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Showing 21 to 40 of 89 Records
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1969 (9) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... T" meant "DROP OF VITAMIN" till the explanation of that word was given to. him. We see no reason, therefore, to differ from the reasoning of the High Court on this 'aspect of the case. If the word "DROPOVIT" is not a descriptive word it must be held to be an invented word. It is true that the word "DROPOVIT" is coined out of words commonly used by and known to ordinary persons knowing English. But the resulting combination produces a new word, a newly coined word which does not remind an ordinary person knowing English of the original words out of which it is coined unless he is so told or unless at least he devotes some thought to it. It follows that the word "DROPOVIT" being an invented word was entitled to be registered as 'a trade mark and is not liable to be removed from the Register on which it already exists. For the reasons expressed we hold that this appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (9) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the infringement is such as is likely to deceive or cause confusion?
Held that:- In the present case the High Court has found that there is a deceptive resemblance between the word "RUSTON" and the word "RUSTAM" and therefore the use of the bare word "RUSTAM" constituted infringement of the plaintiff's trade mark "RUSTON". The respondent has not brought an appeal against the judgment of the High Court on this point and it is, therefore, not open to him to challenge that finding. If the respondent's trade mark is deceptively similar o that of the appellant the fact that the word 'INDIA' is added to the respondent's trade mark is of no consequence and the appellant is entitled to succeed in its action for infringement of its trade mark.
Appeal should be allowed and the appellant should be granted a decree restraining the respondents by a permanent injunction from infringing the plaintiff's trade mark "RUSTON" and from using it in connection with the engines machinery and accessories manufactured and sold by it under the trade mark of "RUSTAM INDIA". The appellant is also entitled to an injunction restraining the respondent and its agents from selling or advertising for sale of engines, machinery or accessories under the name of "RUSTAM" or "RUSTAM INDIA". The appellant is also granted a decree for nominal damages to the extent of ₹ 100/-
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1969 (9) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the phrase "person to whom a shop has been sold" in cl. 21 of r. 5.34 means a "person whose bid has been provisionally accepted"?
Held that:- In the present case the first part of cl. 21 applies. It is not disputed that the Chief Commissioner has disapproved the bid offered by the respondent. If the Chief Commissioner had granted sanction under cl. 33 of Ex. D-23 the auction sale in favour of the respondent would have been a completed transaction and he would have been liable for any shortfall on the resale. As the essential pre-requisites of a completed sale are missing in this case there is no liability imposed on the respondent for payment of the deficiency in the price. For these reasons we hold that the judgment of the Punjab High Court dated August 19, 1963 in L.P.A. No. 50-D of 1960 is correct and this appeal must be dismissed.
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1969 (9) TMI 108 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the order of reinstatement can be said to be improper as urged by counsel?
Held that:- The regional manager might well feel that if the respondent was capable of collecting evidence against the company, he might in future collect perhaps evidence of a more dangerous and harmful nature. Obviously, if he cannot repose confidence in the respondent, if reinstated, he cannot make any use of Ms services as a stenographer. In the circumstances, we think that the tribunal ought not to have directed his reinstatement despite its conclusion that the termination of his services was wrongfully made, but ought to have awarded suitable compensation instead.
As to the suitable compensation, considering the fact that the respondent had served the company only for a year and that it is not too difficult nowadays for competent stenographers to obtain suitable employment, we think it fair to direct the company to pay to him compensation equivalent to one year's salary at the rate of ₹ 307 per month. Set aside the order of reinstatement passed by the tribunal and order the appellant-company to pay to the respondent compensation equivalent to twelve months' salary at the rate of ₹ 307 per month with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from 17 July 1967 till payment
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1969 (9) TMI 107 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... xability does not depend on the person who purchases them, but it depends on the character of the goods sold. The third question is ill-conceived. Item 44 deals with all machineries or machines worked by electricity, diesel or petrol and spare parts and accessories thereof, excepting agricultural machinery and implements and parts thereof. The question framed is not correctly worded. The question should have been whether the oil-engines and centrifugal pumps purchased by agriculturists for bona fide agricultural purposes come within the exceptions of item 44 and the answer to that question would be also in the negative. 11.. In the result, our answer to question No. (1) is in the affirmative and the answers to questions Nos. (2) and (3) are in the negative. The reference is disposed of accordingly. The applicant, M.P. State Co-operative Marketing Society, Jabalpur, shall pay the costs of the Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. Hearing fee Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1969 (9) TMI 106 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cited at the Bar in support of the respective contentions by learned counsel for the parties The State of Madras v. Voltas Limited 1963 14 S.T.C. 446., Patnaik and Company v. The State of Orissa 1965 16 S.T.C. 364 (S.C.)., McKenzies Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra 1965 16 S.T.C. 518 (S.C.)., Richardson and Cruddas Ltd. v. The State of Madras 1965 16 S.T.C. 827., Arun Electrics, Bombay v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra State 1966 17 S.T.C. 576 (S.C.). and Commissioner of Sales Tax v. M/s. Habibulla Saheb 1968 22 S.T.C. 219. 5.. In the result, therefore, it must be held that the Tribunal took the correct view in construing the contract between the parties as works contract and as such not exigible to sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act. Question No. (1) also thus submitted to the High Court by the Tribunal must be answered in favour of the assessee and against the department. There will be no order as to costs. SINGH, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1969 (9) TMI 105 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the mills. The authority to the assessee to purchase cotton on behalf of the mills could be given to him by the authorised agents of the mills and such an authority can be inferred from the circumstances proved in the case. No circumstance has been brought out by the department which would indicate that the cotton purchased by the assessee was actually not supplied to the mills or that the price of any part of the cotton came from some source other than the mills. The Tribunal was, therefore, justified in coming to the conclusion that the assessee was acting as an agent on behalf of the mills and that these cotton transactions were not liable to sales tax. 2.. Our answer to the reference, therefore, is that on the facts and circumstances of the case the turnover of Rs. 1,85,305-6-9 representing the value of the cotton is not liable to sales tax in the hands of the assessee. The assessee shall get his costs. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1969 (9) TMI 104 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... either for use in the execution of any contract or for resale or for use in packing of taxable goods for resale. There is nothing on record to show that any attempt was made on behalf of the dealer to satisfy the taxing authority that there was any other material on record to show that the goods were purchased by the purchasing dealer for use in the execution of any contract or for resale or for use in packing of taxable goods for resale as is required under rule 18. In the absence of any such material produced before the taxing authority, the view expressed by the Tribunal must be accepted as correct and the question must be answered against the assessee, both, in the matter of the power of the Tribunal to rectify by review the order of the Board as also on merit with reference to the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the above case. 5.. The question referred to is accordingly answered against the assessee. WASIUDDIN, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1969 (9) TMI 103 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g must be construed as notice to the Commissioner. The date on which the order is made must be considered as the date on which the Commissioner receives notice of the order. In our judgment, a revision application filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax is governed by the period of limitation prescribed under section 10(3-B) of the Act, and the date on which the Sales Tax Officer makes the assessment order must be taken to be the date of service of the order on the Commissioner. The revision applications filed by the Commissioner are, therefore, barred by limitation. In this view we are supported by the decision of another Bench of this court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. M/s. Mangal Sen Shyam LalSales Tax Reference No. 361 of 1964. The question referred in each case is answered accordingly. The respondent is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 100 as one set of costs in all three cases. Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure. References answered accordingly.
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1969 (9) TMI 102 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... essment related to a firm but notice was served upon a person who was not even a partner of that firm. The Supreme Court held that in such a case it will not be deemed that the assessment order was passed against the firm. The following decision also makes it clear that a judgment will be void if a party is not given notice of proceedings See R. v. Huntingdone Confirming Authority 1929 1 K.B. 698 at p. 713. It is pertinent in this connection to note that not only the issue and service of the notice was improper but the order which the Commercial Tax Officer made was also wrong because it was made not against the firm but was made against the proprietary concern of which Pachipulusu Venkata Subba Rao is the sole proprietor. The order thus suffers from these infirmities and has been rightly, in our view, found to be illegal and cannot therefore be given effect to. The revision case therefore is dismissed. The department will pay the costs to the respondent. Petition dismissed.
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1969 (9) TMI 101 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lsi and waste caustic liquor . Their Lordships held that in disposing of old and discarded items the company was not carrying on the business of selling those items, but when the subsidiary products, such as kolsi and caustic liquor , were turned out in the assessee s factory regularly and continuously and were sold from time to time, an intention to carry on the business in those items could reasonably be attributed to the company. This view was reiterated by their Lordships in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board 1959 1 S.C. Cases 200 25 S.T.C. 188. In that case their Lordships held that sales of coal ash, which was regularly and continuously produced as a subsidiary product, were liable to be assessed to sales tax. 7.. In view of the foregoing discussion, our answer to the reference is in the affirmative. The Commissioner of Sales Tax shall have the costs of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 75. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1969 (9) TMI 100 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Sales Tax Officer to make an assessment order under rule 41(3) in respect of those sales. Rule 41(3) empowers the Sales Tax Officer to make an assessment either when no return has been submitted or if the return is submitted without payment of tax. The latter case arises only when tax is payable on the turnover disclosed in the return and the assessee does not claim that the turnover is exempt from sales tax. As the petitioner claimed in his return that the turnover of handspun woollen yarn was exempt from tax there was no jurisdiction in the Sales Tax Officer to make the impugned assessment order. The assessment order is liable to be quashed. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to consider the other grounds raised in the writ petition. The petition is allowed. A writ in the nature of certiorari shall issue quashing the assessment order made against the petitioner for the first quarter of the assessment year 1968-69. There is no order as to costs Petition allowed.
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1969 (9) TMI 99 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 908-B/S/57-3 Revenue, dated 24th July, 1957, in so far as it empowers the appellate authority to dismiss an appeal for default is repugnant to section 21(4) of the Act and ultra vires of the power of the Tribunal under section 3(4) read with section 21(4) of the Act and is, therefore, struck down. The Tribunal must, therefore, be held to have acted without jurisdiction in dismissing the appeal for default on 29th June, 1964, and to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it in not disposing of the appeal filed by the petitioner herein on merits. The order of the Tribunal dated 29th June, 1964, and its subsequent order dated 17th April, 1965, dismissing the petition are accordingly quashed and the Tribunal is directed to dispose of the appeal filed by the petitioner herein on merits in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above. The writ petition, therefore, succeeds and is accordingly allowed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200. Petition allowed.
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1969 (9) TMI 98 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e question referred to the Full Bench. My answer is In order to recover the interest under section 8(1-A) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act as arrears of land revenue, it is necessary for the Sales Tax Officer to serve upon the assessee a notice of demand in pursuance of an order quantifying the amount of interest (even though it may not be an order of assessment) and on the assessee s failure to comply with the notice of demand to issue a recovery certificate to the Collector specifying therein the amount of interest sought to be recovered. As admittedly, this procedure has not been followed in this and the connected writ petitions the recovery proceedings are unauthorised and are liable to be quashed. By the Court In view of the majority judgment, we answer the question referred to us by saying that it was not necessary for the Sales Tax Officer to make an assessment order in respect of interest and to issue a notice of demand in respect of the same. Question answered accordingly.
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1969 (9) TMI 97 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e, it cannot be said that the assessment order is erroneous, clearly there is no case for rectification under section 22 of the Act. In the instant case, admittedly, the petitioner had not filed C Forms with the Sales Tax Officer before the assessment order was made. He received C Forms only after the assessment order had been completed. The C Forms not having been before the Sales Tax Officer when the assessment order was made by him, it cannot be said that there is any mistake apparent on the face of the record of assessment. The record of assessment did not include the C Forms when the assessment order was made and, therefore, there was no mistake apparent on the face of the record by reference to the C Forms. We are not satisfied that the case falls within the scope of section 22 of the Act. This ground for challenging the validity of the impugned orders fails. No other ground has been pressed before us. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1969 (9) TMI 96 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o sever the earth or gravel from the land before sale or agreement to sever gravel or earth under the contract of sale. It is not the case of the assessee-firm that there was any such contract involved in the sales of the metal made by it. But it was argued by Sri K.B. Krishna Murthy, the learned counsel appearing for the assessee-firm, that the exemption in question granted under the G.O. must be taken as giving exemption to the sales of gravel quarried and sold and even though the assessee-firm quarried the metal from its own land it must be deemed that the quarrying was done as on contract and in this view of the matter it must be held that the transactions in question were exempted from payment of sales tax. We fail to see that there is any basis or warrant for construing the sales in question in such a manner. Under these circumstances we do not see any merits in these two revision cases. Accordingly, the two revision cases are dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1969 (9) TMI 95 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sale of goods. The explanation to the definition of a dealer is subject to there being a sale. There is reference in the explanation to distribution, as distribution involves a transfer. That it is so is also clear from the first explanation to the definition of sale . Distribution there contemplated is such as involves a transfer of property. If therefore the petitioner s transaction in the import and distribution of art silk, dyes and chemicals involved no transfer of property, it cannot be held that as a dealer it effected sales in the course of business attracting sales tax. We are not in these petitions concerned with local purchases made by the petitioner from mills of yarn and distribution. We do not decide whether those transactions would attract tax or not. Subject to this observation, the petitions are allowed and the orders of assessment involved in these petitions are quashed. The petitioner is entitled to costs, one set counsel s fee Rs. 260. Petitions allowed.
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1969 (9) TMI 94 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... I.R. 1949 Pat. 418. is relevant in so far as it refers to assessment of super-tax under the Agricultural Income-tax Act. It has been held that where super-tax was not assessed at the original assessment proceeding, it could be done under section 29, but subject to limitation of time provided in the section itself. Under that section, the assessment of escaped tax must be made within three years from the end of the accounting year and, therefore, the last date for assessment of the escaped tax in that case was 31st March, 1956. The principle of that decision is applicable to the present case as well and it supports the view adopted by the Tribunal in holding that assessment for 1954-55 was barred by limitation. In Province of Bihar v. Khetra Mohan Kunar(4), a similar view has been adopted. 6.. The reference is accordingly answered in favour of the assessee that the assessment for the year 1955-56 was barred by limitation. WASIUDDIN, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1969 (9) TMI 93 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ods , also showed that the tractor was treated as a separate item and only a fixed sum of Rs. 100 per tractor was to be levied as sales tax irrespective of its sale price. It was clear from this that the tractor is not luxury goods and obviously it could not be the intention of the Legislature that although tractor may not be luxury goods, its spare parts would be luxury goods. The learned Advocate-General, who appeared on behalf of the State, after going through the judgment of the learned Single Judge, frankly conceded that it is not possible for him to advance any serious argument challenging the correctness of the decision of the learned Single Judge. In view of the above, we feel that the learned Single Judge has very thoroughly discussed the point and by no stretch of imagination can the tractor or its spare parts be categorised as luxury goods under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act. These letters patent appeals are consequently dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1969 (9) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT
Petition filed by respondent No. 1 under article 226 of the Constitution was allowed and a notice dated March 11, 1963, issued to him under section 31(1) of the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Act 17 of 1947), hereinafter called the Act, was quashed
Held that:- Appeal allowed. These again are matters which cannot be decided at this stage and it is for respondent No. 1 to show these and other relevant provisions to the authority by which the impugned notice has been issued and to satisfy it that production of accounts as called for will not be in conformity with the statutory provisions. At any rate it appears to us that the matter has to be decided under section 31(1) on the evidence and the accounts which are already on the record and no further or additional evidence can be called for and adduced.
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