|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 467 Records
-
1997 (9) TMI 629 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... loser, to the facts of the case in G.R. Govindarajulu Naidu v. CIT 1973 90 ITR 13 (Mad) and we are, therefore, inclined to follow the observation of the Division Bench mentioned above. That apart, the provision of law, namely, section 2(22)(e ), which we have already extracted above, says that by a fiction dividend is made to include any payment by a company, etc. Therefore, it is difficult for us to introduce another fiction in respect of the words "payment by the company" by construing even a transfer entry as amounting to payment. In other words, when section 2(22)(e) itself introduces a fiction, it is improper for us to introduce another fiction and construe a payment as equivalent to a constructive payment. In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to accept the arguments advanced on behalf of the Revenue and following the decision in G.R. Govindarajulu Naidu v. CIT 1973 90 ITR 13 (Mad), we answer the reference in the affirmative and against the Revenue.
-
1997 (9) TMI 628 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... that this is a fit case for appeal to the Apex Court. We have decided the limited question about the maintainability of the second writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution where the detenu has already been released from custody and where no fresh facts are averred nor is any circumstance pointed out which had occurred after the decision of the first petition. We have held that the ground sought to be urged in this petition was very much available to the detenu in July, 1996 when the first petition was decided, but was not raised and no exceptional circumstance has been pleaded either in the petition or orally at the bar. We have decided the issue on the basis of the legal position settled by three Constitution Bench decisions and the last decision in Abdul Sattar's case, (1990)1SCC480 , as also two Full Bench decisions of this Court. We, therefore, do not think that this is a fit case for appeal to the Apex Court. Hence prayer rejected. 51. Petition dismissed.
-
1997 (9) TMI 627 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... persons like the present petitioner happens to be the Directors if they were to face criminal charges, obviously, this Court will interfere. Coming back to the case of the petitioner, it is quite clear that he was the Director who not the one who could be said to be in charge of the Company and to be responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company. In response to the Rule, neither the respondent no.2 nor the respondent no.3 have filed any return. The averments made in the petition on oath, therefore, will have to be taken as accepted and virtually considered. The net result, therefore, is that the petition shall have to be allowed. The petition is allowed. The complaint and the application filed before the trial Court is quashed, so far as the petitioner is concerned and the order passed thereon in relation to the petitioner and process if issued and any proceedings that might have taken till now qua the petitioner are set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly.
-
1997 (9) TMI 626 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... on are more germans while considering an application for post-arrest bail. Consideration which should weigh with the Court while dealing with a request for anticipatory bail need not be the same as for an application to release on bail after arrest. At any rate learned Single Judge ought not have side-stepped the apprehension expressed by the CBI (that respondent would influences the witness) as one which can be made against all accused person all cases. The apprehension was quite reasonable when considering the high position which respondent held and in the nature of accusation relating to a period during which he held such office. After bestowing our anxious consideration, including a perusal of the Case-Diary file, we definitely feel that the High Court has mis-directed itself in exercising the discretionary power under Section 438 of the Code by granting a pre-arrest bail order to the respondent. We, therefore, upset the impugned order. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
-
1997 (9) TMI 625 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
... ...
... ... ..... an and that the transfer of the said shares was duly registered by the company in the name of N. Ravindran. Thus, title in respect of 304 equity shares is in dispute and consequently the applicant does not fulfil the eligibility criteria as provided in Section 186. 17. Though arguments were advanced on the question of title to the shares, in an application under Section 186 for an order directing the holding of a general meeting the Bench will neither determine title to 304 shares nor go to the extent of rectifying the register of members as held in the case of Shrimati Jain v. Delhi Flour Mills Company Ltd. 1974 44 Comp Cas 228 (Delhi). The application is, therefore, not maintainable. 18. The applicant is at liberty to establish his title in respect of 304 shares in accordance with law. 19. In view of the foregoing, without going into the merits of the case the application is dismissed. There is, therefore, no need to go into the case law cited by counsel for the applicant.
-
1997 (9) TMI 624 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ew that the State of Punjab and the assessing authority on one part and the buyer-Corporation and its liquidator on the other are under the legal responsibility of facilitating the appellant transfer his liability towards payment of sales tax for the sales involved in the relevant assessment year. To facilitate the appellant to do the same, we issue directions to the respondents concerned to perform their duties as enjoined under the Act and once that is done, it would be open to the appellant to move the sales tax authorities for a suitable review so as to undo the orders already passed by them on the basis that the requisite Form ST XXII has not been produced. This relief to the appellant should suffice. Let the exercise commence within six weeks from today and be finalised as quickly as possible. 8. As a result this appeal is allowed, the judgment and order of the High Court is set aside and the matter is streamlined to be adjusted in the manner above-stated. 9. No costs.
-
1997 (9) TMI 623 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... not disputed that the boiler was leased out to the earlier seller. It is also not disputed that the assessee was carrying on leasing business for the last several years. Therefore, after examining these questions of fact, the Tribunal affirmed the finding of the CIT(A) and pointed out that the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in case of McDowell & Co. Ltd. vs. CTO (supra) does not apply in the case of the present assessee. 5. We have gone through the record and perused the order of the Tribunal. We are satisfied that this is essentially a question of fact whether the assessee has committed any breach of law or has acted in violation of the law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. We are satisfied that these questions of fact were rightly examined by the Tribunal. Both the questions framed by the Revenue are essentially questions of fact and no question of law is involved. 6. There is no merit in this reference application which is dismissed.
-
1997 (9) TMI 622 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... rrectness of the decision of the High Court that the writ petition was pre-mature. This being so, we do not consider it necessary to examine the question raised in this special leave petition because there does not appear to be any likelihood of any imminent prejudice to the petitioner. We, therefore, leave the question raised in the special leave petition open for consideration at a later stage, if and when that situation arises. The special leave petition is dismissed accordingly.
-
1997 (9) TMI 621 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... to an action in tort in a claim being made for damages because the ESI Act creates certain rights as a result of the employment qua the employer and has no application as far as third parties are concerned. In this ’employment injury’ in Section 53 relates to a claim which is relatable to the employment of the insured person with his employer. o p /o p In our opinion, though there is considerable force in the said submission but it is not necessary for the decision of the present case the claim which was sought to be made was not against the third party but against the third party but against the employer itself. Perhaps this question may require considerable in an appropriate case. o p /o p For the aforesaid reasons this appeal is allowed. The judgement of the High Court is set aside that of the trial court dismissing the respondent’s application under Order 33 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is restored. There will be no order as to costs. o p /o p
-
1997 (9) TMI 620 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... stained and the same are set aside and the applications presented by the respondents in these appeals before the Central Administrative Tribunal stand dismissed 30. It has been submitted by the learned Solicitor that after the decision of the Allahabad Bench, Central Administrative Tribunal in A.S.P. Sinha case the appointments to the posts of General Managers and equivalent are being made on consideration of residual service of at least two years with reference to the date of accrual of vacancy. If, in any case, any officer included in the panel for 1994-95, 1995-96 has been bypassed improperly by not adhering to the interpretation of para 7.3 as indicated by this Court, the appellant Union of India is directed to review such case and to give the eligible officer notional promotion with all consequential benefits till the date of his superannuation and thereafter consequential post- retiral benefits 31. These appeals are accordingly disposed of without any order as to costs
-
1997 (9) TMI 619 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... to continue until regular appointments are made. They will also be eligible for consideration for regular appointment by the District Selection Board concerned along with other applicants. They will be entitled for such consideration by the District Selection Board which shall waive the age bar, provided at the time of their initial appointment, they were within the prescribed age limit. The District Selection Board may take into account their record of service while functioning as such ad hoc Headmasters or Headmistresses. We also make it clear that if any scheme for regularisation of such ad hoc Headmasters/Headmistresses is framed, all those who were functioning as such ad hoc Headmasters/Headmistresses with the approval of the Inspector of Schools on the date of the High Court's judgment which is impugned before us, will be entitled to be considered for regularisation if they are qualified under that scheme for such consideration, The appeals are allowed accordingly.
-
1997 (9) TMI 618 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rosecution with the consequence that whole proceedings stood void ab initio. 39. Normally when the sanction order is held to be bad, the case is remitted back to the authority for re-consideration of the matter and to pass a fresh order of sanction in accordance with law. But in the instant case, the incident is of 1983 and therefore, after a lapse of fourteen years, it will not, in our opinion, be fair just to direct that the proceedings may again be initiated from the stage of sanction so as to expose the appellant to another innings of litigation and keep him on trial for an indefinitely long period contrary to the mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution which, as a part of right to life, philosophizes early and of criminal proceedings through a speedy trial. 40. The appeal is consequently allowed. The judgment passed by the trail court as also by the High Court are set aside and appellant is acquitted. He is on bail. He need not surrender. His bail bonds are cancelled.
-
1997 (9) TMI 617 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... to prove that the apparent was not real which was not discharged in the instant case. The view which has found favour with the Tribunal is supported by more than one decision of this Court. Reference may be made to the decisions of this Court in Century Foams (P.) Ltd. v. CIT 1994 210 ITR 625 and in Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1989 180 ITR 651 wherein it was held that addition on account of difference between the value of stocks declared to the bank and that which was found in account books could validly be brought to tax if the circumstances of the case warrant such an addition. On the material that was placed before the Tribunal and the findings of fact recorded by it, no exception can be taken to the decision of the Tribunal. We are not prepared to say that addition in question was not supported by any material on record. The order of the Tribunal is concluded by the findings of fact and does not give rise to any question of law. 6. The application is rejected.
-
1997 (9) TMI 616 - CESTAT KOLKATA
... ...
... ... ..... hat has been held by the Tribunal in the case of Aruna Industries Vs. Collector of Central Excise reported in 1986 (25) ELT 580 (Tribunal). This is also the ratio of the Bombay High Court's judgement relied upon by the learned advocate for the appellants. 5. As regards the reliance placed by the learned JDR for the Revenue on Richardson & Crudas, it was found as a fact that separate goods known to the market were manufactured by the appellant in that case. This is apparent from paras 9 and 10 of the citation relied upon by the learned JDR. We are, therefore, of the view that the judgement of the Tribunal in the case of Richardson & Crudas is confined to its own facts and no general principle of law can be derived to make it applicable to other cases. 6. In view of the settled position so far as Tribunal is concerned and in view of the other High Court judgements relied upon by the learned advocate, we allow this appeal with consequential relief to the appellants.
-
1997 (9) TMI 615 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... lated by the sub-rule. No distinction was intended by the sub-rule between a party who has produced some evidence in the trial court and one who has adduced no evidence in the trial court. All that is required is that the conditions mentioned in the body of the sub- rule must be proved to exist. It is not permissible to restrict the sub- clause (aa) for the benefit of only those who have adduced some evidence in the trial Court. The view taken by the Gauhati High Court is not therefore correct. A similar view taken by the Lahore High Court in Gurbakash Singh v. (Finn) Shankar Das, AIR (1936) Lahore 71 is also not correct. In the result, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the objection to the maintainability of the application is overruled, It will now be for the High Court to examine the application of the appellant or merits and decide the same in accordance with law. Appeal is allowed as stated above. There will be no, order as to costs. R.K.S. Appeal allowed.
-
1997 (9) TMI 614 - ITAT MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... block period, on the basis of the evidence or materials found during the search and as per the provisions of Chapter IV. That apart, one of the objects of a search is to obtain evidence regarding the true income of an assessee and if such evidence points to a loss, the computation being made under the statute itself, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the loss is to be set off, howsoever reluctant one may be to do so. 11. To sum up, we hold that for the reasons stated above, the assessee’s claim is accepted and the losses for the assessment years 1989-90, 1993-94, 1994-95 and 1995-96, as computed in the block assessment, are directed to be set off against the undisclosed income computed in respect of the other previous years falling within the block period. 12. As already stated in the beginning of this order, we have not heard arguments on the merits of the other grounds taken by the assessee. The appeal is therefore allowed to the extent indicated above.
-
1997 (9) TMI 613 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... supra) (treating it as a 'protest petition') and then proceed further in the matter, It would be appropriate that further investigation to be carried out by the CBI under Section 173 (8) Cr.P.C. is directed to be carried out by an officer, other than the officer who had earlier investigated the case and filed the final report seeking closure of the case. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate shall issue directions to that effect also to the investigating agency when calling upon them to undertake further investigation under Section 173 (8) Cr.P.C. The CBI shall be directed to complete the investigation expeditiously and proceed in the matter in accordance with law in the light of the observations made by us above. Before parting with the case, we wish to clarify that nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as any expression of opinion on the merits of complaint filed by the appellant. The appeal accordingly succeeds and is allowed but without any order as to costs.
-
1997 (9) TMI 612 - ITAT MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... ed CIT(Appeals). The aforesaid time-limit could not be revived or extended. 5.1 It is, therefore, clear that directions issued by the learned CIT(Appeals) to make assessment under section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act were not in accordance with law. At any rate, he was merely to decide whether the adjustment made by the Assessing Officer under section 143(1)(a) was within the limit provided by the Statute or was beyond limitation. After having impliedly held that the exercised carried by the Assessing Officer were beyond his jurisdiction, in our opinion, it was not necessary for the learned CIT(Appeals) to give further direction to make assessment under section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act. The Assessing Officer could have done if it authorised under the law. The directions issued by the learned CIT(Appeals) are without jurisdiction and are hereby set aside. The adjustments made by the Assessing Officer are cancelled. 6. In the result, the assessee’s appeal is allowed.
-
1997 (9) TMI 611 - AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULINGS, NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... ect undertaken by the recipient or consideration which would be income of the recipient chargeable under the head ‘Salaries’". No doubt this is a special statutory definition and cannot be straightaway imported into the DTAA. But even so, there must be a rationale for the exclusion which can only be that consideration for projects of the nature mentioned cannot be equated to consideration for services rendered in the course of their execution. 14. In this view of the matter, the Authority pronounces the following ruling on the question posed by the applicant RULING Question Answer Whether the Applicant is liable for tax under the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year 1997-98 on the contract proceeds receivable from Gas Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL) under the Contract Agreement dated 25-10-1996 in the absence of any PermanentNo. Establishment in India, in view of Articles 5 and 7 of the Double Tax Avoidance Agree-ment between India and France ?"
-
1997 (9) TMI 610 - ITAT MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... ll not force a man to demand that which he cannot recover. The law will not itself attempt to do an act which would be vain Lex nil frustra facit nor enforce on which would be frivolous - Lex neminem Cogit ad vana seu inutilia - the law will not force anyone to do a thing vain and fruitless." 12. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that though because of the retrospective amendment an adjustment can be made in assessment, no adjustment can be made under s. 143(1)(a) nor the rectification can be made to the intimation already sent in such a case. If the AO wants to add this amount to the assessees income, he should proceed under s. 143(2) or 147 as the case may be. The assessee consequently cannot be burdened with the liability of additional tax under s. 143(1A) for no fault of it, the levy being penal and akin to the levy of penalty. We, therefore, delete the levy of additional tax and allow the assessees appeal to this extent. The appeal is allowed pro tanto.
........
|
