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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 56 Records
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1966 (4) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tion for that of the trial Judge; but if it appears to the, appellate court that in exercising its discretion the trial court has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant facts then it would certainly be open to the appellate court to interfere with the trial court’s exercise of discretion. This principle is well-established; but, as has been observed by Viscount Simon, L. C., in Charles Osenton and Co. v. Johnston(1) "The law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a Judge below in the exercise of his discretion is wellestablished, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well-settled principles in an individual case". For these reasons we hold that the appellant has made out no case for our interference with the order of the High Court refusing stay of the proceedings in the suit under S. 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (4) TMI 70 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ized or whether the State is deprived of its revenue which is ultimately found to be legitimate, in either event, it is better for both that such controversy is not kept pending for an unduly long time. It may in this connection be remembered that the first and paramount necessity for social order, personal liberty, private property and general national progress is the maintenance of efficient civil Government and Government cannot exist without revenue. The taxpayer too has to adjust his affairs and regulate his economy so as to arrange for his contribution towards the maintenance of civil Government. The speedy determination of such disputes is thus a matter of importance to the society as a whole. I have considered it necessary to elaborate this aspect because my experience shows that due attention has somehow not been paid to it. Cases of this nature deserve priority and it is hoped that this aspect would in future be kept in view. KHOSLA, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1966 (4) TMI 69 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bovementioned and is a bad piece of legislation. A writ of certiorari, therefore, must issue quashing the assessment order dated 10th August, 1959, made by the Sales Tax Officer and the consequent demand notice dated 14th August, 1959. With respect to the years 1955-56 and 1956-57 it is stated by the petitioner that the Sales Tax Officer is threatening to make assessments in accordance with rule 28. That rule having been declared ultra vires, the authorities cannot make the assessment on the basis of the said rule. A writ of prohibition may, therefore, issue to the respondents prohibiting them from making the assessment or calculating the sale price in accordance with rule 28. It will, however, be open to the respondents to make fresh and/or proper assessments in accordance with law. The relief to be allowed in other writ petitions, namely, Nos. 305-D, 436-D and 556-D of 1959 has been mentioned in the short judgments dealing with the said writ petitions. Ordered accordingly.
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1966 (4) TMI 68 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be taken as references to the provision so re-enacted. There is nothing in section 8 to indicate that the words former enactment mean only a Central enactment and not a State enactment, and the Courts would not be justified in reading in that section words which are not there and thereby to place a narrow and limited construction on the words former enactment . A Central enactment can repeal and re-enact the provisions of a previous Central enactment as well as those of a previous State enactment, and we find no valid reason to hold that the words former enactment have reference only to the former Central enactment and not to the former State enactment. We, therefore, affirm the finding of the learned Single Judge. The appeal, consequently, fails and is dismissed, but, in the circumstances, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. FALSHAW, C.J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (4) TMI 67 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ivered not in Bengal when they were delivered to the common carrier but in Bihar when they were delivered to the purchaser. Thirdly, the view taken in the above observations of Venkatarama Ayyar, J., has been followed by a number of High Courts, e.g., Capco v. Sales Tax Officer 1960 11 S.T.C. 34 A.I.R. 1960 All. 62., Birendra v. Commissioner of Taxes 1959 10 S.T.C. 327., Khaitan Minerals v. Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal 1962 13 S.T.C. 508 A.I.R. 1963 Mys. 141., and it is somewhat late in the day to assert the contrary. I find just now that this view of mine stands supported by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Shree Bajrang Jute Mills v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1964 15 S.T.C. 430 1964 6 S.C.R. 691, 698. We are clearly of the opinion that the sale under the present item took place within West Bengal and that question (e) must be answered in the affirmative, and against the assessee. There would be no order as to costs. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1966 (4) TMI 66 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... urt already referred to before. Apart from the matter being concluded by the decision of their Lordships, the language of section 18 as introduced by the amending Act is in such terms that it is not possible to read any retrospectivity in it. The use of the present tense in the opening part of subsection (1) shows that the intention was to enact the provision prospectively and not retrospectively. Mr. Anand Mohan Suri has sought to argue that the liability of a dealer under the Act arises the moment he files a return and that the return was filed in the present case before the firm was dissolved. That, however, will not make any difference in view of the clear pronouncement of their Lordships in the matter. In the result, this petition is allowed and the order of the Assessing Authority in the matter of assessment of the dissolved firm for the period in question is hereby quashed. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. MAHAJAN, J.-I agree. Petition allowed.
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1966 (4) TMI 65 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Schedule II of that Act read with entry No. 2 of Schedule III of the same Act. The second question is answered by saying that for the period governed by the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, bone-meal and crushed bone are exempt from payment of sales tax under entry No. 25 of Schedule II of the Act of 1947. Our answer to the third question is that it is wholly irrelevant for the purpose of assessment of sales tax to make an analysis of the crushed bone or bone-meal manufactured by the assessee in order to find out whether it satisfies the standards prescribed in the Schedule appended to the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1957. It is unnecessary to add that the Tribunal must now dispose of the appeal preferred by the assessee in the light of the answers given by us in this reference. 7.. In this reference as both the Commissioner of Sales Tax and the assessee have succeeded partly, we leave the parties to bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1966 (4) TMI 64 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... quite clear and unambiguous because tax can only be imposed by authority of law and such law must accordingly be reasonably clear in its mandate. At the same time, when an assessee, chooses to bring his case within an exemption from the imposition, it is for him to bring his case quite clearly within the language of the exemption. Broadly speaking, grants of tax exemption also attract a construction which is inspired by the rule that the burdens of taxation should be distributed equally and fairly among the members of society. From whichever point of view the matter is considered, it appears that the word vegetable is intended to qualify the word plants as well. For the foregoing reasons, our answer to the question referred is in favour of the revenue, namely, that flower plants are not exempted under item No. 7, Schedule II, to the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941. There would be no order as to costs of this reference. KHOSLA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1966 (4) TMI 63 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1957. 5.. For these reasons, our answer to the first question is that bone-meal or crushed bone is taxable under entry No. 11 of Part III of Schedule II of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958, read with entry No. 2 of Schedule III of that Act and that the exemption granted by entry No. 22 of Schedule I of that Act does not apply to bonemeal or crushed bone. Our answer to the second question is that it is wholly irrelevant for the purpose of assessment of sales tax to make an analysis of the crushed bone or bone-meal manufactured by the assessee in order to find out whether it satisfies the standards prescribed in the Schedule appended to the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1957. It is unnecessary to add that the Tribunal must now dispose of the appeal preferred by the assessee in the light of the answers given by us in this reference. The assessee shall pay cost of this reference. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1966 (4) TMI 62 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the same person cannot sell goods to himself. That is true enough. But here, the same person held two different capacities, one as an agent of a non-resident principal and the other as proprietor of his own business, two different entities altogether. When he transferred the goods to himself, he not only acted in that transaction as the agent of his non-resident principal, but also as a purchaser. There is nothing wrong in this dual capacity coming into play in this transaction which, as we think, is clearly within the definition of a sale in the Act. There is no reason to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. The Tax Revision case is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1966 (4) TMI 61 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e Act, but that hardly provides any justification for holding that he is a person appointed under section 3. Rule 65(2) reads (2) Where the Chief Commissioner or any person appointed under section 3 proposes to revise or review any order of his own motion, he shall give the dealer as well as the Assessing Authority an opportunity of being heard. Far from supporting Mr. Shankar it seems to support the petitioners. If the Chief Commissioner was an authority appointed under section 3 then there was no necessity to make a mention of the Chief Commissioner. In the result, I must hold that the Chief Commissioner has no power to review and, therefore, the notice given by him on 3rd October, 1958, is invalid and deserves to be quashed. It is, in the circumstances, not necessary to decide the other two contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners. In the result, these petitions are allowed and notice dated 3rd October, 1958, is quashed with no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1966 (4) TMI 60 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pugned before me. Shri S.N. Shankar, the learned counsel for the respondents, urged that it is quite possible that the declarations of Messrs. L.C. Trading Company may not be valid, that it may be found that in fact no sales at all were effected by the petitioners to Messrs. L.C. Trading Company and that false and spurious declarations were obtained only for the purpose of evading the tax. Mr. Shankar had to concede that no such finding has been given in the impugned order. That being so, I cannot dismiss the writ petition on what might possibly be found in appropriate proceedings. All that I need say is that this order will not stand in the way of the Assessing Authorities going into those allegations in appropriate proceedings in accordance with law if it becomes necessary to do so. In the above circumstances this writ petition is allowed with costs and the order disallowing the deduction for sales in favour of Messrs. L.C. Trading Company is struck down. Petition allowed.
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1966 (4) TMI 59 - SUPREME COURT
When a purchasing dealer in one State furnishes in Form 'C' prescribed under the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957, to the selling dealer in another State a declaration, certifying that the goods ordered, purchased or supplied are covered by the certificate of registration obtained by the purchasing dealer in Form 'B' prescribed under rule 5(1) of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957 is it open to the Sales Tax Authority under the Central Sales Tax Act to deny to the selling dealer the benefit of concessional rates under section 8(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Observation of the High Court that the selling dealer may not enquire whether the requirement is not within the certificate of registration of the purchasing dealer is not accurate. But whether the goods specified in the registration certificate in Form 'B' can be used for the purpose is not for the selling dealer to determine. That is a matter which has already been determined by the notified authority issuing the certificate of registration.
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1966 (4) TMI 51 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Managing director - Approval of Government for appointment, Penalty where no specific penalty is provided elsewhere in the act
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1966 (4) TMI 42 - IN THE CHANCERY DIVISION
Disqualification of directors, Winding up – Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... ion. Secondly, I should like to say this. The present position is that the trustee in bankruptcy has all the rights of a minority shareholder. It is the duty of Breden and Menear to respect those rights. If, in the circumstances of this case, they fail to do so, then I think the court will listen very readily to any further petition which the trustee in bankruptcy might bring based on oppression. However, I say no more about that now. Skone James, for the respondents, applied for costs. Pennycuick J. I cannot make an order against the trustee in bankruptcy personally. He is not before the court at all, although it is his petition as trustee. I do not think I can make any order for the costs to be paid out of the bankrupt s estate. I do not see, however, why I should not make an order against the bankrupt. He has brought a petition which has failed. I will therefore make an order for the payment of costs against him whether or not it will be of the slightest use I do not know.
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1966 (4) TMI 41 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Shares warrants and entries in register of members ... ... ... ... ..... the shares of different companies had vested in the Corporation by virtue of section 7 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, none of the other companies adopted the attitude in the matter of transfer of shares in the name of the Corporation as has been done by respondent No. I company. On the contrary, it appears that they agreed to the transfer of shares in the name of the Corporation on the latter signing a letter of request to become a member of the company concerned, and this position was brought to the notice of respondent No. 1 company. In our view, after the dismissal of its suit in the Calcutta High Court for want of prosecution, respondent No. 1 company should not have created any difficulty in the way of entering the name of the Corporation on its register of members and that it unnecessarily delayed the matter. In these circumstances, we direct respondent No. 1 company to pay to the petitioner costs quantified at Rs. 250. It will bear and pay its own costs.
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1966 (4) TMI 40 - IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
Requirements with respect to memorandum ... ... ... ... ..... subscribers risk, but the wider such objects the greater is the security of those who transact business with the company. What Lord Parker was contemplating was that third parties proposing to deal with the company could by looking at the memorandum have the security of knowing whether they could compel performance by the company of the contract in contemplation. I hardly think that he had in mind that third parties by looking at the memorandum should have the security of knowing that they might safely enter into a contract and promise to pay the company for services without any obligation to honour their contractual promise after they had received the services. The judge in effect came to the conclusion that the reasoning in Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. Ltd. v. Riche LR 7 HL 653, led to this strange result. I express no opinion on this point and leave it to be decided when it arises, for we have heard no argument upon it. I agree that this appeal should be allowed.
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1966 (4) TMI 19 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the reassessment proceedings under section 17(b) of the Wealth-tax Act were not validly initiated and in setting aside the same ?
Held that:- In the present case the Wealth-tax Officer issued notices before that decision was known to him and the question is whether, in the circumstances, in view of the later decisions of the High Courts to which we have referred, a question of law arose or not. The language of section 17(b) of the Act is pari materia with the language of section 34(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act and therefore the decisions under section 34(1)(b), ibid., would be relevant in construing the scope and effect of section 17(b) of the Act. There does appear to be divergence of opinion among the High Courts as to the meaning of the word " information " in section 34(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, and in view of that divergence we are of opinion that a question of law did arise in the present case as to the interpretation of the word " information " in section 17(b) of the Act and should have been referred by the Tribunal.
We therefore allow the appeals, set aside the order of the High Court and direct the Tribunal to state a case referring the question of law arising in these cases in the form suggested by the appellant. The Tribunal will be free to decide whether to refer the matter to the High Court under section 27(1) or to this court under section 27(3A) of the Act
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1966 (4) TMI 18 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the dividend income of ₹ 11,09,332 received from the Binod Mills was chargeable under the War Profits Tax Ordinance ?
Held that:- There is no doubt that Ordinance 2002 did purport to add this Explanation to rule 3(2) but it seems to us that if we look at the language of the Explanation it was meant to be an Explanation not only to rule 3(2) but to rule 3(1) also. First, the words " the income from investments to be included in the profits of the business under the provisions of this rule " are comprehensive and include income from investments both under rule 3(1) and rule 3(2). Secondly, there is no reason why any distinction should have been made between investments mentioned in rule 3(1) and investments mentioned in rule 3(2). Rule 3(1) is general and deals with all investments from profits of all businesses and would include investments mentioned in rule 3(2). Rule 3(2) deals with investments of a certain business, i.e., business which consists wholly or mainly in the dealing in or holding of investments. We have not been able to appreciate why, if Mr. Shroff is right, it was necessary to distinguish between income from investments mentioned in rule 3(1) and income from investments mentioned in rule 3(2). At any rate, the language of the Explanation is quite clear and it seems to us that by the words " in rule 3(2) of the First Schedule to the Ordinance, the following shall be added " what was really meant was to add the Explanation below rule 3(2). Appeal dismissed
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1966 (4) TMI 17 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Recovery of duty from Agent - Limitation - Agent's liability ... ... ... ... ..... esult, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the respondent was not entitled to adjust the amount had to be accepted. 8.Learned counsel for the respondent, however, contended that an alternative remedy is available to the petitioners and as the petitioners have not availed of it, the writ petition should be dismissed. It is no doubt true that normally the petitioners should exhaust all remedies before approaching this court, but that does not preclude this Court from issuing the writ in appropriate cases. The adjustment of the amount in this case is clearly unjustified and illegal and this is a fit case in which, though alternative remedy has not been availed of, a writ could issue. As the amount had already been adjusted, Writ petition No. 621 of 1965 has become infructuous, and it is dismissed. But the order of the Collector of Customs, adjusting the amount of Rs. 3,910.50 is set aside and Writ Petition No. 513 of 1966 is allowed with costs Rs. 100.
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