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Showing 21 to 40 of 354 Records
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1990 (8) TMI 399 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in 1967 required the declaration to be made within three years from the date of the preliminary notification. On the date the declaration was made there were hardly two days left for completion of three years and after the High Court order on 8-1-1988, the period has already lapsed but no declaration has been published and the same can no longer be made on the basis of preliminary notification at present. In the absence of challenge by the State, the order of the High Court against it has become final. We are of the view that in these circumstances it would no more be available to the State to make the requisite declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The acquisition itself is quashed but we make it clear that it is open to the State Government in case it is satisfied that acquisition is necessary in public interest, it is free to exercise its power of eminent domain and make a fresh preliminary notification. The special leave petitions are disposed of accordingly. No costs.
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1990 (8) TMI 398 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ited, to show that it is a similar sub-standard unit without any capacity for expansion, so that it too must continue to be an uneconomic unit like M/s. Travancore Cement Limited, Kottayam deserving a similar treatment. The counter-affidavit, therefore, shows a rational basis for classifying M/s. Travancore Cement Limited, Kottayam, differently as a sub-standard and an uneconomic unit without any scope for improvement in comparison to other units. This argument also is untenable. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, we do not find merit in any of the contentions advanced in support of these appeals to support the challenge on the basis of Article 14 of the Constitution to the fixation of a uniform retention price of ₹ 100 per tonne in 1969 by the impugned Order or to the practice of a uniform retention price being followed upto 1979. These appeals are accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1990 (8) TMI 397 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he Code, the nature of finality to such order and the resultant protection of the persons discharged subject to revision under s. 398 of the Code may not be lost sight of. This should be so because the complainant’s desire for vengeance has to be tempered with though it may be, as Sir James Stephen says; "The Criminal law stands to the passion of revenge in much the same relation as marriage to the sexual appetite." (General view of the Criminal Law of England, p. 99). The A.P.P. ’s application under s. 2 16, in so far as the appellants 1 to 3 were concerned could be dealt with under s. 2 16. Appellants 4 & 5 could be dealt with neither under s. 2 16 nor under s. 3 19. In that view of the matter the impugned order of the Magistrate as well as that of the High Court in so far as the appellants 4 & 5, namely, Vijya Bai and Jiya Bai are concerned, have to be set aside which we hereby do. The appeals are allowed to that extent. G.N. Appeals allowed.
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1990 (8) TMI 396 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nd the State after excluding the plots of lands in dispute Shri Roy, learned counsel for the State repeatedly asserted that the lands no longer remain to be fishery land and became part of urban area around the Calcutta City and building operations are going on. On the other hand the counsel for the respondents asserted to the contrary. We have no definite evidence on record. Therefore, if the lands are still found to be capable of using for fishery purpose and in case the State intends to lease it out for fishing operations, to any third party, as per rules in vogue, first preference may be given to the respondents. subject to the usual terms. as per the procedure prevalent in the State of West Bengal in this regard. Accordingly, we quash the order of Appellate Tribunal dated March 4. 1971 and restore the order of the Asstt. Settlement Officer elated July 12. 1968. The appeal is allowed accordingly and the parties are directed to bear their respective costs. Appeal allowed.
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1990 (8) TMI 395 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... detaining authority, thus, stands vitiated if some irrelevant documents are taken into consideration while arriving at a conclusion to pass the order of detention. To the same effect are two cases Jagdish Mitr v. Union of India and Others, 1990 Cr.L.J. 269 and Criminal Writ Nos. 568, 686 and 691 of 1989 decided on 9th January, 1990. (9) Considering the facts of this case in the light of the aforesaid decisions it is clear that the detaining authority has placed reliance upon irrelevant documents on account of which the impugned order is liable to be set aside. It is clear that there is non-application of mind by the detaining authority as the aforesaid documents are not in any manner shown to be connected with the prejudicial activities of the petitioner. (10) As a result of my aforesaid discussion, the writ petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute. The detention order is quashed. I direct that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case.
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1990 (8) TMI 394 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nt any lease to any person for the collection of slurry deposits either from the river bed or other land. The impugned settlements made in favour of the respondents by the State Government are illegal and the respondent-lessees have no right or title to collect the slurry deposits, therefore, they are restrained from lifting or collecting the same from the land in dispute. We, accordingly, allow Civil Appeal No. 4521 of 1986 and Civil Appeal Nos. 61-62 of 1987 and set aside the order of the High Court of Patna and allow the writ petitions filed by the appellants before the Patna High Court. We further allow Civil Appeal Nos. 230-231 of 1987 and set aside the order of the High Court of Calcutta and dismiss the writ petitions filed by Industrial Fuel Marketing Company and Ors. We further direct that the money deposited pursuant to the interim orders passed by the High Court and this Court will be paid to the successful party. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1990 (8) TMI 393 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dismiss the appeals on this preliminary ground. In the result the appeals and the writ petition are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. The appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 2368 and 2369 of 1986 had been dispossessed from the premises in their occupation after the dismissal of their appeals by the Additional District Judge. During the pendency of these appeals interim orders were passed by this Court whereunder possession of a part of the premises was restored to the appellants. Since these appeals have been dismissed the appellants in both the appeals are directed to handover the possession of the portion of the premises in their occupation to the Respondent Bank within one month. In Civil Appeal No. 3725 of 1986 and Writ Petition No. 864 of 1985, this Court had passed interim orders staying the eviction of the petitioners in those matters. Since the appeal and the writ petition are being dismissed the said interim orders shall stand vacated. Petitions dismissed.
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1990 (8) TMI 392 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rman were in different categories. Equation of the Tribunal with the High Court therein was only as the forum for adjudication of disputes relating to service matters and not for all purposes such as the one arising for decision in the present case. We are unable to accept that the decision of this Court in S.P. Sampath Kumar (supra) supports the contention before us in this petition. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, we have no hesitation in holding that the equality claimed by the Members of the Administrative Tribunal with the Judges of the High Courts or even the Vice Chairman of the Tribunal in the matter of pay and age of superannuation does not exist being contrary to the pattern and scheme of the parent statute establishing the Tribunal and, therefore, the very foundation for the argument of discrimination being nonexistent, the petition must fail. Consequently, the petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs.
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1990 (8) TMI 391 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... m intended to undermine the security of the State and not to ordinary law and order problems. We do not consider it necessary to go into this larger question because, in our opinion, the Designated Court was fight in coming to the conclusion that this was a case of inter-gang rivalry not attracting Section 3(1) of the Act. In the above view that we take all the three appeals fail and are dismissed. Mr. Lalit the learned counsel for the accused stated that since the High Court has directed expeditious disposal of the case he would not press the special leave petition directed against the High Court’s order refusing bail. In view of the said statement, the Special leave petition No. 2459/89 will stand disposed of as not pressed. We may, however, state that the Sessions Court to which the case stands transferred should endeavour to complete the trial as early as possible, preferably within four months from the date of receipt of this Court’s order. Petition disposed
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1990 (8) TMI 390 - SUPREME COURT
Entire gratuity and pension otherwise admissible to the appellant was withheld on permanent basis as a measure of punishment through the proceedings dated November 24, 1981 on opting voluntary retirement
Held that:- Rule 9 of the rules empowers the President only to with hold or withdraw pension permanently or for a specified period in whole or in part or to order recovery of pecuniary loss caused to the State in whole or in part subject to minimum. The employee's right to pension is a statutory fight.The fight to gratuity is also a statutory right. The appellant was not charged with nor was given an opportunity that his gratuity would be withheld as a measure of punishment. No provision of law has been brought to our notice under which, the President is empowered to withhold gratuity as well, after his retirement as a measure of punishment. Therefore, the order to withhold the gratuity as a measure of penalty is obviously illegal and is devoid of jurisdiction.
As no finding that appellant did commit grave misconduct as charged for, the exercise of the power is clearly illegal and in excess of jurisdiction as the condition precedent, grave misconduct was not proved. Accordingly the appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated November 24, 1981 is quashed.
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1990 (8) TMI 389 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... question, that arises for consideration, in considering as to whether the levy of purchase tax under section 5(A)(1)(a) is warranted, is, whether bamboos were consumed in the manufacture of other goods for sale. This Court after referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pio Food Packers 1980 46 STC 63, Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Thomas Stephen and Co. Ltd. 1988 69 STC 320 and Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law) v. Kannan Nair 1988 70 STC 48, held that no manufacturing process was involved when bamboos were just bound by a rope and sold as bamboo blinds and that the identity of the goods was not lost and there was no transformation. In the light of the earlier Bench decision of this Court, we are of the view that the common order, passed by the Appellate Tribunal for the two years, dated October 27, 1989, is valid and justified in law. These tax revision cases are without merit. They are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1990 (8) TMI 388 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd the questions of law referred to above are exactly similar to those in Civil Rule Nos. 104 to 107 of 1983 (M/s. Pioneer Enterprise v. State of Tripura) which have already been heard. The decision in those cases will govern the present cases also. The decision in the aforesaid cases has since been delivered. It has been held that supplies of bricks made in pursuance of the contracts in question amounted to sales exigible to sales tax under the Act. It has also been held that the supplier was not entitled to claim any deduction on account of any expenditure incurred in carrying the goods to the place of delivery, loading, unloading, etc., and the total amount received on account of supply of bricks was the sale price for the purpose of taxation. 3. Following the aforesaid decision, we decide both the points involved in these writ petitions against the petitioner. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. Dr. B.P. SARAF.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (8) TMI 387 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he turnover upto Rs. 30,000 from the net of taxability and if such a construction of the notification is not possible, it is unreasonable and violative of article 14 of the Constitution. The language employed in the notification is too plain to admit of the construction sought to be placed upon it by the assessee. The exemption was for small dealers having annual turnover of less than Rs. 30,000 and was not intended to exempt turnover of Rs. 30,000 from taxability. 4. The question of validity of notification could not be gone into by the Tribunal. We are informed by Shri Lalwani, learned counsel for the assessee, that the assessee has already questioned the validity of this notification by a writ petition filed in this Court which is pending in this Court. We are satisfied that there is neither any incorrectness nor illegality in the order passed by the Tribunal or the application for reference filed by the assessee. 5. Application dismissed. No costs. Application dismissed.
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1990 (8) TMI 386 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... under the First or Fifth Schedule to the Act. It is true that turnover tax can be levied on the turnover, which took place from 1st of July, 1987. But for the purpose of determining the total turnover of the dealer, the turnover of the entire year should be reckoned. In section 5(2A), so introduced in the statute book, the concept of total turnover accruing in the Act was not deviated from. That term takes within its fold the entire turnover for the financial year, which is defined as the year. 5.. In this view, we concur with the conclusion of the Appellate Tribunal that in deciding the liability, the total turnover in the year has to be taken into account. The plea to the contrary is without force. The assessee has no case that tax has been paid in part on the turnover prior to 1st of July, 1987. We see no error either in the reasoning or in the conclusion of the Appellate Tribunal, dated August 25, 1989. The revision is without merit. It is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (8) TMI 385 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the basis of the consumption of the electrical energy, ruled that when tests were conducted in cases of other mill owners crushing oil, and when such test was not conducted in the case of assessee resulted in arbitrary assessment or estimate of the turnover of the assessee in that case. We do not see how that helps the case of the assessee-petitioner before us. Question of conducting a test of other mills did not arise in this case. In this case books of account and the documents produced in support of the return filed were rejected by the authorities below. In that circumstance they made best judgment assessment of the turnover linking the production of oil and oil-cake to energy consumption to determine the turnover. We therefore find that it was a sound basis in the absence of other materials or evidence led by the assessee which would prove such basis was not a sound basis. 5.. We do not find any merit in this petition and accordingly we dismiss it. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (8) TMI 384 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... 4(6)(i) of the 1941 Act as far as relatable to purchases of this type, are constitutionally valid and not violative of articles 14 and 19 or any other provisions in the Constitution. In view of the above findings, the application fails and is dismissed. The appropriate assessing authorities shall make assessments or make fresh/revised assessments for any period or periods, as the case or cases may be, wherever necessary, in accordance with law and in terms of this judgment. Applicants had deposited certain amounts as security in terms of interim orders. Respondents shall be entitled to encash, appropriate and adjust the same towards assessed or reassessed dues of taxes under the 1941 Act in respect of sales to the applicants by their selling dealers for the periods commencing from April 1, 1980. Interim orders are vacated. Parties will bear their own cost of this proceeding. B.C. CHAKRABARTI (Chairman).-I agree. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member)-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1990 (8) TMI 383 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d the belated filing of form XVII declarations. There will be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed. Appendix The decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of VENKATASWAMI and K.M. NATARAJAN, JJ. in State of Tamil Nadu v. Electronics Trade and Technology Development Corporation Ltd. (T.C. No. 736 of 1989 decided on 5th December, 1989), is printed below STATE OF TAMIL NADU VERSUS ELECTRONICS TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD. The order of the Court was made by VENKATASWAMI, J.-The point raised in this tax case is covered by a judgment of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Jakthi Veliyeetakam 1977 40 STC 466 and Baluswami Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu 1986 63 STC 492 and also the decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. Arulmurugan Co. 1982 51 STC 381 FB . Inasmuch as the Tribunal has followed the ratios in these judgments, we do not think that there is any case for interference in this tax revision case. The tax case is dismissed.
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1990 (8) TMI 382 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a Lambardar who fails to collect the land revenue and deposit the same in the State Treasury, can be said to be a 'defaulter' within the meaning of Section 3(8) of the Act?
Whether the sale in favour of the purchasers, i.e. the appellants before us, was null and void as they had failed to pay the balance (75%) of the purchase-price within the time allowed by Section 88 of the Act?
Whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit having regard to Section 158 of the Act?
Held that:- Once it is held that the sale was rendered null and void on the failure of the auction-purchasers to comply with the requirements of Section 88 of the Act, it was the imperative duty of the authorities to put the property to re-sale for the law did not confer any discretion in the concerned authorities to extend the time for the payment of the balance amount. Once the mandatory requirement of Section 88 of the Act was not complied with, the only course open to the concerned authorities was to put the property to re- sale. It, therefore, by Section 88 of the Act. Therefore, the action of the concerned authority in accepting the balance money on 2nd March, 1965 long after the period prescribed by Section 88 of the Act had expired was an act without jurisdiction and of no avail. So also the confirmation of sale on 21st March, 1966 was without jurisdiction and must be ignored. If that is the true position in law, there can be so doubt that there was no sale in the eye of the law in favour of the appellants herein and, therefore, the threatened action of the appellants to dispossess the landowner was clearly de hors the Act and could validity be challenged in a civil court. We, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the view which found favour with the High Court. Appeal dismissed.
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1990 (8) TMI 381 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948. 18.. Similar view was also expressed by the High Court of Kerala in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes) v. McDowell and Co. Limited 1980 46 STC 79 and by the Madras High Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. McDowell and Company Ltd. 1980 46 STC 85. Relying on these decisions. the learned single Judge, has held that the deposit relating to bottles and crates does not form part of the sale price and it is not exigible to tax. We are in full agreement with the view expressed by the learned single Judge. 19.. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we do not accept any of the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants in these writ appeals, as well as in the S.T.R.P. No. 50 of 1984. 20.. The appeals fail and they are accordingly dismissed. 21.. Similarly, S.T.R.P. No. 50 of 1984 is also dismissed. 22.. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Writ appeals and revision petition dismissed.
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1990 (8) TMI 380 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... inant object is sale. Sub-section (1) is in respect of transactions which involved both service and supply of food materials as part of the service. In those matters, section 6(2) gives exemption to the dealer. Non-collection of tax would not give exemption in cases where supply is with dominant object of sale. A dealer has option not to collect tax. Under section 4 of the Act which is charging section, liability is on the dealer. Accordingly, absence of collection of tax where dominant object was sale would not be of any assistance to the dealer under section 6(2) of the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act. 6.. On the facts and in the circumstances, it is to be answered that the Member, Additional Sales Tax Tribunal, was justified to hold that transactions effected by the dealer are exigible to tax irrespective of whether he has realised tax on the said transactions. There shall be no order as to costs. J.M. MAHAPATRA, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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