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Showing 21 to 40 of 723 Records
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2009 (5) TMI 1002 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... court acquitted him on 30-1-2002. However, as the criminal court acquitted the appellant on 30-1-2002 and until such acquittal, there was no reason or ground to hold the dismissal to be erroneous, any relief monetarily can be only w.e.f. 30-1-2002. But by then, the appellant had retired; therefore, we deem it proper to set aside the order of dismissal without back wages. The appellant would be entitled to pension. 23. The facts in the aforesaid decision is more or less akin to the facts and circumstances of this case. Therefore, the issue that we have raised for our consideration need not detain us for a long. Therefore, we are of the view that the appellant is not entitled to back wages. The appellant would be entitled to pension only. 24. In the result, we allow this appeal. We set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge in CWJC No. 14536 of 2005 dated 02.05.2007 as affirmed in L.P.A. No. 521 of 2007 dated 12.07.007. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2009 (5) TMI 1001 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... licable to the first situation that we are concerned with but is being mentioned only to indicate the two distinct situations that can arise. 11. In view of the above, in our opinion Respondent No.3 could not succeed to the mere membership of his deceased mother, more particularly on the facts of this case because Respondent No.3 did not satisfy the eligibility conditions laid down in the Bye-Laws of the Petitioner-Society. We may note for the record that learned counsel for the Petitioner contended before us that the decision of the District Consumer Dispute Redressal Forum having attained finality, Respondent No.3 is bound by that decision and cannot agitate the claim all over again in a different forum. We are not going into this aspect of the matter because even otherwise on merits we are of the view that the impugned orders passed by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies and the Financial Commissioner are not sustainable in law. 12. The writ petition is allowed. No costs.
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2009 (5) TMI 1000 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tion for leave. Rather, the respondent thought that he had a right to desert the LINE at his sweet will. It was a case of gross violation of discipline. Appeal filed by the respondent employee was decided by the Statutory Appellate Authority giving cogent reasons. The facts of the case did not present special features warranting any interference by the Court in limited exercise of its powers of judicial review. In such a fact situation, we are of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the punishment order passed by the disciplinary authority on such technicalities. 29. In view of the above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 31.1.2002 in FMAT No. 1370 of 1992 and judgment and order dated 16.7.1991 of the learned Single Judge passed in Civil Order No. 3885 W of 1987 are hereby set aside and the order of punishment imposed by the statutory authority is hereby restored. No costs.
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2009 (5) TMI 999 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... into service by the petitioner Company in the present writ petition. He is unable to rebut the reasoning given by the Gujarat High Court while holding notification dated 12.06.2006 (Annexure P-6) as ultravires of the Act, 1992 so far as it gives retrospective effect. We are also in full agreement with the judgment passed by the High Court of Gujarat in the case of Welspun India Ltd. v. Union of India, rendered in Special Civil Application No. 19753 of 2006 decided on 30.11.2006. Adopting the same reasoning, we allow the present writ petition and quash the notification No. 08(RE-2006)/2004-2009 dated 12.06.2006 issued by the Director General of Foreign Trade and Ex-Officio Additional Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce (Annexure P-6) and declare it ultravires the Act, 1992 so far as it gives retrospective effect and the petitioners are held entitled to get duty credit entitlement certificate, if entitled to otherwise.
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2009 (5) TMI 998 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the article on payment of the personal penalty and redemption fine will not affect the assessment of the value of the seized jewellery under section 69A. Since section 69A does not provide for any deduction whatsoever in respect of addition, the claim for redemption fine later paid by the assessee for retrieving gold is not an admissible claim at all. So much so disallowance of the claim by the Assessing Officer and confirmed by the Tribunal is perfectly in order though not for the reasons stated by them. However, we make it clear that if retrieved gold is later taken as stock in business the assessee may be entitled to claim redemption fine paid as expenditure or cost. In any case since this issue does not arise for consideration for the assessment year in question, we do not propose to give any opinion about it. Since subsequent years’ assessment orders are not before us we do not give any direction in this regard. The appeal is dismissed with the above observations.
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2009 (5) TMI 997 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... J. ORDER Delay condoned. Issue notice.
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2009 (5) TMI 996 - SUPREME COURT
Commission of an offence u/s 341 IPC - Construction/tarring of the road - difficulties in ingress and egress to and from his house for a short while - Allegations against Managing Director and the Directors of the Company - Vicarious liability - M/s Gharda Chemicals Limited is a deemed public limited company registered and incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 - Appellant No. 1 (Accused No. 1) is the Chairman cum Managing Director of the said Company - Appellants 2 to 5 are the Directors thereof and the Appellant No. 6 is an Architect. It is stated that Appellants 1 and 3 are no longer associated with the Company - first respondent lodge a FIR after he allegedly found that the work had been continuing - Allegations at that point of time were confined to Accused Nos. 8, 9 and 11 at the first stage and to Accused Nos. 8, 10 and 11 at the second stage - Accused Nos. 7 to 10 were workers of the Company.
HELD THAT:- The statement made by the first respondent that accused Nos. 1 to 5 were managing the affairs of the Company and had instigated accused No. 6 to construct the road must be viewed. It is one thing to say that the Company had asked the accused No. 6 to make construction but only because the accused Nos. 1 to 5 were its Directors, the same, in our opinion, would not be sufficient to fasten any criminal liability on them for commission of an offence u/s 341 of the IPC or otherwise.
Appellants herein were not at the site. They did not carry out any work. No overt act or physical obstruction on their part has been attributed. Only because legal proceedings were pending between the Company and the Bombay Municipal Corporation and/or with the first respondent herein, the same would not by itself mean that appellants were in any way concerned with commission of a criminal offence of causing obstructions to the first respondent and his parents.
We have noticed hereinbefore that despite of said road being under construction, the first respondent went to the Police Station thrice. He, therefore, was not obstructed from going to Police Station. In fact, a firm action had been taken by the authorities. The workers were asked not to do any work on the road. We, therefore, fail to appreciate that how, in a situation of this nature, the Managing Director and the Directors of the Company as also the Architect can be said to have committed an offence u/s 341 of the IPC.
The ld Additional CJM, therefore, in our opinion, was not correct in issuing summons without taking into consideration this aspect of the matter. The Managing Director and the Directors of the Company should not have been summoned only because some allegations were made against the Company.
Indisputably, there might have been some delay on the part of the appellants in approaching HC but while adjusting equity the HC was required to take into consideration the fact that in a case of this nature the appellants would face harassment although the allegations contained in the Complaint Petition even assuming to be correct were trivial in nature. HC furthermore has failed to take into consideration the fact that in the first information report no allegation in regard to acts of common intention or common object on the part of the appellants was made out. Appellants were not named as accused therein. It is, therefore, really difficult to appreciate as to on what basis the Complaint Petition was filed.
Therefore, the impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed. The order summoning the appellant is quashed.
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2009 (5) TMI 995 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ches of the High Court with regard to the interpretations of Sections 9 and 23 of MCOCA. Except for the fact that the appellant has undergone a further period in custody, there is really no change in the circumstances under which his initial bail application was rejected. We, therefore, see no reason to entertain the appeal filed by him and the same is dismissed. 44. Criminal Appeal No.1085 of 2006 filed by Ashok son of Gyanchand Vohra and Criminal Appeal No.1088 of 2006 filed by Shabbir Noormohamed Patel will also stand disposed of along with the appeals filed by the State of Maharashtra in the same vein. 45. The appeals filed by the State of Maharashtra in respect of the writ petitions filed by Shri Rasiklal Manikchand Dhariwal and G.M. Joshi are delinked from the other appeals and disposed of with a direction to the High Court to dispose of their writ petitions expeditiously. Let the lower court records in respect of their matters be sent back to the High Court forthwith.
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2009 (5) TMI 994 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... such carry over unabsorbed depreciation cannot be added to the current depreciation of that year because until 2001 there is complete exclusion of the income from EOU. The AO is directed to recompute the eligible depreciation and carry over unabsorbed depreciation and business loss from 2001-02 onwards based on amendment. The assessee should be heard before orders are passed. Even though the Tribunal has given a finding for the asst. yr. 2001-02 the assessee cannot carry forward unabsorbed depreciation for the year 2003-04. Counsel for the appellant referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Manmohan Das 1966 59 ITR 699 (SC) wherein the Supreme Court has held that eligibility for carry forward of unabsorbed depreciation is to be considered in the succeeding year. The AO is directed to follow the decision of the Supreme Court on this issue. The appeal is disposed of setting aside the order of the Tribunal and we remand the case to the AO for passing fresh orders.
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2009 (5) TMI 993 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... Delay condoned. The civil appeal is dismissed.
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2009 (5) TMI 992 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the future and the possibility that his rise in his chosen field would now be restricted, are matters which cannot be taken care of under the multiplier method. 41. Civil appeal No.3126 of 2000 is allowed in the above term with costs of ₹ 50,000/-. It is also clarified that the complainant parents would be entitled to the sum awarded to them by the Commission. CA No.4119 of 1999 is dismissed. 42. Before we end, a word of appreciation for the complainant who, assisted by his father, had argued his matter. We must record that though a sense of deep injury was discernible throughout his protracted submissions made while confined to a wheel-chair, he remained unruffled and with behaved quiet dignity, pleaded his case bereft of any rancour or invective for those who, in his perception, had harmed him. 43. As the complainant is severely handicapped and has appeared in person, we direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to his address, free of cost, under registered cover.
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2009 (5) TMI 991 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat similar case was decided in the appellant's favour is correct in the facts and circumstances of this case? b) Whether the judgement of this Hon'ble Court in writ petition filed by the appellant on the ground of financial hardship operated as res judicata in considering the appellant's pleas for stay and waiver of condition of predeposit on new grounds and fresh evidence?
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2009 (5) TMI 990 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... following question "Whether producing a film would amount to manufacture under Section 80IA of the Income Tax Act?" To be listed on 10th September, 2009 for final disposal. Department to inform the assessee about the fixed date of final hearing.
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2009 (5) TMI 989 - SC ORDER
Cenvat/Modvat - Fraudulent availment of credit - penalty imposed - Held that:- Delay condoned - appeal dismissed.
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2009 (5) TMI 988 - COMPANY LAW BOARD NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... n 237(b) of the Act. The facts and circumstances of the case compel me to opine that this is a fit case for ordering an investigation under Section 237(b) of the Act. To prove this prima facie case of "intent to fraud" and misfeasance on the general public conducting the business of the company otherwise for a fraudulent and unlawful purpose, I have no hesitation in granting the petitioners' prayer for ordering an investigation under Section 237(b) of the Companies Act, 1956 in view of the foregoing. To do substantial justice between the parties, I hereby order that the investigation of the respondent companies be carried out by the Central Government under the provisions of Section 237(b) of the Companies Act, 1956 so that the truth can come out about the nature and modus operandi of these transactions. 36. Company Petition No. 6 of 2003 is hereby disposed of in the above terms. All CAs stand disposed of. All interim orders stand vacated. No order as to costs.
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2009 (5) TMI 987 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ship between the parties, restoring the petitioner as a director would only escalate the disputes and differences, I suggested that all the three shareholders could bid for the company and the successful bidder could take over the company. While the petitioner was agreeable to this suggestion, the respondents were not willing. Eventhough I have held that the directorship of the petitioner deserves to be restored, yet, it would not be in the interest of the company in view of the strained relationship among the parties. Since the petitioner is a minority shareholder, I direct the respondents to purchase the shares of the petitioner at a fair value to be determined by an independent valuer. For the purpose of appointing an independent valuer, the matter is fixed on May 26, 2009 at 4.00 p.m., when both the sides will suggest the name of a chartered accountant to determine the fair value of the shares. 10. The petition is disposed of in the above terms with no order as to costs.
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2009 (5) TMI 986 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... r the interregnum period. I further stipulate that, by using their majority shareholding and majority on the board, the petitioners shall not take any step to exclude the second respondent from the management and he will continue to discharge the functions as he was doing before March 31, 2007. The bank accounts shall be operated jointly by either of the petitioners and the second respondent so that neither side could allege siphoning off of funds, etc. Since, there has never been a post of managing director in the company, he shall cease to be the managing director with immediate effect. Whoever convenes a board meeting, the other two directors should be given five days' notice along with the agenda, and the directors shall sign the attendance register to be brought into use immediately. I only hope that the parties will work together for the betterment of the company from hence on as they had done for nearly 25 years. 13. The petition is disposed of in the above terms.
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2009 (5) TMI 985 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, CHENNAI
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... ... ..... nd out of the Machilipatnam Port Project as at 31.03.2008, which shall be ascertained by the Expert Valuer; (iii)The petitioners shall forthwith reconstitute the Board of directors of the Company, in exclusion of the nominees of the second respondent, upon which the Company is at liberty to carry on its business, in terms of the articles of association of the Company (iv)The petitioners shall keep informed the second respondent of any major developments in the Subarnarekha Port Project every month, within seven days of the following month commencing from June 2009, till completion of the whole of exit formalities of the second respondent from the Company. 10. With the above directions, the Company Petition and all the Company Applications stand disposed of, reserving the right to issue appropriate consequential directions, in terms of clauses (i ). & (ii)- of para 9 hereabove on 21.07.2009 at 2.30 PM. In view of this, all interim orders are vacated. No order as to costs.
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2009 (5) TMI 984 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d that the Magistrate had emphasized that he was considering the complaint at the pre cognizance stage which according to him was not correct. By deciding to examine the complainant and the witnesses under Section 202 of Code, the Magistrate had already taken cognizance of the offence and he was not considering the sworn statements of the witnesses at the pre cognizance stage. Learned Single Judge felt that enquiry was mandatory after 23.6.2006. 3. The legal position is unexceptionable. 4. In the background facts we do not think that any exception can be taken to the transfer as directed by learned Single Judge. The observations regarding the conduct are unnecessary and stand deleted. Learned Single Judge has directed that the Chief Judicial Magistrate shall have discretion to record further sworn statements if necessary in case he decides to take cognizance of the offence. The aforesaid observations and directions are also in order. 5. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.
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2009 (5) TMI 983 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... trade marks and device viz., device of QILLA, the words GOLDEN QILLA (word per se), LAL QILLA CHAPP (word per se), LAL QILLA (word and device mark) and NEEL QILLA in relation to the goods for which they were registered, i.e., rice. While the Defendants will be restrained forthwith as directed hereinbefore, they are granted 3 months' time to dispose of the current stock of rice packed in bags using the words HARA QILLA and device QILLA. In other words, the Defendants will forthwith stop the words HARA QILLA and device QILLA and will be permitted to dispose of the existing stocked of rice that has already been packed as of date within a period of three months from today subject of course to maintaining proper inventories and accounts which will be filed in the trial court every three months. 27. The learned single Judge is requested to expedite the trial of the suit and dispose it of within a period of one year from today. The trial court record will be returned forthwith.
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