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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 157 Records
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1979 (9) TMI 193 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ice bearers of the institution but they are in possession of the institution and are lying in the office of the institution. A search of such a public place under the authority of a general search warrant can easily be sustained under s. 93(1)(c). If the order of the learned Magistrate is construed to mean this, there is no, illegality committed in issuing a search warrant. Of course, issuance of a search warrant is a serious matter and it would be advisable not to dispose of an application for search warrant in a mechanical way by a laconic order. Issue of search warrant being in the discretion of the Magistrate it would be reasonable to expect of the Magistrate to give reasons which swayed his discretion in favour of granting the request. A clear application of mind by the learned Magistrate must be discernible in the order granting the search warrant. Having said this, we see no justification for interfering with the order of the High Court in this case. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (9) TMI 192 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ce. Section 97 (3) has a different role to play. This Section 97 (3) is subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 97. Since in the instant case, Section 97 (2) applies, the right to file appeal has to be governed by the latter. 35. For the reasons given above, we answer the first question in the negative, 36. The second question is answered in the affirmative by saying that Section 97 (2) (a) preserves the right of appeal against orders passed under Section 47, Civil P. C. in respect of appeals already pending on the date of enforcement of the Amending Act as well as in respect of appeals where the orders on the objection filed under Section 47 had already been passed before the enforcement of the Civil Laws (Amendment) Act. 37. The third question is answered by saying that the right to file an appeal accrues on the date of filing of the execution application. 38. Let the papers of this case be laid before the appropriate Bench with the answers mentioned above.
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1979 (9) TMI 191 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f these writ petitions.” I respectfully agree with Chinnappa Reddy, J., and uphold the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that any remedy by way of any appeal to the Appellate Collector or the Central Board of Excise and Customs or the Central Government, as the case may be, would be of no avail, though they are quasi-judicial authorities, as it could not be stated that those authorities who also function as executive authorities will not be influenced by the view taken at the highest level as to how the Notification should be interpreted and that any approach to them would bah only futile. In these circumstances, I hold that these writ petitions which have been filed without exhausting the alternative remedies by way of appeals in some cases and revisions in some other cases are maintainable. 73. For the foregoing reasons, all the writ petitions, are allowed as prayed for with costs. Counsel’s fee ₹ 500/- in each of the petitions.
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1979 (9) TMI 190 - CENTRAL BOARD OF EXCISE AND CUSTOMS
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... ... ..... w, or material to suggest, that such subsequent buyers knew, or it can be inferred from the attendant circumstances that they could have had reason to know that the said tobacco, received by them under T.P. 1 was in fact non-duty paid tobacco. There is no information available in the records as to the price at which the said tobacco changed hands at different stages. It is difficult to say, therefore, whether the subsequent buyers got the tobacco at a price less than the normal market price of the duty paid tobacco of such variety which, if it were so, could inter alia be indicative of mens rea on their part and tend to suggest that being the bneneficiary of the gain accruing from the initial evasion of duty they could be privy to the fraud. 4. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, Board sets aside the six impugned orders under appeal, and directs that these cases be readjudicated after proper enquiry complying with the principles of natural justice.
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1979 (9) TMI 189 - SUPREME COURT
Whether determining capital value on the basis of the annual value recorded in the assessment books of the local authority concerned is arbitrary because of the absence of the necessary machinery for its determination?
Whether the law governing the levy and fixation of annual value of buildings in the areas of the local authorities concerned provide the necessary procedure and the machinery for their assessment and final fixation?
Held that:- Rule 4 of the Kerala Building Tax Rules, 1974, provides that the return under sub-section (1) or (3) of section 7, or section 8 of the Act shall be in Form II. Column 2 of that form makes a mention of the location of the building, but not the location of its ground or land, or the value thereof. It refers only to the annual value of the building in column (13) and its capital value in column 7, so that the location of the building, as distinct from the location of its ground, or the value of the ground as such, do not go in for the determination of the annual or capital value of the building.
Section 29 of the Act declares, for the avoidance of doubt, that in fixing the fair rent of a building under section 5 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, the rent control court shall not take into consideration the building tax payable in respect of the building under the Act. That has given rise to the argument that the provision is extortionate as it prevents the owner from passing on the liability to the tenant. If the provisions of sections 11 and 18 are read harmoniously it would appear that if an, assessee is entitled to pay the building tax in instalments under the prescription referred to in section 18, he will not be identified to file an appeal if he has paid those instalments as and when they fall due. That is a fair and reasonable view to take of the relevant provisions of the Act, and we hold accordingly. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (9) TMI 188 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng to the liability of the assessee under section 16 and the question of penal liability under section 45. Thus, it cannot be said that the impugned notice did not pertain to the same subject-matter. Under the circumstances, the aforesaid submission of Mr. Nanavati is liable to be rejected. In view of the aforesaid decision on the first submission of Mr. Kaji, it is not necessary to examine the merits of the second submission regarding the effect of the revisional order of the Sales Tax Tribunal and whether the order of the Assistant Commissioner had merged in the revisional order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal. We express no opinion on this question. In the result, this special civil application filed by the petitioner is required to be allowed and the impugned notice at annexure B seeking to revise the prior order of the Assistant Commissioner is held to be without jurisdiction, null and void and is therefore quashed. Rule is made absolute with costs. Rule made absolute.
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1979 (9) TMI 187 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tax to the respondent, instead they did not pay any heed to the representation of the respondent. In our view, it would be doing injustice to the respondent, if we allow the appellants to take advantage of their own wrong. The respondent, in our opinion, cannot be said to be negligent in the matter of refund of tax. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that the bar of limitation of three years as relied on by the appellants is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. No other point has been urged in this appeal. In these circumstances, the appeal is dismissed, but in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs. Leave for appeal to the Supreme Court has been prayed for by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants. The prayer is disallowed. The operation of this judgment will remain stayed till three weeks after the long vacation. SHARMA, J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed. Leave to appeal disallowed.
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1979 (9) TMI 186 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as a whole, and the Collector of a district means a Collector of a district anywhere in the country. A certificate issued by a Collector of a district is enforceable in another State, as in the case of a certificate issued by the Collector of another district in the same State. This is the view held by the High Court of Karnataka in Burman v. Commercial Tax Officer 1971 28 S.T.C. 637., which, with respect, I fully endorse. 7.. For the reasons stated by me, I see no merits in the various contentions raised by the petitioner. Counsel for the petitioner, however, submits that section 4 of Act 1 of 1890 enables the petitioner to institute a suit for repayment of the amounts paid by it in certain cases and that, in the instant case, the petitioner should not be denied such right. The petitioner, no doubt, has such rights as are available to it under section 4 and, on that point, there is no dispute. 8.. The original petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1979 (9) TMI 185 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... urchase by the petitioners or whether there has been restriction on trade and business. 21.. In the result, all the writ petitions are allowed. The impugned notifications of May, 1977, and December, 1977, in so far as relating to bamboos agreed to be severed and trees agreed to be severed are quashed. In the circumstances of the cases, there will be no order as to costs. 22.. RAY, C.J.-I agree that the impugned notifications must be quashed. In the series of sales in question, the first sale, that is, the taxable event, started from the D.F.O. He is the taxable person, who sold the taxable goods, namely, the timber. What is sold by the D.F.O. is purchased by the petitioners. The identity of the goods sold and purchased is the same. Thus, when such a sale is taxed, the purchase thereof is excluded from the levy of tax by virtue of sections 3-B and 8 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act and, consequently, the levy of purchase tax by the impugned notifications is bad. Petitions allowed.
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1979 (9) TMI 184 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n of 16th February, 1962. This would be defeating the intent of the notification of 16th February, 1962. On a composite consideration of these notifications, we are of the view that handloom shawls and lohis were exempt from tax only in the assessment year 1961-62, i.e., from the period 16th February, 1962, and onwards and not from any relevant year. We hold accordingly. Treating this as a revision instead of a reference, in view of section 20(6-A) of U.P. Ordinance No. 27 of 1978, instead of answering the question referred, we allow the revision in part, and hold that the assessee is not entitled to exemption in respect of his turnover of shawls and lohis during the assessment years 1959-60 and 1960-61, but was entitled to the benefit as from 16th February, 1962, up to 31st March, 1962, and not for any other part of the assessment year 1961-62. In view of the partial success and failure of the parties, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. Petitions partly allowed.
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1979 (9) TMI 183 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e outset has drawn our attention to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mangulu Sahu Ramahari Sahu v. Sales Tax Officer, Ganjam 1973 32 S.T.C. 494 (S.C.). , and submitted that the question which was to be decided by this Court in the present case has already been decided by the Supreme Court. It appears that lemon has been held to be a vegetable. Once it is held that lemon is a vegetable then there is no controversy that the respondent is entitled for exemption in view of the notification dated 1st July, 1959, details whereof have been mentioned in the statement of case forwarded to this Court by the Tribunal. 5.. Accordingly, we answer the reference in the affirmative that lemon is a vegetable and is exempted from the levy of general or special sales tax by item No. 11 of Schedule III read with the notification dated 1st July, 1959. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. S.P. SINHA, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1979 (9) TMI 182 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... enalty for incomplete or incorrect return can be imposed only in case of best judgment assessment. It is true that the provisions of the Madras Sales Tax Act were not analogous to section 15-A of the U.P. Act but the principle is none the less salutary that if the account books have been accepted it obviously means that the return which is filed on the basis of the account books contains correct particulars. In any case, it would be difficult in such cases to hold that particulars of turnover were concealed or deliberately inaccurate return was filed. The words concealment and deliberate used in the sub-section restrict imposition of penalty to limited cases only. In the result, this revision succeeds and is allowed. The question of law raised by the assessee is decided by saying that no penalty can be levied for inaccuracy only. The assessee shall be entitled to its costs which is assessed at Rs. 300. The fee of the standing counsel is assessed at Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1979 (9) TMI 181 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 1965-66 was without any basis. The Commissioner had noticed all these facts and arguments in his order, but had just quietly ignored the effect of such facts and arguments. The Tribunal found that the point had been raised by the dealer before the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes but he had failed to consider it. The Tribunal was, therefore, competent to go into that question and ask the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes to decide it after proper investigation. 8.. In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal s order setting aside the Commissioner s order and remanding the case to him for passing a fresh order in the light of their observations is valid and legally justified. 9.. Consequently, the answer to the latter part of the question must also be in the affirmative, namely, that the order of remand passed by the Tribunal in this case was legally justified. Since nobody appears on behalf of the dealer, there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1979 (9) TMI 180 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ficer could not be utilised as in the appellate order dated 13th September, 1974, the jurisdiction of the assessing authority was circumscribed and it was directed that no order should be passed so long as proceedings under section 9(3) do not come to an end. The argument has no merit. In Ram Dayal Harbilas Prabhu Dayal v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1979 44 S.T.C. 84 (F.B.) 1979 U.P.T.C. 999 (F.B.). , it has been held by a Full Bench that once proceedings are remanded by the appellate authority the entire matter is at large. In the result, this revision succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the Additional Judge (Revisions) is set aside. The question of law raised by the assessee is decided in its favour by saying that once proceedings in original assessment have been remanded the proceedings under section 21 could not go on. The assessee shall be entitled to its cost which is assessed at Rs. 300. The fee of the standing counsel is assessed at Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1979 (9) TMI 179 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... trical equipment or plants? It is obvious, even the standing counsel does not contest, that poles sold by the assessee cannot be considered to be for convenient handling of electrical equipment or plants. What is urged by him is that it is accessory to electricity generated by plants as electric wire cannot be run without fixing poles and, therefore, they should be treated as accessory of electrical plant or equipment. The argument is devoid of any merit. Poles might be needed for running electricity but by that they do not become accessory of electrical plant or equipment. In the result, this revision fails and is dismissed. The question of law raised by the Commissioner of Sales Tax is decided by saying that cement poles supplied by the assessee were not covered under entry 7A of Notification No. 7096 dated 1st October, 1965. The assessee shall be entitled to its cost, which is assessed at Rs. 200. The fee of the standing counsel is assessed at Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1979 (9) TMI 178 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing meals and other things at cheap rates which is a facility and not in the nature of self-service. No agency can be spelt out nor any mutuality because the general body of consumers, members and non-members, have no say in the conduct of the activity of the canteen. A socially desirable activity like fair price shops or super bazars started by Government does not mean that the purpose overrides the nature of the activity. The motive of starting such activity is laudable. The activity is nothing but carrying on business. In the view that we have taken, we answer the four questions set out on page 6 as under (a) The first question is answered in the affirmative. (b) The second question is answered in the affirmative. (c) The third question is answered in the affirmative. (d) The fourth question is answered in the affirmative. The references are answered accordingly. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. References answered accordingly. See page 437 supra.
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1979 (9) TMI 177 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... spectfully following the decision in Banaras Bead Manufacturing Co. 1970 25 S.T.C. 100., I hold that the entry glasswares in the notification mentioned in question No. (1) above must be taken to refer to all articles of glass except those expressly excluded in the entry and except glass bangles and articles of glass which can be considered as falling within other entries. Glass beads or for the matter of that guilded glass beads must be taken to be included in the entry glasswares . As there is no such head as glass beads used for ornaments or rosaries, guilded glass beads cannot be taken away from the head glasswares. In my opinion, therefore, the revenue authorities have been right in treating the glass beads as falling in the category of glasswares, the sales whereof are taxable at 10 per cent. The view taken by the revising authority to the contrary is erroneous in law. Both the revisions are hence allowed with costs which I assess at Rs. 200, one set. Petitions allowed.
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1979 (9) TMI 176 - SUPREME COURT
Whether this State Purchase Tax Act is bad because it is a legislation with respect to a controlled industry, to wit, the sugar industry?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed.Nothing more than prevention of escapement of purchase tax on cane is done and what is done is legitimately incidental to the taxing power. Peripheral similarity between purchase tax and excise levy does not spell essential sameness. Sugarcane tax operates in the neighbourhood of sugar excise but proximity is not identity. The tax is only on purchase of cane, not its conversion into sugar. If the miller has his own cane farm and crushes it, he has no purchase tax to pay but cannot escape excise duty, if any. Again, if cane is purchased by a miller and it is later robbed or destroyed before sugar is manufactured, the State tax is exigible although excise on production is not. A perspicacious appreciation of the implications of purchase and production dispels confusion on this issue. To buy raw produce is a step preliminary to manufacture but is not part of manufacture. Maybe, in some cases tax on such purchase and duty on manufacture therewith are so close that "thin partition do their bounds divide" but how can we obliterate those bounds and telescope the two.
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1979 (9) TMI 168 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and circumstances of this case, the article ceased to be an agricultural produce?
Whether the tea produced by the assessee would be exigible to sales tax?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The tea-leaf was made fit for human consumption by subjecting it to those processes. At no stage, did it change its essential substance. It remained a tea- leaf throughout. In its basic nature, it continued to be agricultural produce.
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1979 (9) TMI 158 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Oppression and mismanagement ... ... ... ... ..... obligations cast on the brothers have been duly discharged. In case the shareholding of the brothers is to be transferred to the heirs in terms of the option and default clause appearing hereinbefore, the direction with regard to alienation of assets would be applicable to the heirs and the assets of the brothers would in that case be discharged from this obligation. (i)Parties, as indeed the chairman, would be at liberty to seek such directions as may be necessary to carry out the various directions and to protect the interests that require protection. C.P. No. 17 of 1979 is disposed of in these terms. In the circumstances, the transferred Civil Suit No. 157 of 1979 is dismissed as infructuous. The injunction granted by the trial court is hereby vacated. C. As Nos. 164 and 322 of 1979 do not survive and are, therefore, dismissed. No useful purpose would be served by pursuing Cr. (O) 3 of 1979 and notice issued in that is discharged. Parties would bear their respective costs.
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