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Showing 21 to 40 of 515 Records
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2000 (3) TMI 1105 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... ed a partition suit which was pending. The requirement that the information was not disclosed by the appellants intentionally in order to make the respondent No. 2 part with property is not alleged expressly or even impliedly in the complaint. Therefore the core postulate of dishonest intention in order to deceive the complainant-respondent no.2 is not made out even accepting all the averments in the complaint on their face value. In such a situation continuing the criminal proceeding against the accused will be, in our considered view, an abuse of process of the court. The High Court was not right in declining to quash the complaint and the proceeding initiated on the basis of the same. Accordingly the appeals are allowed. The Judgment/Order dated 13-4-1999 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Misc. No. 22880/1998 and Criminal Misc. No. 24068 of 1998 is set aside and the proceeding in Criminal Case No. 22/96 pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Siwan is quashed.
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2000 (3) TMI 1104 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... or his clinic had the approval of the Government. Even basic facilities for abortion were not available in his clinic. Chauhan took Alpana to the clinic of Sharma with intent to cause her miscarriage and then her death was caused by Sharma while causing abortion, which act was done by Sharma in furtherance of the common intention of both Sharma and Chauhan. There is no escape from the conclusion that Chauhan had been rightly convicted under Section 314/34 IPC. The question then arises of the sentence awarded to Chauhan. We are of the opinion that the sentence awarded is rather on the higher side. We would, therefore, reduce the sentence of imprisonment to one and half years (18 months) rigorous imprisonment but would enhance the fine to ₹ 25,000 and in default of payment of fine Chauhan to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. In case fine is realised the same shall be payable to Lalita Soni, mother of Alpana. The appeal is thus partly allowed.
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2000 (3) TMI 1103 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... f the Supreme Court in the case of Moti Laminates Pvt. Ltd. v. C.C.E., Ahmedabad - 1995 (76) E.L.T. 241 (S.C.). As regards the galvanisation, we find that the matter is covered by the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. State of Kerala - 1989 (42) E.L.T. 513 (S.C.). The appellate authority had relied upon the Tribunal's decision in the case of Collector of Central Excise, Baroda v. Dodsal Pvt. Ltd. - 1987 (28) E.L.T. 352 (Tribunal), wherein the Tribunal had held that the straightening, cutting, bending, punching and galvanising of steel angles, plates, channels and bars as per specifications of the suppliers for erection of transmission towers would not amount to the process of manufacture. 5. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we agree with the view taken by the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals), Bombay. We do not find any merit in this appeal filed by the Revenue and the same is rejected. Ordered accordingly.
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2000 (3) TMI 1102 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t case all the courts below on facts held that the mortgage deed being for a period of 99 years was a clog on the equity of redemption. Such findings were returned keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and the financial position under which the mortgagor Shri Prakash Singh was placed at the time of execution of the mortgage deed on 19.3.1968. The appellants were found to be in an advantageous position qua the mortgagor. They were also found to be deriving the usufructs of the mortgaged land for a period of over 26 years at the time of filing of the suit on payment of meager sum of ₹ 7,000/- only to the mortgagor. The findings of the facts returned by the courts below do not require any interference particularly when the learned counsel appearing for the appellants has not contended that such findings were perverse or uncalled for or against the evidence. There is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs.
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2000 (3) TMI 1101 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tution which would obviously include Articles 233 to 235. The other aspect of the matter is in regard to Article 16 (4) which Mr. Dwivedi appearing in support of the Appeal in Appeal No.9072/96 contended that reservation is outside the purview of Chapter VI and since Article 16 (4) can be termed to be a basic feature of the Constitution appointments in the posts of district judges ought also to be governed thereunder and not de hors the same. This aspect of the matter however, has been dealt with elaborately by both my learned Brother Majmudar and Brother Pattanaik and as such I do not wish to record any further reasons therefore but adopt the same and hereby record my concurrence therewith. In that view of the matter I would dismiss both Appeals without however, any orderr as to costs. ORDER Leave granted. The Civil Appeals stand dismissed as per the majority view subject to the modification and directions contained in thee main judgment. There will be no order as to costs.
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2000 (3) TMI 1100 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n The Channel Tunnel Group v. Balfour Beauty Construction Limited and Ors 1993(1) All ER 664 where it was held that the English Courts possessed inherent powers to grant injunctive relief even where the seat of Arbitration was not in England. This view has now obtained statutory sanction in terms of the English Arbitration Act. This is the ubiquitous view internationally. I see no reason to adopt a pedantic approach and thereby render the legal regime in India dissimilar to that prevailing in other, parts of the world. The globe is now becoming a village, and persons will have increasing to choose between several available Courts. Earlier these may be not have been available due to constraints of communication; So long as the choice is not capricious, merited relief should not denied. It is palpably obvious that the present court was chosen because the relief, if granted, would be most efficacious and timely. The application is rejected with costs adjudged at ₹ 5000/-.
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2000 (3) TMI 1099 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cide for any reason, it can require the legatee to get the genuineness of the will established in a court of law as per the procedure prescribed under the Indian Succession Act. 7. In my considered opinion, by directing the petitioner to obtain a probate of the will in view of the dispute arising in respect of title to the property, the respondent has proceeded in terms of the observations made by the Division Bench of this court in the aforesaid decision. A dispute is raised by one of the legal heirs in respect of ownership and title of the property in question and also to the claim of the petitioner. 8. In view of the said position, the respondent has been unable to decide the question of mutation and has asked the petitioner to get the matter decided through probate proceedings in accordance with law. Therefore, I do not find any illegality in the said action on the part of the respondent. There is no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed but without any costs.
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2000 (3) TMI 1098 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n, it is pertinent to note that after the first respondent issued legal notice and received reply notice. Ext. P3 from the petitioner in 1990, and after having remained silent for nearly 7 years, may not be justified in suddenly raking up the issue without the petitioner being put on notice which conduct of the first respondent, is, in our view, against all cannons of fair play and is a colourable exercise of power, 9. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we have no hesitation in holding that Exts. P4 and P12 cannot be legally sustained. Accordingly, we quash Exts. P4 and P12 as illegal and arbitrary and against the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court and this Court in the decisions cited supra. In view of the fact that we are quashing Exts. P4 and P12 for the reasons already stated, the other questions referred by the learned single Judge viz., the question of limitation is, left open to be adjudicated upon by the appropriate authority in accordance with law.
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2000 (3) TMI 1097 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he ground of lapse of long period now. Of course this lapse of long period is a good reason for expediting the trial. Now the deck is clear and hence the trial court can proceed with faster pace and accelerated velocity. If any of the accused applies for dispensing with his personal presence in the court, after making the first appearance, the trial court can exempt him from continuing to appear in the court by imposing any condition which the court deems fit. Such conditions can include, inter alia, that a counsel on his behalf would be present when the case is called, that he would not dispute his identity as the particular accused in the case, and that he would be present in court when such presence is imperatively needed. Subject to the above observations, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court as well as the order of the Sessions Court. We direct the trial court to proceed with the case in accordance with law and dispose it of as expeditiously as possible.
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2000 (3) TMI 1096 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... position of any sentence less than the prescribed minimum to the respondent. To show mercy in the case of such a heinous crime would be travesty of justice and the plea for leniency is wholly misplaced. The High Court in the facts and circumstances of the case, was not justified in interfering with the discretion exercised by the Trial Court and our answer to the question posed in the earlier part of the judgment is an emphatic - No. 18. We, therefore, accept this appeal and consider it our plain duty to enhance the sentence in this case. While maintaining the conviction of the respondent for an offence under Section 376 IPC besides all other offences, we enhance the sentence of 4 years R.I. as imposed by the High Court to 10 years R.I. for the said offence. We maintain the sentence of fine together with the default clause as imposed by the Courts below also Necessary warrant shall be issued to take the respondent into custody to undergo the remaining period of his sentence.
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2000 (3) TMI 1095 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... er at its end. We make it clear that we make no observation on the merits of the objections under Section 30 of the Act which have to be decided by the trial court on its own. As the delay of 2 months 22 days is condoned we direct the appellant to pay ₹ 5,000. 00 by way of special cost to the respondent within four weeks from today. In the meantime, ₹ 24,37,868. 00 lying deposited in the court of learned District Judge, Jaipur shall be invested by learned District Judge in any Nationalised Bank initially for a period of six months awaiting decision in the remanded proceedings and the said deposit can be renewed for further suitable period if so required. In view of the present order, earlier order dated 5.11.1999 directing the appellant to keep a net balance of ₹ 7 lacs in Bank Account No. D-45 with State Bank of India at NCRB Branch, Jaipur does not survive. The appeal is allowed accordingly with ₹ 5,000. 00 special cost to be paid to the respondent.
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2000 (3) TMI 1094 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o witnesses. 6. The appeal is of the year 1992 and more than seven years have elapsed in the meantime. It indicates the callousness with which the State has been pursuing the appeal in this Court in a matter like this. The Counsel did pray for adjourning this case in the midst of hearing, but we do not think it proper for this Court to adjourn the matter in the midst of hearing because of the failure on the part of the prosecution to place a copy of the evidence before the Court for its own appreciation to judge whether the appreciation of evidence made by the High Court is justified or not. 7. In the aforesaid circumstances and in the absence of any materials being produced before us to take a contrary conclusion than the conclusion arrived at by the High Court, we affirm the order of acquittal as recorded by the High Court and dismiss this appeal. 8. A copy of this order/judgment be sent to the Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Haryana for his perusal and appropriate action.
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2000 (3) TMI 1093 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in effect is again incorrect. o p /o p The High Court further took the view that the expression premises in the Act does not state as to when the amendment was to be effective as it does not state whether the amendment was retrospective or prospective. The same is on the statute book on the date on which the suit or proceeding is pending for purpose of eviction and cannot ignore the provision on the statute book. Therefore, the view of the High Court on this aspect of the matter also, is incorrect. The arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents that these amendments are retrospective in character and could not have been made in the absence of an authority under the main enactment by virtue which such order is made is untenable. o p /o p For the aforesaid reasons, the appeals are allowed, the order made by the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for a fresh consideration in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. o p /o p
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2000 (3) TMI 1092 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hat at the time of booking of the consignment any representation as stated by Shri Desai was given by the respondent to the appellant. Shri Shanti Bhushan pointed out that the question regarding insuring the consignment was raised after the incident of non-delivery or loss of the consignment took place when the respondent asked the appellant to issue a certificate of non-delivery of the consignments. Then the respondent ascertained though it had insured all its consignments in bulk the amount stated in the policy had been exceeded by the date the consignments in question were booked, and therefore the insurance policy was not of any avail so far as non-delivery/loss of the consignments in question is concerned. It follows that this contention raised by Shri Desai is also to be rejected. On the discussion in the foregoing paragraphs all the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant having been negatived the appeal is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs
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2000 (3) TMI 1091 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e carriers by the application of the legal presumption under the common law. Section 14(l)(d) has to be under-stood in that manner. The complainant can discharge the initial onus, even if it is laid on him under Section 14(l)(d) of the Consumers Protection Act, by relying on Section 9 of the Carriers Act. It will therefore be for the carrier to prove absence of negligence. It has been held La like circumstances that a defendant in a suit on the basis of a negotiable instrument can discharge the onus lying on him under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by relying on another presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act under which if a plaintiff does not produce the accounts in his personal custody an adverse inference can be drawn against the plaintiff. Kundanlal v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, AIR (1961) SC 1316. With the above observation and following the above said Judgment in the case of Patel Roadways, we dismiss the special leave petitions accordingly.
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2000 (3) TMI 1090 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rs. This apart, respondent no.1, if aggrieved, had a remedy either by preferring an appeal or revision against it under Section 31 or 32 of the Act. Even otherwise, we feel if any development scheme is published either by the Union Government, State Government or local authority any application by any person under Section 29 for development cannot have its way in contradiction to such scheme. The scheme was framed in the year 1985, because of this long litigation delay is being caused in implementing the same with full force. The courts should normally refrain from interfering with the same, unless it is violative of the Act, rule or any constitutional provisions. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find merit in this appeal and hold that the High Court committed error in quashing the draft scheme and allowing the application of respondent no.1. Thus we allow the present appeal and set aside the judgment and order dated 25.8.1988 passed by the High Court. Costs on the parties.
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2000 (3) TMI 1089 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on batai. It is also to be stated that plea of adverse possession and retaining the possession by operation of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act are inconsistent with each other. Once it is admitted by implication that plaintiff came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till the date of the suit, the plea of adverse possession would not be available to the defendant unless it has been asserted and pointed out hostile animus of retaining possession as an owner after getting in possession of the land. (Re Mohan Lal vs. Mirza Abdul Gaffar and Anr., (1996) 1 SCC 639 . In the result, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the High Court in Second Appeal No.255 of 1977 requires to be set aside and is hereby set aside. The appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 20-A of 1976 is restored. The parties shall bear their respective costs. Ordered accordingly.
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2000 (3) TMI 1088 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... condoned. The Civil Appeal is dismissed.
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2000 (3) TMI 1087 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of law laid therein applied in a case involving the interpretation of s. 80-O as well. 5. Having perused some of the decisions of the High Courts dealing with s. 85, as it existed prior to the insertion of s. 80-O, we are of the view that the issue involved namely, whether while calculating the deduction under s. 80-O, expenditure, direct or indirect, incurred in India is to be reduced from the net convertible foreign exchange received in India, requires to be considered in greater detail by a larger Bench, particularly the question whether s. 17 of the Finance Act, 1974 has brought about any material change for the purpose of deduction under s. 80-O of the Act. 6. Since the reference is being referred to a larger Bench, it is unnecessary to deal with the second question at this stage. We, accordingly, direct that papers of this case be laid before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench for deciding question No. 1, set out hereinabove, authoritatively.
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2000 (3) TMI 1086 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... be in harmony with the object. It cannot be disputed that insurance claim received in respect of goods destroyed by fire has no close nexus with the export activity; the connection is too remote, in the sense that the goods might have been meant for export. But we have to only arrive at "total turnover" and not the "total receipts" of the business. Not all items appearing in the profit & loss account can be properly described as "total turnover" of the business. 7. Section 41(2) as it existed prior to 1-4-1993 gives a clue. Any insurance monies received in respect of goods, the cost of which has been earlier allowed as deduction "shall be deemed to be profits and gains of business" under the provision. The fiction was unnecessary if such receipts were to be considered as "turnover" as normally understood. 8. We are therefore of the view that the decision of the CIT(A) is correct. We uphold the same and dismiss the appeal.
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