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Showing 21 to 40 of 113 Records
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1974 (9) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... hese have, ordinarily to be given their full effect. Although the arguments of the respondents mentioned above seem to have found complete acceptance in the High Court, I find myself, with due respect, unable to accede to them. Logically speaking, I find no way of escaping the conclusion that a tax imposed on consumption cannot be avoided even when the consumer uses up energy either in generating or producing it or transmitting it or transforming it before utilising it for some manufacturing process. It is consumption that is taxed. 1, therefore, regret my inability to accept the conclusions of my learned Brother Khanna on taxation of energy used up in its transmission or transformation before its use for a manufacturing purpose. In my opinion, the appeal before us must be allowed wholly with costs. ORDER In view of the decision of the majority, the appeal is allowed in part and the judgment of the High Court modified. The parties are left to bear their own costs throughout.
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1974 (9) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... he company. The Bank Nationalisation case (supra) has established the view that the fundamental rights of shareholders as citizens are not lost when they associate to form a company. When their fundamental rights as shareholders are impaired by State action their rights as shareholders are protected. The reason is that the shareholders' rights are equally and necessarily affected if the rights of the company are affected." We think the second appellant is entitled to challenge the validity of the sub-section on the ground that it abridged his fundamental right under Articles 19(1)(g) and 19(1)(f). In the result we hold that there was no valid purchase of the undertaking and that taking delivery of the undertaking was unlawful. The State Electricity Board is directed to redeliver the undertaking to the licensee. We set aside the judgment under appeal and allow the appeal to the extent indicated but, in the circumstances, without any order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1974 (9) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... the mining area, all of which indicate that the respective mining areas are enclosed premises within the meaning of the exceptions under s. 2(c) of the Taxation Act. In the result Civil Appeal 336/70 is dismissed with cost and other appeal-, are partly allowed and it is held that dumpers and rockers though registrable under the Act are not taxable under the Taxation Act as long as they are working solely within the premises of the respective owners. So far as the tractairs are concerned they are neither registerable under the Act nor taxable under the Taxation Act. The appellants will get proportionate costs. As we have held that these machines are not taxable the question about the constitutional validity of the Taxation Act challenged by Writ Petition No. 372 of 1974 filed by Bolani Ores Ltd. would become academic and need not be considered. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed but without costs. C.A.336/70 and W.P. 372/74 dismissed C. A. 1816-1817/68 partly allowed.
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1974 (9) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... n the prevailing conditions to prohibit the use of machinery in the remaining 8 districts. It was also submitted that the notification offended Article 301. Article 302 states that the State can impose restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse between one State and another or within any part of the territory of India. It was said that the Defence of India Act is not a law made by Parliament, imposing restrictions is contemplated under Article, 302. The Defence of India Act has been passed by Parliament. The Rules under the Act have legislative sanction. The restrictions are imposed in the interest of the general public. The restrictions are reasonable in the interest of the industry and public. For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the High Court is upheld. The appeals are dismissed. In view of the fact that the High Court directed the parties to bear their own costs we also direct that the parties will pay and bear their own costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1974 (9) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... avit from the District Magistrate, nor the swearing by an Upper Division Assistant was at any rate considered to be fatal because the habeas corpus petition was in the result dismissed. 2. In this case, it may be pointed out that the affidavit is of the Deputy Secretary (Home Department) who is dealing with these matters. This Deputy Secretary has stated that the District Magistrate was not available because he was pre-occupied with some urgent business and was engaged on pressing duties connected with the maintenance of law and order in the district. In our view, the affidavit filed by the Deputy Secretary (Home Department) shows that the order was made by the District Magistrate on being satisfied that the detention of the petitioner was necessary to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. There being no other ground urged against the legality of the detention order, this petition is dismissed.
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1974 (9) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... t is the obligation of the State or the detaining authority in making its return to the rule in such a case to place all the relevant facts before the Court and if there is any delay in making the order of detention or in arresting the detenu which is prima facie unreasonable, the State must give reasons explaining the delay. Here there is no explanation for the delay which has occurred at both stages and in the absence of such explanation, we are not at all satisfied that the District Magistrate, Burdwan applied his mind and arrived at a real and genuine subjective satisfaction that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner. The condition precedent for, the making of the order of detention was, therefore, not satisfied, and consequently, the order of detention must be quashed and set aside. 3. We accordingly quash and set aside the order of detention and direct that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith.
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1974 (9) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... by the learned Judge decided that an award that created a charge must be registered. That is, undoubtedly correct. The question regarding the application of section 17(2)(v) of the Registration Act however did not arise there. The learned Judge does not refer to any of the decisions which we have referred to, including those of this Court because he proceeded to decide the matter on the assumption that the award itself created a right in immovable property of the value of over one hundred rupees. We are clearly of opinion that the award in this case falls under s. 17(2) (v) and is, therefore, not registrable. As regards the question of stamp duty, we, do not propose to express any opinion as it would appear that the learned Judge of the High Court would himself have been ready to receive the stamp duty and penalty if he had held that the agreement was not compulsorily registrable. The appeal is allowed and the first respondent should pay the appellants costs. Appeal allowed
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1974 (9) TMI 110 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... x20B9; 75,742 minus ₹ 21,604.78 paise ₹ 54,138.22 paise. The relief granted in respect of declaration and injunction has been properly granted. The result is that the appeal partly succeeds. 75. First Appeal No. 713 of 1968 is partly allowed. The decree of the trial Court, so far as money claim is concerned, is modified. Instead of ₹ 82,571.10 paise, plaintiff-respondent is entitled to recover from the appellant defendant ₹ 54,137.22 paise with proportionate costs and running interest at 6 per cent on it from the date of the suit till payment. The decree passed by the trial Court regarding declaration and injunction is hereby confirmed. For the money claim disallowed, the plaintiff is to pay proportionate costs to the defendant in the suit. In the appeal the plaintiff-respondent to get the costs from the appellant defendant for the claim disallowed in the appeal and pay the costs to the appellant-defendant for the claim allowed in the appeal.
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1974 (9) TMI 109 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... en confiscated to the Government. In view of the existence of this order no writ of mandamus can be issued to the respondent directing them to return the goods to the petitioner. Now, two things are clear. One is that the goods themselves have not been seized from the custody of the petitioner and the petitioner himself admits that they were seized at Delhi Lahori Gate railway station, when the goods were sent by the petitioner to M/s Mahavir Trading Co., New Delhi. Secondly there has been an order confiscating the identical goods in question. The only contention that the learned counsel for the petitioner put forward is that the petitioner is not a party to that order. But that does not in any way affect the situation. So long as that order is there, without getting rid of that order, the petitioner cannot ask for a mandamus for return of the goods to him, particularly when the goods themselves were not seized directly from petitioner. Hence, the writ petition is dismissed.
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1974 (9) TMI 108 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... Section 30(a) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. Even assuming that the Supreme Court in the Voltas case has made a new declaration of law on the construction of Section 4(a) of the said Excises Act such declaration cannot be used retrospectively in the facts and circumstances of this case. 50. For all the reasons stated above, the Rule is discharged subject to the following direction that the respondents will deal with the pending applications relating to levy of Excise duty under Section 4(a) of the said Excises Act on which final determination of duty has not yet been made in accordance with the principles of law laid down in the Voltas case, that is one the basis of the wholesale cash price comprising manufacturing costs and manufacturing profits only and excluding post-manufacturing costs and profits. All interim orders stand vacated. There will be no orders as to costs. The petitioner-company will be at liberty to take recourse to any other remedy, permissible in law.
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1974 (9) TMI 107 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... egister and the actual stock stored by the respondent. By a comparison of the stock entries in the stock book and the stock actually stored, it was found that there was a difference of 18, 45 kilograms of chewing tobacco. The stock book showed 11,280 kilograms, while the actual stock was 22,934 kilograms. When the respondent was asked to explain he exated that shortage was due to driage in storage. It is in evidence that tobacco was stocked for a long time. It is conceded by the prosecution that there will be a driage and that driage in some cases, may even go to an extent of 42 per cent. 3. In this case, the shortage is 35 per cent. It, therefore, cannot be said that the shortage was only due to clendestine removal. It might be due to dringe, whatever, it might be, the appellant would, certainly, be entitiled to benefit of doubt. This being an appeal against the order of acquittal I do not find any sufficient reason to interfere with the order. The appeal is dismissed.
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1974 (9) TMI 106 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ned in the writ petition sales tax at the rate of 5 per cent is leviable on copper, tin, nickle, zinc or any alloy containing any of these metals only . The product made by the petitioner is alloy of zinc and aluminium. It does not fall within the aforesaid entry, because the entry is confined to alloy of copper, tin, nickle and zinc only. The opinion of the Sales Tax Officer that this product being an alloy of zinc and aluminium is liable to be taxed as an unclassified item appears to be justified. There is no substance in these writ petitions. They are accordingly dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1974 (9) TMI 105 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ng and walling. Both corrugation and galvanisation improve the utility of the raw material. By the process of galvanisation and corrugation, the iron and steel do not lose their essential character as iron and steel. In view of this decision it must be held that galvanisation and corrugation process does not change the essential character of the iron and steel. They remain iron and steel. In view of the finding that galvanising and corrugating are done by the same mill which manufactures them, the case clearly falls within sub-clause (d) of clause (iv) of section 3-AA(1). Learned counsel has not pressed that the turnover of these sheets was wares made of metal within the meaning of the notification dated 21st May, 1963. Our answer to the question referred to us is that the turnover of the sheets in question fell within the category of iron or steel as defined under section 3-AA. The assessee is entitled to costs, which are assessed at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (9) TMI 104 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... 74, for which they have filed objections stating that they have filed all the returns in time and there is no lapse on their part in this respect. But the assessee is silent about the date of payment of the tax involved. Hence the proposed levy is confirmed and the penalty due as per the above section is Rs. 12,802.75. Issue final demand notice for the same as per Rules. It is seen from the order of the respondent (Commercial Tax Officer) extracted above, that no reason has been given by him as to why he levied the maximum penalty permissible under law. It is needless to say that such an order should contain reasons in support of the order. Because the order in question is not a speaking order, it is liable to be quashed. Hence it is quashed. The Commercial Tax Officer is at liberty to pass a fresh order in accordance with law. The petition is accordingly allowed. No costs. The Government Advocate is permitted to file his memo of appearance within ten days. Petition allowed.
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1974 (9) TMI 103 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ndered unfit for human consumption by some manufacturing process, cannot come within its fold. 11.. The assessee deals with goods like paints, colours and varnishes, etc. Denatured spirit , in ordinary parlance, is a commodity used for the purpose of varnishing, painting or colouring. In that analogy, it is to be placed on the footing of articles like paints, colours and varnishes. According to the taxing statute, all items are taxable unless expressly provided to be tax-free. In this case, denatured spirit has not been made explicitly tax-free nor it can be presumed by necessary implication. Accordingly, we would hold that denatured spirit does not come under serial No. 12 meant for articles exempted from tax. 12.. In the result, therefore, we would answer the recast point of reference in the negative in favour of the revenue. Consolidated hearing fee Rs. 50 (Rupees fifty only). The reference is answered accordingly. S.K. RAY, AG. J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (9) TMI 102 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... id by him. In fact, no reference can be made to the machinery of refund under the Delhi Act inasmuch as none of the assessees before us claims to be entitled to refund tax or the Central sales tax. They have, therefore, no locus standi to raise any question regarding any provision for refund either in the Central Act or in the State Act. No other contention was raised by the assessees. All their contentions having fallen through and the contentions of the Government having succeeded, the writ petitions filed by the assessees, namely, Civil Writs Nos. 1247 of 1972 and 350 of 1973 are dismissed and the writ petitions filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax, namely, Civil Writs Nos. 460 and 553 of 1973 are allowed. The impugned orders passed by the Financial Commissioner are quashed. The Financial Commissioner will now act in the light of the observation made in this judgment. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are ordered to bear their own costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1974 (9) TMI 101 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ding the liability of a dealer is always on the revenue, the onus of certain special facts exclusively within the knowledge of the assessee to claim the benefit of any exemption under the statute is alone on the assessee. I do not think that such a construction can be placed on sub-section (2) of section 6-A. Sub-section (2) of section 6-A clearly states that in the absence of any acceptable evidence adduced on behalf of the dealer who is liable to pay tax on the first sale or first purchase, his turnover in respect of the declared goods in question should be presumed to be taxable under the relevant provisions of the statute. The authorities are bound to give effect to the said presumption while passing orders of assessment notwithstanding the fact that ordinarily the burden of proof regarding the liability of tax under a fiscal statute is on the revenue. 16.. No other point is urged. In the result, these petitions fail and they are dismissed. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1974 (9) TMI 100 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... of the society indicate that it has got authority to conclude the bargain on behalf of the seller. Even if the society may not have any dominion over the goods and may not be a selling agent with authority to sell in the strict sense of the term, it acts as an agent through whom the sale is effected. The activity of the society brings it within the definition of dealer . A similar question arose in the case of Co-operative Marketing Society v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. 1972 29 S.T.C. 619 1972 U.P.T.C. 86. A Bench of this Court ruled that where the assessee sells the goods of agriculturists-members on the strength of the authority given to it by the principal to conclude the bargain on his behalf, the assessee is a dealer. Our answer to the question referred to us is, therefore, in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner, Sales Tax, is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (9) TMI 99 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... of the petitioner is that the Sales Tax Officer has issued a notice requiring the petitioner to show cause why penalty should not be imposed under clause (c) of section 15-A(1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. This clause speaks of failure to pay tax within the time allowed without reasonable cause. As already seen, the prescribed period of 30 days from the date of service of fresh notice as contemplated by subsection (9) of section 8 had not even begun to run because no such notice had been served upon the assessee. It could not therefore be said that the assessee failed to pay the tax assessed on him within the time allowed by the statute. The notice to impose penalty was equally premature. In the result the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 20th November, 1973, as well as the notice for imposing penalty for not depositing the tax within time are quashed. As no one has appeared to oppose the petition there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1974 (9) TMI 98 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... n obstante clause in section 5 but under section 5 which is a special charging section. It is self-contained as section 3(1). It is not unusual that where a turnover of sales, when split up, is found to contain a variety of transactions which are differently dealt with for the purpose of charging under the Sales Tax Act, it is no argument, because there is a compendious assessment that the sales which attract the special charge could not be separated from assessment. Nor are we persuaded by the contention that the scope of section 5 is so narrow that it only has reference to cancellation of the exemption limit under section 3(1), and that, whatever be the quantum of turnover, the sales of the type mentioned in section 5 will not attract the charge. In our opinion, Sivamurugan v. Assistant Commercial Tax Officer 1970 26 S.T.C. 68. was rightly decided. The writ appeal and tax cases are dismissed with costs in each of them. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Appeal and petitions dismissed.
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