.
A three-Judge Bench in M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P.[2000 (12) TMI 892 - SUPREME COURT] while dealing with the contention that it is not enough that some currency notes were handed over to the public servant to make it acceptance of gratification and prosecution has a further duty to prove that what was paid amounted to gratification
It is well settled that the presumption to be drawn u/s 20 is not an inviolable one. The accused charged with the offence could rebut it either through the cross-examination of the witnesses cited against him or by adducing reliable evidence.
If the accused fails to disprove the presumption the same would stick and then it can be held by the Court that the prosecution has proved that the accused received the amount towards gratification.
It is against this background of principles we have examined the contention of the appellant that the charges u/s 7 have not been proved against him. It was argued by Shri U.U. Lalit, Senior counsel, that the circumstances found by the HC in their totality do not establish that the appellant accepted the amount of ₹ 1500/- as gratification. Having examined the findings of both the Courts, we are satisfied that the appellant has proved his case by the test of preponderance of probability and we accordingly reach the conclusion that the amount was not taken by the appellant as gratification. He was made to believe that amount paid to him was towards the repayment of loan taken by PW2 from Accused No. 1.
The prosecution failed in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant received any gratification. Therefore, conviction of the appellant and the sentence imposed upon him is set aside. The appeal is allowed.
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2009 (2) TMI 887 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... am, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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