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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 216 Records
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1988 (9) TMI 349 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in the selected areas on the basis of a revised policy. (3) The impugned order under Ex. P-7, irrespective of the question whether the Government had the requisite power of cancel-lation or not, is vitiated by reason of non- observance of the principles of natural justice and the vice of extraneous factors. In the result, all the appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. However, even as the Division Bench has done, we make it clear that we are not making any pronouncement about the suitability or otherwise of the respondents to be granted permission under Rule 11 to open new schools or upgrade existing Schools. All that we hold is that the respondents are entitled, on the basis of the earlier order passed in their favour under Ex. P-4, to seek continuance of the statutory procedure in order to have their applica-tions considered under Rule 9 and for appropriate orders being passed under Rule 11 in accordance with law. Appeals dismissed.
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1988 (9) TMI 348 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Since Bombay is a commercial town its population is larger then elsewhere in Maharashtra, video game parlours in Bombay are making more profits than the video game parlours elsewhere. Therefore since the takings in Bombay from the video game parlours are larger, a flat rate of duty at the rate of ₹ 500/- per month per machine is charged whereas having regard to the takings in places other then Bombay a flat rate or only ₹ 200/- per month per machine is charged. Thus a reasonable classification is made in that behalf. The micro classification within the metropolitan city of Bombay was neither called for nor possible. Therefore the classification made is wholly reasonable and it is not possible for us to accept the challenge of the petitioners based on Art. 14 of the Constitution also. 11. IN this view of the matter we do not find any substance in these writ petitions. Hence Rule discharged in all these writ petitions with no order as to costs. 12. Rule Discharged.
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1988 (9) TMI 347 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ish- Committee" report, the authorities considered the infusion of higher academic and technical quality in the personnel requirements in the relevant cadres of Engineering Services necessary. These are essentially matters of policy. Unless the provision is shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or to bring about grossly unfair results, judicial policy should be one of judicial- restraint. The prescriptions may be somewhat cumbersome or produce some hardship in their application in some individual cases; but they can not be struck down as unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary. The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in striking down the Rules as violative of Articles 14 and 16. 10. Accordingly, all the Appeals are allowed, the Judgment of the High Court dated 2.9.1987 set-aside and the Civil Writ Petitions No. 2 132 of 1984 and 2082 of 1984 in the High Court dismissed. However, the parties are left to bear and pay their costs, both here and below. Appeals allowed.
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1988 (9) TMI 346 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors., 1985 2 SCR 72; City Corporation of Calicut v. Thachambalath Sadalinan & Ors., 1985 2 SCR 1009; I.T.C. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (per Fazal Ali & Mukharji, JJ) ( 1985) SUPP1. SCR 476 and Om Parkash Agarwal & Ors. v. Giri Raj Kishori & Ors., 1986 1 SCR 149. Viewed from this perspective, the conclusion is inevitable that the levy of the fee under r. 21 of the Textiles Committee Rules, 1965 by the Textiles Committee under sub-s. (1) of s. 12 of the Textiles Committee Act, 1963 is valid and constitutionally permissible. All the appeals and connected writ petitions filed by the textile mills in India must fail and are dismissed with costs. Civil appeal No. 1281 of 1973 preferred by the Textile Committee, Bombay against the judgment and order of the Kerala High Court dated March 3, 1979, is however allowed and the writ petition filed by the respondent, M/s. Travancore Rayons Limited is dismissed with costs.
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1988 (9) TMI 345 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cess of ₹ 15,000 might admit of an ad-volorem levy at rates which, preferrably, should not exceed 71/2 subject further to an upper limit which, having regard to all circumstances, could be envisaged at ₹ 75,000. The upper limit even piror to 1974 under the Bombay Act was ₹ 15,000 and prior to 1961 under the Rajasthan Act' at ₹ 7,500. Having regard to steep inflation over the two decades the upper limit could perhaps go upto ₹ 75,000. After that limit is reached, it is appropriate to impose on gradually increasing slabs of the value of the subject matter, progressively decreasing rates, say from 7-l/2/ down to 1/2 in graduated scales. The Governments concerned should bestow attention on these matters and bring about a rationalisation of the levies. With these observations and directions we dismiss the appeals, writ petitions and special leave petitions, but in the circumstances, without an order as to costs. Appeals & Petitions dismissed.
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1988 (9) TMI 344 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed on 28.4.1980. Hence, prima facie it would not be legal to make direct recruitment against temporary vacancies, even if the vacancies were at an earlier date ear-marked for direct recruits ......... In these circumstances, there is, in my opinion, no scope for direct recruitment against temporary vacancies after 28.4.1980, i.e., the date on which the rules were amended as stated above." are unsustainable. We hold that the amendment made on 28 4 1980) does not apply to the vacancies which had arisen prior to the date of the amendment We accordingly set aside the judgment of the Tribunal and remand the case to it again to decide in the light of the above observations the other contentions which had been raised by the persons who had filed the Representation Petition before the Tribunal and to dispose of the case on the basis of the findings to be recorded by it on those contentions The appeal is accordingly disposed of. There is no order as to costs. Appeal disposed of.
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1988 (9) TMI 343 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... should prepare their minds for this equitable distribution and acquire within the next two years at least 25 lakhs of acres of land from about five lakhs of our villages on the rough basis of five acres per village. This land will be distributed to those landless labourers who are versed in agriculture, want to take to it, and have no other means of subsistence. " (Underlining for emphasis by us) This would clearly indicate the purpose of the scheme of Bhoodan Yagna and it is clear that Sec. 15 provided that all allotments in accordance with Sec. 14 could only be done under the scheme of the Bhoodan Yagna. In the light of the discussion above therefore, the judgment of the High Court could not be maintained. The appeals are therefore allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the orders passed by the Additional Collector are restored. Appellant shall be entiled to costs of the appeals, counsel fee Rs. l,500 in each of these three appeals. Appeals allowed.
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1988 (9) TMI 342 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... le. Another short submission has been made on behalf of the appellants in Civil Appeal No 1193 of 1984. Our attention has been drawn to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the additional affidavit filed on behalf of the appellants, and affirmed by one Sat Prakash, son of Mathura Prashad, one of the appellants, that in Khasra No 21/6/2 and in Khasra No. 22/10/1, there are a temple, a Piaou and a Dharamshala. It is submitted that the land comprising the temple, Piaou and Dharamshala may be exempted from acquisition. We do not PG NO 1062 consider it necessary to give any direction in this respect. The appellants, however, will be at liberty to make a representation in that regard to the authority concerned. No other point has been urged in these cases. For the reasons aforesaid, subject to the directions given on the short submissions, all the appeals and the writ petitions are dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs in any of them. H.S.K. Appeals and Petitions are dismissed.
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1988 (9) TMI 341 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... seldom well known to the public. This is because we, as consumers, do not ordinarily make use of chemicals in their pure form. Instead they are converted into products that reach the consumer only after a number of operations ...." (Emphasis supplied) As mentioned hereinbefore, the expression should be understood not in technical sense but from broad commonsense point of view to find out what it truly means by those who deal with them. Bearing the aforesaid perspective in mind, we are unable to agree with the view of the Kerala High Court expressed in the aforesaid judgment. In that conspectus of the Kerala High Court everything would be included in the process of chemical. In the aforesaid view of the matter we are of the opinion that the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the impugned judgment was right and the High Court of Kerala in the judgment referred to hereinbefore was not right. In the aforesaid view of the matter this petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.
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1988 (9) TMI 340 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there is need for the continuance of the Order of injunction passed by this Court on 25th August, 1988?
Held that:- As the Issue is not going to affect the ,general public or public life nor any injury is involved, it would be proper and legal, on an appraisal of the balance of convenience between the risk which will be caused by the publication of the article and the damage to the fundamental right of freedom of knowledge of the people concerned and the obligation of Press to keep people informed, that the injunction should not continue any further.
In the aforesaid view of the matter, we direct that there is no further need for the continuance of the injunction. Publications, if any, however, would be subject to the decision of the Court on the question of the contempt of court, namely, prejudging the issue and thereby interfering with the due administration of justice. Preventive remedy in the form of an injunction is no longer necessary. Whether punitive remedy will be available or not. will depend upon tacts and the decision of the matter after ascertaining the consent or refusal of the Attorney-General. The application for the present purpose is, therefore. disposed of with the direction that the injunction against publication in the order dated 25th August, 1988, need not further continue.
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1988 (9) TMI 339 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er be regarded as the same goods but instead becomes a new and different kind of goods. When they are exported, the goat hair and goat hair strings lose their original character and identity and become a new commodity. It is thus not correct to say that the process of sorting, cleaning and knitting has not changed the character and identity of the product. In this view of the matter, I am of the view that goat hair or goat hair strings and goat hair patties are two different commodities in common as well as in commercial parlance and a process of manufacturing has taken place. Both are commercially different items and the learned Member of the Tribunal was justified in levying the tax at the rate of 1 per cent and 2 per cent under section 5C of the Act for two different periods. No illegality has thus been committed by the learned Member of the Tribunal. In the result, these revision petitions filed by the petitioners are dismissed. No order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1988 (9) TMI 338 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ssessee, then, filed an application under section 44(2) of the Act before this Court, which was allowed. Accordingly, the Tribunal has made this reference and referred the said question of law for decision of this Court. 3.. In Ganesh Trading Co. v. State of Haryana 1973 32 STC 623 (SC) 1974 7 VKN 13 (SC) the question for decision was whether paddy and rice could be considered as identical goods for the purpose of imposition of sales tax and it was held that they were different commodities as understood in common parlance. Following this decision, it must be held that bringing of paddy within the local area and its export, after dehusking as rice, amounts to consumption, use or sale therein to attract levy of entry tax under the M.P. Act No. 52 of 1976. Accordingly, the said question of law is decided in favour of the department and against the assessee. 4.. In the circumstance of the case, we make no order as to costs of the reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1988 (9) TMI 337 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... x the transactions of sale of food-stuffs by restaurants and hotels. The assessments were set aside by the High Court and the department was directed to re-do the assessments in the light of the review order rendered by the Supreme Court in Northern India Caterers case reported in 1980 45 STC 212. It may be noted that these decisions have no relevance to the present case. The assessments in those cases related to the period from 1978 to 2nd February, 1983, the date of amendment to the Constitution. In the case on hand, we are concerned with the assessments prior to 1978. These are all cases of sale of food and drinks in a restaurant and the contention that there was no law in force to levy tax on sale of food or drink, before the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act, has to be rejected as without substance. For the reasons stated above, no ground is made out to interfere with the assessments made and the writ petitions are accordingly dismissed. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1988 (9) TMI 336 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s cited on behalf of Revenue are distinguishable on facts and need no consideration. 9.. Although three questions of law have been referred to us by the Tribunal in M.C.C. Nos. 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262 and 263 of 1987, we are of the view that they are all covered in the question of law referred to us in the other cases and which has been considered and answered by us in the foregoing paragraphs. The only difference is that the questions relate to imposition of penalty in respect of differences in tax assessed and the tax returned for taxes under the Central and State Sales Tax Acts and the Entry Tax Act. 10.. The upshot of our foregoing discussion is that all the questions referred to us deserve to be answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue and accordingly we answer the questions in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. 11.. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs of these references. References answered in the negative.
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1988 (9) TMI 335 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e to be included in the taxable turnover. But very recently the Supreme Court has upset the aforesaid decision of this Court in the case of Vinod Coal Syndicate v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1989 73 STC 317 1988 UPTC 218. It has been held by the Supreme Court in the said case that if the freight was separately charged, the same is not liable to be included in the taxable turnover of the assessee. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, in my opinion, the Tribunal is in error in holding in the impugned order that the freight, which was separately charged in this case, is liable to be included in the taxable turnover of the assessee. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. The impugned order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal is hereby quashed and it is held that the freight in question, which was separately charged by the assessee, is not liable to be included in the taxable turnover of the assessee-petitioners. Writ petition allowed.
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1988 (9) TMI 334 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , M.P. v. Samriti Trading Corporation, Indore 1986 19 VKN 136, this Court had to consider the question whether the Tribunal was justified in deducting expenses referable to the transaction from the sale price for ascertaining taxable market value of goods liable to entry tax and it was held that in a case where the goods are sold on adhat and the purchase price is not known, the market value can be determined only by deducting from the sale price expenses including commission referable to the sale. On the same principle we are of the view that the market value of the goods liable to entry tax would be the price paid by the arhitya and such market value would not include the sales tax and the other taxes to which such goods may or might be liable. Accordingly the aforesaid question of law is answered in favour of the assessee and against the department. 4.. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1988 (9) TMI 333 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Barclay s Bank Ltd.), it is held the ghost of tax dodgers in that case were exorcised. These principles have been replayed after the decision of 1985 59 STC 277 (SC) AIR 1986 SC 649 (McDowell and Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer), once again but we are not informed of the result of the replay of these principles. For the purpose of these references we adopt what is referred to as commonsense rule of interpretation or as understood in English language, we hold the common man understands cotton waste is covered by cotton and cotton yarn waste is covered by the words cotton yarn. The first and the second questions for the aforesaid reasons are answered in affirmative in favour of the assessees and against the Revenue. The learned counsel for the assessees has stated that the third question was referred to this Court by way of abundant caution and is not pressed for the answer. Therefore, no answer is recorded for that question. No costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1988 (9) TMI 332 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... annot be classified along with all kinds of padlocks and locks nor can they be understood as padlocks and locks, the use of which is altogether different. In all the decisions referred to by the learned Government Pleader, both this Court and other High Courts were dealing with accessories in relation to other goods, such as printing machinery, typewriter, tractortrailer, etc. Therefore, the test whether cycle locks should be treated as accessories of bicycles turn on the interpretation to be given to entry 14, vis-a-vis entry 150. For my view in this regard expressed in this order, I derive support from the decisions of the Supreme Court in Atul Glass Industries (P.) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise 1986 63 STC 322 and Annapurna Carbon Industries Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1976 37 STC 378. In the result, the petitions should succeed, and I order accordingly and declare that the cycle locks should be taxed under entry 14 of the Second Schedule. Writ Petitions allowed.
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1988 (9) TMI 331 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ble to sales of ambulance and delivery vans. As pointed out by the Tribunal, ambulance is a vehicle primarily used in carrying sick persons. It may be moulded either as a truck or as a pick-up van. The mini-bus could be used as an ambulance after removing the seats and changing the internal lay out of the seating arrangements. Under the circumstances, there is no reason why the ambulance and the delivery vans should be deprived of the reduced rate of tax under the said notification dated 4th March, 1976 of the Government. We are, therefore, of the view that the Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that the ambulance and delivery vans were entitled to be subjected to reduced rate of tax of 10 per cent as per notification dated 4th March, 1976. We accordingly answer the said question of law in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. 4.. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1988 (9) TMI 330 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... were indeed laid before the Legislative Assembly in the first session after the Rules were made, i.e., on December 11, 1987. It is also stated that the Subordinate Legislation Committee of the House has also approved the said Rules on July 6, 1988. For the above reasons, the attack upon the constitutionality of the Act fails. The writ petitions are, accordingly, dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 75 in each. Mr. S. Ramachandra Rao, learned counsel for the petitioners, makes an oral request for grant of a certificate under article 132 of the Constitution on the ground that this case involves a substantial question as to the interpretation of entry 52 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. We do not think that this case involves any substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution within the meaning of article 132 of the Constitution. The oral request is accordingly rejected. Writ petitions dismissed.
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