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Showing 21 to 40 of 42 Records
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1963 (5) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 50 had been enacted by the State Legislature of Bombay. But by the repeal of the Act of 1948 by the Central Act of 1950 the foundation for the continuance and existence of the Bombay Act of 1950 disappeared. Moreover, since s. 41 of the Central Act provided that a Corporation shall be deemed to be a local authority within the meaning Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and not within the meaning of any other law, the provisions of s. 29 of the Bombay Act could in no circumstances be said to survive. In view of all this the learned Attorney-General did not press his argument on the point further. In our view the acquisition impugned in this case having been made for the benefit of a Corporation, though for a public purpose, is bad because no part of the compensation is to come out of public revenues and the provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act have not been complied with. We, therefore, allow the appeals and decree the suits of the appellants with costs in all the courts.
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1963 (5) TMI 57 - SUPREME COURT
Whether when Art. 289 provides for the exemption of State property from Union taxation, it only provides for exemption from that kind of Union taxation which is a tax directly on property?
Whether the proposed extension of customs and excise duties to all goods belonging to the State Governments, imported or exported in the one case and manufactured or produced in the other, would not offend Art. 289?
If the expression 'taxes' in relation to the exemption of property from tax were confined to direct taxes on property the exemption would be unmeaning, as such taxes could not be imposed by the Union?
Held that:- It would not be proper to read the scope of the saving in favour of the Union in clause (2) as reflecting on the scope of Art. 289(1). A tax on the use of property or on the property itself which is occupied for the purpose of trade would obviously be a direct tax on property which ex-concessis the Central legislature under the Government of India Act and Parliament under the Constitution are incompetent to impose. It is not the contention of the States that the center has such a power to levy a tax on occupation or use of property where it is in connection with a trade or business. This would at least show that it is not justifiable to imply from clause (2) to the construction of clause (1) of Art. 289 that but for that provision Parliament would be entitled to impose such a tax. The other points urged have been dealt with in the opinion of my Lord the Chief Justice and I do not propose to cover the same ground.
The questions referred to this Court for its opinion should be answered as they have been by the Chief Justice i.e. in the negative.
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1963 (5) TMI 56 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hardly legitimate to call it an impurity. My answer, therefore, is that the sale of phosphor bronze ingots does not fall within the ambit of the notification as interpreted by me or of the rider. To sum up, my answers are Question (1)-No, subject to what I have already explained. Question (2)-Yes. Question (3)-Yes. The case came on for final hearing before Desai, C.J., and Asthana, J., and the Court made the following order on 9th May, 1963. Order In view of the opinion of the third Judge our answer to the question is in the affirmative. We direct that the copies of this judgment shall be sent to the Judge (Revisions) and the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., under the signature of the Registrar and seal of the Court as required by section 11(6) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. We further direct that the assessee shall pay the cost of this reference which we assess at Rs. 100 to the Commissioner, Sales Tax, U. P. Counsel s fee is assessed at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1963 (5) TMI 55 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... acts of that case are clearly distinguishable from the facts in the instant case. In the instant case, the title to the property passed to the ultimate buyers in Rajasthan from the moment the goods reached Khokhropar and the State Trading Corporation acquired title to them. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the opinion that no sales tax can be levied on the petitioner for the transactions of the sale of the cement imported from the Pak Factory by the State Trading Corporation under the agreement with Milkhiram and Sons Ltd. as the sales by the petitioner as an agent of the State Trading Corporation to the various dealers took place while the cement was in the course of the import. We, therefore, quash the order of assessment exhibit 2 so far as it seeks to levy tax on such transactions of sale as mentioned hereinbefore. We also direct the respondents not to collect any sales tax on such transactions. The writ petition is allowed with costs. Petition allowed.
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1963 (5) TMI 54 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pliance with the same, he appeared before the Assessing Authority and asked for adjournment, which was granted. Later on, he has been appearing before the Assessing Authority from time to time. If ultimately he does not turn up or co-operate, then it cannot be said that there has been non-compliance with the terms of the notice issued under sub-section (2) of section 11 of the Act. The Assessing Authority could, therefore, make the assessment even after three years. In this view of the matter, the assessment order in the present case also is within limitation and is quite valid. The result is that these petitions fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, however, I will leave the parties to bear their own costs. Order CAPOOR, MAHAJAN and PANDIT, JJ.-The writ petitions (Civil Writs Nos. 798 and 1042 of 1962) are allowed and the impugned assessment orders quashed in view of the majority judgment. The parties are left to bear their own costs. Petitions allowed.
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1963 (5) TMI 53 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... was lifted, then consistently with the other ban under Article 286(1)(a), only the delivery-cum-consumption State could tax that sale and not any other State with reference to which that sale would be an outside sale. In the light of the interpretation of the decisions, it seems to us that the Ashok Leyland case(3) cannot be relied upon for enabling the Madras State to tax these sales, which both under the Indian Sale of Goods Act as well as the constitutional Explanation became located as sales in States other than the Madras State. The Madras State is an outside State in so far as these sales are concerned, and the ban on the levy of a tax in respect of a sale, which is an outside sale, being inviolate, the Madras State cannot tax these sales. It follows that the order of the Board of Revenue is made upon an incorrect appreciation of the legal position and has to be set aside. The appeal is allowed. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1963 (5) TMI 52 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 15. But as we do not regard the statement of the Sales Tax Officer that clarification was given to the assessee that proceedings had been initiated within time as any order deciding his objection, it would not be proper for us to consider the merits of the objection. We must, however, deprecate the tendency, which we have been of late noticing on the part of Sales Tax Authorities, in the shape of postponing the decision of a preliminary objection or objections raised by the assessee till the conclusion of the assessment itself or deciding them at the outset in a slipshod manner such as the one noticed in the present case. 5.. For these reasons, the Sales Tax Officer is directed to decide judicially and in a proper manner the objections raised by the petitioner in his application filed on 25th May, 1962. In the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Case remanded.
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1963 (5) TMI 51 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... essees. While the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer stated in his order that he had examined all the records, vouchers, etc., in detail and reached the conclusion that the material fully supported the claim of the assessees that the purchases had been effected outside the State of Madras, the Deputy Commissioner seems to have doubted the genuineness of the vouchers in part. The order of the Deputy Commissioner does not state what material it was that he relied upon, but undoubtedly it seems to have comprised of statements from third parties secured in the absence of the assessees and which statements the assessees had no opportunity of challenging. There is no doubt that such material cannot be utilised to the prejudice of the assessees without their being afforded a proper opportunity in that regard. In the result, the petition is allowed. The order of the Deputy Commissioner is set aside and the petitioner will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1963 (5) TMI 50 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o be undertaken by the buyer only on behalf of the sellers and not in exercise of any right which had passed to him. On a consideration of the material that is available here, we are fully satisfied that the property in the goods did not pass to the ultimate buyer till after the clearance of the goods such clearance was effected only on behalf of the assessees. In the face of the admitted position that there was no transfer of the documents of title, which alone could give an indefeasible right to the buyer to the goods, and in the light of the admission that the bill of entry was filed only in the name of the assessees, the inference is irresistible that the assessees were the owners of the goods till the goods were cleared from the customs, and it was only the subsequent delivery to the buyer that operated to transfer title to the goods. It follows that the order of the Board is correct. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (5) TMI 49 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... transactions carried out prior to 26th November, 1949, for the simple reason that they could not be said to have been carried out in accordance with the terms and conditions of the licence and was liable to be taxed to sales tax on it. There was no question of its being required to pay any more licence fee because it has not been shown that the licence fee paid by it was insufficient. My answer to question No. (3) is that the assessee was liable to pay sales tax on the turnover there was no question of its being required to pay any more licence fee. Copies of this judgment should be sent to the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax, U.P., and the Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P., under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar, as required by section 11(6) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The assessee should pay to the Commissioner the costs of this reference, assessed at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee may be assessed at Rs. 100. K.B. ASTHANA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1963 (5) TMI 48 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bullion is given the popular meaning or the meaning given to it in trade, that expression means not only pure gold or silver but also an alloy of gold or silver with such small percentage of some other metal as does not take away from it, the character of bullion. In the instant case also the petitioners purchased sokka thangam, mixed a small percentage of copper to make it sovereign gold and sold it to their customers for the purpose of making jewels. We think that the correct interpretation of the word bullion is the one given by the learned judges of the Mysore High Court and we prefer to follow their decision and with respect we differ from the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Akhraj Parakh v. The State of Andhra Pradesh(2). We hold that the word buillion is used to include all kinds of gold alloy of different grades of fineness suitable for the making of gold jewellery. The revision is accordingly allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1963 (5) TMI 47 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s took the precaution of showing the sales of paper and labour charges separately, the labour charges did not come within the scope of the definition of works contract, and as pure labour charges they were not taxable as the taxable turnover was below the minimum it was not liable to be taxed. In the instant case also the assessee has been careful enough to, prepare two separate bills one for the sale of cloth and the other for work charges. As both are exempted from liability to sales tax, the assessee would not be liable to pay any tax on the disputed turnover. We are satisfied that the nature of the transactions is such that there are two separate dealings. When once it is found that these are two separate transactions, the assessee would not be liable to pay sales tax either for the sale of cloth (that being exempt) or for work and labour. Therefore, we set aside the order passed by the Tribunal and allow this revision with costs, counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1963 (5) TMI 46 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rley and Company s case 1958 9 S.T.C. 353. Desai, C.J., in the concluding portion of his judgment held In the instant case what the customer wanted was the construction of bodies on the chassis of his buses. The assessee could have prepared the bodies first and then fixed them on to the chassis or could have started the construction of the bodies by putting one plank after another on the chassis themselves. All the materials were to be supplied by the assessee. The element of sale predominated over the element of contract of work. We would respectfully adopt these observations for the purposes of answering the first question. On the facts stated in the reference the conclusion is inescapable that the transactions which were entered into by the petitioner-firm were one of sale within the meaning of the word sale as given in the Act. The question is answered accordingly. In view of the nature of the points involved, we make no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1963 (5) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
The respondent company, which was incorporated in New York and carried on business in spices, brought a suit in the original side of the Bombay High Court against the appellant for recovery of a sum of Rs. 92,884-4-10 on the basis of a judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York affirming two awards obtained by it and also on the awards in the alternative. - The appellant failed to supply turmeric in terms of the two contracts it entered into with the respondent. The respondent put the matter into arbitration in pursuance of the arbitration clause. The appellant took no part in it. The arbitrators gave the two awards in favour of the respondent for damages. The appellant did not pay. The respondent then took appropriate proceedings and got the awards confirmed by the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York. The single judge of the Bombay High Court who tried the suit held that it was not maintainable either on the foreign judgment or on the awards and (dismissed the suit. The Division Bench on appeal held that the suit was maintainable on the awards, though not on the judgment, as part of the cause of action had arisen in Bombay and the relevant facts had been proved by the Public documents produced by the respondent and the admissions made by the appellant and decreed the suit. Held, (per Dayal and Mudholkar JJ.) The decision of the Single judge of the High Court that the suit was not maintainable on the foreign judgment must be affirmed but on other grounds.
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1963 (5) TMI 44 - IN THE CHANCERY DIVISION
Winding up – Avoidance of transfer, etc., after commencement of ... ... ... ... ..... creditor who has a charge upon the leasehold property such an amount as that creditor may be entitled to by virtue of that charge. I really have very little information about the solicitor s claim for a lien for costs, and I do not feel able to give any particular direction about that. If the solicitor is entitled to a lien, he will be in a position of a secured creditor to that extent in the winding up and can have recourse to his remedy as such. Muir Hunter. Would your Lordship authorise the payment of the costs of the solicitor out of the fund ? Buckley, J. I think that must be right. I will do that. Muir Hunter. Perhaps part of the direction could be without prejudice to such lien if any ? Buckley, J. Yes, I am quite content that some such words should be put in the order. I will direct that the costs of the company and of the petitioning creditor of this application shall be paid out of the proceeds of sale and that the balance of the proceeds should be paid into court.
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1963 (5) TMI 43 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
Accounts – Annual accounts and balance sheet ... ... ... ... ..... ould not lay the balance-sheet or profit and loss account because no meeting was called. This well known principle was emphasised in Park v. Lawton 1911 1 K.B. 588 and has been followed in India in a Calcutta decision in Debendra Nath Das Gupta v. Registrar of Joint Stock Companies 1952 22 Comp. Cas. 78, followed in Gangipati Appayya, In re I.L.R. 1918 45 Cal. 486 and B.N. Viswanathan v. Assistant Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, Madras 1953 23 Comp. Cas. 63 , while construing the corresponding provision of the old Indian Companies Act of 1913 (sections 76 and 133). Mr. Mohanty then relied on some observations in Narasimha Rao v. Emperor 1937 7 Comp. Cas. 80, but that case is fundamentally distinguishable on facts, and hence, it is unnecessary to discuss this point further. I must accordingly hold that the conviction of the managing director for the offence under section 210(5) was justified in law. The sentence is also not severe. All the revision petitions are dismissed.
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1963 (5) TMI 42 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... r counsel. The rest of the costs can be taken by the official liquidators from the estate. Except as directed herein, the parties will bear their own costs. We may formally point out that the result is that the official liquidators have succeeded in part in O.S.A. No. 8 of 1961 to the extent to which the liability of respondents Nos. 5, 7 and 8 has been increased to a sum of Rs. 2,000 plus Rs. 6,758 plus Rs. 10,000, that is, Rs. 18,758, from Rs. 10,000 fixed by the learned judge in respect of the irrecoverable advances made after March 7, 1947 and to the extent of Rs. 10,060 in respect of the liability for the period prior to March 7, 1947, which has been fastened on the 5 th respondent. Dr. T.S. Varadachari. The cross-objections in O.S.A. No. 8 of 1961 are dismissed without costs. The 8th respondent, Sri K.V. Ganapathi Subramania Iyer, will be entitled to have the liability of Rs. 25,000 plus Rs. 1,000 adjusted out of the deposits in his name and his son s name straightaway.
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1963 (5) TMI 31 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Memorandum of association – Special resolution and confirmation by CLB required for alteration of
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1963 (5) TMI 30 - SUPREME COURT
What is the meaning to be ascribed to the word " allotment" occurring in section 75(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 ?
Held that:- The word "allotment" in section 75(1) must be understood without reference to sub-section (5) in the same way as that word in section 104(1) had to be understood without reference to sub-section (4) of that section. It is safer to read sub-section (5) of section 75 as having been enacted ex abundant cautela, that is to say, to prevent any argument being raised that a return has to be filed of the reissued shares forfeited for non-payment of calls. We also agree with the view expressed in the High Court that the reason why only forfeiture for non-payment of calls was mentioned in section 104(4) of the Act of 1913 and section 75(5) of the present Act is, that there has always been a great deal of doubt, as will appear from the difference of opinion in the Calcutta High Court to which we have earlier referred, as to whether there can be any forfeiture of shares except for non-payment of calls which latter case had been expressly provided for by the statute. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (5) TMI 10 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the court would have been within its right to direct his name to be included in the register, even if the company was impleaded in the suit filed by, Sir Padampat against Reddy?
Held that:- We are however unable to grant the relief to the plaintiff in view of our finding that Reddy could not be compelled as constructive trustee to buy new shares in his own name for the cestui que trust and further in view of our finding that even if he could be compelled to acquire those shares in his own name for the cestui que trust he could not be said to have defaulted in his duty in carrying out the directions of the cestui que trust as in this case no proper and valid requisition was made by the cestui que trust on the trustee for the acquisition of those shares. The plaintiffs in the two suits are therefore not entitled to any relief.
For the reasons given above, we allow Reddy's appeal and dismiss the cross appeal of Sir Padampat as well as the receiver's appeal and dismiss both the suits, but in the circumstances of this case we will make no order as to costs in both the suits throughout.
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