|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 110 Records
-
1974 (8) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... make the recommendation. We see no reason why the Division Bench should have departed from the procedure prescribed by the statute. The observance of the procedure laid down by statute before depriving a person of his property is necessary to generate the feeling that rule of law prevails in this country. When a procedure is prescribed by the legislature, it is not for the court to substitute a different one according to its notion of justice. When the legislature has spoken, the judges cannot afford to be wiser. We quash the declaration published under s. 6 of the Act and direct the Land Acquisition Collector to enquire into the objection after giving an opportunity to the appellant of being heard and make the necessary recommendation to the appropriate Government. The appropriate Government will proceed further in the light of its decision on the recommendation. We set aside the order of the Division Bench and allow the appeal but make no order as to costs. Appeal allowed
-
1974 (8) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ell. Evert in cases of alleged breaches of mandatory duties the salutary general rule which is subject to certain exceptions applied by us as it is in England when writ of Mandamus is asked for could be stated as we find it set out in Halsbury's Taws of England (3rd edition vol. 13 p. 106) "As a general rule the order will not be granted unless the party complained of has known what it was he was required to do so that he had the means of considering whether or not he should comply and it must be shown by evidence that there was a distinct demand of that which the party seeking the mandamus desires to enforce and that that demand was met by a refusal." in the cases before us there was no such, demand refusal. Thus no ground whatsoever is shown here for the issue of any writ order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution. These appeals must be and are hereby dismissed but in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
-
1974 (8) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... o the cooperative housing societies would not make the acquisition one for company'. Nor are we satisfied that there is any merit in the contention that compensation to be paid for the acquisition came from the consideration paid by the cooperative societies. In the light of the averments in the counter affidavit filed in the writ petitions here, it is difficult to hold that it was cooperatives which provided the fund for the acquisition. Merely because the Government allotted a part of the property to cooperative societies for development, it would not follow that the acquisition was for cooperative societies, and therefore, Part VII of the Act was attracted. It may be noted that the validity of the notification under s. 4 and the declaration under s. 6 was in issue in Udai Ram Sharma and Others v. Union of India(1) and this Court upheld their validity. We see no merit in the appeals and the writ petitions. They are, therefore, dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.
-
1974 (8) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... factual withdrawal has no legal effect. It is no withdrawal at all, because the candidate continues to be contesting candidate and be is as much in the contest as he was before the announcement. The word withdrawal', in the context in which it occurs, cannot be read in a loose and inexact sense to mean something which it plainly does not. We are, therefore, of the view that the words "to withdraw or not to withdraw from being a candidate" in clause (a) of sub-section (A) of section 123 refer to the stage of withdrawal of candidature under section 37 and they do not apply to a situation where a contesting candidate announces that lie does not wish to contest the election or declares his intention to sit down after the last date for withdrawal of candidatures under section 37 is past and a list of contesting candidates is Published under section 38. Mohd. Yunus Saleem's case, (supra) in so far as it takes a different view, must be regarded as wrongly decided.
-
1974 (8) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d respondent is likely to have spent money An excess of statutory power cannot be validated by acquiescence in or by the operation of an estoppel. The Court declines to interfere for the assistance of persons who seek its aid to relieve them against express statutory provision. Lord Selborne in Maddison v. Alderson 1883 8 App. Cases 467 said that courts of equity would not permit the statute to be made an instrument of fraud. The impeached resolution of the Municipality has no legal foundation. The High Court was wrong in not quashing the resolution on the surmise that money might have been spent. Illegality is incurable. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is accepted. The order of the High Court leaving resolution dated 19 June, 1970 being Annexure 'D' to the Petition undisturbed is set aside. The resolution dated 19 June, 1970 being Annexure 'D' to the Petition before the High Court is quashed. The parties will pay and bear their own costs Appeal allowed
-
1974 (8) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n and Ors. v. Secretary of State for India in Council and Anr. K.R. 28 I.A. 211. Lala Beni Ram and Anr. v. Kundan Lall and Ors. 26 I.A. 58 at pp. 63-64. Subodh Chand Mitter v. Bhagwandas Saha 50 Calcutta Weekly Notes p. 129 at pp. 856 and 863. Sir J.W. Ramsden v. Lee Dyson and Joseph Ithornton 1966 (1) House of Lords p. 129 at p. 1401. Willmott v. Barber (7) The appellants could not bring their case, on facts found, within the principles laid down in these cases. 6. There is no question of applying order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C. when the cause of action for the suit before us is different from the causes of action in the suit which were compromised. The failure of the defendants to carry out the terms of the compromise decrees constitutes a part of the cause of action in the suit before us. We, therefore, finding ourselves in agreement with the High Court and trial court, dismiss this appeal, but in the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs in this Court.
-
1974 (8) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he course of an investigation, that section 162 of the Code applied with full force to the inquiry proceedings and that in taking signatures of witnesses on the statements made by them the inquiry officer had committed a flagrant violation of section 162 of the Code. We may add that apart from the statements made by witnesses during the inquiry which were brought on the record of the case by the learned Magistrate, there was before him the evidence of the witnesses who were examined in the court and therefore the entire trial could in any case not be said to have been vitiated. At best the High Court should have excluded from consideration what it thought was inadmissible in evidence. In the result we set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the learned Civil and Sessions Judge, Gorakhpur. The evidence shows clearly that the respondent was in possession of Railway property and had thereby committed an offence under section 3(a) of the Act. Appeal allowed.
-
1974 (8) TMI 108 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... f this Court the accent has shifted, the canons have varied and predictability has proved difficult because the play of legal light and shade has been baffling. The learned Chief Justice has in his judgment, tackled this problem and explained the rule which must govern the determination of the question as to when termination of service of a probationer can be said to amount to discharge simpliciter and when it can be said to amount to punishment so as to attract the inhibition of Art.311. We are in agreement with what the learned, Chief Justice has said in this connection. So far as the present case is concerned, it is clear on the facts set out in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice that there is breach of the requirements of Rule 7 and the orders of termination passed against the appellants are, on that account liable to be quashed and set a side. In the result, we agree with the conclusion reached by the learned Chief Justice and concur in the order proposed by him.
-
1974 (8) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... stituting a suit for recovery of possession under s. 13(1)(e) on the ground that the tenant had sub-lot the premises. The position, therefore, was that the landlord was entitled to recover possession of the promises under s. 13(1) of the Saurashtra Act on the ground that the tenant sub-let the premises. It would follow that a right accrued to the landlord to recover possession under s. 13(1) of the Saurashtra Act when the tenant sub-let the premises during the currency of that Act and the right survived the repeal of that Act under proviso (2) to s. 51 of the Bombay Act and, therefore, the suit for recovery of possession of the premises under s. 13(1) read with clause (e) of the Saurashtra Act after the repeal of that Act on the basis of the sub-letting during the currency of the Saurashtra Act was maintainable. In this view, we think that the judgment of the High Court must be up held and we do so. The appeal is dismissed, but we make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1974 (8) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ppeal being in the nature of a re-hearing that the courts in this country have in numerous cases recognized that in moulding the relief to be granted in a case on appeal, the court of appeal is entitled to take into account even facts and events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against. As an appeal is a re-hearing, it would follow that if the High Court were to dismiss the appeal, it would be passing a decree in a suit for pre-emption. Therefore, the only course open to the High Court was to allow the appeal and that is what the High Court has done. In other words, if the High Court were to confirm the decree allowing the suit for pre-emption. it would be passing a decree in a suit for preemption, for, when the appellate court confirms a decree, it passes a decree of its own, and therefore, the High Court was right in,-allowing the appeal. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal but, in the circumstances,’ make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1974 (8) TMI 105 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e learned counsel. 5. The crucial question to be determined is whether 12,724 Mds. of sugar which subsequently got damaged and was reprocessed, could be considered to be sugar produced during the year 1956-57. The Union of India has not controverted the allegations made in the petition that they 12.724 Mds. of sugar had actually been produced by the Petitioner factory during the 1959-60 season. Merely because it became damaged and was not immediately marketable and required reprocessing, it did not mean that quantity of sugar was not produced in 1959-60 season. Sugar was therefore, part of the production of 1959-60 season and the petitioner company was entitled to the benefit of the concession given by G.S.R. No. 706 in respect of it. In our opinion the learned Single Judge was right in quashing the demand as also the various orders passed by the Asstt. Collector, Central Excise and the Union Government. 6. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with cost.
-
1974 (8) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
Whether Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 being Act No. 26 of 1971 valid?
Whether a detention order is valid or not?
Held that:- The Act does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. Merely because a detenu is liable to be tried in a criminal court for the commission of a criminal offence or to be proceeded against for preventing him from committing offences dealt with in Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not by itself debar the Government from taking action for his detention under the Act. Second, the fact that the Police arrests a person and later on enlarges him on bail and initiates steps to prosecute him under-the Code of Criminal Procedure and even lodges a first information report may be no bar against the District Magistrate, issuing an order under the preventive detention. Third, where the concerned person is actually in jail custody at the time when an order of detention is passed against him and is not likely to be released for a fair length of time, it may be possible to contend that there could be no satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority as to the likelihood of such a person indulging in activities which would jeopardise the security of the State or the public order. Fourth, the mere circumstance that a detention order is passed during the pendency of the prosecution will not violate the order. Fifth, the order of detention is a precautionary measure. It is based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct in the light of the surrounding circumstances. Appeal dismissed.
-
1974 (8) TMI 103 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... er did not obtain an order of stay from the appellate authority and the mere filing of an appeal is not an automatic stay of the order appealed against. So long as there is no stay order against the enforcement of the order of adjudication, the third respondent who is the Recovery Officer is entitled to proceed to recover the amount of penalty imposed in the order of adjudication. It is even now open to the petitioner to approach the appellate authority and obtain orders of stay, if possible. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed.
-
1974 (8) TMI 102 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... vegetable non-essential oil thus means the vegetable oils classified as class one above, the mineral oils being outside our purview. That being the position on the definition of oil given in the ordinary dictionary, it is obvious that vegetable non-essential oil will mean oil which is not included within its definition as essential or volatile oil. Accordingly and for reasons given by the learned Judge we are of opinion that there is no vagueness in the definition as contended by the petitioners. The learned Judge was correct in holding that mustard oil was rightly included within the ambit of Item 23 and later on Item 12 in the First Schedule to the said Act and extensive use of mustard oil will not make it essential oil which has a technical meaning. The rules were rightly oil which has a technical meaning. The rules were rightly discharged in the circumstances. 12. The appeals fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. All interim orders are vacated.
-
1974 (8) TMI 101 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ular case, there is not dispute that the pieces which were packed in 11 bales were each 50 centimetres in length. The respondents were, therefore, not right in saying that these were not rags’ falling within the definition damaged or sub-standard cotton fabrics. As stated earlier the pieces of cloth need not be damaged or be sub-standard. In our opinion, the petitioner was right in claiming exemption on the ground that the pieces were rags coming within the definition, “damaged or sub-standard cotton fabrics” under Rule 96A of the Central Excises Rules, 1944. The Respondents were not justified in demanding the duty on the 11 bales. The orders of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Integrated Divisional Office, Nagpur and the Collector of Central Excise, Nagpur are quashed. We are told that the petitioner have cleared the goods after paying the duty. If that is so, the duty shall be refunded. 7. In the result, the Rule is made absolute with cost.
-
1974 (8) TMI 100 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ty of evasion of excise duty they would take such action as is permissible under law. At this stage it appears that the seizure of the plant including the machine and the motor is not warranted under tile provisions of either section 110 of the Customs Act or the provisions of Rule 173Q of the Central Excise Rules. Under the Customs Act and the Rules framed thereunder seizure and confiscation have been dealt with separately. The Department has not justified the seizure under the provision relating to seizure. They have only tried to justify the action under Rule 173Q of the Central Excise Rules which provision, as observed above, does not seem to apply. 5. The petition succeeds and is allowed. The respondents are directed to release the plant, machinery and motor of the petitioner, seized by them on 17th of January, 1973. It will, however, be open to the Department to proceed on with the adjudication proceedings. The petitioner is entitled to the costs of this petition.
-
1974 (8) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
Two notifications dated 11 August, 1972 issued by the State Government challenged
Held that:- In the present case, the impeached orders suffer from two insurmountable infirmities. One is that the entire committee of Management has been superseded. There is a provision under section 30 of the Act to supersede the management. The State Government does not take recourse to the don. Indirectly the State Government has overthrown- the Committee of Management including the President and the Vice-President. The President and the Vice-President are officers within the meaning of section 2(g) of the Act. Section 54 does not confer any power to remove the President and the Vice- President of the Society. Section 54 contemplates exercise of control over the conduct of the business. The word "control" suggests check, restraint or influence. Control is intended to regulate and hold in check and restrain from action. In the guise exercising control the State has displaced the committee of Management and substituted its own Committee. The State has indirectly intended to achieve what it is directly prohibited from doing under section 54 of the Act.
The second vice of the notification is that it is in violation of principles of natural justice. Section 30 of the Act contemplates a notice where the State intends to supersede the Management. The Committee has been deprived of their right to manage the affairs of the Society. They have been deprived of the right arbitrarily and in utter defiance of the powers under the statute.
The High Court rightly set aside the impeached notifications. Appeal dismissed.
-
1974 (8) TMI 98 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... section (3) of section 19 may be treated as a proviso to or an explanation of section 33(5). But because sub-section (3) of section 19 is of a general nature applicable to a defunct firm, whether the existing firm made returns or not, it applies separately. That will not detract from the fact that sub-section (3) of section 19 provides for a procedure for assessing a defunct firm by deeming the defunct firm as continuing to exist for the purpose of assessment. Reference was made to section 44 of the Income-tax Act and the decided cases thereon. But that section contains express provision enabling a defunct firm to be assessed to income-tax. Though the language of section 44 of the Income-tax Act is not in pari materia with section 19(3) of the Bombay Act, on a construction of the latter provision we have, as already indicated, come to the conclusion that it does provide for a procedure for assessing a defunct firm. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs. Appeal allowed.
-
1974 (8) TMI 97 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... relied upon Rattan Lal and Co. v. Assessing Authority 1970 25 S.T.C. 136 (S.C.). In that case it was held that where the taxing State is not imposing rates of tax on imported goods different from rates of tax on goods manufactured or produced inside the State, article 304 has no application. It was also observed that merely because the imported goods might be a little more expensive by reason of freight, etc., the burden of tax will be heavier (sic) will not off end against the equality clause of article 304 of the Constitution. These observations are also not applicable to the present case. In the result the petition succeeds and is allowed. The term importer occurring in Notification No. ST-II-6624/X-1012-1972 dated 1st December, 1973, is quashed. The respondents are directed not to demand deposit of sales tax from the petitioners in pursuance of the quashed portion of the notification. In view of the divided success the parties will bear their own costs. Petition allowed.
-
1974 (8) TMI 96 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... assessee had not claimed the concessional rate by placing the necessary facts, such omission will not be an error within the meaning of section 55. Madras Auto Service Private Ltd. v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer 1969 23 S.T.C. 111. relied on for the assessee-respondent dealt with a different situation. That was a case where no subsequent decision was involved and there was an error apparent on the face of the record, inasmuch as the facts before the authorities were not duly appreciated. If the facts had been looked into in that case carefully, it would have emerged that the sales charged to tax were second sales not subject to tax. In the instant case, the error was not on the scope of the law vis-a-vis entries 7(a) and (b) in Schedule II of the Act but the error lay on the assessee not placing the necessary facts and establishing that he was entitled to the charge only at the concessional rate under entry 7(b). On that view the appeal is allowed. No costs. Appeal allowed.
|
