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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 62 Records
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1962 (10) TMI 54 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o make an assessment invoking the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act without regard to the period of limitation prescribed under section 14(1). Again, another Division Bench of this Court in Mohd. Akhalaq Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1969 23 STC 204 observed that under the provisions of section 9(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act not only the procedural provisions but also the substantive provisions of the local sales tax law were made applicable. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the limitation prescribed under section 14(1) of the State Act is attracted to assessments made under the Central Sales Tax Act. The assessment having not been admittedly completed as required by section 14(1) within 4 years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates, the assessment is invalid and unenforceable. Accordingly, the revision case is allowed and the impugned assessment order is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150.
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1962 (10) TMI 53 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the assessee company having distributed dividends of over 60% of the company's total income less income-tax and super-tax payable thereon is entitled to the rebate of 1 anna per rupee on the undistributed balance of profits as provided in clause (i) of the proviso to item B of Part I of the First Schedule to the Finance Act of 1955 ?
Held that:- Appeal dismiised. High Court was right in holding that the company was entitled to the rebate claimed by it.
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1962 (10) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the amount claimed by the assessee company as a deduction was not admissible either under section 10(2)(xi) or 10(2)(xv) ?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. An advance paid by the assessee company to another to purchase shares cannot be said to be incidental to the trading activities of the assessee company. It was more in the nature of a price paid in advance for, the shares which the Southern Agencies had a right to allot in the Rodier Textile Mills Ltd. This cannot, therefore, be described as a debt and indeed the changes in the books of account of the assessee company clearly show that the assessee company itself was altering the entries to convert the advance into a debt so as to write it off and claim the benefit of section 10(2)(Xi). Thus section 10(2)(xi) was inapplicable to the facts of this case.
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1962 (10) TMI 51 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the sum of Rs. 37,847, Rs. 43,162, Rs. 34,899, Rs. 13,402 and Rs. 32,523 were assessable to income-tax in the hands of the assessee 'Amarchand N. Shroff, by his legal heirs and representatives' in the five respective years under reference?
Whether the income which was received subsequent to the previous year in which Amarchand died is liable to be assessed to income-tax under section 24B as his income in the hands of his heirs and legal representatives?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As the amounts which are sought to be taxed and which have been held not to be liable to tax are those which were not received in the previous year and are therefore not liable to tax in the several years of assessment. It cannot be said that they were income which may be deemed by fiction to have been received by the dead person and therefore they are not liable to be taxed as income of the deceased, Amarchand, and are not liable to be taxed in the hands of the heirs and legal representatives who cannot be deemed to be assessees for the purpose of assessment in regard to those years.
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1962 (10) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the amounts received by the assessee under the Attika Patra are liable to tax ?
Whether the contributions made through Annadan Patra by the donor would amount to a trust or else whether it is a mere device to give the entire income to the Panda for his own benefit?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. On the true meaning of section 4(3)(i) in the absence of any finding that the Annadan income was derived from property held under a religious or charitable trust, the claim of the assessees for exemption must fail. Their claim to exemption under section 4(3)(ii) must fail because they are not a religious or charitable institution.
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1962 (10) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there was any legal admissible evidence to justify that the transactions in question was not the transaction of the assessee?
Whether the assessee firm can set off the loss Rs. 1,05,641 against its other profits from its other business?
Held that:- Appeal allowed in part. High Court did not exceed its powers in examining the evidence in support of the inference of the Income-tax Officer that no business was done in company with Damji but the assessee firm took over some of his losses. The answer of the High Court to the first question is therefore upheld.
High Court's answer to the second question is set aside.
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1962 (10) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT
Whether an opportunity had to be given to the appellants as required by the proviso to section 35 to show cause against the demand for penal interest?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The word "assessment" is used in the proviso not as an equivalent of the tax calculated at the rate given in the Finance Act but the total amount which the assessee is required to pay. The proviso applies whenever the effect of the order is to touch the pocket of the assessee and in our opinion this was such a case.
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1962 (10) TMI 47 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... econd application for registration. The learned Judges held that as there was sufficient cause he was not liable under section 12(5) though he might be liable under section 12(4) read with section 12(2) of the Act. In that case, section 9-A of the Act did not come up for interpretation because when the first application for registration was made, that section was not found in the statute book. Hence, the aforesaid Division Bench decision will not assist us in deciding the main controversy here, namely, whether an application for registration under section 9-A is also contemplated by sub-section (5) of section 12 of the Act. 7.. We must accordingly hold that the learned Member, Sales Tax Tribunal, took the correct view. The answer to the question referred to this Court is in the affirmative. The application is dismissed with costs. The petitioner should pay a consolidated cost of Rs. 50 (Rupees fifty) only for both the applications. BARMAN, J.-I agree. Applications dismissed.
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1962 (10) TMI 46 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... king a reassessment on the assessee acting under section 16 of the Act. The Tribunal has found that the turnover relating to the hirepurchase agreements was properly assessable even at the time of the first assessment. This view is well founded on the evidence on record. It is not necessary for us to consider the question whether section 16 can properly be invoked where the assessing officer had considered the taxability of a particular turnover and reached a decision favourable to the assessee on the first occasion. The learned Additional Government Pleader drew our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar 1960 S.C.J. 145 37 I.T.R. 388. But in the view that we have taken, we are not called upon to decide the question whether the decision of the Supreme Court is properly applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The revision petition is allowed. But there will, however, be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1962 (10) TMI 45 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the next harvest and for his and his family s support and, therefore, could not be used for production of gur. We do not understand why the Legislature should still exempt from attachment and sale cane crushers and boiling pans. If there was no sugarcane left with the agriculturist for production of gur the cane crushers and boiling pans would be useless. We, therefore, reject the contention that cane crushers and boiling pans are implements of husbandry and, therefore, implements of agriculture. We answer the questions in the negative and against the applicantassessee and direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax and the Commissioner of Sales Tax under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar as required by section 11(6) of the Sales Tax Act. We further direct that the Sales Tax Commissioner shall get his costs of this reference, which we assess at Rs. 100, from the applicant-assessee. Reference answered in the negative.
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1962 (10) TMI 44 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at there would be an exemption for the duration of a licence taken under rule 21, even that would not give the plaintiff a vested right to exemption beyond the period for which the notification was in force. 5.. Since the duration of the licence has no bearing whatsoever on the duration of the exemption, the question whether the State Government could or could not cancel the licence before the expiry of its term does not arise. In fact the State Government did not cancel the licence. It was not the licence that granted the exemption, but the notification of the 15th June, 1950. The taking out of the licence was only a condition for earning the exemption, and, as I have already said more than once, the fact that the licence continued for a period beyond the withdrawal of the exemption cannot have the effect of continuing the exemption. 6.. In the result I allow the appeal and dismiss the plaintiff s suit in entirety with costs both here and in the Court below. Appeal allowed.
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1962 (10) TMI 43 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o the contrary view taken by the other High Courts in the cases cited above. But in that case the learned Judges do not appear to have noticed the aforesaid two judgments of the Supreme Court. The later Supreme Court judgment was delivered only on 18th January, 1962, whereas the Punjab High Court s judgment was delivered on the 6th February, 1962. With great respect, I am inclined to prefer the view taken by the majority of the High Courts which gains considerable support from the interpretation given by the Supreme Court to the old section 44 of the Income-tax Act. 8.. The second question is therefore answered in the negative. The Tribunal was not right in holding that the notice issued in the partnership s name and served on one of its partners, after the dissolution of the partnership, was illegal. 9.. The references are disposed of accordingly, but as there is no appearance for the other side we make no order for costs. BARMAN, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1962 (10) TMI 42 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ot affect retrospectively the validity of the said enactment. In the present instance, Punjab Act No. 19 of 1952 had been passed after the interdict had been placed by Parliament. It matters not that the impugned notification purports to have been issued under section 6 of the Act which was passed in 1948. In truth and substance the Act did not become valid till the amendment of 1952 which gave life and limbs to it. We are not impressed by the argument that the notification is not a law which has been made by the Legislature of the State and therefore, the assent of the President could be dispensed with. The Act which can sustain the notification is the amending enactment of 1952 and this having been passed after the Central Act No. 52 of 1952 the impugned notification cannot be justified. The answer to the questions formulated by the Financial Commissioner in both sets of cases must, therefore, be in the negative. MEHAR SINGH, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1962 (10) TMI 41 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... net turnover for levy of tax by the State having come into force before the order of assessment was made in the instant case, the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit thereof. But, the amendment has not been made retroactive. Rules are always presumed to be prospective in effect unless there be indication otherwise in the enactment concerned. The liability to tax in regard to sales effected in the period 17th August, 1950, to 31st March, 1951, has become complete before the exemption came into force, though the order of assessment was made only on 3rd November, 1952. The plaintiff cannot therefore claim the exclusion under the amendment which came into force on 1st April, 1951, only. 5.. In the result, the appeal is allowed, and the suit dismissed. The appellant will have its costs of this appeal from the respondent. 6.. The cross-objection by the plaintiff in regard to costs disallowed to him by the trial court is not pressed and is dismissed without costs. Appeal allowed.
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1962 (10) TMI 40 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the order of assessment was according to law?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Rule 17 confers on the Deputy Commissioners the power to determine and tax escaped turn- over in cases where revisions have been taken to them [sub-rule (1-A)] and also where revisions have not been taken to them [sub-rule (3-A)]. Provisions of section 9(1) and (2) therefore are no bar to the exercise of power of assessing escaped turnovers. Moreover section 9 does not deal with escaped turnovers but is a provision for the determination of the turnover of a dealer in the first instance nor can it be said that rule 17 is in conflict with section 12(2). That section deals with another state of affairs and another jurisdiction, i.e., where the Deputy Commissioner suo motu or on an application made calls for the record and deter- mines the legality or propriety of an order made by one of the subordinate officers. It cannot be said in view of rule 17 that the power of revision by the Deputy Commissioners is limited to powers under section 12(2). Rule 17 deals with a separate and independent jurisdiction in regard to the determining and taxing escaped turnovers. The provisions of section 12(2) are in no way in conflict with the powers conferred under rule 17(1), 17(1-A) and 17(3-A).
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1962 (10) TMI 31 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Compromise and arrangement, Winding up - Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... he principle enunciated in respect of income-tax, would only become due when the notice of demand was served and not at any date anterior thereto, and the principle that where a tax is to be assessed it does not become either due or payable till at least an assessment is made, was one of general application. For these reasons I would hold that assessment proceedings do not fall within the scope of other legal proceedings and do not automatically come to a stop the moment the company goes into liquidation. Such proceedings have to be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Income-tax Act which is a complete code in itself. The company in liquidation is still an assessee, and income-tax proceedings up to the stage of assessment do not fall within the scope of the words other legal proceedings as used in section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed, but, in the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1962 (10) TMI 30 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Annual Return – Penalty for not filing ... ... ... ... ..... essary action. The opposite party has twice been granted time for the purpose of filing a reply to the affidavit of the Registrar of Companies but has failed to file any such reply. The allegations contained in the Registrar s affidavit thus stand uncontroverted and may be taken as proved. A suggestion has been made before me today by learned counsel for the opposite party that the required returns have since been furnished to the Registrar, but there is nothing whatsoever on the record to show that there is any substance in this assertion. In any case the opposite party is clearly guilty of contempt of court for failing to comply with the orders of the District Judge within the time allowed by the District Judge. I accordingly impose a fine of Rs. 200 on Tika Ram Uniyal and direct that if he fails to pay the fine within two months from today, he shall be detained in prison for one month. He shall also be liable for the costs of the Registrar of Companies assessed at Rs. 100.
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1962 (10) TMI 18 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Power of court to rectify register of members and Winding up – Liability as contributories of present and past members
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1962 (10) TMI 17 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellants were owners of this foreign exchange?
Whether the notification is ultra vires section 9 of the Act?
Held that:- Considering the fact that the appellants received this foreign exchange as gift, even though the intention might have been to spend the amount on their trip in the United States of America. Further, as the Appellate Board has rightly pointed out, it is obvious that the money was given to the appellants outright, as otherwise the appellants would not have offered the amount found on them on October 1, 1958, for sale through the Reserve Bank as they did on October 25, 1958. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the appellants became owners of this foreign exchange.
The notification in the present case by using the words "or who may hereafter become the owner of any foreign exchange" merely makes explicit what was already implicit in the section. In fact, even if the impugned clause had not been included in the notification, it would have made no difference to the meaning. Like the main section, the remaining part would have covered cases of owning and holding foreign exchange in the past as well as in the future. The clause has been added only to clarify the position, and that is all. We are therefore of opinion that the notification is completely intra vires section 9. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (10) TMI 3 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM
Valuation - Trade discount ... ... ... ... ..... not denied-in determining the value of the articles. Of course, if any of the sales to persons other than Messrs. Bawa Agencies is a wholesale sale and no discount has been given for the sale, then the price fetched might well be the wholesale cash price for which the articles are capable of being sold and a trade discount paid to a favoured customer might be of no consequence. Even so, sales of negligible quantities might have to be left out of account. But, as I have said, the assessing authority has not considered this aspect of the matter at all, and has, without any material, jumped to the conclusion that the sales to persons other than Messrs Bawa Agencies were wholesale sales. 2. 8195 In the result I allow the petition and quash the demand notice Ext. P6 served on the petitioner in pursuance of the arbitrary assessment. This will not, of course, prevent the assessing authority from making a fresh assessment in accordance with law. 3. There will be no order as to costs.
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