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Showing 21 to 40 of 64 Records
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1960 (4) TMI 80 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is not disputed by learned counsel for the assessee that as regards the rent realised from outsiders the assessment should be made under section 9 of the Indian Income-tax Act. In our opinion, the principle laid down by this High Court in Jamshedpur Engineering and Machine Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1957 32 I.T.R. 41 governs the present case. Applying the principle laid down in the case we hold that in the facts and circumstances of the present case the rent realised by the assessee company from the buildings of which it is the owner and which have been let out to its employees is assessable under section 10 of the Indian Income-tax Act and not under section 9 of the Indian Income-tax Act. We accordingly allow the application and answer the question of law referred to the High Court in favour of the assessee and against the Income-tax Department. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (4) TMI 79 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the material provisions of the Madras Agricultural Income-tax Act, but we cannot ourselves modify assessments in accordance with such interpretation. Such revision can only be made by the Agricultural Income-tax Officer. This court cannot go into the details of each case to find out how far the income in respect of which tax has been levied includes income which arose prior to 1st April, 1954. The determination of such questions of fact must be left to the concerned officer. All that we can do is to allow Writ Appeals Nos. 121 and 122 of 1957 and to quash the orders passed by the Agricultural Income-tax Officer under section 35 of the Act and to direct that there may be a fresh assessment in accordance with this judgment. In the writ petitions there will be orders quashing the orders of the Agricultural Income-tax Officer passed under section 35 of the Act and directing a fresh assessment in the light of this judgment. There will be no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1960 (4) TMI 78 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... h 5 of the petition in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 121 of 1958. But it must be said that the question of the status of the assessee as that of a firm and not that of a Hindu undivided family is a question of fact; and the assessee failed to state before the Revenue Commissioner and in this petition also the material facts and circumstances on which he claims that the questions raised in paragraph 5 of the petition are questions of law. All that the assessee has done is to say in a general and vague manner that questions about deductions, notice and other matters are questions of law without showing as to how in the context of proved and accepted fact and circumstances they become questions of law. In the result, the question referred to in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 116 of 1958 is answered in the negative and Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 121 of 1958 is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. Question answered accordingly.
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1960 (4) TMI 77 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rovision of initial depreciation to be given to the assessee under section 10(2)(vi) is controlled by the language of section 10(3) of the Act which expressly restricts the allowance to the fair proportional part of the amount which would be allowable if the machinery was wholly used for the purposes of the business, in the case where the machinery is not wholly used for the purposes of the business but is used both for the purposes of the business and for private purposes. For these reasons, therefore, we hold that the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal in this case is erroneous in law and the assessee is entitled to a sum of ₹ 1,200 as initial depreciation for the assessment year 1952-53, and the view taken by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is correct. We accordingly allow the application and answer the question of law referred to the High Court in favour of the Income-tax Department and against the assessee. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference.
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1960 (4) TMI 76 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
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... ... ..... no circumstances a sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The learned Counsel for the assessee in course of his argument relied on the said Madras case, which, in my opinion, has also no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. There is no question of mistake in law in the present case. 7. The answer to the first question is accordingly in the affirmative, that is to say, that in the facts and circumstances of the case there was not sufficient cause for not presenting the appeals within the prescribed period; and the answer to the second question is in the negative, that is to say, that the delay in postal delivery cannot be considered as constituting sufficient cause for not presenting the appeals within the prescribed time. 8. The result, therefore, is that all the three references are rejected with costs. A consolidated hearing fee is assessed at ₹ 100/-. Narasimham, C.J. 9. I agree. J.K. Misra, J. 10. I agree.
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1960 (4) TMI 75 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... any order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax in pursuance of any order or direction of any higher authority. There is a notice of motion taken out by the Commissioner and in that notice of motion it is urged that the question should be reframed in the manner there suggested. The question as framed is as under "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the limitation provided in section 33B(2) is applicable to an orders passed subsequent to an order of the Tribunal setting aside the order of the Commissioner under section 33B of the Act?" The question is wide enough to include what is sought to be brought out by the suggested question. The conclusion we have reached is that the rule of limitation prescribed in section 33B(2) does not reach a cases of the nature before us and our answer to the question is in the negative. Assessee to pay the costs. There will be no order as to the costs of the notice of motion. Question answered in the negative.
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1960 (4) TMI 73 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d to take its stand on the sheer legal position and if the law is in favour of the Revenue, we on our part are bound to give effect to the same. The peculiar and extraordinary factual position here is that the bank has, in fact, made no profits but incurred heavy losses. In effect the assessee will have to pay tax on a part of the amount of the large embezzlements, which we are informed exceed ₹ 25 lakhs. If the assessee had been entitled to claim a deduction in respect of even a part of the amount that was embezzled, it would have been able to bring down the profits otherwise made in the year of account. We feel that we should be failing in our duty if we did not recommend to the Revenue that this is a case in which, having regard to the large number of persons, including small depositors and persons with savings accounts, who must have suffered in the wake of the failure of this bank, substantial relief should be given to the assessee. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (4) TMI 72 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... written down value in the hands of the predecessor was different from the market value on the date of inheritance, the lower of the two should prevail, was not applicable to assessments in 1951-52. The learned counsel for the assessee referred to the observations of Lord Atkin at pages 217-8 in Corporation of Birmingham v. Barnes 1933-35 19 Tax Cas. 195. But as the pointed out by page, C.J., in Commissioner of Income-tax v. E. Solomon and Sons 1933 1 I.T.R. 324, the wording in the English Finance Act differs materially, and the question at issue has to be determined really on the language of the Indian Income-tax Act. We answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. That in effect means the Tribunal will yet have to ascertain the quantum which, as the Tribunal itself has pointed out, there was on occasion to determine so far. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee Rs, 250. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1960 (4) TMI 71 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he same even on merits, assuming we could have done so. In the circumstances, the first question, which has been referred to us by the Tribunal must be answered in the affirmative. If the service of the notice and the letter was good and valid, the only ground which has been put forth on behalf of the assessee for his failure to remain present on 30th January, 1957, is that the manager, Parasare, being ill had not informed him of the said date. With regard to that the finding is that the manager, Parasare, was not ill but had attended the work on 29th January, when he had received the communication from the Income-tax Officer. The finding of the Tribunal, therefore, that there was no sufficient cause for failure to comply with the notice is perfectly justified. The answer to the second question, therefore, which has been referred to us on this reference, must also be in the affirmative. The assessee to pay the costs of the Commissioner. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1960 (4) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... urpose is the date of the original proceeding. which eventually culminated in the appeal." This decision was approved by this Court both in Hoosein Kasam Dada, 1953 S.C.R. 987 and Gankapatti Veerayya, 1957 S.C.R. 488. It is thus clear that in a long line of decisions approved by this Court and at least in one given by this Court, it has been held that an impairment of the right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not a matter of procedure only; it impairs or imperils a substantive right and an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was right in the view it took, and the orders of refund of excess court fees which it passed were correct in law. Accordingly, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. There will be one set of costs, as the appeals have been consolidated and heard together. Appeals dismissed.
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1960 (4) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... g stay as claimed by the appellant. Under these circumstances we do not think we would be justified in substituting our discretion for that of the courts below. It may be that if we were trying the appellant's application under s. 34 we might have come to a different conclusion; and also that we may have hesitated to confirm the order of the trial court if we had been dealing with the matter as a court of first appeal; but the matter has now come to us under Art. 136, and so we can justly interfere with the concurrent exercise of the discretion by the courts below only if we feel that the said exercise of discretion is patently and manifestly unreasonable, capricious or perverse and that it may defeat the ends of justice. Having regard to all the circumstances and facts of this case we are not disposed to hold that a case for our interference has been made out by the appellant. That is why we dismiss this appeal but make no order as to costs throughout. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (4) TMI 68 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ay perhaps apply to a like transaction can be this; If the amounts in dispute were commission, they would certainly be income of the constituent partners. It seems extremely difficult for us to view their payments received by the constituent partners as income earned by them. The correct position seems to us to be that the disputed amounts touch and directly touch the amount of charges payable for pressing cotton bales and cannot be regarded as anything apart from those pressing charges. They rate rebates in both the legal and commercial signification of that expressing and cannot be treated as "commission". For all these reasons we are of the opinion that the disputed amounts are not hit by the provisions of section 10(4)(b). Our answer to the first question will be in the affirmative. We have already answered the second question. The Commissioner to pay the costs of the assessee firm. There will be no order on the notice of motion. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (4) TMI 67 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , would be the income, which is taxable. This question was not raised before the Tribunal and is sought to be raised before us for the first time. We would not, therefore, allow this question to be argued for the first time before us. Moreover, even if it had been allowed to be raised, we would have answered it against Mr. Joshi. In the view which we have taken that the sale of the trees with the roots was a disposal of the capital asset it is impossible to split up the transaction into two parts and regard a part of it as capital sale and the rest as a sale producing income. As we have already pointed out if the entire land with trees had been sold it would have been impossible to hold that the sale in so far as it related to the trees was a sale producing income. In our opinion, therefore, the question which has been referred to us in this reference must be answered in the affirmative. The Commissioner to pay the costs of the assessee. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1960 (4) TMI 66 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Income-tax Act. When this case was first argued before us without a reference to the decision of the Bombay High Court, we came to the same view which has been expressed by the Bombay High Court in this case and for the indentical reasons given by the learned judges of that court. Subsequently when the decision of the Bombay High Court was cited before us, our view was strengthened by the view of the Bombay High Court. Since the reasons which led us to take the view have already been mentioned in detail in the judgment of the Bombay High Court we do not consider it necessary to express them again in this judgment and we think it is enough for us to say that, with respect, we agree with the reasons as well as the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case cited above. In view of that decision the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative. The assessee will be entitled to costs of this reference which we fix at ₹ 200. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1960 (4) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pensation, s. 31(2) does not apply. By s. 33(c), liability to pay compensation may be enforced by coercive process, but that again does not amount to infringement of Art. 20(1) of the Constitution. Undoubtedly for failure to discharge liability to pay compensation, a person may be imprisoned, under the statute providing for recovery of the amount, e.g., the Bombay Land Revenue Code, but failure to discharge a civil liability is not unless the statute expressly so provides, an offence. The protection of Art. 20(1) avails only against punishment for an act which is treated as an offence, which When done was not an offence. In our view, the impugned s. 25FFF(1) including the proviso and the explanation thereto are not unconstitutional as infringing the freedom guaranteed by Art. 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution or as infringing Arts. 14 or 20 of the Constitution. On that view, the petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. There will only be one hearing fee. Petitions dismissed.
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1960 (4) TMI 64 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... essee company. What we have got to see is whether a new contention which was not before the Tribunal is sought to be raised. It is not possible to say that such is the position in the case before us. We may also mention that all the relevant and necessary facts are to be found in the statement of the case. Therefore, the argument that a new contention is sought to be raised by the assessee company must be negatived. We have already set out the questions referred to this court by the Tribunal. Questions Nos. 1 and 2 will remain as they are. The third question requires to be reframed. We shall decide on so as under "Whether the sum of ₹ 57,785 could legally be included in the assessee company's total income for the assessment year ended 31st March, 1950?" Our answer to the question is in the negative. In view of our answer to question No. 3, it is not necessary to answer the first two questions. Commissioner to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (4) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the scheme violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because only fourteen out of a total of thirty one routes on which stage carriages were plied for public transport in the Anekal area were covered by the scheme and that even from among the operators on the fourteen routes notified, two operators were left out, thereby making a flagrant discrimination between the operators even on those fourteen routes?
Whether by Chapter IVA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, Parliament had merely attempted to regulate the procedure for entry by the States into the business of motor transport in the State, and in the absence of legislation expressly undertaken by the State of Mysore in that behalf, that State was incompetent to enter into the arena of motor transport business to the exclusion of private operators?
Whether the Chief Minister who heard the objections to the scheme was biased against the petitioners and that in any event, the objections raised by the operators were not considered judicially?
Whether the Chief Minister did not give " genuine consideration " to the objections raised by the operators to the scheme in the light of the conditions prescribed by the Legislature?
Held that:- It is not clear on the averments made in the petition that the route on which the stage carriages of the two named persons ply are identical; even if the routes on which the stage carriages of these two operators ply overlap the notified route, in the absence of any evidence to show that they had the right to pick up passengers en route, the discrimination alleged cannot be deemed to have been made out.
In any event, the expression " law " as, defined in Art. 13(3)(a) includes any ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification custom, etc., and the scheme framed under s. 68C may properly be regarded as " law " within the meaning of Art. 19(6) made by the State excluding private operators from notified routes or notified areas, and immune from the attack that it infringes the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(g).
The Chief Minister has given. detailed reasons for approving the scheme and has dealt with such of the objections as he says were urged before him. In the last para. of the reasones given, it is stated that the Government have heard all the arguments advanced on behalf of the operators and " after: giving full consideration-to them, the Government have come to the conclusion that the scheme is necessary in the interest of the public and is accordingly approved subject to the modifications that it shall come into force on May 1, 1959 ". In the absence of any evidence controverting these averments, the plea of bias must fail.
The argument that the Chief Minister did not give genuine consideration " to the objections raised by operators to the scheme in the light of the conditions prescribed has no force. The order of the Chief Minister discusses the questions of law as well as questions of fact. There is no specific reference in the order to certain objections which were raised in the reply filed by the objectors, but we are, on that account, unable to hold that the Chief Minister did not consider those objections. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (4) TMI 61 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erson entitled to with a view to persuade a person liable to follow a particular conduct which such person was not otherwise compelled. That being the gist of the definition, we think to withhold it where payment had already been made, and confer it where payment is to be made, would not be a proper interpretation of the section. On the other hand, following the particular conduct would be essential for getting the benefit, and in this context we do not think the provisions of section 11(2) would be attracted, so as to preclude a dealer from claiming the benefit. The learned Advocate has also relied on the definition of the word levy in Firm L. Hazari Mal v. Income-tax Officer, Ambala(1), but we do not think the definition of the word levy in that case can be of use in construing the word rebate in section 8. It follows therefore that this revision petition is dismissed with costs, and the order of the Tribunal is upheld. We fix the Counsel fee at Rs.150. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (4) TMI 60 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ioner and if the petitioner has not paid the tax on demand, I see no inhibition to the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act being put in motion. There is no force in the contention that there is no valid notice of demand. I am of opinion that this writ should also fail for another reason. Under section 59 of the Revenue Recovery Act, there is a specific effective alternative remedy by way of a suit. That section is in these terms Nothing contained in this Act shall be held to prevent parties deeming themselves aggrieved by any proceedings under this Act, except as hereinbefore provided, from applying to the Civil Courts for redress provided that Civil Courts shall not take cognizance of any suit instituted by such parties for any such cause of action, unless such suit shall be instituted within six months from the time at which the cause of action arose. In these circumstances, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (4) TMI 59 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... egularity. Under these circumstances it was open to the Sales Tax Officer to assess him to the best of his judgment. The question whether the omission to enter the payment of Rs. 10 as advance is a minor irregularity which might possibly have been condoned by the assessing authority is not a matter which we are called upon to decide. That is a matter which was entirely within the discretion of that authority. But if it was not prepared to condone the irregularity and chose to call upon the assessee to explain the same or to furnish better returns and if he expressed his inability to do so, its jurisdiction to assess him to the best of its judgment under section 12(3) comes into operation. We would accordingly answer question no. (1) in the negative and hold that the assessing officer was justified in making best of judgment assessment. The reference is accordingly disposed of with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 50 (rupees fifty only). DAS, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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