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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 578 Records
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1998 (3) TMI 694 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nder section 80P(2)(a)(iv) of the Act has to be enhanced to the extent of the double addition. The Tribunal held that it represented the sale of the fertiliser. Once it is found that the amount realised was on the sale of the fertiliser, on the profit realised on the sale of the fertiliser to the assessee's members, the assessee would be entitled to exemption under section 80P of the Act. We are of the opinion that the earlier decision of this court rendered in the assessee's own case for the earlier two assessment years would equally also apply to the facts and circumstances of the case and the Tribunal was justified in holding that, with reference to the three amounts, the assessee is entitled to exemption under section 80 of the Act. There is no infirmity in the order of the Tribunal. 6. Accordingly, our answer to the question of law, referred to us is in the affirmative and against the revenue. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1998 (3) TMI 693 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
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... ... ..... ster of members on grounds other than arising out of transfer of shares/securities has not been now vested in the Company Law Board. Since the maintainability of the present petition in terms of Section 399 depends on the rectification of the register of members of the company, which is a public company, on grounds other than transfer of shares, however strong and valid the claims of the petitioners may be, for such rectification, in view of want of jurisdiction, we will not be able to adjudicate on the claims of petitioners Nos. 2 and 3. Perhaps, the remedy relating to the declaration that they are shareholders lies in a civil suit, which incidentally the petitioners have already initiated. Since the other two petitioners hold only about 2 per cent. shares, by themselves, they do not qualify under Section 399 to pursue this petition. 10. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed as not maintainable in terms of Section 399. All interim orders are vacated. No order as to costs.
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1998 (3) TMI 692 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s a view which it is impossible to arrive at etc., which would justify the High Court from taking its own view and not just follow the precedent which may otherwise have a persuasive value, though not binding. 22. In view of what we have said hereinabove, we are of the view that there is absolutely no merit in these petitions and they are required to be rejected. All these petitions are therefore, rejected with no order as to costs. At this stage, the learned Counsel for the petitioners made an oral request for granting certificate of fitness under Article 133, read with Article 134A of the Constitution of India, for appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In our view, there is no substantial question of law of general importance involved in these petitions, which needs to be decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Our decision is based on the provisions of law which are clear, causing no ambiguity whatsoever. The request for certificate of fitness is therefore, rejected.
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1998 (3) TMI 691 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the application and the interim order of stay dated 19.4.1985 is vacated ." The appellant has thus not worked in the respondent- Corporation since the date of his termination. His salary upto to October, 1985 has been paid to him as directed by the High Court. The record which is before us does not show what the appellant has earned from October, 1985 upto date. But looking to the fact that he has not worked with the respondent-Corporation and that they stay order which enabled him to work in the Corporation had to be vacated on account of the appellant's conduct which shows that he was not desirous of working in the respondent's organisation, in the totality of circumstances of the present case, a monetary compesation of ₹ 2 lakhs would be adequate to compensate the appellant. The respondents are, therefore, directed to pay to the appellant the sum of ₹ 2 lakhs within a period of three months from today. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs.
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1998 (3) TMI 690 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hat is the area of the flat presently occupied by the landlady." As a matter of fact, the landlady had mentioned it, which the High Court has overlooked. In the affidavit sworn to by the landlady in the writ petition filed in the High Court the following averment has been made " I say that I am holding and occupying a flat admeasuring 560 sq. ft. which consists of one bed room, one living room, one kitchen and a bathroom along with W.C." We find no justification for the High Court for quashing the decree of eviction passed by a competent court on satisfaction of the ground under Section 13(1)(g) of the Act. We, therefore, allow these appeals and set aside the impugned judgment of the high Court. The decree of eviction will stand restored subject to a rider that respondent- tenant can have three months' time from today for surrendering the premises in question, provided he gives the undertaking on usual terms within four weeks in the Registry of this Court.
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1998 (3) TMI 689 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ernment may have sound reasons to withdraw from acquisition but those must be made known to the company which may have equally sound reasons or perhaps more which might persuade the State Government to reverse its decision withdrawing from acquisition. In this view of the matter it has to be held that Yadi (Memo) dated 11.4.91 and Yadi (Memo) dated 3.5.91 were issued without notice to the appellant (L&T Ltd.) and are, thus, not legal. Accordingly all these appeals are allowed with costs; impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. SCA 1568/87 and SCA 5149/89 filed in the High Court are dismissed and SCA 5171/91 is allowed. Yadi (Memo) dated 11.4.91 and Yadi (Memo) dated 3.5.91 containing orders of the State Government withdrawing from acquisition of the land are quashed. A direction is issued to the respondents 1 and 2 to complete the acquisition proceeding in pursuance to the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.
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1998 (3) TMI 688 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 44 deals with regulation of loan-making policy and the said sections are not at all attracted in the facts of the case. Section 45 deals with restriction on the transaction with non-members. It will be appropriate at this stage to refer to Section 45. "45. Restrictions on other transactions with non-members.--Save as is provided in this Act, the transactions of a society with persons other than members, shall be subject to such restrictions, if any, as may be prescribed." 4. It appears that the transaction to come under Section 45 must be subject to such restriction as may be prescribed. Admittedly, no rule has been prescribed by which any restriction in respect of such transaction has been imposed. Therefore, Section 45 is also not attracted. Hence, the dispute cannot be brought under Clause (c) of Section 91(1). We do not, therefore, find any reason for interference against the impugned judgment. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed without any order as to costs.
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1998 (3) TMI 687 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ry corollary would be to set aside the impugned order but certain other factors have intervened of which we must take notice. 6. The respondent was reinstated after the order of the Tribunal dated 16-4-1996 and he joined duty on 28-5-1996. Nothing has been brought to our notice to show that after his reinstatement on 28-5-1996, almost two years ago, the respondent has committed any act which may warrant his being placed under suspension during the pendency of the trial. Since the respondent was reinstated about two years ago and the appellants have taken their own sweet time to approach this Court after a delay of 295 days, we do not want to interfere with the impugned order but we clarify that should the appellants, at any stage of the trial, find it necessary, for reasons to be recorded in writing, to place the respondent under suspension, they shall be at liberty to proceed under the Rules and this order shall not come in their way. 7. The appeal is disposed of. No costs.
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1998 (3) TMI 686 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 18th of June, 1985. The appellant was appointed pursuant to this advertisement. He had to meet the qualifications prescribed. The appellant has drawn our attention to Rule 38 of the Assam Legislative assembly Secretariat Rules 1986, under which all orders made or action taken before these Rules came into force shall be deemed to have been made or taken as if these were made or taken under these rules. rule 38 can apply only to orders lawfully made or action lawfully taken before these Rules came into force. It cannot validate an action which was not lawful at inception. The High Court has, therefore, rightly come to the conclusion that the appellant did not possess the prescribed qualifications at the time when he was appointed in 1985 as officer on Special Duty. We are informed that the appellant has since been reverted to Assam Judicial Service in a Grade III post and has thereafter also been promoted to a Grade II post. In the premises, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1998 (3) TMI 685 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... roborated. Hence, the order of acquittal passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge Madras, is not sustainable and the same is liable to be set aside and the order of the trial Court has to be restored. 14. Then coming to the sentence, the trial Court has imposed the punishment of one year rigorous imprisonment for each offences, in addition to the fine of ₹ 2,000/- respectively. As the offence was committed in the year 1981 and more than sixteen years have lapsed, I feel that the minimum sentence prescribed under FERA is sufficient to meet the ends of justice in this case. 15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. However, the respondent/accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for each of the offences, in addition to the fine of ₹ 2,000/- as imposed by the trial Court. The sentences are to run concurrently. The trial Court is directed to issue arrest warrant forthwith and see to it that the accused is arrested and sent to prison.
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1998 (3) TMI 684 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the order has been passed but refund has not been given, as such unless the petitioner proves that his case falls under any of the exceptions of the provisions of Section 11B(2), the petitioner is not eligible for any refund. This is a question if fact and the petitioner can approach the authority, but no direction aby way of issue of writ of mandamus can be granted by this Court. 3. In present of the other application files by the petitioner and the show-cause notice issued by the respondent, the petitioner may submit his reply and the respondent may consider the same and pass orders. It is also brought to the notice od this Court that the appeals have also been filed by the respondent and it would be in the interest of justice that firstly the appeals are decided by the appellate authority. Accordingly a direction is given to dispose of within a period of 3 months from the date of submission of copy of this judgment. Petitions stand disposed of with the above observations.
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1998 (3) TMI 683 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rule 2. Section 281 only to safeguard the interest of the assessee. Hence the proviso to the said section deals with the alienations made by the assessee without notice of the proceedings against him under the Income Tax Act. Hence no question of harmonising section 281 with rule 16 arises in the circumstances. Nor can there be any question of any disharmony between the section and the rule. In fact the case reported in TRO v. Radhakrishna Eradi (supra) referred deals with the same. 19. From the above discussion, it is clear that section 281 of the Income Tax Act cannot be read conjointly with section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act and section 281 cannot be read in harmony with rule 16 of Schedule II of the Income Tax Act. 20. For the above stated reasons, I find that both the courts below have rightly discussed the issues in detail and concurrently held that the plaintiffs are not entitled for the relief as claimed. Accordingly the second appeal is dismissed. No costs.
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1998 (3) TMI 682 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e are of the view that without going into the factual aspect of the case, the order of the Tribunal as well as the order of the General Manager confirmed by the appellate authority are liable to be set aside on the sole ground that the document based on which the conclusion came to be reached having not been supplied to the appellant, the decision cannot be sustained. The respondent ought to have given to the appellant a copy of the opinion of the Forensic Department based on which the impugned order came to be passed. 7. Accordingly, the order of the Tribunal as well as the order of the General Manager confirmed by the appellate authority are set aside and the matter is remanded back to the original authority and if the Department so desires, it can proceed further in the matter after supplying all the relevant documents to the appellant on which they propose to place reliance for taking further action against the appellant. 8. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. No costs.
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1998 (3) TMI 681 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
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... ... ..... asis to FFIs and others, the allegations of the petitioners, that the preferential allotment was made with a view to increase the promoters shareholding would become justified. Therefore, it has become necessary for us to issue the following directions 38. The board of directors shall implement its decision to allot four lakhs shares to financial institutions and others as approved by the general body on August 4, 1994, before December 31, 1998. In case, their proposal does not materialise by then, within a further period of three months, the company shall issue shares at par to all the willing shareholders, other than those to whom convertible warrants/shares were issued, in the same proportion in which the shares were issued on conversion of the warrants, if need be, by increasing the authorised capital. 39. With the above directions we dispose of the petition, C. P. No. 32 of 1995. The other petition, C. P. No. 8 of 1995, is dismissed as infructuous. No order as to costs.
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1998 (3) TMI 680 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... s and the connected papers. We find no merit in the Review Petitions which are accordingly dismissed.
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1998 (3) TMI 679 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in the letter dated 9-9-1996 wherein it is stated that in the case of ex-ECOs/SSCOs reappointed in the public sector banks after nationalisation of banks, i.e., 19-7-1969, the age of retirement would be 58 years even though they have received back-dated seniority which is only notional for the purpose of next promotion and pay fixation in terms of relevant government instructions. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the judgment of the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court. We are in agreement with the judgment of the Kerala High Court in Writ Appeal No. 568 of 1997 dated 1-4-1997, WP No. 568 of 1997 wherein the said High Court has taken a view contrary to that taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 6. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the judgment of the learned Single Judge and that of the Division Bench of the High Court are set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1998 (3) TMI 678 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... mistake but once a declaration of law had been made by the Bombay High Court on 16th September, 1987, it was open to the petitioner to claim for recoveries and the same should have been made within a reasonable time thereafter., On ascertaining what is reasonable time for claiming refund, the courts have often taken note of the period of limitation prescribed under the general Law of Limitation for filing of suits for recovery of amount due to them. In the present case also that standard adopted by the High Court is the same in ascertaining whether there has been laches on the part of the appellant in seeking relief in due time or not. The finding clearly recorded is that long after the charges had been paid and law had been declared by the Court, the writ petition has been filed and, therefore, such a refund should not be allowed. We do not think such a view taken by the High Court calls for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. Hence we dismiss the petition.
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1998 (3) TMI 677 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t to invoke judicial activism to set at naught legislative judgment is subversive of the constitutional harmony and comity of instrumentalities." (emphasis supplied) In view of the law so laid down the above section cannot be interpreted to mean that in respect of the offences for which the Registrar is the sanctioning authority a prior hearing is required to be given. The matter can be viewed from the other angle also. If the words "such sanction" is to refer also to offences for which the Registrar is the sanctioning authority it will lead to an absurd situation, in that a duly authorised officer of the State Government will hear the parties on the question of grant of sanction on its behalf, but the decision to grant sanction will rest on the former. In any view of the matter, therefore, the interpretation given by the High Court and for that matter, the direction issued cannot be sustained. We accordingly allow this appeal and quash the impugned direction.
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1998 (3) TMI 676 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ted in 2002 (148) E.L. T. 484 (Tri. - Mumbai) (Supreme Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner). While dismissing the appeal the Supreme Court passed the following order - “As the application is delightfully vague it is dismissed. Consequently, the appeal stands dismissed.”
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1998 (3) TMI 675 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the entries in the documents fulfil the requirements so as to be admissible in evidence?
Held that:- From a combined reading of the all Sections it is manifest that an oral or documentary statement made by a party or his authorised agent, suggesting any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact may be proved against a party t the proceeding or his authorised agent as 'admission' but, apart form exceptional cases (as contained in Section 21), such a statement cannot be proved by or on their behalf. While on this point the distinction between 'admission' and concession' needs to be appreciated. In absence of any definition of 'confession' in the Act judicial opinion, as to its exact meaning, was not unanimous until the judicial Committee made an authoritative pronouncement.
It is thus clear that under the third clause when a person abets by aiding, the act so aided should have been committed in order to make such aiding an offence. In other words, unlike the first tow clauses the third clause applies to a case where the offence is committed. Since in the instant case the prosecution intended to prove the abetment of a Jains by aiding (and not by any act falling under the first two clauses adverted to above ) and since we have earlier found that no prima facie case has been made out against Shri Advani and Shri Shukla of their having committed the offence under Section 7 of the P.C. Act, the question of Jains' committing the offence under Section 12 and , for that matter, their admission in respect thereof - does not arise. Incidentally, we may mention that the abetment by conspiracy would not also arise here in view of our earlier discussion. Appeal dismissed.
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