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2007 (8) TMI 806 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... um of ₹ 4,68,581/-as on the date of cheque i. e. 25-4-2001. That was the amount due when the cheque was presented on 8-9-2001, as per statement. In any event, it must also be noted that assuming the cheque was given to the Complainant on 25-4-2001, as contended on behalf of the Complainant, the Complainant at the most, would have had implied authority to fill in the same with an amount which was due to the Complainant as on that date i. e. the date the cheque was given. In other words, the cheque could be filled in for an amount of existing liability or liability in presenti as on the date the cheque was issued and not a liability which would arise subsequently after accrued interest was added to it. From whatever angle one looks at the case of the Complainant, the Complainant cannot succeed. 13. In the light of the above, the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Court cannot be faulted. There is no merit in this appeal and therefore, the same is hereby dismissed.
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2007 (8) TMI 805 - SC ORDER
... ... ... ... ..... lay condoned. Heard. The Civil Appeal is dismissed.
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2007 (8) TMI 804 - SC ORDER
... ... ... ... ..... . 171 (S.C.) 2007 (4) SCC 155. In that case, the Commissioner examined the process under which crushing of Betel Nut was done and gave a finding that there was no manufacture. This finding of the Commissioner was restored by the Division Bench of this Court in the above judgment reported in 2007 (4) SCC 155 of the same assessee. Hence, Civil appeal of the Department stands dismissed with no order as to costs.
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2007 (8) TMI 803 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ded by the courts below suffered from any infirmity or that they were contrary to the record. The High Court also concluded that there was no question of law much less any substantial question of law which arose in the second appeal. Before we part with this judgment, we keep on record that Mr. Mohan appearing for the appellant substantially argued before us on the issue that the High Court was not justified in rejecting the application for acceptance of additional evidence. We have already discussed this aspect of the matter herein before and after such discussion, we have already held that there was no infirmity in that part of the judgment by which the High Court had rejected the application for acceptance of additional evidence. 19. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any ground for which interference with the judgment of the courts below can be called for. Accordingly, the appeal requires to be dismissed and is dismissed as such. There will be no order as to costs.
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2007 (8) TMI 802 - SC ORDER
... ... ... ... ..... ORDER Delay condoned. Civil Appeal is dismissed.
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2007 (8) TMI 801 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... s. v. Sudha Thejus and Ors., a Division Bench of Kerala High Court has held that amended Rule 9(A) is not retrospective. 16. Therefore, I am of the view that Corporation can only charge prepayment/foreclosure premium at 1% on the outstanding balance of loan amount and that the Circular dated 14.05.2005 has no application in so far as the petitioners are concerned. 17. In the result, I pass the following Order I. It is hereby declared that petitioners are liable to pay 1% premium on the advanced payment/foreclosure of their loan account with the respondent-Corporation. II. The respondent-Corporation is directed to close the loan account of the petitioners on payment of 1% premium on the outstanding loan balance amount being prepaid/foreclosed. If the petitioners have already paid 2% premium on the prepayment/foreclosure of their loan account, they are entitled for refund of 1% of the premium paid by them from the Corporation. Writ petition is disposed of accordingly. No costs.
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2007 (8) TMI 800 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... n order dated 13th January 2003, pursuant to the recommendation made by the BIFR, this Court has also admitted this petition and directed the Official Liquidator to advertise the same. Though there is no affidavit filed on record from the side of the Official Liquidator, however, considering the opinion as referred to above in view of the facts and circumstances averred in Company Petition No.1180 of 2002 and as there is an affidavit of publication on record and further as there is no response of any kind in all this matters from the side of the Respondent-Company till this date, I am of the view that the Petitioners have made out a case to grant prayer clauses (a) and (b) of the Company Petition No.1180 of 2002. In the result, Company Petition No.1180 of 2002 is allowed in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b). 9. So far as Company Petition No.813 of 2003 is concerned, the Official Liquidator to take steps in accordance with law. Both the petitions are disposed of accordingly.
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2007 (8) TMI 799 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ed goods to the corporation, which was manufactured as per the specification of the KPTCL at Karnataka State. Therefore, the provisions of Section 9(1) proviso of the CST Act is attracted but not Section 6(2) of the CST Act to the case on hand. Therefore, Assessing Authority and First Appellate Authority have rightly held that the Karnataka State is the appropriate State entitled under the provisions of CST Act for recovery of the sales tax in respect of the goods sold to the KPTCL by the registered dealer. 16. In view of the finding of fact recorded by the Assessing Authority which was concurred by the Appellate Authority and for the reasons stated supra by us and the reliance placed by the learned A.G.A. on the decisions of the Supreme Court, Andhra Pradesh High Court, Gujarat High Court, Calcutta High Court and Madras High Court in the above cases, we answer the questions of law in favour of the Revenue and against the respondent. Accordingly, revision petition is allowed.
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2007 (8) TMI 798 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... wo companies, the transferor company dies a civil death and the entity which has evolved upon amalgamation cannot be prosecuted for an offence committed by the transferor company. To the same effect are the observations of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in the unreported decision in Crl. Rev. No. 150/1994 M/s. Brooke Bond Lipton (India) Ltd. and Anr. v. State of H.P. and Anr. decided on 24.3.1995. 20. So far as Clause 8 relied upon by the counsel for the State is concerned, same relates to transfer of legal proceedings. The clause does not contemplate that criminal liability for offence committed by the earlier company would be transferable to the petitioner company. 21. Noting that the petitioner company came into picture on 27.9.2001, after the date of manufacture of the said drug in year 2000, I hold that it cannot be prosecuted for the said offence. 22. Order dated 18.12.2003 summoning the petitioner to face trial in the complaint in question is quashed. 23. No costs.
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2007 (8) TMI 797 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ) 1). The Larger Bench has held that qualification of 'Prathma' cannot be held equivalent to the qualification of Secondary after withdrawal of the recognition of 'Prathma' by the State Government w.e.f. 1.4.1985. However, the court observed that if the vacancies exist prior to the date referred to above i.e. 1.4.1985 and the employees had acquired qualification of 'Prathma' upto the above date, they may be held entitled for promotion or appointment, as the case may be for such vacancies of the years prior to 1.4.1985. In the present case, admittedly, the promotions were made for the year 1995-96 when the qualification of 'Prathma' was not recognised by the State Government. Having considered the entire facts and circumstances, since the impugned order has been passed as per the decision of the Larger Bench of this Court, I find no ground for any further interference of this court. The writ petition is dismissed accordingly as having no merit.
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2007 (8) TMI 796 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... tside power or authority can issue a direction to enact a particular piece of legislation. In Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. Union of India (1989)IILLJ506SC it has been held that no court can direct a legislature to enact a particular law. Similarly, when an executive authority exercises a legislative power by way of a subordinate legislation pursuant to the delegated authority of a legislature, such executive authority cannot be asked to enact a law which it has been empowered to do under the delegated legislative authority. This view has been reiterated in State of J and K v. A.R. Zakki AIR1992SC1546 . In A.K. Roy v. Union of India 1982CriLJ340 it has been held that no mandamus can be issued to enforce an Act which has been passed by the legislature.... 4. In view of the aforesaid legal position, we are of the opinion that this Court cannot grant any relief to the petitioners, as prayed for, in the writ petition. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.
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2007 (8) TMI 795 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
... ... ... ... ..... atement of the driver that the goods were brought from Nepal cannot be accepted. It is seen from the reply to show cause notice of the appellants that fresh Ginger is widely cultivated at Mihinpurwa and it is a crash crop of local farmers as it is evident from the representation of Udyog Vyapar Mandal, Mihinpurwa. On perusal of the records, it is seen that the seized goods were accompanied with the documents of the appellant No. 1. The seized goods are not notified items under Section 123 of the Customs Act 1962. There is no evidence produced by the revenue to establish that the seized goods are smuggled goods. I find that the authorities below did not dispute the fact that the fresh Ginger and other vegetables products are cultivated around Mihinpurwa. So, confiscation of the fresh Ginger of 60 quintals and the trucks are not sustainable. Therefore, the impugned orders are set aside. The appeals are allowed, with consequential relief. (Dictated and pronounced in open court)
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2007 (8) TMI 794 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... served in 1976. It was not proceeded with till 1988 when reasons were supplied. Order was passed by the competent authority upon affording adequate opportunity of hearing. The respondent No. 1 availed the remedy of appeal where his appeal was partly allowed. With deepest regard we have for the learned single Judge, His Lordship was perhaps not right in interfering with the show cause notice at the stage when the respondent No. 1 availed of the remedies in law and became partly successful before the appellate authority. 21. The appeal thus succeeds and is allowed. 22. Judgment and order of the learned single Judge to the extent where the show cause notice and the orders passed on the basis thereof were quashed, is set aside. 23. There would be no order as to costs, 24. There would be stay of operation of this judgment and order for a period of six weeks from date. 25. Urgent xerox certified copy would be given to the parties, if applied for. Tapas Kumar Giri, J. 26. I agree.
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2007 (8) TMI 793 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... le mortgage by deposit of title-deeds. It is only through the subsequent administrative instructions dated March 29, 2007 that instrument of deposit of title-deeds have been made compulsorily registerable and this too through a clarification. 12. The settled law is that a mortgage created by a simple deposit of title-deeds. After the deposit has been made, the parties may, if they so desire, record the transaction in a memorandum but such a memorandum would not be an instrument of mortgage and would not require compulsory registration either under Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act or under the notification dated November 6, 2006 (Annexure R71) and instructions dated March 29, 2007 (Annexure R/2). Resultantly, this petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to enter mutation in favour of the bank recording that the properties which stand equitably mortgaged in favour of the Punjab National Bank, Branch Office Marrahanwala, Panchkula, by deposit of title-deeds.
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2007 (8) TMI 792 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... rved demanding payment and thereupon the complaint was filed. In view of the decision in Prem Chand Vijay Kumar (supra) the complaint against the company was conceded by learned counsel for the complainant to be barred by limitation. But, viz-a-viz second petitioner, no notice of dishonour was served when the cheque bounced at the first presentation. Only one notice was served to second petitioner, when cheque bounced on second presentation. 7. It is not in dispute that qua petitioner no.2 the complaint is within limitation. 8. I may note that as per the complaint second petitioner is described as the Managing Director of accused no.1 i.e. petitioner no.1 and there are specific allegations that he is incharge and was responsible for the conduct of the business of the accused no.1 company. 9. Petition accordingly stands disposed of quashing the summoning order but viz-a-viz petitioner no.1 only. The summoning order is affirmed viz-a-viz second petitioner. 10. LCR be returned.
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2007 (8) TMI 791 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
... ... ... ... ..... rs and there is no contract or agreement entered with between applicant and the customer. The contention is that as per the definition of maintenance and repair service under Section 65 of the Finance Act, any service provided by a person under a contract or agreement in relation to maintenance or repair. 2. We find that in absence of any contract or agreement, applicant have a strong case in their favour, therefore, pre-deposit of amount of service tax is waived for hearing of the appeals. Stay petitions are allowed. (Dictated and pronounced in the open Court)
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2007 (8) TMI 790 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... of seven investment companies by the Assessee company, which certainly amounts to a gift. Therefore, fastening the gift tax upon the assessee company by the assessing authority in his order is perfectly legal and valid. Therefore, the impugned Judgement of the ITAT is liable to be set aside as the same is not only erroneously but also error in law as the same is contrary to the provisions of the Companies Act, Gift Tax Act and law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases referred to supra upon which the learned counsel for Revenue has rightly placed reliance in support of the findings and reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer in his order, which order is erroneously set aside by the KAT and therefore and above substantial questions of law do arise and the same are answered in favour of the Revenue by affirming the order of the assessing authority. 9. Hence, the appeal is accordingly allowed. Order of the ITAT is set aside and affirm the order of the assessing authority.
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2007 (8) TMI 789 - SC ORDER
Appointment of Accountant Members in ITAT - Selection List as approved by the Selection Board - Held that:- We find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment/order. Accordingly, the specialleave petition is dismissed. By the impugned judgment/order, a direction has been given to the respondents before it to give effect to the selection list as approved by the Selection Board.
The Union of India is given eight weeks’ time from today to complete the formalities.
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2007 (8) TMI 788 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ond the due date of 30-6-1975. The assessee filed a revised return first on 10-10-1977 and a second revised return on 13-6-1978. The admitted position is that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kumar Jagdish Chandra Sinha v. CIT 1996 220 ITR 671, a return not filed under section 139(1) cannot be considered as a valid return in respect of which a revised return could be filed in terms of section 139(5) of the Act. 3. Under the circumstances, the question referred for our opinion is answered in the affirmative, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. 4. The reference is disposed of accordingly.
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2007 (8) TMI 787 - SC ORDER
... ... ... ... ..... Appeal admitted. Interim stay order dated 24-11-2006 to continue.
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