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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 229 Records
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1990 (4) TMI 289 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rson leases a building together with land, it seems impermissible in the absence of clear intention spelt out in the deed, to dissect the lease as (a) of building and appurtenant land covered by the Rent Control Act and (b) of land alone governed by other relevant statutory provisions. What the parties have joined, one would think, the court cannot tear as under. In fact, we may point out that a wider meaning for this word was convassed in Irani v. Chidambaram Chettiar, AIR 1953 Madras 650 which the court had no necessity to go into in the view taken by it on the interpretation of the lease deed. In this case also no contention has been raised in regard to this aspect and so we shall also leave open the precise connotation of the word except to say that it may warrant a wide meaning in the context. For the reasons discussed above, we see no grounds to interfere with the judgments of the courts below. The appeal is dismissed but we make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1990 (4) TMI 288 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hares, then for the purpose of section 73 such a company shall be deemed to be carrying on a speculation business to the extent the business consisted of purchase and sale of such shares. It is not the requirement of the section that both purchase and sale of shares should take place in the same year. But what the section requires is that there will be business of sale and purchase of shares and the assessee-company will carry on that business in the relevant year of account. The very fact that shares were valued as stock-in-trade and the loss was disclosed, as a result of the valuation of the shares, goes to show that the business of share purchase and sale of shares was carried on by the company. To the extent such business was carried on, the business of the assessee-company must be treated as speculation business. 7. In that view of the matter, the question is answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. Banerjee, J.-I agree.
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1990 (4) TMI 287 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ese steps. When such are the different steps in the process of selection, the minimum or maximum age for suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date. If the final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons, the candidates who are eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific, and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for recruiting agency to scrutinise applications. It would be, therefore, unreasonable to con- strue the word selection only as the factum of preparation of the select list. Nothing so bad would have been intended by the Rule making authority. The appeal therefore, is allowed setting aside the order of the Tribunal. In the circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1990 (4) TMI 286 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... as pending till 198G and there is an allegation that the respondent had been making representation to the Government in this regard and in fact one such representation was accepted and it is on that basis in spite of the fact that the facts and situations remained the same in the 1982 the respondent was selected for selection grade with effect from 4.3.1982. In those circumstances the Tribunal said that they were not willing to dismiss the application on ground of the laches and it has to be decided on merits. In these circumstances we are also unable to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant did not question the direction given by the Tribunal relating to consideration by the Special Screening Committee in respect of promotion to the post of Super Time Scale, in the rank of D.I.G. No other point also arises in this appeal. Accordingly, both the appeals are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs in both the appeals.
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1990 (4) TMI 285 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was passed on 13-7-89, but the same was served on 24-7-89. According to the learned Counsel, there is a violation of Section 3(3) of the Act. The said provision lays down that for the purpose of Article 25(2) of the Constitution, the order should be served as soon as possible but ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days from the date of detention. Learned Counsel for the State submitted that firstly the point of delay was not taken up in the special leave petition, therefore, he had no opportunity to counter the same. However, from the record he submitted that it took quite sometime for translating the documents to Hindi and Gurumukhi. We have seen the documents filed before us and we are satisfied that there are valid and sufficient reasons for delay in serving the detention order. 15. Thus, we find no merit in any one of the submissions. The petition is, therefore, dismissed.
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1990 (4) TMI 284 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... m an opportunity to put forward their grievances before the court by dismissing these writ petitions on the preliminary objections raised by the Bank. In fact, we should like to place on record our appreciation of the stand taken by Sri G. Ramaswamy, learned counsel for the Bank in this respect. He fairly stated that, as he is appearing for a public sector undertaking, he is quite prepared to contest the writ petitions on their merits and that his preliminary objections were primarily intended to bring to our notice the conduct of the petitioners in this case. We are glad he did it as this was a matter which needed serious notice. We should like to record our dis-approval of the way in which the proceedings have been conducted on behalf of the Federation. However, as mentioned above, we overrule the preliminary objections and will proceed to dispose of the writ petitions on their merits. The Writ Petitions are adjourned, as per separate order, to 17.7.90 for further hearing.
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1990 (4) TMI 283 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nuary 1987. The decision of the Tribunal was of 31st August, 1987 and thereafter the present Civil Appeal was pending in this Court from December 1987 till this day. Considering the fact that she is compelled to serve, that she has acquired the requisite qualification, that today she may be overaged for the post and the further fact that many who were underqualified were appointed to the post earlier, we feel that it will be unjust to deprive her of the post at this stage. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the Tribunal but allow the appeal partially and direct that the respondent should be appointed in the post from the beginning of the ensuing academic year 1990- 91. Since Shri Madhav Reddy contended that there is no vacant post at present, we further direct that, if necessary, a post be created to accommodate her. She will, however, not be entitled to any benefits including back wages till her appointment. The parties will bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.
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1990 (4) TMI 281 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... b-section (2). The legislature has thus excluded from vesting under Section 3 sub-section (2) the trees of every variety. But while providing for exclusion under sub-clause (C), the legislature could not have again thought of trees or plants of all kinds. It seems to have considered only fruit-bearing trees and not of other species. If the intention was otherwise, the sub-clause(C) would have been in a different language. In our view as a matter of pure construction untrammelled by authority, the words used in the latter part of sub-clause (C) could not take within its fold all varieties of trees and it could exclude only fruit-bearing trees. This is also the conclusion of the High Court not only in the impugned judgment under appeal but also in the subsequent two decisions; Malayalam Plantation Limited and K.C. Maosa Haji cases (supra). In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1990 (4) TMI 280 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there is a prima facie case on which Antox could be held entitled to restrain Wander Ltd. and Alfred Berg from manufacturing and marketing goods under the Trade name Cal-De-Ce?
Whether on considerations of balance of convenience and comparative hardship a temporary injunction should issue?
Held that:- The Drug Controller's licence claimed by Antox as the source of its right to the user of the trade-mark, itself expressly stipulates that the goods to be manufactured pursuant to the said licence shall be goods under the registered Trade-mark, of Wander Ltd. The effect of this on the quality of the user has not been examined by the Appellate-Bench.
Even if a prior registration of a Trade mark is not necessarily evidence of prior user as contended by Sri Raa, Antox cannot, prima facie, explain how in a passing-off action its user subsequent to June 1986 would prevail over the prima facie finding that Wander Ltd. was manufacturing Calcium Gluconate Tablets under the trade-mark Cal-De-Ce at its own factory in Bombay from August 1983 to June 1986. The Appellate Bench does not dislodge this finding nor does it recognise the crucial effect of prior use by the defendant on the plaintiff's case in a passing-off action. It appears to us that it was not an appropriate case where the appellate Bench could have interfered with the discretion exercised by the learned Single, Judge. Allow these appeals
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1990 (4) TMI 279 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the dealer appeared before the assessing officer on January 9, 1981 with the relevant books of accounts and, in fact, produced the statement of sales effected including the C forms which are there on record. In this view of the matter, even though no return has been filed on behalf of the department, but a scrutiny of the records establishes the fact that there was service of notice on the dealer and consequently, the order passed by the assessing officer cannot be said to be invalid for non-service of notice. 7. In the premises, as aforesaid, notwithstanding our conclusions on the questions of law in point Nos. 1 and 2, but in view of our conclusion that there has been valid service of notice on the dealer, the proceedings cannot be said to be one without jurisdiction and accordingly there is no merit in these writ applications which are accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. J.M. MAHAPATRA, J.-I agree. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1990 (4) TMI 278 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... ces clearly indicate that this is not a case of user of a trade mark or brand name to which a particular industrial concern has exclusive proprietary right. In this view of the matter, we hold that the applicants have not violated the stipulation laid down in Explanation (vi) of rule 3(66)(i). This ground, therefore, cannot be considered as valid. 20.. In view of the reasons given above, we hold that the applicants are entitled to the eligibility certificate for the period ending March 31, 1989. The orders of the Assistant Commissioner and the Additional Commissioner are quashed with the direction on them to issue eligibility certificate to the applicants as prayed for. The application for declaration forms shall also be disposed of on the basis of this order and in accordance with law. 21.. In the result, the applications are allowed on contest. There will be no order for costs. B.C. CHAKRABARTI (Chairman).-I agree. L.N. RAY (Judicial Member).-I agree. Applications allowed.
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1990 (4) TMI 277 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s done by the Amending and Validating Act. We find that there is enough basis and reason and on no count the said provision can be said to be either arbitrary or unreasonable. 43.. After having held that the provision cannot be held to be invalid on the basis of the provisions of article 14 of the Constitution of India, we do not think it to be permissible to still restrain the State Government from collecting the sales tax on the ground that it may result in financial hardship for the petitioners. Apart from the fact that we are not in a position to come to a positive finding on that aspect, we also find that that is a matter of legislative policy and it may not be proper for this Court to interfere in the same. 44.. In the result, we do not find any merit in these petitions and the petitions are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the rule in all the petitions is discharged. The petitioners shall pay the costs of the petitions to the respondents. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1990 (4) TMI 276 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... by which the Steel Authority of India returned the declaration forms. It is dated May 4, 1987. It was received by the applicant on May 9, 1987. The writ application was filed in December, 1988, that is to say, nearly eighteen months after the cause of action arose. This delay remains unexplained. The powers under article 226 of the Constitution are discretionary in nature. It is not meant for those who sleep and slumber. The oft-quoted maxim is that equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent. Since the applicant filed the application nearly eighteen months after accrual of cause of action and since no effort was made to explain this delay, we find that this application on this ground alone ought to be rejected. This apart, we have already indicated that the assessment having already been completed, the prayers in the original application have become infructuous. The case accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Applications dismissed.
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1990 (4) TMI 275 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... itasanjibani being an ayurvedic medicine, even though it contains more than 12 per cent alcohol, so long it continues to be identified as ayurvedic medicines, it cannot be treated differently than other ayurvedic medicines for the purpose of levy of sales tax. There is no justification for the discrimination and, in our opinion, mritasanjibani should be treated for the purpose of levying sales tax in like manner as other ayurvedic medicines which as stated above are exempt from sales tax in Assam. We, therefore, hold that item 67 of the Schedule to the Assam Finance (Sales Tax) Act is violative of article 14 of the Constitution. In the result the writ petitions are allowed. The impugned orders including the orders of assessment are set aside. The assessing authority is directed to reassess the turnover of the petitioner treating mritasanjibani as all other ayurvedic medicines which are exempt from sales tax under the Act. We make no order as to costs. Writ petitions allowed.
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1990 (4) TMI 274 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... , in the facts and circumstances of the given cases. (i) Declared goods under section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, if used in the execution of a works contract, can be taxed only in accordance with section 15(a) of the said Act and not otherwise. 33.. We may not have at all discussed some allegations made or some points raised in the applications under consideration. We have done so, because those were not argued at all and were for all practical purposes abandoned by the applicants. Accordingly, all the applications are disposed of in terms of this judgment. All interim orders are vacated. If completed assessment for any period is required to be revised in view of the decision herein given, the appropriate authority shall do so within six months from this date. No order is made as to costs. This judgment will govern RN-30(T), 31(T), 34M, 103(T), 367(T), 138(T), 338 and 339-all of 1989. B.C. CHAKRABARTI (Chairman).-I agree. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree.
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1990 (4) TMI 273 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... intention of the Legislature to deprive such contractor of a right of appeal on grounds other than those which have been mentioned above. Such a construction will amount to collection or levy of tax without any authority of law contrary to the provisions of article 265 of the Constitution of India. In view of the foregoing discussion, the order dated December 26, 1989 (annexure P-1) passed in appeal by the Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner (A), Ambala, is quashed with a direction to the appellate authority to decide the petitioner s appeal on merit. The bank guarantee furnished by the petitioner in view of interim order of this Court dated February 2, 1990, be released to the petitioner forthwith. The petitioner is directed to appear before the appellate authority on July 23, 1990. A copy of this order be sent to the Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner (A), Ambala, for compliance. This writ petition stands allowed in the terms indicated above. Writ petition allowed.
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1990 (4) TMI 272 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... the purpose of the notification. This was too far-fetched an interpretation and can hardly be accepted. Sales tax and purchase tax stand on different footings depending on the taxing event. If we go by the notification, as it is, there is no question of exemption from the payment of purchase tax. Further, in the view we have taken, we find that a newly set up small-scale industrial unit is not entitled to exemption from turnover tax on the strength of the notification issued under section 4AA of the 1954 Act. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view expressed by the learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in the case referred to earlier and we find that the liability for payment of turnover tax and purchase tax subsists in spite of the notification issued under section 4AA. The case accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed. There will be no order for costs. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. L.N. RAY (Judicial Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1990 (4) TMI 271 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nts, it was not disputed before us that on the findings recorded by the Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, the case of the petitioner is squarely covered by the said circular. In this view of the matter, we find no justification on the part of the respondents either to seize the goods or in requiring the petitioner to deposit security. The goods were liable to be released in favour of the petitioner after taking the samples as provided in the circular mentioned above. Accordingly, we direct that respondent No. 2 shall release the goods seized by his order dated 9th February, 1990, in favour of the petitioner forthwith without demanding any security for the same and after taking samples of the seized goods, as provided in the circular, dated 13th April, 1989. Subject to the above, the writ petition is finally disposed of. A certified copy of this order be given to learned counsel for the petitioner within forty-eight hours on payment of the usual charges. Ordered accordingly.
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1990 (4) TMI 270 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he transport organisations that the goods have been delivered to them at their destination by endorsing the way-bills constituting second interState sale under section 3(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act. We also find that all the sales are covered by proper and valid C declaration forms issued by the buyers and EI certificates issued by the sellers in outside the State and thereby falling under section 6(2)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, enabling the appellants for total exemption under the Central Sales Tax Act , and consequently allowed the appeal. 4.. As against the above clear finding of the Tribunal supported by materials, nothing contrary has been produced before us by the learned Government Advocate to persuade us to take a different view. On the facts, as found by the Tribunal, the conclusion reached by the Tribunal is unexceptionable. In the circumstances, the fax case fails and the same is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (4) TMI 269 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rdance with law. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary for, us to consider the other contention urged by the learned Advocate-General for Goa, that prior to May 30, 1987, Government of India was the Government of Union Territory and therefore the sale of electricity to such Union Territory is exempt by virtue of section 3 of the A.P. Electricity Duty Act, 1939, read with article 287 of the Constitution. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. The learned Advocate-General makes an oral request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under article 132 of the Constitution of India. In our opinion, this is a case involving substantial question of law as to the interpretation of Constitution and therefore, we direct that a certificate shall issue under article 132 of the Constitution. So far as the refund of the amount consequent upon this judgment is concerned, the refund is stayed for a period of two months. Writ petition allowed.
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