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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 567 Records
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1997 (7) TMI 683 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... personal asset to the partnership firm represents a real attempt to contribute to the share capital of the partnership firm for the purpose of carrying on the partnership business or is nothing but a device or ruse to convert the personal asset into money substantially for the benefit of the assessee while evading tax on a capital gain. 4. There is no finding by the Tribunal that transferring the property towards the capital was a device or a ruse. In view of the above authority, it must be held that making over the property to the firm by the assessee as his contribution towards its capital cannot fall within the terms of s. 48 and that such a case must be regarded as falling outside the scope of capital gain tax altogether. We, therefore, hold that though the transfer of the property by the assessee towards capital of the firm amounts to transfer but on the facts and circumstances of the case, that cannot be subjected to capital tax. The reference is answered accordingly.
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1997 (7) TMI 682 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ded to grant an ex parte ad interim injunction confiding in the applicant that having been shown indulgence by the court he would comply with the requirements of the proviso, it would simply vacate the ex parte order of injunction without expressing any opinion of the merits of the case leaving it open to the parties to have a hearing on the grant or otherwise on the order of injunction but bi-part only. The applicant would be told that by this conduct (mis-conduct to be more appropriate) he has deprived the opponent of an opportunity of having an early or urgent hearing on merits and, therefore, the ex parte order of injunction cannot be allowed to operate any more. 37. The appeal is allowed. The impugned order of injunction granted by the learned Single Judge is set aside. The plaintiff respondent's seeking the injunction is dismissed. Defendant-appellants' application seeking vacating of the ex parte injunction is allowed. No order as to costs. 38. Appeal allowed.
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1997 (7) TMI 681 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... o the appellant. This being so, the grievance made in these appeals no longer survives. Learned counsel also stated that the balance amount of duty required to be paid by the appellant according to the Tribunal’s order dated 8th February, 1990 as clarified by the subsequent order dated 11th/12th April, 1994, has already been paid because in fact the amount paid is even in excess thereof. This being so, these appeals have become infructuous and it is unnecessary to go into the merits of the points which have been raised in these appeals. These appeals are dismissed accordingly. However, the department will give effect to the Tribunal’s order dated 11th/12th April, 1994.
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1997 (7) TMI 680 - AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULINGS, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... sition. Subject to verification, if need be, by the departmental authorities as to whether, in fact, the applicant has had no dealings with Mabanaft in India, it is clearly a case where the applicant can be said to be rendering services to Mabanaft from India and in view of the Explanation services should, therefore, be deemed to be services rendered outside India. 14. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the Authority pronounces the following ruling in the present case RULING Question Answer Whether under the facts and circumstances stated in the Statement of Facts, the applicant Isentitled to deduction under section 80-O of the Act in respect of consideration received in terms interms of the consultancy agreement entered into between the applicant and Mabanaft A.G., Switzerland. Yes, subject to the other conditions in section 80-O of the Act that the payment should be in 'convertible foreign exchange' and should be received in India within a prescribed period,
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1997 (7) TMI 679 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ce amount remaining after adjusting the dues to the Corporation, should go in discharge of the Company's dues to the Vysya Bank. The 1st respondent Company was not able to explain what was the occasion for the Company to ask the Vysya Bank to move the Corporation, The sale of the unit was on 13.3.1995, the same was approved by the Board of the Corporation on 13.5.1995 and the purchaser had deposited the entire sale consideration on 21.6.1995. It is not in dispute that the Corporation has paid the Vysya Bank the amount covered by the certificate out of the balance of the sale proceeds that remained with the Corporation. This conduct of the company precludes it from questioning the sale. 23. For all the aforesaid reasons, we allow both the civil appeals, set aside the judgment of the Division Bench and dismiss the Writ Petition filed by the 1st respondent with costs. The costs are quantified at ₹ 10,000 and are to be shared equally by the appellants in these appeals.
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1997 (7) TMI 678 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ch are filed in view of the conflicting views taken by two Division Benches. The State has also come in appeal before us. All the parties are agreed that the appropriate course would be to refer the matter to the Full Bench of the Patna High Court. All these appeals are, therefore, remanded to the High Court of Patna. The Chief Justice of that High Court may constitute a Full Bench for deciding all issues which were raised before the Division Bench in the impugned judgment. Although the departure from the earlier decisions of the Division Bench may not be on all issues raised before the Court, since the appeals are being remanded to the High Court, it is desirable that the Full Bench, in considering all these matters, deals with all the issues which were raised and considered by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment. 4. If any of the parties concerned desires to apply for any interim orders it may do so before the High Court. 5. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.
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1997 (7) TMI 677 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... maintaining discipline amongst members and punish those who go astray from the path of rectitude set out for them. In the present case the Bar council of India, through its disciolinary committee, has considered all the relevant circumstances and has come to the conclusion that P.D. Gupta, advocate is guilty of misconduct and we see no reason to take a different view. o p /o p We also find no ground to interfere with the punishment awarded to P.D. Gupta in the circumstances of the case. o p /o p The charge of professional or other misconduct by an advocate is a serious matter and has to be considered and disposed of by the Disciplinary committee of a state Bar council expeditiously and with in period of one year. We are unable to comprehend as to why the Disciplinary Committee of the Delhi Bar council could not dispose of the matter within the prescribed time frame and it was left the apex body to deal with it. o p /o p The appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. o p /o p
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1997 (7) TMI 676 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sdiction one way or the other under Order XLI Rule 27 specially clause (b). If the order was wrong on merits, it would always be open for the respondent to challenge same in accordance with law if an occasion arises to carry the matter in Second Appeal after an appellate decree is passed. But at this interim stage, the High Court should not have felt itself convinced that the order was without jurisdiction. Only on this short question, without expressing any opinion on the merits the controversy involved and on the legality of the contentions advanced by both the learned counsel for the parties regarding additional evidence, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court. In the result, the Additional District Judge, Ferozepur shall now decide the appeal on its own merits. We make it clear that the order of the learned Additional District Judge, Ferozepur dated 12.12.1995 shall now be complied with, subject to the liberty reserved to the respondent as aforesaid.
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1997 (7) TMI 675 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... e difference of expenses incurred out of unaccounted income; and (2) ₹ 9.49 lakhs is spread over between Kishorilal F. Jhunjhunwala, Nirmal P. Jhunjhunwala, Niranjan P. Jhunjhunwala and Purshottamdas F. Jhunjhunwala for asst. yr. 1987-88. These differences are basically for difference in valuation of the jewellery, therefore, in my opinion, cannot be termed as concealment and penalty cannot be levied for this amount. 28. Apart from asst. yr. 1987-88, in some of the cases it is claimed that the additional income was offered in the returns filed for the first time and there were no assessments made earlier prior to the disclosure. In such cases, I find myself in agreement with the assessee's contention that when the income is disclosed in the first return itself, no penalty can be levied for concealment. This is because the concealment has to be in the return of income. Assessees to furnish the particulars before passing of the final order under s. 255(4) of the Act.
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1997 (7) TMI 674 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ot over age on the cut off date which was, in that case 1st of January, 1992. The contention was raised on a wrong reading of the date of birth. It is now accepted by the parties that the correct date of birth of the petitioner in that case was 1st of January, 1959 and not 19th January 1959 as originally urged. The petitioner would, therefore, complete 33 years of age which was the maximum age prescribed in the concerned advertisement, on 1st of January 1992, the cut off date. His case, therefore, is not different from the case of other aggrieved candidates before us who are age barred on the cut off date. In the premises the appeals of the candidates who have challenged the cut off date under the relevant Rules are dismissed while the appeal filed by the State of Rajasthan are allowed. The validity of the concerned Rules relating to the cut off date being fixed with reference to 1st January of the year following the application is upheld. There will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (7) TMI 673 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
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... ... ..... llation of the impugned shares. Thus, signifying the fact, the petitioner had not chosen to challenge the cancellation for such a long period. Therefore, even though we have held that the Limitation Act is not applicable in proceedings before the Company Law Board, yet we are conscious that a person who delays exercising his right of action cannot expect the Company Law Board to close its eyes to the inaction on the part of such a person for a long period. 8. Therefore, considering the entire matter in totality, we find that the petitioner had not been able to satisfy us properly regarding his inaction for over a period of 11 years in moving this petition and as such on account of delay and laches, the petition should be dismissed. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the various contentions raised by the parties in regard to the validity of the cancellation of the shares, we dismiss this petition as time-barred and as such not maintainable. 9. No order as to costs.
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1997 (7) TMI 672 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 9693/96 decided on 16.12.96, hear the Revision Application again and give a fresh decision in the matter ignoring the earlier revisional order. In view of this statement, the learned Counsel for the petitioners states that the petitioners do not press for this petition. Notice is discharged with no order as to costs.
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1997 (7) TMI 671 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... onflict upon the two Benches. The large Bench, then, has to consider the correctness of earlier decision in disposing of the later application. The larger Bench can over-rule the view taken in the earlier judgment and declare the law, which would be binding on all the Benches (See Jhon Lucas (supra). In the present case, what we find is that tribunal rejected the application of the appellants thinking that appellants are seeking setting aside of the decision of the tribunal in Transfer Application No. 263 of 1986. This view taken by the Tribunal was not correct. The application of the appellant was required to be decided in accordance with law. For the aforesaid reasons, the order of the Administrative Tribunal dated 14.8.1987 passed in O.A. No. 47 of 1990 is set aside and the case is sent back to the Tribunal for decision on merits preferably within three months from the date of receipt of the copy of the Judgment. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1997 (7) TMI 670 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... as of right is not entitled to the promotion as PGT (Sanskrit), that too in a post reserved for Scheduled Castes. But since the first respondent has been working since 1986 in PGT (Sanskrit) from June, 1986 when the post fell vacant, the facts and circumstances, we think that the appellants have to be directed to create a supernumerary post of PGT (Sanskrit) and allow the first respondent to continue in that post till he retires. That post may be be created in any school or directorate as the case may be. He would be entitled to the scale of pay of PGT (Sanskrit) from the date of the creation of the post. This direction to adjust him by creation of supernumerary post and to permit the first respondent to continue in that post should not be treated as a precedent in any other case. No one is entitled to jump the regular channel merely on the basis of by qualification acquired or the basis of having officiated in a higher post. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.
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1997 (7) TMI 669 - AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULINGS
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... ... ..... to the extent any such exemption is conferred by the Government. 4. Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the applicant will not be taxable in India on capital gains (whether long-term or short-term) arising from the transfer of securities it holds in Indian companies ? Not taxable in view of article 13 of the DTAA. 5. Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the activities of the Indian advisor will constitute a permanent establishment of the applicant in India ? Question not pressed. No ruling. 6. Whether, on the facts and the circumstances of the case, any other income earned by the applicant not being in the nature of dividends, interest, capital gains, business income or any other income which is not expressly covered by any other article under the Treaty, for example income from units of a mutual fund in India, will be taxed in Mauritius only and not in India ? Yes, income derived from units of mutual funds will not be liable to tax in India.
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1997 (7) TMI 668 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ment of the depreciation allowance between two entities. I am, therefore, of the opinion that full depreciation is allowable to the firm that existed during the 2nd period. As regards the firm that existed in the first period, the assessee has admittedly made no claim for deduction on account of depreciation and, therefore, I refuse to entertain its plea that the ITO should have on his own allowed full depreciation. It follows that no depreciation would be allowable to the firm that existed in the first period and full depreciation as claimed by the assessee, would be allowable to the firm that existed during the 2nd period." The Tribunal affirmed the aforesaid finding of the AAC. We do not see any legal infirmity in the view taken by the AAC which was affirmed by the Tribunal. The standing counsel also could not point out any legal infirmity to us. We, therefore, decide the third question also in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1997 (7) TMI 667 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and the execution of the housing project "Anupama" by this joint sector company, in the given circumstances, on the land in question which is part of the bigger piece of land is not in public interest. The Housing Board acts as regulatory body and the State Government overseas the housing project and has also imposed certain terms and conditions. No ulterior purpose has been alleged and it cannot be said that the power exercised by the State authorities are in any way arbitrary or irrational or there is any abuse of power. Rather the legal compulsion of the State and the Housing Board to get the housing project executed through a joint sector company is quite understandable. We also find the impugned action is within the purview of law and is valid. Accordingly, these appeals are allowed, judgment of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court is set aside and the writ petitions filed by the respondents are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (7) TMI 666 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... aid applications. The correctness of the decision of the Full Bench of the Tribunal has been affirmed by this Court in Chairman, Railway Board & Ors. V. C.R. Rangadhamaiah & Ors., Civil Appeals Nos. 4174-4182 of 1995 and connected matters decided today. Having regarding to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that this was a fit case in which the Tribunal should have condoned the delay in the filing of the application and the appellants should have been given relief in the same terms as was granted by the Full Bench of the Tribunal. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the impugned judgment of the Tribunal is set aside, the delay in filing of O.A. No. 774 of 199 is condoned and the said application is allowed. The appellants would be entitled to the same relief in matter of pension as has been granted by the Full Bench of the Tribunal in its judgment dated December 16, 1993 in O.A. Nos. 395-403 of 1993 and connected matters. No order as to costs.
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1997 (7) TMI 665 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... decisions of this Court in Union of India and Others v. Bombay Tyres International Pvt. Ltd., 1984 (17) E.L.T. 329 (S.C.) and Government of India v. Madras Rubber Factory Ltd., 1995 (77) E.L.T. 433 (S.C.) (at page 469 - paras 61 and 62), this appeal has to be dismissed. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed. Civil Appeal Nos. 15457-15459 of 1996 In terms of the signed order, the appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment of the Tribunal is set aside.
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1997 (7) TMI 664 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... TO (1996) 221 ITR 557has held that if the Supreme Court has construed the meaning of a section then any direction to the contrary given by any authority must be held to be erroneous and as such error must be treated as an error apparent on the records. 27. When the effect of a decision of the Supreme Court is well settled as above, then it is quite pertinent that in the present case where the Assessing Officer';s action has been found to be in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court then how the Tribunal can sustain the assessee';s plea that a circular has binding precedence over the decision of the Hon';ble Supreme Court. We, in view of the above discussion, are of the opinion that the Tribunal is bound by the Supreme Court decision in the case of Vijaya Bank Ltd. (supra) and respectfully following the same we reverse the order of the CIT(Appeals) and allow the Revenue';s ground. 28. This para is not reproduced here as it involves minor issue.
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