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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 297 Records
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1994 (7) TMI 358 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rned by the law in force. Lilan being sister and nearer than the appellants could claim by virtue of the decree that the right and interest of alienor devolved on her. But if she did not, it could not recoil against the appellants and in favour of stranger. Further, Lilan undisputedly died during the pendency of the appeal in this Court. Therefore, the rights of the appellants even if they were dormant due to nearer reversioner being alive got activated after her death and it is appropriate in exercise of power both under Order 41 Rule XXXHI and under Article 142 of the Constitution to grant a decree in favour of appellants. May it be stated that appellants’ right flowing from the compromise decree had at no point of time been denied by Ulan during her life time. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the Division Bench in the Letters Patent is set aside and that of the learned Single Judge is restored. Parties shall bear their own costs.
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1994 (7) TMI 357 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... case1 with which we are in complete agreement. Since the review petition was dismissed on 15 3 1993 without noticing the said decision, it is needless to emphasise that the said dismissal does not come in our way for the view we are taking at present. (6) The result, therefore, is that the respondent employees in the present proceedings would be entitled to the revised pay scales only with effect from 1 4 1987 since the revised pay scales will be fixed for the first time with effect from that date. They are not entitled to any difference on the basis of the notional fixation of pay w.e.f. 1 1 1986. The arrears, if any, paid to the respondent employees on account of the notional fixation of their pay w.e.f. 1 1 1986 may be recovered from their future salaries. It is, however, made clear that the said arrears shall not be recovered from those of the employees who have already retired from service. The interlocutory application is allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1994 (7) TMI 356 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ent to public services. It is entirely different than an examination held by a college or university to award degrees to the candidates appearing at the examination. Even if a candidate is selected he may still be not appointed for a justifiable reason. In the present case the railway authorities have rightly refused to make appointments on the basis of the written examination wherein unfair means were adopted by the candidates. No candidate had been debarred or disqualified from taking the exam. To make sure that the deserving candidates are selected the respondents have been asked to go through the process of written examination once again. We are of the view that there is no violation of the rules of natural justice in any manner in the facts and circumstances of this case. 10. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the Tribunal and dismiss the application of the respondents filed before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta. No costs.
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1994 (7) TMI 355 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... 377; 42,922 as expenses claimed by the assessee. The assessee-trust incurred expenses of ₹ 42,922 for the purpose of buying movable properties for the objects of the trust. These were disallowed by the ITO. On appeal, the CIT(A) held that these expenses were incurred for running and maintenance of the trust and were allowable as deduction in view of the ratio of the decision of Delhi A' Bench in the case of Dharam Pratishthanam (supra). 8. After hearing both the parties, we do not find any infirmity in the order of the CIT(A). The expenses of ₹ 42,922 were incurred by the trust for the purpose of buying movable properties for the objects of the trust and accordingly these are allowable deduction. 9. The cross-objection filed by the assessee merely supports the order of the CIT(A). In view of our observations in Revenue's appeal, the cross-objection has become infructuous and is dismissed. 10. In the result the appeal and the cross-objection are dismissed.
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1994 (7) TMI 354 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be adjudicated upon in proceedings before a civil court or in other appropriate forum in accordance with law. At any rate, there are disputed questions of law and fact involved in the petition and I, therefore, hold that the winding up petition is not the proper remedy pursued by the petitioner in the circumstances of the present case. 8. Before concluding, it may be mentioned that whatever has been stated herein-above is only for the purposes of disposing of the present winding up petition and no observation of mine should be taken as an expression of my opinion on any of the issues that may arise before the Senior Subordinate Judge, Chandigarh before whom the award is being challenged and the said Court will decide the matter before it on its merits and in accordance with law without being influenced by anything stated herein . 9. For the reasons recorded above, I find no merit in the petition and the same stands dismissed with no order as to costs. 10. Petition dismissed.
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1994 (7) TMI 353 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e. 5. It is well-settled in this regard that interpretation of law is not the domain of the Board and any interpretation to be made by the Board is not binding either on the assessing authority or Courts insofar as the question of interpretation of law is concerned, though it may be read as an independent opinion of the Board which may or may not be accepted by the adjudicating authority after hearing the person concerned. Viewed from the aforesaid point of view, we think it appropriate to dispose of these petitions with observations that the concerned assessing authority will decide the question of deductibility of 2 per cent of the sum paid to any contractor independent of the view expressed in the impugned circular after giving the assessee concerned an opportunity and taking into consideration the relevant law including the aforesaid Supreme Court judgment without feeling bound by the impugned circular. Petitions stand disposed of, accordingly, with no order as to costs.
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1994 (7) TMI 352 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... permission to sell implicit in the form of the order enabled the appellants to purport to convey; respecting the goods, a better title than what appellants themselves had. That such a thing was achieved by an ex-parte order, tends to shake litigants' faith in the judicial process. The learned Sub-Judge, Ist class ought not to have made an ex-parte order which occasioned serious prejudice and loss to the respondent. On the administrative side, the High Court may have to look into the propriety of the conduct of the learned Sub-Judge, Ist Class, in this case. 16. In these facts and circumstances, what the learned Single Judge of the High Court did, which has since been approved by the Division Bench, is both good-sense and good law. There are, in our opinion, no legal infirmities in the orders under appeal. The appeals do not call for interference. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed with costs. The costs payable to the respondent are quantified at ₹ 25,000.
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1994 (7) TMI 351 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ntence of death also into a sentence for life imprisonment and modify the judgments of the two courts below accordingly. 108.In the result Criminal Appeal No. 329 of 1992 entitled Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar fails and is hereby dismissed. The conviction and sentences awarded to him by the two courts below are affirmed. The Criminal Appeal No. 159 of 1992 entitled Gurbachan Singh v. State of Bihar and Criminal Appeal No. 160 of 1992 entitled Raj Pal Sharma v. State of Bihar are hereby partly allowed to the extent indicated above. The conviction of the appellants Gurbachan Singh under Sections 302/120-B and 201 as well as conviction of appellant and Raj Pal Sharma under Sections 302, 302/120- B and 201 of the Penal Code are maintained but the sentence of death awarded to both of them under Sections 302, 302/120-B is set aside and instead they are sentenced to life imprisonment. Their sentence under Section 201 is maintained. All the sentences shall run concurrently.
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1994 (7) TMI 350 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nditure. 3. The second question raised is purely a question of fact and in the statement of case no facts have been stated. The Tribunal has only observed in respect of both the questions that the questions of law do arise- out of the order of the Tribunal. The statement of the ease was accordingly drawn but neither any facts have been stated nor it could be considered that the question raised by the assessee is a question of law and, therefore, we refuse to answer the said question. It is the factual position which has to be determined by the Departmental authorities with regard to disallowance out of the car expenses and depreciation on car on account of personal use by the partner. No question can be said to have arisen out of the order of the Tribunal. Therefore, we refuse to answer the said question. 4. Consequently, the question No. 1 is answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee and no answer is given in respect of question No. 2. No order as to costs.
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1994 (7) TMI 349 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sed as withdrawn and not pressed in view of the endorsement made in this case also, making it clear that the dismissal of the said writ petition shall not be construed as an expression of any opinion on the validity of the provisions themselves. 6. So far as W.P. No. 1353 of 1993 is concerned, the petitioner shall have liberty to move the concerned ITO/assessing authority or/and CBDT for appropriate relief and orders depending upon the nature of grievance and the relief that is sought for. As and when the petitioner in the above writ petition moves the CBDT or the authorities concerned, such authority shall consider the claim so made by the petitioner in the light of the directions issued in W.P. Nos. 2528 to 2539, etc., of 1993 dated 13-12-1993, of course, after giving notice and opportunity to the petitioner or his representative to represent his case and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. This writ petition is finally disposed of on the above terms. No costs.
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1994 (7) TMI 348 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rovisions of Section 6(3-A) of the Act and Section 3(2) of the Bombay Act are entirely different. On the plain reading of Section 3(2) of the Bombay Act it is patent that the Maharashtra Legislature was making law in respect of the land held by a person anywhere in India. The expression "all land field by a person or as the case may be by a family unit whether in this State or any other part of India ..." clearly indicates the intention on the part of the Maharashtra Legislature to make extraterritorial law. No assistance can, thus, be taken by the learned counsel from the Full Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court. Even otherwise we are of the view that various observations made by the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court are, rather, broadly stated and require to be straightened, if necessary, in some appropriate proceedings. 10. The appeals are dismissed with costs. We quantify the costs as ₹ 10,000 in each appeal to be paid by each of the appellants.
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1994 (7) TMI 347 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ng and mineral lease or leases granted by the appel-lants to third parties, since that question was neither canvassed in the High Court, nor any factual foundation laid before us. We declined to go into that question. For well over twelve years the appellants worked the mines etc. by obtaining stay of operation of law and had appropriated the mines or minerals or quarries from the respective lands. The appeals are accordingly dismissed with quantified costs at ₹ 1,00,000 in each set. Compensation or amount payable under Section 69A(4) of the Code may be worked out and the costs be set off in working out the amount and the balance, if any, be recovered from the appellants. This ex&rcise should be done within three months from the date of the receipt of the judgment. Working the mines etc. should be stopped forthwith by either the appellant, their lessees, or any body in the feigned camouflaged or coloured shoes. The State should take immediate action is this behali.
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1994 (7) TMI 346 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y consider if he can be allowed to complete his studies in the institution. However, on the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Constitution this Court was clear in its view that legally speaking he was not entitled to admission in the Scheduled Tribe quota. 18. We are in respectful agreement with the above view expressed by the Constitution Bench in the aforesaid decision. All the points which were canvassed before us by Mr Raju Ramachandran were also canvassed by him in the said matter. They were negatived by the Constitution Bench. Nothing has been pointed out to persuade us to think that the view taken by the Constitution Bench requires reconsideration by a larger Bench. In fact we are in complete agreement with the interpretation placed on the various provisions of the Constitution, in particular Articles 341 and 342 thereof, in the said judgment. We, therefore,, see no merit in this writ petition and dismiss the same. However, we make no order as to costs.
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1994 (7) TMI 345 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... Special Leave Petition is dismissed on merits.
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1994 (7) TMI 344 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... med that such a reference was, in fact, made by the Collector and is pending. By interim orders this Court stayed further proceedings of the reference. Accordingly we dismiss the appeals and direct the civil court to expeditiously determine the market value according to law. However, it is made clear that the observation of the High Court in the judgment under appeals "that the civil court shall not be bound by the terms of the agreement Ex. P-1 in the matter of determining the compensation" cannot come in the way of the Land Acquisition Collector relying upon the agreement as a piece of evidence as to what the parties had thought to be the market value of the acquired property with reference to the date of publication of preliminary notification and the court deciding on its evidentiary value in the matter of determination of the market value of the acquired property. 8. The appeals are dismissed, but in the circumstances parties would bear their respective costs.
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1994 (7) TMI 343 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the Act read with Section 167(2) of the Code before the Designated Court the rejection of their Bail Application Nos. 195 and 196 of 1993 by the Designated Court cannot be found fault with at all. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned order of the Designated Court rejecting the bail applications does not merit any interference. Both the appeals have no merit and are hereby dismissed. 74.We may, however, clarify that the non-interference with the impugned order of the Designated Court, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of these appeals, should not be construed as any expression of opinion on the merits of the case. It has been submitted before us that applications under Section 20(8) of TADA have already been filed and are pending disposal before the Designated Court. The Designated Court shall deal with those applications on their own merits, uninfluenced by the dismissal of these appeals and dispose the same of expeditiously in accordance with law.
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1994 (7) TMI 342 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he land vests in the State to whom the rent is payable. It is not uncommon that a person in 2 ILR 7 All 553 (FB) 5 AWN (1885) 108 possession of an agricultural holding even as an owner cannot put his land to any use as he desires. For instance, if the land has to be converted from agricultural use to non-agricultural use then the tenure-holder is required to obtain permission of the State Government or the appropriate authority appointed by it. All these indicate that even though a khatedar tenant is an owner for all practical purposes but his ownership is limited and, therefore, the transfer by a khatedar tenant of an agricultural holding does not give right to a co-sharer to claim right of pre- emption. The submission that the ownership of the State was a mere fiction cannot be accepted. Right of preemption is a right of substitution in ownership either of land or house. It is not available in transfer of tenancy. 6. In the result, all these appeals fail and are dismissed.
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1994 (7) TMI 341 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... which exemption was granted. The restriction imposed is neither arbitrary nor retrospective. 7.. Counsel for the petitioner then contended that his appeal be ordered to be heard on merits as the respondent-authorities have already recovered nearly 60 per cent of the tax due, i.e., Rs. 5,11,000 by auction and a sale of the property and Rs. 1,00,000 deposited through a bank draft. We find force in this submission. Petitioner-company has suffered a loss of nearly rupees two crores and keeping in view this aspect and that nearly 60 per cent of the tax has already been recovered, we direct the First Appellate Authority, i.e., Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner (Appeals), Rohtak to hear the appeal on merits and dispose of the same after affording due opportunity on hearing to the petitioner. The condition of deposit of the remaining tax as a pre-condition for hearing the appeal is dispensed with. Parties are directed to appear before the Appellate Authority on August 3, 1994.
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1994 (7) TMI 340 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... instructions, we would like to make it clear that the appellate authority is not bound by the same as he is, in exercise of quasi-judicial functions, expected to give an objective disposal to the appeal in accordance with law. 5.. In the circumstances of the case, while we express our disinclination to entertain this writ petition, we direct that there shall be stay of recovery of tax pursuant to the impugned demand, for a period of one month from today. It is open to the petitioner to file an appeal and move the appellate authority for stay pending appeal. If an appeal is filed within two weeks from today the same shall be entertained without raising any objection as to limitation. We also direct, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, that the appeal shall be disposed of within a period of three months from the date of filing the same. The writ petition is summarily disposed of with the above directions and observations. No costs. Writ petition dismissed
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1994 (7) TMI 339 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to a unit which is declared as a sick unit and since the petitioner s unit was not declared as a sick unit, it would not be entitled for the same. We would not like to enter into a controversy which is not relevant in this case. Once it is not disputed that the petitioner s unit continued without any break for more than six months, that is, till March 31, 1986, there is no justification for the respondent to decline to grant the eligibility certificate to the petitioner at least till March 31, 1986. With the above observations, the writ petition is allowed. The order dated March 28, 1988, rejecting the review application of the petitioner (annexure 5 o the writ petition) and order dated March 19, 1988 (annexure 3 ) is hereby quashed with the direction to respondent No. 2 to issue the eligibility certificate to the petitioner in the light of the observations made by this Court earlier. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs. Petition allowed.
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