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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 370 Records
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1991 (4) TMI 448 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f the rule exemption is available for vehicle kept upto 30 days in a year. In that view of the matter tourist vehicles registered outside the State of Punjab and Haryana when brought into these two States for regular use and not by way of transit and when used for more than 30 days in a year would attract taxability otherwise the exemption provision in rule 8(v) would be available . We have settled the legal position and we leave it to the individual taxing authorities as also the operators of tourist vehilces to work out their respective rights. We would , therefore , like to clarify that the first aspect being a challenge against the taxing provision whether by way of tax or additional tax is rejected and the question of exigibility of tax in the States of Punjab and Haryana with reference to rule 8(v) of the Punjab Motor Vehicles Taxation rules, 1925 is left to be determined in individual cases as and when raised. There would be no order as to costs. Petitions deposed of.
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1991 (4) TMI 447 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e Gram Panchayat Act the statutory interposition of vesting the tank and the appurtenant land in the Gram Panchayat made it to retain possession, control and supervision over it, though the Gram Panchayat unlawfully took possession. The need to grant decree for possession in favour of the Gram Panchayat is thus redundant. The suit of the descendants normally to be decreed on the finding that ryotwari patta under Section 3 of the Inams Act was granted in their favour and that they were unlawfully dispossessed. Since the grant of ryotwari patta, though in the name of individuals, was to maintain the public tank which stood vested under Section 85 of the Act in the Gram Panchayat, the descendants are divested of the right and interest acquired therein. Thus the suit of the descendants also is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the decrees of dismissal of both the suits are upheld and the appeal dismissed. But in the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1991 (4) TMI 446 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rnment is alone empowered to grant exemption and the power to cancel the same also vest in the State Government and the Commissioner of Sales Tax or the Sales Tax Officer has no power to sit in judgment over grant of exemption. The said decision has also been followed in the case of M/s. Maxims Delicacies (Private) Ltd. v. State of U. P. and others, 1988 U. P. Tax Cases 100. On the facts of this case, which are not in dispute it is clear that the eligibility certificate granted to the petitioner is still existing and there is no valid order cancelling the said grant of exemption. In view of this and having heard learned counsel for the parties we held that the assessing authority i. e. the Sales Tax Officer/Assistant Commissioner (Assessment), respondent No. 3, is not entitled to sit in judgment over grant of Eligibility Certificate in favour of the petitioner granted on 18-2-1985. 4. With these declarations of law, the present writ petition is finally disposed of summarily.
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1991 (4) TMI 445 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... no valid initiation of the proceedings under s. 17 of the Act. The CWT(A) has held that it is clear from the records that WTO has evaluated the law and came to the conclusion, that s. 21A is applicable and based upon that issued notices to the assessee. He was also of the view that the officer informed himself on the basis of the balance sheet for the year ended 31st March, 1972 that certain exemptions are not available to the trust. It must, therefore, be held that the WTO has validly initiated the proceedings and the orders under s. 16(3) of the WT Act were passed in accordance with law. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the view that the Tribunal fell in error in holding that the initiation of the proceedings under s. 17 of the Act for the years in question was invalid. 7. We, therefore, answer this question in this reference in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN, J. I agree.
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1991 (4) TMI 444 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ils in this connection available from the large number of documents which we closely examined during the hearing at considerable length and do not have any hesitation in rejecting the argument of the learned counsel in this regard based on the factual aspect. 11. So far the decision to adopt a different policy with respect to filling up of the reserved vacancies is concerned the same is justified on account of the special circumstances mentioned in the respondent's affidavits. The decision to depart from the confirmed policy was taken after a consideration by the authorities of the position in regard to unavailability of qualified candidates from year to year adversely affecting the desired strength of the reserved candidates in the services and cannot be condemned on the grounds of arbitrariness and illegal discrimination. 12. In the result, we do not find any merit in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed, but, in the circumstances, without costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (4) TMI 443 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e De Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Fourth Edition, p. 309). The impugned directive of the Ministry of Finance, is therefore, wholly without jurisdiction, and plainly contrary to the statutory Regulations governing disciplinary matters. For the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal and the writ petition quashing the directive issued by the Finance Ministry, Department of Economic Affairs, (Banking Division) dated 21 July 1984. We also issue a direction to the Chairman of the Syndicate Bank to withdraw the circular letters dated 27 July 1984 and 8 September 1986. We further set aside the impugned orders of the disciplinary authority and appellate authority with a direction to the former to dispose of the petitioner's case in accordance with law and in the light of the observation made. The petitioner is entitled to costs which we quantify in both the cases at ₹ 15,000 which shall be paid by the Central Government. Appeal and petition allowed.
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1991 (4) TMI 442 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o been in force till date from 15th June 1988. Further in our considered opinion, such a harsh direction is not commensurate to the alleged conduct of the second appellant for the simple reason that he had usually served faulty notices under Section 59 of the Bombay Police Act. However, as we have pointed out earlier the petitioner is now repenting for his previous acts, and has given an undertaking that he will ensure that such mistakes do not occur in future, in addition to tendering his unconditional apology, we feel that the remarks made by the High Court which we have extracted above can be expunged. Accordingly we allow the appeal and direct that the abovesaid observations directing the State Government "that power to pass orders under the Bombay Police Act should be withdrawn" and that the order should be communicated to the second appellant wherever he is posted do stand expunged from the order of the learned Judges dated 15-7-1988. 5. The appeal is allowed
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1991 (4) TMI 441 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ation at the rate of ₹ 325/- per month for the period commencing from January 1, 1991 within February 15, 1991 and will go on depositing the same thereafter every month within 15th of each succeeding month. In furtherance to the said order, it is directed that apart from the sum of ₹ 30,000/- which is required to be paid in accordance with the said directions of this Court the balance amount payable by respondents Nos. 5 and 6 towards compensation for the period October 12, 1971 to October 31, 1990 shall be paid in instalments of ₹ 10,000/- each at the interval of two months after the third instalment for the sum of ₹ 30,000/- has been paid. As regards compensation for the period subsequent to October 31, 1990, respondents Nos. 5 and 6 shall pay the same to the appellants as per the directions contained in the order passed by this Court on January 15, 1991. 21. The appeals are disposed of subject to the aforesaid directions with no orders as to costs.
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1991 (4) TMI 440 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... remises has, therefore, to be sustained. See, Keharsingh v. Yashpal, AIR 1990 SC 2212 15. It has already been held that subsequent event touching the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act cannot now be noticed. Hence the application under Order 26, Rule 9 or Order 6, Rule 17, Civil Procedure Code filed on 5-4-1991 by the appellant cannot be entertained. The complaint that the possession in the year 1977 was taken by the decree-holder/respondent illegally or irregularly cannot also be entertained as being one highly belated. Moreover, that is a ground which could have been entertained by the Executing Court under Section 47, Civil Procedure Code and is not one noticeable appropriately in second appeal directed against the decree. The applications are rejected. 16. For the foregoing reasons, no fault can be found with the impugned decree. The appeal is held to be without any merit and is dismissed accordingly. No order as to costs. Counsel fee as per Schedule, if certified.
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1991 (4) TMI 439 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t is always open to the competent authority to place the reasons before the Court which may have led to the rejection of the representation. it is always open to an administrative authority to produce evidence alinude before the court to justify its action. The President was under no legal obligation to record reasons in rejecting the respondent's representation against the adverse remarks. Consequently, the order of the president was not vitiated in law. The Central Administrative Tribunal committed error in quashing the order of the president as well as the order of the Ministry of Commerce dated 6.1.1986. Assuming that there was some defect in the order rejecting the respondent's representation, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the adverse entries awarded to the respondent should be treated as having been expunged. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Tribunal dated 27.7.1987. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1991 (4) TMI 438 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... vice in terms of Rule 3(2) read with appendix A' and allot the posts in each year of allotment as contemplated under rule 12 read with Rule 5(2)(a) and issue orders appointing substantively to the respective posts within the quota and determine the inter se seniority between the appellants promotees and R.R. Sheoran, direct recruits in the respective quota cadre posts of Executive Engineers etc. within four months from the date of receipt of this judgment. The inter se seniority of promotees and direct recruits shall be determined accordingly. All the impugned promotions or those pending proceedings in the High Court or in this Court shall be subject to the above determination and the status quo would continue till the appointments according to the rules are made and seniority is determined in the light of the law declared in this judgment. The appeals is disposed of accordingly. In the circumstances parties are directed to bear their respective costs. Appeal disposed of
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1991 (4) TMI 437 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... price or ritual. The discretion should be exercised reasonably and rationally. It should be exercised faithfully and impartially. There should be proper value judgment with fairness and equity. Those drivers would have served the Corporation till their superannuation but for their unfortunate medical unfitness to carry on the driver’s job. Therefore, it would not be improper if the discretion is exercised with greater concern for and sympathetic outlook to the disabled drivers subject of course to the paramount consideration of good and efficient administration. These are some of the relevant factors to be borne in mind in exercising the discretion vested in the Corporation under Regulation 17(3). In the result we allow these appeals. In reversal of the judgment of the High Court, we direct the Corporation to consider the cases of respondents in the light of the observations made. In the circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1991 (4) TMI 436 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... this Court, they would refund the amount collection with interest. It is submitted that the condition imposed, or undertakings given, to this effect and recorded at the time of passing interim orders in the various cases should be given implemented. The interim undertakings or directions cannot be understood in such a manner as to conflict with out final decision on the writ petitions set out above. But we agree that, to the extend refunds of amounts of cess collected after the relevant dates are permissible on the basis indicated by us, the State should refund those amounts to the assessees directly or to the Coalfields from whom they were collected, with interest at the rate directed by this Court or mentioned in the undertaking from the date of the relevant judgment to the actual date of repayment. The Coalfields, when hey get th refunds, should pass on the same to their customers, the assessees. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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1991 (4) TMI 435 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... with liberty to the Assessing Authority to proceed afresh keeping in view the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court. Direction is also issued to refund the amount within three months from today. 3.. As regards the second point, it would be a question of fact whether churi can be called husk of foodgrain and pulses or can be called fodder, or whether it would be an item other than the aforesaid two. In the extraordinary writ jurisdiction we are unable to go into these facts and the proper course would be to leave the matter to the authorities under the Act to determine the question of fact and then to decide as to under which entry it would fall, that is, as suggested on behalf of the assessee or it would be covered by notification annexure P-4, which specifically levies tax on churi. 4.. In all other respects, the order of the Assessing Authority is not interfered with. The petition stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. Petition disposed of accordingly.
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1991 (4) TMI 434 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion of plain iron sheets is concerned, it stands answered by this decision of the Supreme Court. As regards corrugation of iron sheets, this Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Shah Veljibhai Motichand reported in 1969 23 STC 288 has held that merely because iron is given the shape of a sheet and is subjected to corrugation that would not take it out of the description of iron and steel . Thus, the question in so far as it pertains to corrugated iron sheets is concerned, it also stands answered by that decision. We, therefore, held that the Tribunal was not right in holding that galvanised plain and corrugated iron sheets did not fall under entry 3 in Schedule B, Part I to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 nor under entry 3 in Schedule II, Part A to the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969. 3.. In the result, the question is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the department. There shall be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1991 (4) TMI 433 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Tribunal came to the conclusion that the assessee had not recorded or disclosed all sales and purchases made by it in the year 1975. This finding was again based upon facts found from the account books of the assessee and from verification of stock of the assessee. The inference or the conclusion which the authorities had drawn as regards the turnover which had escaped assessment was thus an inference drawn on the basis of findings of facts. No principle of law was applied for drawing such an inference. It is, therefore, difficult to appreciate how the questions which have been referred to us can be said to be questions of law. Mr. Modi was not able to point out any principle of law applied by the Tribunal while arriving at the estimate of the extent of the suppressed sales. As the questions which are referred to us are questions of fact, we decline to answer the same. This reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. Reference disposed of accordingly.
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1991 (4) TMI 432 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... vied penalty. The appellate authority confirmed the levy of penalty, but reduced the amount. Before the Tribunal, it was contended by the assessee that as the assessing officer, who had passed the order of assessment had no intention to levy penalty, the succeeding officer was not justified in levying penalty. The Tribunal found that the slip recovered did not relate to assessee s business and therefore it was not open to the succeeding officer to levy penalty. On revision, the Division Bench held that the Tribunal erred in its view that the succeeding officer had no jurisdiction to levy penalty in a case where the original authority had not passed an order levying penalty. That judgment is fully applicable to this case, and we are in agreement with the law laid down in Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) v. Govardhana Engineering Industries 1986 63 STC 109. Consequently this revision has no merit and it is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1991 (4) TMI 431 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ary 28, 1978. We cannot agree. A reference to the order of assessment made by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer on September 27, 1979, would show that the assessee had got its trade mark registered under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, with effect from May 12, 1975, vide Trade Mark Certificate No. 3052828 dated May 12, 1975. It is, therefore, futile to contend that the trade mark certificate was received by the dealer only on February 28, 1978. May be the renewal of the certificate was received on a particular date, but that would not make any difference when even on the petitioner s own showing the registration certificate was presumably itself renewed on February 7, 1977. Thus, in view of the discussion above, we find that the order of the Tribunal does not suffer from any illegality, perversity or impropriety. No interference is called for in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. The petition consequently fails and is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1991 (4) TMI 430 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ld govern this case also. 2.. We find that the assessee at the time of hearing before the Tribunal produced C forms and requested that they may be accepted. The Tribunal relied upon the law laid down in State of Tamil Nadu v. Chellaram Garments (P) Ltd. 1979 44 STC 239 (Mad.) and set aside the order of the assessing officer so far as the turnover to which the rate of tax at 10 per cent was applied and remanded the case to the assessing officer to examine the entertainability of the C form declaration and pass appropriate orders. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the view of the Tribunal that the question of entertainability of C form should be considered by the assessing officer to whom the case was restored is sound and fair. We do not find any reason to interfere with that finding recorded by the Tribunal. 3.. Consequently, in view of what we had said above, this revision fails and is dismissed. 4.. There shall however be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1991 (4) TMI 429 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... ide belief that eligibility certificate would be granted. This, in the opinion of the applicant, had prejudicially affected its business. Mr. Majumdar, however, contended that the delay was primarily due to the non-co-operation of the dealer, who on many occasions either did not appear or prayed for time. Except formally denying the allegation no materials have been furnished by the applicant controverting the finding of the Additional Commissioner in this regard. The record also reveals that on a number of occasions the applicant failed to appear and produce records and that the dealer was no less responsible for the delay. This ground, therefore, has no substance. 12.. In view of the reasons given above, we do not find any cause to interfere with the order of the Additional Commissioner. 13. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed. There will be no order for costs. S.P. DAS GHOSH (Chairman).-I agree. L.N. RAY (Judicial Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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