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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 565 Records
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2001 (10) TMI 1158 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... orities. A special leave petition against the order of the Settlement Commission was dismissed on three grounds, namely, the amendment of the Trust Deed, that the money had in fact been spent on charitable purposes in the assessment years in question and the amounts involved were very small. We are in no doubt, on the facts, that a fraud was played by the rectification of the Trust Deed by altering the very object of the Trust. To be sure, we had asked for a copy of the Trust Deed, the plaint and the order thereon to be produced. We are satisfied that the Trust Deed must be read as it originally stood and that that is the manner in which the appellant Trust should now be assessed. Whatever we have said shall not affect the assessment proceedings that have already become final. On the application of learned counsel for the appellants, the civil appeals are dismissed as withdrawn. The appellants shall pay to the respondents costs quantified in the sum of Rupees fifty thousand.
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2001 (10) TMI 1157 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he landlady for evicting the tenant. In such circumstances, in our opinion, the order of the Trial Court deserves to be restored. On the question of comparative hardship as also on the issue of partial eviction, having our-selves evaluated the well- reasoned findings recorded by the Trial Court we are inclined to uphold the same more so when they have not been reversed by the High Court. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the Trial Court restored. However, the respondent-tenant is allowed four months' time to vacate the suit premises subject to her filing before the Trial Court the usual undertaking on her affidavit that she would deliver vacant and peaceful possession to the landlady on or before the expiry of four months and in between she would clear the arrears of rent, if any, and continue to pay rent falling due month by month and shall not induct any one else in the premises. Costs as incurred.
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2001 (10) TMI 1156 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rror is apparent or patent on the face of the award. Whether under the context of the terms and conditions of a contract, a stipulation in the form and nature of clause 14(ii) operates as a special provision to the exclusion of Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act is a matter of appreciation of facts in a case, and when the decision thereon is not patently absurd or wholly unreasonable, there is no scope for interference by courts dealing with a challenge to the award. Therefore, we think, the view taken by the High Court in this matter is correct and calls for no interference. If as construed by the arbitrators that clause 14(ii) excludes applicability of Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act and the proposition of law stated by the arbitrators is correct, then Section 73 is not attracted to the case. In this view of the matter, we find absolutely no substance in these petitions and they are dismissed with costs of the respondents quantified at ₹ 5,000/- in each set.
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2001 (10) TMI 1155 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... judgment-debtor to carry out the aforementioned direction i.e. 23.9.1966 and if he failed to carry out the direction it was open to the decree-holder to seek help of the executing court for measurement and demarcation of the land, and thereafter, to get the sale deed executed by the judgment-debtor if possible or by the Court if necessary. The decree-holder for reasons best known to him did not choose to execute the decree till April 1980. In the facts and circumstances of the case and on a fair reading of the decree in the context of the provisions of Article 136 of the Limitation Act the conclusion is inescapable that the execution petition was filed after expiry of the period of limitation prescribed under the Act. The Appellate Court was right in dismissing the execution petition as time barred and the High Court committed no illegality in confirming the said order. In the result this appeal being devoid of merit is dismissed. There will however be no order as to costs.
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2001 (10) TMI 1154 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Court in Common Cause vs. Union of India 1996 (6) SCC 775 , it is apparent that the said decision has no application to the facts of this case. In the present case, cause of the delay is mostly due to the accused either because they challenged the various orders passed or because they were not present in the court and hence proceedings could not be continued on many occasions. Causes attributable to the prosecution or even to the court are comparably much less as to permit the accused to take advantage of the delay in registering progress of the proceedings. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order and direct the trial court to proceed with the case and complete the prosecution evidence within six months from the date on which the accused would appear before the trial court. We make it clear that if the accused is instrumental in causing the delay, then so much of the period would be debited from the time frame fixed by us above. This appeal is allowed in the above terms.
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2001 (10) TMI 1153 - ITAT CHENNAI
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... ... ..... he has no objection for the matter to be remanded back to the file of the CIT (Appeals) for disposal according to law as this appeal is appealable under Section 246A(1)(ha) of the I.T. Act. Since the appeal of the assessee falls within the same period, the impugned order is set aside. Since the CIT (Appeals) has not decided this appeal on merit but dismissed only on technical ground, the appeal is remitted back to the file of the CIT (Appeals) for deciding according to merits of the case, after giving the assessee reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. 66. In the result, I.T.A. No. 1503/Mds/99 filed by the assessee is allowed for statistical purpose. 67. To consolidate the results of all the appeals dealt with in this Order, ITA Nos. 1827 & 1827(Mds)/1998 filed by the Revenue are dismissed, ITA No. 200/Mds/2001 filed by the assessee is partly allowed for statistical purpose and ITR No. 1503/Mds/1999 filed by the assessee is allowed for statistical purpose.
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2001 (10) TMI 1152 - CEGAT, MUMBAI
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... ... ..... and such immovable property therefore disqualifies for being considered as capital goods. 3. In our decision in United Phosphorous Ltd. Vs. CCE , (Appeal E/2356/96), we, after discussing the relevant provisions of the rule and taking note of the decision in Mahalakshmi Glass Works Ltd. Vs. CCE , 1999 (113) ELT 558 , we had not found it possible to uphold the denial of the credit of the duty paid on capital goods solely for the reason that, in the course of their use, they become permanently attached to the earth or to anything that was attached to earth and thus become immovable property. The reasoning would apply to the facts before us. 4. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the impugned order is set aside.
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2001 (10) TMI 1151 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ratios of the partners within 6 months of the capital contribution then what is the purpose of bringing in disproportionate capital in the first place? There is also an admission in the same explanation that the monies were drawn out of advances received by Nirmal Enterprises from the buyers of units. This disproves the other part of the explanation as to why the monies were withdrawn. Thus the explanation is inherently false. Therefore, even on merits, Explanation 1 to section 271(1)(c) is fully attracted. 31. For the above reasons, we set aside the order of the CIT(A) cancelling the penalty and restore that of the Assessing Officer. The Department will have its costs from the assessee which we assess at ₹ 5,000 (Rupees five thousand only). The same shall be deposited by the assessee with the Registry of the Tribunal within 2 months from the receipt of this order. The Department may withdraw the same by filing an application to the Registry. 32. The appeal is allowed.
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2001 (10) TMI 1150 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... exercise of inherent power is not only desirable but necessary also, so that the judicial forum of court may not be allowed to be utilized for any oblique motive. When a person approaches the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the very issue of process, the High Court on the facts and circumstances of a case has to exercise the powers with circumspection as stated above to really serve the purpose and object for which they are conferred. Thus having regard to facts and circumstances stated and discussion made above, the issue of process against appellant nos. 1-6 and 8 is set aside and the process issued against appellant no. 7 namely, Amrit Lal Desai A.B. Desai for offences under Sections 406 and 120-B is also set aside. However, the issue of process against him under Section 420 IPC is maintained. The order of the learned Magistrate and the impugned order are modified to this extent. Thus, this appeal is partly allowed and stands disposed of in the above terms.
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2001 (10) TMI 1149 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... years post the decree. 19. We are thus of the considered view that it is not a fit case where valuable rights of the appellant should be put under jeopardy by the attachment order in respect of the property in question which for all practical purposes vests in the appellant. It is also relevant to add at this stage that thought there was a scheme of conversion from lease hold to free hold learned counsel for the appellant has stated that the appellant was unable to seek conversion and get a registered document executed in her favor on account of the pendency of the present proceedings since the term of conversion require that there should be no litigation pending in respect of the property in question. 20. The appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 31.10.1990 is set aside. The application EA No. 239/1989) filed by the appellant is allowed thereby revoking the order of attachment dated 29.4.1989 in respect of property No. A-27/C, DDA Flats, Munirka, New Delhi. No Costs.
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2001 (10) TMI 1148 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... in Commissioner of Central Excise, Coimbatore & Ors. v. Jawahar Mills Ltd. & Ors. 2001 (132) E.L.T. 3 (S.C.) 2001 (6) SCC 274.
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2001 (10) TMI 1147 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... DER Delay is condoned. The appeals are dismissed.
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2001 (10) TMI 1146 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ority from discharging its statutory functions or transferring those functions to another jurisdiction. Exercise of such power, the Supreme Court held, generates its rippling effect on the subordinate judiciary and statutory functionaries. In GUDUTHUR BROS v I.T.O., , the apex court refused to issue a writ of prohibition when merely a show cause notice was issued. A writ of prohibition is a negative remedy. 46. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the impugned order cannot be sustained. However, the appellants could not have directed appointment of the Board of Trustees without giving an opportunity of hearing by an interim order. That portion of the notice, therefore, cannot be upheld. It is set aside accordingly with a direction that the Board of Trustee can be appointed only upon giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner-respondent herein. 47. This writ appeal is disposed of with the aforementioned directions. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2001 (10) TMI 1145 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s rejected. The Tribunal observed that over all assessment made by the Selection Committee and allocation of lump sum marks for the same, taken by itself, cannot be considered to have vitiated the test. However, the Tribunal proceeded to make its own assessment of respondent No. 1 by reference to his experience as a trainee for a commissioned post in Defence Services and what marks should have been allotted to him. The Tribunal also sat in judgment as to whether for academic and technical qualifications the marks allotted by the appellants to respondent No. 1 are justified or not. The Tribunal ought to have considered the matter in right perspective by considering the various contentions raised in the matter and not sit in judgment over the interview and allotted marks on its own and give the directions in the manner it did. Therefore, we set aside the order made by the Tribunal and dismiss O.A. 1057 of 1994 filed in the Tribunal. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.
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2001 (10) TMI 1144 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... not think it proper to serve a notice upon the appellant asking him to show cause against the proposed order of setting aside the order of discharge passed in his favour by the trial court. We refrain from commenting upon the merits of the case and feel that the ends of justice would be served if the case is remanded back to the High Court for passing fresh orders after affording the appellant an opportunity of being heard. Under the circumstances the impugned order is set aside and the case remanded back to the High Court for passing appropriate orders after hearing the learned counsel for the appellant on the question of framing the charges. This order shall be deemed to be a notice served upon the appellant to show cause as to why the impugned order be not 'set aside and he be charged for the offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Learned counsel for the appellant has conceded that no fresh notice be served. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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2001 (10) TMI 1143 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... document being forged, cannot be instituted." 17. In view of the of authorities to the contrary, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings initiated by the appellant against the respondents. We are also not impressed by the argument that as the civil suit was pending in the High Court, the Magistrate was not justified to proceed with the criminal case either in law or on the basis propriety. Criminal cases have to be proceeded with in accordance with the procedure as prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the pendency of a civil action in a different court even though higher in status and authority, cannot be made a basis for quashing of the proceedings. 18. In the result of appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and resorting the order of the Magistrate with direction to proceed with the trial of the case in accordance with the provisions of law and decide the same on merits.
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2001 (10) TMI 1142 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... is nothing in the reading of the evidence by the Tribunal which indicates that its conclusion is such as could not have been arrived at reasonably on the record. We are, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the conclusion of the final fact finding authority. The civil appeals are dismissed. No order as to costs.
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2001 (10) TMI 1141 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cases involved in these appeals stood transferred to the corresponding courts situated within the territories of the Jharkhand State on the appointed day (i.e. 15.11.2000) by the operation of Section 89 of the Act. We therefore, direct the Registrar of the High Court of Patna to instruct the officers concerned for despatching the records of all these 36 cases, to the corresponding courts at Jharkhand State forthwith. We also direct the Registrar of the High Court of Jharkhand to do whatever is needed for reaching such records in the appropriate courts. To avoid the confusion and repetition of the exercise, we make it clear that the evidence already recorded in any of the 36 cases will be treated as evidence recorded by the proper court having jurisdiction. In other words, the Special Judge need not call the witnesses already examined over again for repetition of what has already come on record. The impugned judgments are set aside and the appeals are disposed of accordingly.
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2001 (10) TMI 1140 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was the subject matter of agreement to sell executed in favour of the appellant-plaintiff. On the failure of the respondent-defendant to comply with the conditions of the Agreement, the demands made in the letters and the notice, the appellant-plaintiff filed OS No.1249 of 1980 in the month of November, 1980 itself. The legal action initiated by the appellant-plaintiff was rightly held by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court to have been commenced without delay and definitely within a reasonable time. The High Court was not justified in disturbing the finding of fact arrived at on appreciation of the evidence, while disposing of the second appeal. The impugned judgment being against the settled provisions of law is not sustainable. The appeal is accordingly allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment and restoring the judgments of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court decreeing the suit of the appellantplaintiff against the respondent-defendant. No costs.
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2001 (10) TMI 1139 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
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... ... ..... ecline to pass any orders since the petitioners as already stated above have been time and again guilty of delay for more than 11 years (which till date remains unexplained) in availing of the present remedy and all the necessary parties i.e. NSDL and the subsequent transferees have not been joined as party respondents. However, Respondent No. 2 by his letters dated 5.2.2000 and 13.11.2000 addressed to the Respondent No. 1 company and Bench Officer, Company Law Board, respectively, has while returning the said 270 shares to Respondent No. 1 asked for return of these shares or compensation therefore which in the circumstances of the case the Respondent No. 1 cannot be called upon to bear and pay. 14. The petition is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. However, the petitioners are at liberty to pursue any other remedy which may be available to them and as they may be advised to recover the said 270 and 498 shares from the Respondent No. 2 subsequent transferees.
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