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Showing 21 to 40 of 268 Records
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1989 (8) TMI 358 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... business on pavements or public streets. 9. Street Trading being a fundamental right has to be made available to the citizens subject to Article 19(6) of the Constitution. It is within the domain of the State to make any law imposing reasonable restrictions in the interest of general public. This can be done by an enactment on the same lines as in England or by any other law permissible under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. In spite of repeated suggestions by this Court nothing has been done in this respect. Since a citizen has no right to choose a particular place in any street for trading, it is for the State to designate the streets and earmark the places from where street trading can be done. In action on the part of the State would result in negating the fundamental right of the citizens. It is expected that the State will do the needful in this ' respect within a reasonable time failing which it would be left to the courts to protect the rights of the citizens.
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1989 (8) TMI 357 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... acquitted in that case either has been withheld or suppressed by the sponsoring authority. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, has this material fact of acquittal been placed before the detaining authority it might have influenced the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other on the question whether or not to make the detention order. 13. As rightly submitted by Mr. Parekh, the withholding of the vital fact that the detenu has been acquitted in that criminal case, resulting in the non-application of the mind of the detaining authority to the said fact vitiates the impugned order as ruled in Dharamdas Shamlal Agarwal v. The Police Commissioner and Anr. Judgments Today 1989 (1) S.C. 580. 14. In the result, for the aforementioned reasons, we hold that the detention order is liable to be set aside on both the grounds. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed and the order of detention is quashed. The detenu is directed to be set at liberty forthwith.
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1989 (8) TMI 356 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . 1167/81, 1168/81, 1169/81, 1170/81, 1171/81, 1172/81, 1173/81, 1174/81, 1175/81, 1176/81, 1296/81, 665/82 and 678/82. In Writ Petition Nos. 970/81 and 973/81, the communication, dated 1-9-1980 (Annexure-C); the corrigendum, dated 2-9-1980 (Annexure-D); the communication, dated 27-3-1981 (Annexure-F); and the communication, dated 27-3-1981 (Annexure-G); and in Writ Petition Nos. 971/81 and 972/81 the communications, dated 9-7-1979, 29-9-1980, 1-10-1980, and 26-3-1981-Annexures B, E, G & H, respectively, were based on those very Circulars dated 19-4-1980, 6-4-1981 and 7-4-1981 (Annexures-C, D & F in W.P. No. 1168/81). We quash these communications also and direct the respondents to forbear from claiming any levy, charge or excise duty on the debonded goods on the basis of those Circulars and communications. The rule in all the petitions is made absolute in the above term but in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to the costs. Rule made absolute.
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1989 (8) TMI 355 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ved by the sale deed (Exhibit 152) and the preceding agreement for sale in respect of the land sold which was entered into about five months after the notification. o p /o p The price thereunder is ₹ 3 per sq. yard. From that price certain deductions have to be made on account of the various factors which have been enumerated earlier such as the rise in prices of land after the acquisition and so on. Taking into account all these factors including the situation and potentialities of the acquired land, it appears to us that it would be proper to fix the market value of the acquired land at ₹ 8,800 per acre which comes to about ₹ 1.80 per sq. yard and we direct accordingly. The decree passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bhavnagar will be amended accordingly. o p /o p The respondent will pay to the appellants one half of the costs of the appeal in this Court. There will be no change as far as the rest of the order is concerned. o p /o p P.S.S. o p /o p
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1989 (8) TMI 354 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... should be treated as Revenue expenditure and not as capital expenditure. This is not disputed that by replacing the petrol engine in the jeep no new asset has been brought into existence but possibly the functioning of the jeep has been made economical on the part of the management, in getting the service of the engine with diesel, which will reduce the running expenses no doubt to some extent of the business. As such it is part of the profit making process. The same view has already been taken by the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT vs. Desai Brothers (1977) 108 ITR 14(Guj) We respectfully agree with the view taken in that case and the first question must also be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 5. In the above circumstances, question No.2 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue and question No.1 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. Suhas Chandra Sen, J. I agree.
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1989 (8) TMI 353 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ination of loss for that year is set aside and the loss is not allowed to be carried forward, the order of assessment for the subsequent year cannot be touched in respect of the said determination because the order of assessment for the year 1974-75 has become final. Once the loss has been determined and directed to be carried forward in the assessment year 1974-75, this determination cannot be challenged by the ITO in the subsequent assessment year. He cannot contend that the loss was not properly allowed for the year 1974-75. In that case he should have first rectified the order of assessment for 1974-75 and then as a consequence thereof rectify the order of assessment of 1975-76 which he has not done in this case. 18. For the reasons as aforesaid, we are of the view that the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion as it did. We, therefore, answer the question in this reference in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 19. There will be no order as to costs.
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1989 (8) TMI 352 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... no statutory provisions or a rule framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution which is inconsistent with it. " Narasimhan's case has thus no relevancy to the controversy involved in this case. There was no challenge to any of the rules or para 620 of the manual on the ground that it gives unguided power to the Railway authorities to pick and choose railway employees for the purpose of pre-mature retirement. Para 620 of the Manual being executive instruction supplementing the statutory Rule 2046 has no parity with Rule 2(2) of Pension Rule which is a statutory rule. In any case the point before us in the present case was neither involved nor raised in Narasimhan's case and as such Mr. Anil Dev Singh cannot derive any support from the said judgment. There is thus no legal or equitable ground to interfer with the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is dismissed with costs which we quantify as ₹ 3,000. Appeal dismissed.
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1989 (8) TMI 351 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s Court. Indeed, it appears from the copies of the ledger entries produced before us by the Bank that the Bank had not credited any interest in the Cash Credit Account No. 640. 12. The subsequent order of this Court dated September 24, 1987, on which strong reliance has been placed by the respondents, does not at all lend any support to their contentions. The said order was passed by the consent of the writ petitioners and the respondents without the knowledge of the Bank and without giving the Bank any opportunity of being heard. After the said order was passed by this Court to the prejudice of the Bank, the Bank had to make the present Civil Miscellaneous Petition for direction. 13. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the contentions made on behalf of the parties, we hold that the Bank is not liable to pay interest on the said amount of ₹ 10,12,778.87. The Civil Miscellaneous Petition is allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1989 (8) TMI 350 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rt, this Court will not interfere unless there is manifest injustice or substantial question of public importance. 13. It may be borne in mind that the exercise of power under Article 136 while granting a special leave and while hearing an appeal is one continuous process, and this Court will apply the same principles even at the time of disposal of the appeal. See (i) Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Employees (1959) Suppl. 2 SCR 136 at 141 and (ii) Baldota Bros. v. Libra Works AIR 1961 SC 100 at 103 . 14. In the instant case as already noticed that respondent-1 has suffered and stagnated for about twenty years in the same scale from inception due to defective promotional policy. Therefore, we decline to interfere with the relief granted by the Tribunal although we do not agree with the views expressed on the scope of bye-law 71(b)(ii). 15. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1989 (8) TMI 349 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o continue the business, the amount had to be paid. In our opinion too for this payment the assessee would have had to close down a part of its business. The profitable nature of this part of the business would be clear from the following figures Rs. 1958-59 39,06,143 1959-60 29,20,258 1960-61 25,52,799 1961-62 35,27,366 The assessee's anxiety not to lose an opportunity to make profits of this magnitude can well be understood. The above represents roughly between 20 and 25 per cent of the total profits." 3. On behalf of the assessee our attention has been drawn to the two judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Travancore Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. v. CIT 1966 62 ITR 566 and CIT v. Travancore Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. 1973 88 ITR 1. 4. In view of the principles laid down in these two judgments, the question referred to by the Tribunal is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 5. There will be no order as to costs. Banerjee, J. - I agree.
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1989 (8) TMI 348 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... already filed, a further application could not be filed under section 139(4). 9. Therefore, question No. 1 is answered by saying that the return filed on 14-3-1974 was not a valid return under section 139(2) and/or section 139(5). Question No. 2 is answered by saying that the AAC was right in directing that a fresh opportunity of hearing is to be given to the assessee on the facts of this case. The third question is answered by saying that the Tribunal was in error in not directing the ITO to make a fresh assessment in accordance with law. Question No. 4 is answered by saying that it has already been recorded that the assessee has been heard on a number of occasions in this case. But since the assessee did not have any opportunity of being heard on the last date, the case was fixed for hearing as further opportunity should have been given to the assessee even in respect of the original return filed on 25-7-1973. 10. There will be no order as to costs. Banerjee, J. - I agree.
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1989 (8) TMI 347 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... an, on the other hand, pointed out that the majority judgment in Gullappalli Nageswara Rao v. APSR TC, 1959 Supp. 1 SCR 3 19 has disapproved of Al- ridge's case and that natural justice demands that the hearing and order should be by the same officer. This is a very interesting question and Alridge's case has been dealt with by Wade (Administrative Law, 6th Edition at pp. 507 et seq.) We are of opinion that it is unnecessary to enter into a decision of this issue for the purposes of the present case. Here the issue is one of grant of approval by the Government and not any particular officer statutorily desig- nated. It is also perfectly clear on the records that the officer who passed the order has taken full note of all the objections put forward by the petitioners. We are fully satisfied, therefore, that the requirements of natural justice have been fulfilled in the present case. For the reasons stated above, the appeal stands dismissed. No costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1989 (8) TMI 346 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e than that returned by the assessee. In spite of such rejection of the assessee's books of accounts, whether the turnover returned by him should be accepted or whether a higher turnover should be estimated by the assessing authority, must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case." 13. It is, true, thus, as also laid down by the Division Bench, that the disclosed turnover of the assessee is not necessarily to be rejected due to the books of account being not found acceptable. But all the same it does not follow that on the books of account being rejected due to non-maintenance of the manufacturing account, the disclosed turnover of the assessee be invariably or necessarily accepted as correct. In each case that would be a question of arriving at the best judgment assessment founded on estimate flowing from the attending facts and circumstances and considered as reasonable. 14. Let the reference be returned before a single Judge with the answer aforesaid.
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1989 (8) TMI 345 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f the public, particularly the adolescents and students of both sexes and the menace has assumed serious and alarming pro- portions in the recent years. Therefore, in order to effectively control and eradicate this proliferating and booming devastating menace, causing deleterious effects and deadly impact on the society as a whole, the Parliament in its wisdom, has made effective provisions by introducing this Act 81 of 1985 specifying mandatory minimum imprisonment and fine. As we have now rejected the plea of the defence holding that the penal provisions of Section 27(a) has no role to play as the prohibited drugs and substances possessed by the appellant were far in excess of the quantity mentioned in Column 3 of the table under the notification, the sentence of 10 years rigorous imprisonment and the fine of ₹ 1,00,000 with the default clause as modified by the High Court does not call for interference. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. T.N.A Appeal dismissed.
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1989 (8) TMI 344 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Automobiles came to be inducted as a sub-tenant much later. Can such a general permission be treated to be the consent as required by S. 14 (1) Proviso (b) of the Act? It was held by this Court In M/s. Shalimar Tar Products v. S.C. Sharma, 1988 1 SCC 70; that Ss. 14(1) Proviso (b) and 16(2) and (3) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 enjoin the tenant to obtain consent of the landlord in writing to the specific sub-letting and any other interpretation of the provisions will defeat the object of the statute and is, therefore, inpermissible. Since it is not suggested that the consent of the respondent was obtained specifically with reference to the Sub-letting in favour of M/s. United Automobiles, the clause in the lease deed, which has been relied on can not save the appellant, even if it be assumed in its favour that the clause is admissible and the sUb-lessee is appel- lant's associate concern. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with Costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1989 (8) TMI 343 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... osecutor or the counsel for the accused as to the nature of the circumstances or the type of questions to be put to the accused. It is his duty to examine the accused as per law. It is, however, open to the prosecution to invite the attention of the Court if any incriminating circumstance is left out and not put to the accused. We reserve liberty to the prosecution in this regard. The question of transfer of the case to another Bench of the City Sessions Court also does not arise now. We are told that the that judge has since retired and another judge has taken over his place. He shall, therefore, take up this case expeditiously and proceed preferably day to day, as earlier ordered by the High Court. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court is reversed. This order shall be communicated to the that court within two days by cougher service. The parties should appear before the trial court on August 14, 1989 to receive further orders. Appeal allowed.
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1989 (8) TMI 342 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... h no prospect of his release. It does not satisfy the test indicated by the Constitution Bench in Rameshwar Shaw's case (supra). We hold the detention order to be invalid for this reason alone and express no opinion on merits about the grounds of detention. Consequently, the aforesaid order of detention dated 7.9.1988 passed by the Collector and District Magistrate, Madurai, and the order of confirmation dated 25.10.1988 by the Government of Tamil Nadu are quashed. The appeal and the writ petition are allowed. This, however, will not affect the detenu's custody in connection with the criminal case under section 397 I.P.C. We may also clarify that in case the detenu is released in the aforesaid criminal case, the question of his preventive detention under the Act on the above material may be reconsidered by the appropriate authority in accordance with law and this judgment shall not be construed as an impediment for that purpose. No costs. Appeal and Petition allowed.
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1989 (8) TMI 341 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... be sustained and is also hereby set aside. As a consequence we direct that since the Corporation in the instant case has accepted ₹ 65,000 in full and final satisfaction of its claim, it shall return the mortgage deed executed by Maganlal to him. The Additional District Judge in whose court the application under Order 34 Rule 5 of the Code was made as stated earlier shall strike off the execution in full and final satisfaction. The sum of ₹ 53,000 deposited by the first purchaser together with ₹ 2,650 representing 5% of the said sum deposited by Maganlal and interest which may have accrued on these amounts shall be paid over the first purchaser. Likewise, the sum of ₹ 1,46,000 deposited by the second purchaser together with ₹ 7,300 representing 5% of the said sum deposited by Maganlal and the interest which may have accrued on these amounts shall be paid over to the second purchaser. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1989 (8) TMI 340 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the past activities of the detenu is such that from it a reasonable prognosis can be made as to the future conduct of the detenu and its utility, therefore, lies only in so far as it subserves that purpose and it cannot be allowed to dominate or drawn it?
Held that:- The representation of the detenu has not been given prompt and expeditious consideration, and was allowed to lie without being properly attended to. The explanation now offered by the third respondent that the delay has occurred in seeking the comments of the Collector of Customs etc. is not a convincing and acceptable explanation. In our view the delay in 72 days in the absence of satisfactory explanation is too long a period for ignoring the indolence on the part of the concerned authority. Hence we hold that the unexplained delay in disposal of the representation of the detenu is violative of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, rendering the order of detention invalid. Allow this criminal appeal by setting aside the judgment of the High Court, quash the impugned order of detention and direct the detenu to set at liberty forthwith.
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1989 (8) TMI 339 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT]
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... ... ..... s the last date for making such application. In its case, a registered dealer may apply for a certificate of eligibility on or after April 1, 1983, without any limitation of time. If that be the position, I fail to see how the petitioner can be denied eligibility certificate on the basis of delay in making the application. Admittedly, the petitioner was registered as a dealer on June 6, 1983 and the application for eligibility certificate was made on June 8, 1983. The petitioner clearly comes within the proviso to rule 3(66)(iv). Therefore, the petitioner s application should not have been dismissed by the Additional Commissioner on the ground that the application should have been made before such last date for filing such application fixed by the statute, that is, on or before April 14, 1983. The writ petition, therefore, must succeed. There will be an order as prayed in terms of prayers (b) and (c) of the petition. There will be no order as to costs. Writ Petition allowed.
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