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Showing 21 to 40 of 587 Records
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2004 (4) TMI 645 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Appeal in England. Therefore, we have no hesitation in deleting a sum of ₹ 6,00,000/- awarded to the claimant. So far as interest that is payable is concerned, the arbitrator has appropriately considered the same and no real objection can be raised in this regard. As regards arbitration costs also there cannot be any serious dispute. Therefore, except for the sums coming under the heading No. 5, that is, Refund of Sales Tax and claim for payment of losses arising out of turn over due to prolongation of work, other part of the award having been upheld by us, the award made by the arbitrator shall stand modified accordingly. In similar terms in respect of second contract, for the very reasons stated in this part of the order, we disallow the claim for refund of sales tax and compensation for losses arising out of on account of prolongation of work. In other respects, we maintain the award made by the arbitrator. The civil appeals stand disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
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2004 (4) TMI 644 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cussed above, on facts of this case, damages were required to be assessed for use and occupation of the premises after 10.3.1987 by the appellant under the orders of the Court. The rent method for assessing damages has not at all been considered by the arbitrator while assessing damages. Even while applying the income/profit method, the expenses, the cost of investment etc. have not been taken into account. Therefore, the impugned award stood vitiated. For the aforestated reasons, this civil appeal stands allowed and the impugned judgment and order of the High Court is quashed and set aside. Consequently, we set aside the award dated 18.11.1991 passed by the arbitrator and remit the matter to him for disposal in accordance with law. If the said arbitrator is not available, the High Court shall appoint another arbitrator who shall decide the matter within three months from the date of appointment. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2004 (4) TMI 643 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ted or supplemented with reference to another statute." CONCLUSION 22. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained and are set aside accordingly. 23. Before parting with this case, we may, however, place on records the statements made by Mr. M.A. Krishna Moorthy to the effect that the appellant is not interested in having the second renewal and the possession of leasehold shall be handed over the respondent herein on the expiry of the tenure of the renewed lease i.e. tenure of the lease. With a view to do complete justice between the parties, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we direct that the appellant herein shall pay a sum of equivalent to 10 times of the original rental with effect from the date on which the original deed of lease expired. This order shall, however, not be treated as a precedent. 24. These appeals are allowed on the aforementioned terms. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2004 (4) TMI 642 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... xxx xxx 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. xxx xxx xxx 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. xxx xxx xxx 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 19. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. Appeal is allowed. This Order, however, may not be construed to be a judgment in respect of the right, title and interest over the property in question.
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2004 (4) TMI 641 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... re has been no miscarriage of justice. That cannot be said to be the same with an appeal envisaged under Section 378 Cr.P.C. despite the fact that it is made subject to the obtaining of leave to file the appeal. The requirement to obtain leave does not render the nature, extent or the scope of the appeal under the code a precarious one as sought to be assumed, on behalf of the appellant. Consequently, this appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court is set aside. 5. Considering the nature of the appeal before it and the time lag already involved, in our view, interest of justice would be better served by granting the leave, without expressing any view on the merits of the claims in the appeal before the High Court, to enable the same to be disposed of on its own merits without any further delay. Leave is granted. The High Court will do well to entertain the appeal and after issuing notice to the respondents, will consider and dispose of the same in accordance with law.
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2004 (4) TMI 640 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ade in the judgment could not appear before the higher court to defend his order Judges of higher courts must, therefore, exercise greater judicial restraint and adopt greater care when they are tempted to employ strong terms against the lower judiciary.” 14. The said observations, would in our view, apply with equal force to all such parties who were not before court and not merely could not be before the court in the proceedings concerned. 15. In view of the aforesaid we direct that the observations of the High Court, as against the appellants quoted above shall stand expunged and deleted from the judgment of the High Court, and consequently must be treated as having never existed or being part of the High Court judgment. The decision in this case, is confined to the claim of the above appellants only and nothing to do with the claims of other before the High Court and this Court in the other related appeals. 16. The Appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above.
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2004 (4) TMI 639 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... exure-P.4). It is true that neither respondent No. 3 is qualified to be a member nor his appointment as part time member is in accordance with law. Therefore, when he is acting as a Chairperson, under the order, the same is also required to be quashed along with Annexure-P.2. It was also submitted that when a duly appointed member is available, how a part time member is appointed is difficult to understand. It is a fact that a full time member is available. However, for the reasons best known to the respondent a part time member is chosen to be placed as a Chairperson for the time being. We have already held that there is no provision for a part time member under the Act. A part time member, thus, has no standing and cannot function as such. There was, Therefore, no question of giving any preference to such a 'part time' member over a regular member for appointment as acting Chairperson. Therefore, also the appointment of a part time member as the Chairperson is bad.
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2004 (4) TMI 638 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t have been promulgated is misconceived. Ordinance has the same force and effect as any Act of the State Legislature and there is no prohibition in the Constitution that during the period an Assembly is dissolved and fresh Assembly has not yet been constituted, that Ordinance could not have been promulgated by the Governor. This act of the Governor will be deemed to be an exercise of power of the Legislative Assembly, as envisaged under Article 206 and even under Article 205 and as noticed above. Clause (3) of Article 203 is a prohibition not to withdraw from the Consolidated Fund any amount being subject to provisions of Articles 205 and 206 of the Constitution. The Ordinance having validly been promulgated there is hardly any force in the other submission that a situation has arisen where power must be exercised or directed to be exercised by the President of India under Articles 356 or 360 of the Constitution. 17. Finding no merit in the petitions, the same are dismissed.
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2004 (4) TMI 637 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat duty drawback is not derived from the industrial undertaking. 17. In view of the above discussion, we are of the view that while cash compensatory support (cash assistance) received by the assessee would not constitute income "derived from" an industrial undertaking and, therefore, the same is not eligible for relief under section 80J of the Income-tax Act, 1961, but in case of duty drawback, the same is "derived from" the industrial undertaking and, therefore, eligible for relief under section 80J of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Accordingly, our answer to the common question referred in both these references is in two parts. In respect of cash compensatory support, the answer is in the negative i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. In respect of duty drawback, our answer is in the affirmative i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. 18. Both the References accordingly stand disposed of. References answered accordingly.
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2004 (4) TMI 636 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... comply with the tariff rate specified in the order of GoK dated 12th May, 1999; (ii) as per the interim order passed by this Court on 19th November, 2002, it is stated by Dr. Shighvi that the appellant has paid 40% of ₹ 62.5 crores computed by the KPTCL as difference between the PPA rates and the rates fixed by the Commission and, therefore, we direct the KPTCL to repay the amounts recovered from the appellant in pursuance of the interim order dated 19th November, 2002 and also pay amounts that become payable to the appellant arising out of adjustments of the payments already made by the appellant to KPTCL (i.e., the difference between respondent No. 2/PPA rate and Respondent No. 3/interim rate fixed by this Court pending disposal of the appeal, as the case may be) from 1st August 2000 upto November, 2002 within a period of one month from today." (iii) In the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their respective costs in this appeal.
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2004 (4) TMI 635 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... m in that direction. A mandamus directing the respondents to examine the representation and the claim for being classified as non-captive was therefore prayed for. 21. Learned Advocate General had no objection to a mandamus as prayed for being issued. He submitted that the competent authority would within the time stipulated by this Court examine the claim made by the appellant for being classified as a non-captive unit and take a decision under intimation to the appellant. That submission in our opinion should sufficiently satisfy the appellant. 22. In the result, the Writ Appeal Nos. 8220 and 7352 of 1999 fail and are hereby dismissed. W.A. No. 7354 of 1999 is however allowed but only to the extent that the competent authority shall examine the claim made by the appellant in that case for being classified as a non-captive unit within a period of three months from the date a copy of this order is served upon it by the appellant. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
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2004 (4) TMI 634 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ismissed on the ground of limitation alone. However, we have heard learned Counsel appearing for the appellant and we are not satisfied that this appeal deserves to be admitted. This appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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2004 (4) TMI 633 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the Respondents/Accused were evading the service. In the absence of such averment, no such presumption of deemed notice could be raised. 28. Thus the general burden is upon the Complainant to prove the facts constituting the sending of notice and that there is deliberate evasion of service of notice by the accused. In the instant case, absolutely no averments are made either in the Complaint or in the evidence of P.W.1. Considering the facts of the present case, in my view, it is not an appropriate case to raise such presumption of constructive notice against the accused. 29. The appreciation of evidence and the findings of the trial Court that there is no legally enforceable debt from the accused is based on the evidence on record. The view taken by the trial Court that "there is no presumption of constructive notice" also does not suffer from any serious or substantial error warranting interference. 30. For the reasons stated above, this Appeal is dismissed.
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2004 (4) TMI 632 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eaning so assigned as to fulfill the object of that enactment. Such definitions given in other enactments cannot be freely used for finding out meaning to be assigned to a term of common parlance used in an altogether different setting. And lastly, as Justice G.P. Singh points out in "Principles of Statutory Interpretation" (Ninth Edition, 2004, at page 163) "......it is hazardous to interpret a statute in accordance with a definition in another statute and more so when such statute is not dealing with any cognate subject or the statutes are not in pari materia." The same view has been taken in the decision of this court in CIT, W.B. v. Benoy Kumar (supra) which we have extensively referred to earlier in this judgment. We do not find any fault or flaw in the view of the law taken by the High Court. The impugned judgment of the High Court, which is also reported as (1998) III M.L.J. 680 is affirmed in its entirety. All the appeals are dismissed with costs.
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2004 (4) TMI 631 - COMPANY LAW BOARD PRINCIAL BENCH, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... st and reduce its paid up capital to that extent. While canceling the allotment, I have noted that the two allottees are not parties to the proceedings. Since they are not third parties but are the wives of the directors who had allotted the shares, their presence is not considered necessary, especially when the allotment is cancelled on the ground that the directors had acted in breach of their fiduciary duties to the company and the members. 11. Before parting with this matter, it is necessary to record that I had made some attempts to settle the disputes amicably. Since the only assets of the company are the 12 flats, I had suggested that the petitioners could take 7/12th of the total area of the flats with the respondents taking the balance 5/12th area. While the respondents demanded 50 area, the petitioners were willing to give only 25 of the area. Thus the compromise efforts failed. 12. The petition is disposed of in terms of paragraph 10 ante with no order as to cost.
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2004 (4) TMI 630 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... consent of the Unsecured Creditor. Mrs.Soparkar states, on the basis of the balance sheet of the applicant Company, that there are no Secured Creditors. That in light of the fact that all the Equity Shareholders and Unsecured Creditor of the applicant Company have given their consent to the proposed Scheme of Amalgamation, the meeting of the Equity Shareholders and Unsecured Creditor may be dispensed with for approving the Scheme of Amalgamation of the applicant Company with Transpek Industry Limited. 4. In view of the applicant - Company having procured and produced written approval of all the Equity Shareholders and Unsecured Creditor of the applicant Company, and the applicant - Company having no Secured Creditors, the meeting of the Equity Shareholders and Unsecured Creditor of the applicant - Company in relation to the proposed Scheme of Amalgamation as required under section 391 of the Companies Act, 1956 is dispensed with. This application is accordingly disposed of.
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2004 (4) TMI 629 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to the desirability of restraint in publication/exhibition of details relating to sensitive cases, more particularly description of alleged accused persons in the print/electronic/broadcast medias. According to him, "media trial" causes indelible prejudice to the accused persons. This is sensitive and complex issue, which we do not think it proper to deal in detail in these appeals. The same may be left open for an appropriate case where the media is also duly and effectively represented. If the accused persons were not on bail at the time of conclusion of the trial, they shall go back to custody, if on the other hand they were on bail that order shall continue unless modified by the concerned Court. Since we are directing a re-trial, it would be appropriate if same is taken up on day-to-day basis keeping in view the mandate of Section 309 of the Code and completed by the end of December 2004. The appeals are allowed on the terms and to the extent indicated above.
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2004 (4) TMI 628 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... consent order was passed by the Patna High Court and, therefore, the proceedings were governed by the 1996 Act. Aggrieved, the appellant herein had moved the single Judge of Delhi High Court. By order dated 13.10.1998, the learned single Judge of the High Court was pleased to uphold the majority decision dated 6.4.1998. Being aggrieved, the appellant carried the matter in Letters Patent appeal which was dismissed as not maintainable. Having regard to the provisions of Section 39 of the 1940 Act as interpreted by this Court in the case of Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company reported in 1962 3SCR497 second appeal, which included Letters Patent appeal under Section 39(2), was not maintainable. Accordingly, the civil appeal Nos. 9673-74 of 2003 fail and are dismissed. 116. There shall be no order as to costs in all the appeals. ORDER 117. In view of the majority judgment, Civil Appeal No. 9672/2003 is allowed. 118. Civil Appeal Nos. 9673-9674/2003 are dismissed. No costs.
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2004 (4) TMI 627 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sultant order u/s.7 would be illegal. Therefore, the entire proceedings u/s.6 & 7 of the SAFEMA are required to be set aside as being illegal. 46. For the foregoing reasons, this petition is allowed. 46.1 The order of detention of the first petitioner dated 22/12/1975 passed by respondent no. 3 and 4 herein u/s.3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 is quashed and set aside. 46.2 The proceedings u/s.6(1) of The Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 initiated against the petitioners, based on an order of detention dated 22/12/1975 and the consequential order dated 17/02/2000 passed by the competent authority u/s.7 of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 forfeiting the property known as "Roshan Manzil" is also quashed and set aside. 47. Rule is made absolute as aforesaid with no orders as to costs. Direct service is permitted.
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2004 (4) TMI 626 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e trial Court in negating the complaint filed by the complainant on the ground of legal infirmity that as no authorized person represented the company, the same is not maintainable, is not supported by any provision of law under Cr.P.C. Therefore, I am of the view that the judgment of the trial Court does not stand the scrutiny of law and it requires to be set aside, and accordingly, the same is set aside. 13. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is allowed and the judgment of the trial Court is set aside. However, since the matter needs to be decided on the merits of the case, I am of the opinion that it requires to be remanded back to the trial Court for fresh consideration on the basis of evidence already recorded. The trial Court, after hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for both sides, shall dispose of the matter within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Office is directed to dispatch the records along with the copy of order.
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