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2014 (4) TMI 1286 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Recovery of outstanding dues - petitioner filed a claim before the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council of the State of Uttar Pradesh at Kanpur claiming an award - submission of the petitioner is that once the petitioner had invoked the provisions of the 2006 Act, the Facilitation Council was conferred with the exclusive jurisdiction under Section 18 to enter upon the dispute and to initially conduct the conciliation proceedings.
HELD THAT:- Chapter V of the Act contains special provisions in regard to delayed payments to Micro and Small Enterprises. Section 15 provides that where any supplier supplies any goods or renders any services to any buyer, the buyer shall make payment on or before the date agreed upon between him and the supplier in writing or, where there is no agreement, before the appointed day. The proviso stipulates that, in any case, the period agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer shall not exceed forty-five days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance. Section 16 provides for the payment of interest by the buyer at three times of the Bank rate notified by the Reserve Bank upon a failure of the buyer to make payment, as required under Section 15 notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement or in any law for the time being in force.
The petitioner invoked the provisions of the 2006 Act by filing a reference to the Facilitation Council on 3 October 2011. There was undoubtedly a dispute between the petitioner and the respondents in regard to the claim of the petitioner arising out of non payment of its bills. The respondents appointed a sole arbitrator on 5 October 2011 after the petitioner had invoked the intervention of the Facilitation Council on 3 October 2011 under Section 18 of the 2006 Act. Once the jurisdiction of the Facilitation Council has been validly invoked, the Council has exclusive jurisdiction to enter upon conciliation in the first instance and after conciliation has ended in failure, to refer the parties to arbitration - The Facilitation Council was clearly in error in entertaining the objection filed by the respondents and referring the petitioner to the sole arbitrator so designated by the respondents.
The impugned order of the Facilitation Council directing the parties to a reference before the sole arbitrator appointed by the respondents was manifestly illegal - the proceedings are restored back to the first respondent - The first respondent shall now act in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 18 and either conduct the arbitration itself or refer the arbitral proceedings to any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services. The first respondent shall pass necessary orders in consequence of this direction within a period of one month from the receipt of a certified copy of this order.
Petition allowed.
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2014 (4) TMI 1285 - SC ORDER
Recovery of sales tax dues of the company in liquidation - priority to be observed in the matter of payment of debts in the case of winding up - It was held by the HIgh Court that If the sale is held free of encumbrances and if the State is allowed to pursue its claim as against the property, it would naturally bring the sale under a cloud and there would be no end to the litigation which would in the ultimate analysis be not only against the interests of persons whose interests are sought to be secured by the Companies Act on the basis of priority, but against the scheme of the Companies Act.
HELD THAT:- There are no merit in the Special Leave Petition. It stands dismissed accordingly.
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2014 (4) TMI 1284 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Seeking grant of Bail - counterfeiting currency note or bank note - HELD THAT:- The applicant, as stated in the complaint itself, is a permanent resident of Old Goa, Panaji and is not a stranger to the complainant and other witnesses who are mostly the employees of the said Company. It is not the case of the respondents that there are any criminal antecedents with regard to the applicant. Appropriate conditions can be imposed upon the applicant to ensure his presence during trial.
The stage has come now to release the applicant on bail as no purpose will be served by detaining him in custody any more - bail application allowed.
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2014 (4) TMI 1283 - SC ORDER
Unexplained investment - NRI company made share subscription to the capital of respondent - A.O. directed addition of the amount of share subscription to assessee's income due to doubt ob crediworthiness of subscriber company - HC held that if assessee Company having received subscriptions and furnished complete details of the shareholders, no addition could be made under section 68 in the absence of any positive material or evidence to indicate that the shareholders were benamidars or fictitious persons or that any part of the share capital represented company's own income from undisclosed sources - HELD THAT:- Delay condoned. Appeal Dismissed.
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2014 (4) TMI 1282 - ITAT BANGALORE
Unaccounted investment made by the assessee in purchase of the subject property - CIT-A deleted the addition - as argued that the Director of APIPL had, on oath, admitted that the acquired value mentioned in the seized material (computer sheet) was the value which was paid to the land owners for the purchase of the property by the assessee - HELD THAT:- CIT (A) had called for a remand report wherein the AO, admittedly, conceded that the said addition was made in the hands of the assessee purely based on the report of the ADIT (Inv). Surprisingly, the ADIT (Inv) came to a conclusion by relying on the statement of Sri Aga, Director of APIPL, on oath.
As a matter of fact, APIPL had nothing to do with the transaction between the assessee and the sellers of the subject property, namely, Shri Chennappa and Shri Jagadish Chandra Ankalagi.
Since the issue which has been examined in detail by the CIT (A) has not been disputed by the Revenue with any documentary evidence even during the course of hearing before us, we are of the view that the CIT (A) was justified in deleting the addition made by the AO. It is ordered accordingly.- Decided against revenue.
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2014 (4) TMI 1281 - ITAT JODHPUR
Addition in the income declared from contract business - HELD THAT:- CIT(A) has placed reliance on certain cases belong to contractors but as we have already stated, the factual matrix of comparable cases, definitely differ and have little nuance regarding the nature of business, that is , if they are obtaining contract from government/semi government departments or from private parties and respective turnover disclosed by them. But the contract work done also depends on the place(s) where the parties are executing their contract work. In case the past history of the assessee is not available, then in that eventuality, the history of comparables has been treated as a good guidance by the courts - in the given case, when the history of the assessee itself exists, there is no need to jump the gun and ignore its past history.
We hold that the results shown during the year under consideration being better than the results shown in the immediately preceding A.Y., there is no reason to make any further addition on this count. Accordingly, we order to delete the entire addition made in the trading results disclosed by the assessee and more particularly, to delete the impugned addition sustained by the ld. CIT(A) - we allow Ground No. 1 of this appeal.
Income from other sources - addition has been made because the assessee has shown interest income on FDRs in its profit and loss account and on that basis alone, the A.O. persuaded himself to treat this interest income as income from other sources - Whether CIT(A) has grossly erred in holding the income from interest liable to be assessed separately even after holding the same as income from business which is not a separate source of income liable to be taxed separately and is to be considered as part of income from contract business? - HELD THAT:- A.O. has ignored the contention of the assessee that FDRs were purchased for taking contract work and therefore, the interest accruing on these FDRs would become its business income. The assessee filed copies of FDRs, which were pledged with various government department. The A.O. or the ld. CIT(A) have not disputed the above mentioned facts. In our considered opinion, his interest income would partake the character of business income only. In such like cases, we have taken numerous decisions in the same lines. Accordingly, after considering this interest income as part of business income as has been claimed by the assessee, we allow Ground No. 2 of this appeal as it has been prayed for.
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2014 (4) TMI 1280 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Seeking unsealing and releasing of the premises - Section 11 of the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 - HELD THAT:- It is the settled position of law that a lawful tenant cannot be evicted from the tenanted premises without following the due process of law as enumerated in the Rent Act prevailing at the relevant time. Thus, we find substance in the contention of learned counsel for the Appellants. If the premises are directly handed over to Respondent No.2 in the present Appeals preferred by the Appellants, then it would certainly amount to dispossessing the Appellants / tenants without following the due process of law.
The impugned order in the present Appeals was passed on 19 March 2004. The investigation pertaining to the aforesaid MECR No.1 of 2003 has been completed on 23 November 2004 and after its completion a charge-sheet has been filed before the concerned Court and it is now culminated in MPID Special Case No.34 of 2004. The investigating agency by its report dated 26 February 2014 has clearly mentioned that the Appellants have no role to play in the said crime bearing MECR No.1 of 2003 and the Appellants had given the premises Nos.502 and 501 respectively to the original accused viz. Roofit Industries Limited and its directors purely on ex-gratis basis.
Appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2014 (4) TMI 1279 - SUPREME COURT
Seeking a direction to the MPRTC to immediately hand over possession of the land - Seeking to grant permission to demolish the existing structure - breach of contract by MPRTC entered into with the Appellant - privity of contract - HELD THAT:- The scope of judicial review is very limited in contractual matters even where one of the contracting parties is the State or an instrumentality of the State. The parameters within which power of judicial review can be exercised, has been authoritatively laid down by this Court in a number of cases.
At no stage, the Appellant had any privity of contract with IDA. MPRTC entered into a BOT contract with the Appellant contrary to the terms and conditions of the lease which provided specifically that the land shall be used for constructing a bus stand-cum commercial complex. MPRTC had no legal right to create any further right in favour of the Appellant with regard to the receiving of the premium on the constructed units sold to third party(ies). Even otherwise, the Appellant seems to be flogging a dead horse. Admittedly, the possession of the proposed site was delivered to MPRTC on 22nd January, 1982 - The renewal clause in the lease subsequently provides that the renewal shall be with the consent of IDA. This consent by the IDA is not a mere formality.
Appeal dismissed.
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2014 (4) TMI 1278 - ITAT CHENNAI
TDS u/s 194C - amount paid to the lorry drivers/owners exceeded the threshold limit of ₹ 50,000 - disallowance U/s. 40(a)(ia) - CIT (A) held that the amendment to Section 194C (1) (k) of the Act is applicable from 01.06.2007 i.e., for the relevant assessment year 2008-09 onwards - HELD THAT:- As decided in SATISH AGGARWAL AND COMPANY. [2008 (11) TMI 322 - ITAT AMRITSAR] nothing had been brought on record by the Department to the effect that man power was provided along with the trucks to the assessee by the truck owners. Mere provision of the trucks without any man power could not be termed as carrying out any work by the truck owners, for which any payment was made by the assessee.
When the assessee entered into a contract for the purpose of taking temporary possession of trucks from the truck owners, it did not amount to the assessee entering into any contract for carrying out any work. Once the contract was not for carrying out any work, the provisions of section 194C were not attracted. Explanation III to Section 194C can not apply to a situation not amounting to a contract for carrying out any work as contemplated in section194C, and entering into a contract for hiring of trucks was not equivalent to entering into a contract for carrying out any work. Therefore, Explanation III to section 194C was not attracted
Provisions of section 194C will not be applicable in the present assessee’s case before us and therefore, provisions of Section 40(a)(ia) cannot be invoked for both the assessment years. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
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2014 (4) TMI 1277 - ITAT DELHI
Taxability and the extent qua the income from off-shore supply of equipments; income from on-shore equipments; income from on-shore services; and income from design and engineering services - Transfer Pricing Adjustment - HELD THAT:- Such issues have been sent back by the tribunal to the AO/TPO for a fresh decision in accordance with the specific directions given therein. Since both the sides are in agreement that the facts and circumstances as well as the grounds of the extant appeal are mutatis mutandis similar to those for A.Y. 2008-09, following the precedent we set aside the impugned order and remit the matter to the file of AO/TPO for deciding these issues afresh in conformity with the directions by the Tribunal in its order for A.Y. 2008-09 [2014 (3) TMI 368 - ITAT DELHI].
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2014 (4) TMI 1276 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Dishonor of Cheque - bailable offence or not - Seeking grant of anticipatory bail under section 438 of Cr.P.C. - issuance of non-bailable warrant passed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate - whether this Court can invoke its power under section 438 of Cr. P.C. to grant anticipatory bail when the Magistrate has issued non-bailable warrant in the case filed under section 138 of N.I. Act? - HELD THAT:- A Magistrate who issues a warrant knows fully why the accused is avoiding to remain present before the Court and non-appearance causes obstruction in the smooth working of the Court. It is a hurdle in speedy disposal of the matter and therefore the Magistrate issues non-bailable or bailable warrant. On number of occasions, a Magistrate is constrained to issue non-bailable warrant to compel a person to appear before the Court as the trial is at a standstill for want of appearance. To remove this stagnation, the appearance is a must. Though pre-arrest bail can be granted under section 438, however, it cannot be granted in any or each and every impending arrest in non-bailable offence, which is pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the learned Magistrate for any other purpose but not under section 204 of Cr. P.C. Thus, anticipatory bail cannot be sought when warrant is issued during the trial due to non-attendance of the accused.
The anticipatory bail, which is an extraordinary provision which protects the liberty of an individual can be used before he is taken into custody by the police first time after the registration of an offence against him. Once he is taken in custody, this power is not available to the Court and also cannot be invoked. Thus, within the purport of Section 438 of Cr. P.C. grant of pre-arrest bail is not available to the Sessions Court or the High Court when warrant of arrest issued is by the Magistrate except warrant of arrest issued under section 204 of Cr. P.C. Under section 204 of Cr. P.C. the Magistrate takes cognizance and thereafter issues the warrant, so this is the first instance that the person is booked for some offence, which may be either by the police or by the Magistrate.
Thus, arrest pursuant to warrant of arrest issued under section 70 of the Code has wider import than the arrest apprehended under section 438 of the Code. It needs to be clarified that such order of issuance of warrant of arrest by the Magistrate can be challenged before the High court under section 482 of the Code or by filing Writ under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, but not under section 438 of the Cr. P.C. - In the present case, the learned APP has pointed out that this applicant/accused has been deliberately avoiding to appear before the learned Magistrate.
Application dismissed.
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2014 (4) TMI 1275 - SC ORDER
Dispute between Income tax department and statutory Board under the provisions of Chandigarh Administration - Payment of tax by the Chandigarh Housing Board to the Income Tax Department - HELD THAT:- A sum of ₹ 278 crores, which was deposited by the Chandigarh Housing Board in the Government treasury, is agreed to be adjusted in Income Tax head and it is treated as final insofar as liability of Income Tax is concerned. Having regard to the settlement reached between the parties, it is clear that the dispute regarding payment of tax by the Chandigarh Housing Board to the Income Tax Department stands resolved. It is further agreed that no penalty proceeding would be initiated against the Chandigarh Housing Board. However, it is also stated that the decision in this regard can further be taken only by the competent Income Tax authority.
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2014 (4) TMI 1274 - ITAT CHENNAI
Revision u/s 263 - Short Term Capital Gains from the sale of debentures and shares - as per CIT AO did not carry out any enquiry as warranted by facts and circumstances of the case in respect of capital gain arising from the sale of debentures and shares in the period relevant to the AY under consideration - Whether there is any distinction between unlisted shares and shares listed on recognized stock exchange for classifying them as Short Term Capital Asset under the Act? - HELD THAT:- The amendment was brought by the Finance Act, 1994 w.e.f. 01- 04-1995 to include the securities listed on stock exchange, units of UTI, units of specified Mutual Funds and Zero coupon bonds to bring them at par with shares. Circular No.684 dated 10-06-1994 spells out the reasons for inclusion of listed securities, units of UTI etc., within the ambit of Section 2(42A).
The section does not create any distinction between listed and unlisted shares. However, listing of securities is essential prerequisite to fall within the ambit of the term ‘Short Term Capital Asset’ defined in section 2(42A). DR has submitted that as per the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, the term ‘Securities’ include shares. The relevant extract of section 2(h) of the Securities Contract (Regulation) Act, 1956 which defines the term ‘securities’.
Although, under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, the term ‘Securities’ include shares, but in section 2(42A) of the Act, shares have been mentioned separately. Thus, the intention of the Legislature while introducing the amendment to the Act was very much clear not to include shares in the term ‘security’. From the above discussion, we conclude that there is no distinction between unlisted and listed shares for classifying them as Short Term Capital Asset under the Act.In the present case, undisputedly the holding period of the shares is more than twelve months. Thus, the capital gain arising from the sale of shares is Long Term Capital Gain.
We are of the considered opinion that the Commissioner of Income Tax and CIT(Appeals) are two separate authorities exercising their jurisdiction under the different provisions of the Act. The Commissioner of Income Tax exercising his revisional jurisdiction remanded the matter back to Assessing Officer to decide the issue afresh. The Assessing Officer decided the issue in accordance with the directions of Commissioner of Income Tax. The CIT(Appeals) has appellate powers under the Act to examine the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer. Therefore, we do not agree with the contentions of the ld.DR that the CIT(Appeals) has gone beyond his jurisdiction in reversing the findings of the Commissioner of Income Tax. - Decided against revenue.
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2014 (4) TMI 1273 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Maintainability of suit - whether the suit can be referred to arbitration or not - HELD THAT:- The Defendant No. 1 has defaulted in performing its obligations in respect of its trading on the Plaintiff Exchange. Detailed material has been produced with the Plaint, inter alia: Ledger accounts and Clearing Bank Statement of Defendant No. 1, wherein the transactions are reflected - 1st Defendant has clearly admitted its liability to the Plaintiff for a sum of ₹ 693 crores by its letter dated 1st August 2013 at Exhibit Y to the Plaint, and also agreed unconditionally to make payment by installments in 20 weeks. Some amounts were paid, but in view of subsequent defaults the Plaintiff addressed a notice dated 28th August 2013 at Ex "Z" to the Plaint, declaring Defendant No. 1 as a defaulter.
The Plaint and the documents produced therewith show that criminal proceedings have been initiated against Defendant 1 and some of its directors. The EOW and ED have both initiated action in the course of which some arrests have also been made. Exhibits "BB" and "CC" are press reports which mention that the ED has attached properties of Defendant 1 and investigation has revealed that large amounts were siphoned off to invest in the real estate project of Defendant No 20.
The Plaintiff has made out a strong case for being entitled at this stage to limited adinterim relief, interalia, in view of the averments made in the Plaint including the statements in paragraph 9,10, 18 to 21 thereof, and material placed on the record - It is not necessary to consider this question at this ad interim stage. As and when any application under section 8 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 is made by any party the same will be considered on its own merits.
S.O. to 21st April 2014 for consideration of further ad interim relief/s.
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2014 (4) TMI 1272 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Liability to pay unearned increase - Initiation of action to determine the perpetual lease-deed executed in favour of Jindal Strips Limited - non-satisfaction of demand made - HELD THAT:- In the present facts it is obvious that no consideration whatsoever has passed. It is a case of reorganisation of business - the impugned order relies on Clause 2(d) of the Policy for charge of unearned increase to hold that the appellants are covered by the said clause and are hence liable to pay unearned increase.
There is no specific Clause of the Policy dealing with a case of de- merger. The facts of the present case are somewhat akin to a situation as stipulated in Clause 1(b) of the said policy, inasmuch as clause 1(b) deals with a situation of conversion of a partnership firm into a private limited company comprising only original partners as Directors/ Subscribers/ShareHolders, namely, mere reorganisation of the business. The Policy specifically provides for no unearned increase to be charged in such a situation - it is clarified that it is not every case of demerger that the unearned increase will not apply. There may be cases where an element of sale is involved. In such a situation the issue would be different.
The respondent is not entitled to charge any unearned increase in the facts and circumstances of the present case keeping in mind a meaningful reading of Clause 6(a) of the perpetual lease and the policy for unearned increase. Even in equity no such amount can be claimed by DDA - Appeal is allowed.
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2014 (4) TMI 1271 - SUPREME COURT
Maintainability of appeal - ex-parte order - plea of the Appellants was that in the absence of their Counsel, appeal filed by them could not have been decided on merits and the only course open to the Court was to dismiss the appeal in default - Order XII Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure in such an eventuality - Consequences when respondent not present and also in the case where appellant fails to appear - HELD THAT:- Whereas appeal can be heard on merits if the Respondent does not appear, in case the Appellant fails to appear it is to be dismissed in default. Explanation makes it clear that the court is not empowered to dismiss the appeal on the merits of the case. As different consequences are provided, in case the Appellant does not appear, in contradistinction to a situation where the Respondent fails to appear, as a fortiori, Rule 19 and Rule 21 are also differently worded. Rule 19 deals with re-admission of appeal "dismissed for default", where the Appellant does not appear at the time of hearing, Rule 21 talks of "rehearing of the appeal" when the matter is heard in the absence of the Respondent and ex-parte decree made.
In Abdur Rahman case [1996 (8) TMI 471 - SC ORDER], this Court made it clear that because of non-appearance of the Appellants before the High Court, High Court could not have gone into the merits of the case in view of specific course of action that could be chartered (viz. dismissal of the appeal in default above) continued in the explanation to Order XLI Rule 17, Code of Civil Procedure and by deciding the appeal of the Appellants on merits, in his absence. It was held that the High Court had transgressed its limits in taking into account all the relevant aspects of the matter and dismissing the said appeal on merits, holding that there was no ground to interfere with the decision of the trial court.
In the facts of the present case, the Respondent had filed the Suit seeking partition of two properties claiming half share each in both these properties mentioned in Schedules A and B. The trial court had decreed the Suit in respect of Schedule B property but dismissed the same qua Schedule A property. Both the parties had gone in appeal. In so far as appeal of the Respondent is concerned, the same has been allowed ex parte as nobody appeared on behalf of the Appellants. This course of action was available to the High Court as Sub-rule (2) of Order XLI Rule 17 categorically permits it. Though the Appellants moved application for setting aside this order, the same was dismissed on the ground that no reasonable or sufficient cause for non-appearance was shown. Therefore, this part of the order of the High Court is without blemish and is not to be interfered with. Appeal there against is dismissed.
Even if the appeal was to be dismissed in default, whether that order warranted to be recalled on application made by the Appellants? - HELD THAT:- As is clear from the reading of Rule 19 of Order XLI, the Appellants were supposed to show sufficient cause for their non-appearance. The High Court has given categorical finding that no such cause is shown. The learned senior Counsel for the Appellants did not even address on this aspect or argued that the reason given by the Appellant in the application filed before the High Court for non-appearance amounted to sufficient cause and the order of the High Court is erroneous on this aspect.
Appeal dismissed.
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2014 (4) TMI 1270 - ITAT MUMBAI
Disallowance of additional depreciation - asset put to use - CIT-A confirming the action AO in holding that the appellant company was not entitled to additional depreciation @ 10% on the plant and machinery which were installed last year i.e. asst. year 2008-09, as in the last year additional depreciation @ 10% was only claimed because these machineries were installed after 30-9-2007, thereby used for less than 180 days - HELD THAT:- Respectfully following the order of Tribunal in assessee’s own case we decide the appeal in favour of the assessee. Accordingly, the disallowance of additional depreciation is deleted.
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2014 (4) TMI 1269 - ITAT MUMBAI
Enhancement of the income taxable under the head income from house property by CIT-A - decision of the Ld.CIT(A) directing the AO to compute the annual value by taking 8.5% of the total investment of the property for the purpose of calculating the income from house property - HELD THAT:- Sub section 2 of section 251 require that Commissioner (Appeals) shall not enhance the assessment or a penalty or reduce the amount of free fund unless the appellant has reasonable opportunity to show cause against such enhancement. In the present case, it is observed that the requirement of the said sub section is not fulfilled by the Ld.CIT(A) by not providing necessary opportunity to the assessee. Therefore, in the interest of justice we are of the opinion that it is just and fair that the case may be re-adjudicated by the Ld.CIT(A) by providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. Accordingly, Grounds No. 1 to 3 are allowed for statistical purpose.
Disallowance of 10% of telephone expenses and disallowance of 10% of vehicle expenses - Addition as partly confirmed by the Ld.CIT(A) on the 20% disallowance made by the AO on the said expenses - HELD THAT:- As observed that the said ad hoc disallowances have been made by the AO which has been partly confirmed by the Ld.CIT(A) is on account of involvement of personal use. Considering the entirety of facts, we are of the opinion that the said ad hoc disallowances may be restricted to 5% of the telephone expenses & vehicle expenses, respectively, which would justify the case of the assessee. We direct and order accordingly. Accordingly, Grounds No. 4 and 5 are partly allowed.
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2014 (4) TMI 1268 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
Maintainability of appeal - quantum of pre-deposit to be made by the appellants as a condition precedent for the hearing of the appeals - HELD THAT:- The appellants are directed to deposit a sum of ₹ 25 lacs as a condition precedent for hearing of the appeals.
Appeal disposed off.
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2014 (4) TMI 1267 - CESTAT MUMBAI
Maintainability of appeal - non-compliance under the provisions of Section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962 - penalty on appellant-CHA on account that he helped exporter to avail excess drawback claim u/s 114 of CA - learned Commissioner (Appeals) without appreciating the facts and without commenting as to why pre-deposit is required in such a situation, directed the appellant to pre-deposit 50% of the penalty imposed on them - principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- Relying, on the case law in the case of VAMAN KUNDER VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS (ADJ.), MUMBAI [2008 (9) TMI 324 - CESTAT, MUMBAI], it is held that the appeal against the impugned order is maintainable before this Tribunal. Therefore, the preliminary objection raised by the learned AR is turned down.
The learned Commissioner (Appeals)’s order directing the appellant to pre-deposit 50% of the penalty, has not been passed on merits therefore, the order is not correct. Consequently, the final order dismissing the appeal is also not correct, hence set aside - the matter is remanded back to the learned Commissioner (Appeals) to pass an appropriate order on merits, first on their stay application, thereafter on appeal.
Appeal disposed off.
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