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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 32 of 32 Records
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1950 (5) TMI 22 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... proposed to take against the petitioners "is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating activities prejudi- cial to public safety or the maintenance of public order." These facts are supported by an affidavit sworn by the Home Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, who also states among other things that the order in question was passed by the Chief Commissioner in consultation with the Central Press Advisory Committee, which is an independent body elected by the All-India Newspaper Editors' Conference and is composed of representatives of some of the leading papers such as The Hindustan Times, Statesman, etc. In my opinion, there can be no doubt that the Chief Commissioner has purported to act in this case within the sphere within which he is permitted to act under the law, and it is beyond the power of this Court to grant the reliefs claimed by the petitioners. In these circumstances, I would dismiss the petitioners' application. Petition allowed.
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1950 (5) TMI 21 - EAST PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... epreciation. There is no reason why the allowance for depreciation in clause (vi) should be treated differently for the purpose of computing from that given in other clauses. Section 24 provides for the set-off which is allowable to an assessee and the whole income is to be determined after the profits and losses including allowances in Section 10(2) have been all added together and where the assessee is a registered firm and the loss cannot be wholly set off against the income of the firm, this loss shall be apportioned as between the partners constituting the firm. Where set-off is to be given for different kinds of losses other than those due to depreciation they shall be first set off and then the loss due to depreciation. For the reasons, which I have given above, the answer to the question must be in the affirmative. As the result is against the Commissioner the assessee shall have his costs in this Court. Counsel fee ₹ 250. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1950 (5) TMI 20 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... principles for granting special leave in criminal cases, which were reviewed by the Federal Court in Kapildeo v. The King. It is sufficient for our purpose to say that though we are not bound to follow them too rigidly since the reasons, constitutional and administrative, which sometimes weighed with the Privy Council, need not weigh with us, yet some of those principles are useful as furnishing in many cases a sound basis for invoking the discretion of this Court in granting special leave. Generally speaking, this Court will not grant special leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and that the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against. Since the present case does not in our opinion fulfil any of these conditions, we cannot interfere with the decision of the High Court, and the appeal must be dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1950 (5) TMI 19 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tribunals within the limits of jurisdiction assigned to them by law and torestrain them from acting in excess of their authority. These principles are well settled and require no elucidation(1). Our conclusion, therefore, is that article 136 of the Constitution does not contemplate a determination given by the Industrial Tribunal. (1) Rex v. Electricity Commissioners 1924 1 K.B. 171; Board of Education v. Rice 1911 A.C. 179. Even assuming for argument’s sake that we have got jurisdiction under article 136, the exercise of which would depend upon the circumstances of each case, in view of the reasons which we have set out above, this is not an appeal which, in our opinion, should be admitted even if we have the power to do so. The result is that the preliminary objection succeeds and the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. PATANJALI SASTRI’ J.--I entirely agree with the judgment just now delivered by Mukherjea J. and I have nothing to add. Appeal dismissed.
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1950 (5) TMI 18 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rely ordered but delivery is not given or taken and there is nothing from which it can be ascertained that the property in the goods has actually been transferred from the seller to the buyer it cannot be said that there was a sale. A contract of sale is not the same thing as sale. It may be that here the applicant would be entitled to sue the person who placed the particular order with him for damages and may be able to recover damages from him, but what he receives by way of damages would not be regarded as sale price. For these reasons I hold that the particular transaction does not amount to a sale and that therefore the applicant was not bound to obtain a registration certificate. Since he was not bound to obtain a registration certificate his failure to obtain one does not render him liable under Section 24(1)(a) of the Act. His conviction is bad in law and is accordingly set aside so also the sentence. The fine, if paid, is ordered to be refunded. Application allowed.
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1950 (5) TMI 17 - PATNA HIGH COURT
In arriving at the taxable turnover of an assessee under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944 ... ... ... ... ..... learned Commissioner is entirely in consonance with the agreement between the assessee and the Imperial Tobacco Company, and has got to be accepted at its face value. Hence, I disagree with my learned brother Das, J., in his conclusion on the question whether the essential condition for attracting the provisions of sub-clause (v) has been fulfilled. In my opinion, the learned Commissioner has not found that the goods had been despatched by, or on behalf of, the dealer, and, therefore, he is not entitled to the deduction claimed. Hence, in the result, though I agree with most of the reasons given in the judgment of my learned brother Das, J., I disagree with his conclusion as to the answer to be given to the first question. I also do not agree with all the reasons given by my learned brother Sarjoo Prasad, J., as already indicated but all the same, I agree with him in his conclusion that the first question should be ans- wered in the negative. Reference answered accordingly.
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1950 (5) TMI 16 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Meeting and proceedings – Power of Company Law Board to order meeting to be called ... ... ... ... ..... to take the management of the company out of the hands of the directors, at any rate, whilst the question was still in litigation, whether they were properly directors or not. In this case, if I had taken the view that there was a board of directors who could call a meeting, I would not have made the order under section 79 (3). But as I have said Akhil and Tejesh claim to be directors and they are at Jalpaiguri. If they have been validly appointed, then Birendra cannot act alone under Article 104. So Lahiri s co-option is bad and there is no board which can call a meeting. This is a view of the matter which I cannot ignore. There is no dispute among the parties that a meeting has to be called. The question is whether it should be a meeting under section 79 (3) of the Indian Companies Act or otherwise. In the circumstances of this case, and on the considerations aforesaid, I think that it is expedient to make an order under section 79 (3) for calling a meeting of the company.
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1950 (5) TMI 15 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the issue of further shares by the directors was in contravention of section 105-C of the Indian Companies Act?
Held that:- As noticed before, the object of the section is to prevent discrimination amongst shareholders and prevent the directors from offering shares to outsiders before they are offered to the shareholders. So long as these two requirements are complied with, the action of the directors in selecting the time when they will issue the shares as also the proportion in which they should be issue a is a matter left to their discretion and it is not the province of the Court to interfere with the exercise of that discretion. This is or course subject to the general exception that the directors are not to act against the interest of the company or mala fide. No such question arises in this case and therefore it is unnecessary to discuss that aspect of the situation. In my opinion therefore on this third ground this contention of the appellants should be rejected. Appeal dismissed.
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1950 (5) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
Annual Value, House Tax ... ... ... ... ..... he said taxes are assessed, if he is the owner of the buildings or lands or holds them on a building or other lease from the Crown or from the Board, or on a building lease from any person. In any other case the tax is leviable from the lessor, if the property is let (vide Section 149). Section 177 enacts that all sums due on account of a tax imposed on the annual value of buildings or lands or both shall, subject to the prior payment of the land revenue, if any, due to His Majesty thereupon, be a first charge upon such buildings or lands. It is apparent therefore that the provisions of the United Provinces Act in respect of the levy of the taxes are substantially similar to the provisions of the Bombay Act discussed in Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1949. For the reasons given in that appeal and as a result of that decision this appeal stands dismissed with costs and we consider that the High Court of Allahabad has answered the questions above mentioned correctly. Appeal dismissed.
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1950 (5) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in the circumstances of this case, the declaration in the form of return signed by the illiterate assessee by the pen of his son should be treated as properly signed and a valid return?
Held that:- If on a construction of a statute signature by an agent is not found permissible then the writing of the name of the principal by the agent however clearly he may have been authorised by the principal cannot possibly be regarded as the signature of the principal for the purposes of that statute. If a statute requires personal signature of a person, which includes a mark, the signature or the mark must be that of the man himself. There must be physical contact between that person and the signature or the mark put on the document. This appeal must be accepted and the question referred to the High Court must be answered in the negative.
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1950 (5) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the municipal taxes paid by the applicant-company are an allowable deduction under the provisions of Section 9(1)(iv) of the Indian Income-tax Act?
Whether the urban immoveable property taxes paid by the applicant-company are an allowable deduction under Section 9(1)(iv) or under Section 9(1)(v) of the Indian Income-tax Act?
Held that:- This appeal is allowed and the two questions which were referred to the High Court by the Income-tax Tribunal and cited above are answered in the affirmative.
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1950 (5) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in respect of such oil a portion of the profits earned by them is attributable to their business of manufacturing oil at Raichur and that portion of the profits should not be assessed to tax under the Excess Profits Tax Act?
Held that:- The expression " part of a business " must in my opinion be read with the same meaning and implication in provisos (2) and (3) to Section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act. Unable to accept the contention of the Attorney-General that under our Act there is no scheme of apportionment. That overlooks, as pointed out above, the provisions of Section 21 of the Act, which incorporates by reference amongst others Section 42(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act. Therefore, proceeding on the footing that there can arise or accrue profits of the manufacturing activity of the assessee, profits have accrued to the assessee of a part of the business in an Indian State and they having accrued out of such business carried on in such State are exempted under the third proviso to Section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act. For these reasons the conclusion of the High Court is correct and the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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