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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 59 Records
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1954 (3) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he people have to accept whether they are willing or not. Our conclusion, therefore, is that section 58 is not ultra vires of the State Legislature by reason of the fact that it is not a tax but a fee which comes within the purview of entry 47 of List III in Schedule VII of the Constitution. The result, therefore, is that in our opinion the appeals are allowed only in part and a mandamus will issue in each of these cases restraining the State Government and the Charity Commissioner from enforcing against the appellants the following provisions of the Act to wit - (i) Section 44 of the Act to the extent that it relates to the appointment of the Charity Commissioner as a trustee of religious public trust by the court, (ii) the provisions of clauses (3) to (6) of section 47, and (iii) clause (c) of section 55 and the part of clause (1) of section 56 corresponding thereto. The other prayers of the appellants stand dismissed. Each party will bear hi own costs in both the appeals.
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1954 (3) TMI 70 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nting employed by the assessee was such that in his opinion "the income, profits and gains could not properly be deduced therefrom." In the second place, even if such a finding were to be implied from his order it cannot be said that there was material before him which would enable him to come to this finding. The fact that the profits appeared to him to be insufficient and the fact that there was no stock register maintained by the assessee are not in my view materials upon which such a finding can be give, but these are circumstances which may provoke an inquiry. The Income-tax Officer must discover evidence or material aliunde before he can give such a finding. In the third place, I find that in increasing the taxable income he did not adopt any method or basis. For these reasons I would answer the question referred to us in the negative. The assessee will recover costs. I assess counsel fee at ₹ 100. KAPUR, J.--I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1954 (3) TMI 69 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Act. The case before us cannot be disposed of merely as an attempt to take one person's property to discharge another person's liability. We are unable to see any real justification to extend the principles laid down in Hoeper's case to the case before us and to hold that though in effect, that is, in the immediate incidence, the petitioner is made liable for the tax on the income of her minor child, the classification of such persons for purposes of taxation is unreasonable and violates Article 14 of our Constitution. It cannot, of course, be gain said that within the class that falls within the purview of Section 16(3)(a)(ii) there is no inequality in the operation of the taxing provision. The classification being reasonable, there is no denial of equal protection of the laws within the meaning of Article 14 of our Constitution. These petitions fail and are dismissed with costs in one W.P. No. 867 of 1953. Counsel's fee ₹ 250 petitions dismissed.
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1954 (3) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he has earned as he does by dismissal or removal. The answer is clearly in the negative. The second element for determining whether a termination of service amounts to dismissal or removal is, therefore, also absent in the case of termination of service brought about by compulsory retirement. The foregoing discussion necessarily leads us. to the conclusion that a compulsory retirement does not amount to dismissal or removal and, therefore, does not attract the provisions of article 311 of the Constitution or of rule 55 and that, therefore, the order of the President cannot be challenged on the ground that the appellant had not been afforded full opportunity of 'showing cause against the action sought to be taken in regard to him' Both the questions under consideration must also be answered against the appellant. The result, therefore., is that this appeal fails and must stand dismissed. In the circumstances of this case we make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1954 (3) TMI 67 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s. What is even more significant is that it accepts the position that there is no interlacing or interlocking between the Ahmedabad firm and the Bhavnagar firm. That is the correct test in order to determine whether the two businesses are the same or different. It applied the test, and having applied the test it came to the conclusion favourable to the assessee. Having therefore held that there is no interlacing or interlocking it should have come to the conclusion that the two businesses were the same, but it did not come to this conclusion merely because the owners of the two firms were the same. It took the view that under these circumstances it is not possible for the two firms to be separate firms but they must be one firm. We must, therefore, again differ from the view taken by the Tribunal and we must answer the questions submitted to us (1) In the negative. (2) In the negative. (3) In the affirmative. The Commissioner to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (3) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... easonable. As regards the State's appeal against Hukum Singh, clearly the confession of Hem Raj cannot be used' as substantive evidence against him. The learned public prosecutor contended that Hukum Singh was the writer of the letter Exhibit P-5 and the evidence furnished by the key Exhibit P-12 found in his trouser pocket, coupled with the breaking of the door latch, and the circumstance that he was seen together with Hem Raj, was sufficient material for his conviction. We are unable to agree. We are of the opinion, that the learned Judicial commissioner was perfectly right in holding that this evidence by itself was insufficient to uphold his conviction and that Hukum Singh was entitled to the benefit of the doubt in respect of both the charges found against him. There is hardly any material on the record to justify our interference with an order of acquittal in an appeal by special leave. In the result both these appeals fail and are dismissed. Appeals dismissed.
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1954 (3) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y his soul rest in peace. The Court will remain closed today as a mark of respect to the deceased. M.C. SETALVAD, ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR INDIA.--My Lords, the Bar respectfully associates itself with deep regret in your Lordships expression of grief and sympathy. I recall how about three years ago this Court assembled to mourn the death of its first Chief Justice. The hand of fate has smitten with equal suddenness on this occasion. It is a little over two years ago that his Lordship became a member of your Lordship Court. His affable personality, his genial and his uniform courtesy made a deep impression on all those who came into contact with him. Members of the Bar will never forget the keen practical sense which he brought to bear on all questions that came before him, the patience with which he heard them, and the invariable kindness he showed to them. The Bar tenders its deep and heart-felt sympathy to those near and dear to him in their great, sudden and irreparable loss.
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1954 (3) TMI 64 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... its finding. It may be that another Tribunal or this Court might have come to a contrary conclusion on these very facts, but that is neither here nor there. All that we are to satisfied. In our opinion it certainly was. Mr. Palkhivala asks us to make a note in our judgment that this is a proper case which the taxing authorities will consider whether some relief should not be given to the assessee in respect of the assessment year S. Y. 1996. Mr. Palkhivala says that the finding is that the debt became bad is S. Y. 1996 and not in S. Y. 1997 and as he claimed it in S. Y. 1997 he could not get the necessary relief for the accounting year S. Y. 1996. It is for the Central Board of Revenue to consider whether under the circumstances of this case relief should be given to the assessee or not. The answer we give to the question is "The debt became a bad debt in S. Y. 1996." Assessee to pay the costs. Notice of motion dismissed with costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (3) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
Whether appeal was to be heard on the merits?
Held that:- The independence of the judiciary is a priceless treasure to be cherished and safeguarded at all costs against predatory activities of this character and it is of the essence that public confidence in the independence of ,the judiciary should not be undermined by any such tactics adopted by the executive authorities.
We have therefore eliminated from our consideration the whole of the evidence given by Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate, and come to our conclusion in regard to the guilt of the appellant No. I relying solely on the testimony of the two independent witnesses Gadkari and Perulakar. The result therefore is that the appeal of the appellant No. 1 will be dismissed except with regard to his conviction and sentence, under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and the convictions and sentences passed upon him by the Judicial Commissioner under section 465 and section 466 as also section 161 of the Indian Penal Code will be confirmed. The appeal of the appellant No. 2 will be allowed and he be acquitted -and discharged of the offences with which he was charged and immediately set at liberty. The bail bond of the appellant No. 2 will be cancelled.
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1954 (3) TMI 62 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... beyond the limited extent provided in Section 16(3), and the whole attempt of Mr. Joshi is to extend the scope of Section 16(3) by making the father pay tax on an income which is not his, an income which is that of his minor son and which the Legislature for good reasons has not considered to be the artificial or notional income of the father. We must therefore differ from the view taken by the Tribunal and answer question (1) in the negative. Question (2) deals with the premia paid out of the moneys belonging to the minors for effecting insurance on their respective lives. Mr. Palkhivala makes it clear that he wanted to argue this question only if we had decided question (1) against him. But inasmuch as we have decided question (1) in his favour and we have held that the income of the minors is not the income of the father, question (2) does not arise. Therefore we will not answer question (2). Commissioner to pay the costs of the reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (3) TMI 61 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ompleted or under section 34 if the assessment has already been completed. In the latter case the period of limitation mentioned in section 34(3) begins to run from the end of the year in which an order under section 23A has been made. This position appears to me to be fair alike to the taxing authorities and to the assessee. It is moreover in accord with the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Cambatta v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay ( 1946 14 I. T. R. 748), where their Lordships took the view that section 23A is a merely computation section, a view with which I am in respectful agreement and in any event as the construction of the word assess in section 23A is in my opinion not free from doubt, it would be but right to take the view more favourable to the assessee than to the taxing authorities. I, therefore, agree with the answers proposed to the questions by the learned Chief Justice and to the order of costs made by him. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (3) TMI 60 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , 1946, and so on show that the habit of the assessee was to keep the reserve as far as possible intact and to take out money from the current account of various banks at Jharia for meeting the day to day expenditure of the colliery business. In these circumstances the contention put forward on behalf of the assessee is that the assumption made by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is incorrect. In our opinion the argument of Mr. Dutt is well-founded and the assessee has furnished a reasonable explanation for his possession of the high denomination notes to the extent of Rs. 68,000. For the reasons we have expressed we hold that there is no material to justify the conclusion of the Appellate Tribunal that Rs. 33,000 was secreted profit of the assessee and is liable to be taxed. We hold that the question referred to the High Court must be answered in favour of the assessee. The Income-tax Department must pay the costs of this reference. We assess the hearing fee at Rs. 250.
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1954 (3) TMI 59 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bunal has come to the conclusion even on an interpretation more favourable to the assessee than the one we are giving to the expression setting up that these expenses do not show that the business was set up prior to the 1st of September, 1946. In our opinion, it would be difficult to say that the decision of the Tribunal is based upon a total absence of any evidence. As we have often said, we are not concerned with the sufficiency of evidence on a reference. It is only if there is no evidence which would justify the decision of the Tribunal that a question of law would arise which would invoke our advisory jurisdiction which after all is a very limited jurisdiction. We will, therefore redraft the question submitted by the Tribunal as follows whether there was evidence before the Tribunal to hold that the assessee company set up its business as from 1st of September, 1946? and we will answer that in the affirmative. No order as to costs. Notice of motion dismissed with costs.
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1954 (3) TMI 58 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g Co.(2) and Governor- General in Council v. Joynarain(3) go to establish in what circumstances the intention has to be gathered. In these cases under appeal as in (1) (1905) 32 Cal. 816. (3) A.I.R. 1948 Pat. 36. (2) A.I.R. 1923 Bom. 125. these cases, the intention is clearly established by the circumstances that the vendors themselves have taken the railway receipts in their own names and have not allowed them to be delivered to the buyers except on payment of the price due. Till then, it is clear, their inten- tion was to retain the ownership of the goods in themselves. The ownership in fact continues to vest in the sellers till the railway receipts are obtained after payment of price by the purchasers, which can happen only at the other end. The goods are therefore really sold out- side the State and the State cannot therefore levy the tax on these goods. The judgment and decrees of the lower court are confirmed and the appeals are dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1954 (3) TMI 57 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... proceedings are under section 22(1)(g) for knowingly producing incorrect accounts, registers or documents of the firm, we see no reason to interfere at this stage. Mr. Roy suggested that it may very well be that the sanction of the Commissioner that is required under section 22(2) has not been given as regards this offence, namely, under section 21(1)(g) of the Act. The materials on the record are not however sufficient for a decision on this question. This point was not raised in the application on which the rule was issued. If there be no sanction the proceedings will fail but at the present stage it is not possible for us to order quashing of the proceedings on that supposed ground. We accordingly quash the proceedings under section 22(1)(a) of the Bengal Finance Sales Tax Act of 1941, but discharge the Rule as regards the proceedings under section 22(1)(g) of the Act. The prayer for stay of the proceedings is refused. DEBABRATA MOOKERJEE, J.-I agree. Ordered accordingly.
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1954 (3) TMI 56 - TRAVANCORE AND COCHIN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s sought to be provided by Entry 43. In our judgment, Entry 43 authorised Parliament as also the States to legislate in respect of recovery of all claims, whether they accrued before the Constitution or they accrue after the Constitution. 4.. As regards the second point, as mentioned in the order of reference there is conflict of judicial opinion. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act does not appear to us to be confined to cases where there has been a repeal of an enactment though it be without a re-enactment. It is true that the Act contains sections where a repeal and re-enactment are referred to. But those sections do not show that except in cases where the Act re-enacted makes a provision Section 6 will have no operation. With respect we follow the view taken by the Nagpur High Court and we disagree with the view taken by the High Court of Allahabad. 5. The result is that the Original Petition fails and is dismissed with costs, Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1954 (3) TMI 55 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s on their behalf and there were no particulars furnished by the assessees to identify the sellers, so that the department might proceed against them for the tax. It is, therefore, obvious that the assessees failed to establish the contention, that they sold the goods on behalf of known principals, and that they are entitled to the exemption claimed under Section 8 of the Act. All the requirements of the section must be satisfied before the assessees could claim exemption under it, as the object of the provision is to enable the Government to proceed against the principals. It is only in that event that the commission agent would be exonerated from the liability. The decision, therefore, on both the points of the Appellate Tribunal, is correct and must be affirmed. The revision is dismissed with costs Rs. 250. In view of the above discussion, the decision in C.R.P. No. 2110 of 1952 applies also to T.R.C. No. 292 of 1953. It is dismissed but without costs. Petition dismissed.
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1954 (3) TMI 54 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... circumstance. We do not think, if really the assessee has got a legitimate grievance, that he was taxed upon the amount for which under law he could not be legally made liable, he should be deprived of the opportunity to substantiate his case. We, therefore, think that, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, the assessee should be given an opportunity by the Appellate Tribunal to prove, if he can, whether the whole or any portion of the purchase turnover on which he was assessed during the relevant year represents purchases made by him from dealers other than licensed dealers. For this purpose, we think it necessary to set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal and remit the case back to them for disposal according to law in the light of the observations con- tained in this judgment. As the assessees did not raise the point before, we think it just that they should be made liable to pay the costs of the respondent in this Court which we fix at Rs. 250. Case remitted.
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1954 (3) TMI 53 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ue of the groundnut and/or kernel purchased and converted by him into oil and cake provided that the amount for which the oil is sold is included in his turnover. The deduction he is entitled to is the value of the groundnut from which he produced the oil. The total turnover of the oil should be taken into consideration and from that the value of the groundnuts which he purchased, must be deducted. To take a simple example, if the turnover of the oil is Rs. 100 and the value of the groundnut purchased, from which the oil was extracted was Rs. 75, this Rs. 75 should be deducted from Rs. 100 and on the balance of Rs. 25 alone the tax should be levied. This is a simple process, which is permitted under the rule, and it does not admit of any serious argument. In our opinion, the rule was correctly applied by the Tribunal to the facts of the case, and we see no reason to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. The revision is dis- missed with costs, Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1954 (3) TMI 52 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nce made in this case at the instance of the petitioner. When the Court declined to entertain the reference the remedy by revision had become time-barred. The loss of this remedy cannot possibly be attributed to any negli- gence, laches or carelessness on the part of the assessee. His conduct of the case was diligent and bona fide. The expeditious remedy which the Sales Tax Act allowed him is now beyond his reach. There is no equally efficacious and adequate remedy available to him. The orders of assess- ment are illegal and they lead to a miscarriage of justice. The legislature has not expressed its mind with sufficient clarity. The language em- ployed is equivocal and ambiguous and there is no reasonable basis for reading the word cereals in a limited or in a narrow sense. I therefore agree in the conclusion arrived at and the order proposed by my lord the Chief Justice. Orders quashed. (1) 1949 17 I.T.R. 523 A.I.R. 1950 Bom. 6. (2) 1946 14 I.T.R. 479 A.I.R. 1946 Nag. 216.
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