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Showing 41 to 60 of 698 Records
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2009 (10) TMI 959 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... for legal costs of advocates or are immediately payable within a period of four weeks from today, in terms of the commitments already made with respect to these proceedings under Section 34 of the Act. In terms of such affidavit filed by the respondent company, and duly supported by the certificate of the advocates of receipt of fees such costs will be the costs of these proceedings provided the needful is done in four weeks from today. In awarding of costs I have taken into account the benefit on account of reduction in the rate of interest having been given to the objector. I have also for the purposes of costs taken into account the value of the claims involved and the financial capacity of the parties. I may note that on the issue of costs, I am supported by a decision of a learned Single Judge of this court (Madan Lokur, J) in the case reported as Austin Nichols & Co. v. Arvind Behl 2006 (32) PTC 133. 26. With these observations, the objection petition is dismissed.
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2009 (10) TMI 958 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d. In the present case, Ext.P6 order does not show that a notice had been issued on the appeal to the person in relation to whom the information has been sought. Since the State Information Commission is dealing with an appeal against the order passed by the Appellate Authority, it was bound to follow the procedure under Section 11 of the Act while dealing with the appeal, at the instance of the applicant, dissatisfied with the information that was given by the Appellate Authority of the Calicut University. That procedure has not been followed in the present case. 18. For all these reasons, I am of the view that the petitioners are entitled to succeed. Writ petition is therefore allowed. Ext.P6 order is set aside. It is declared that Ext.P4 reply given by the Appellate Authority of the Calicut University under the Act shall be treated as an adequate and sufficient reply to Ext.P1 application made by the 2nd respondent herein, under the Act. There will be no order as to cost.
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2009 (10) TMI 957 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI
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... ... ..... t required to make a public announcement. On an appeal filed by the appellant, an objection was taken to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the appellant therein was not a person aggrieved. The preliminary objection was overruled and the appeal was rightly held to be maintainable. This case has no parallel with the facts of the case before us. The dispute in that case was whether a public announcement was required to be made under the takeover code and the Board found that it was not required to be made. This deprived the appellant of his right to exit as a shareholder and it was rightly held that he was a person aggrieved. This case is different on facts and does not advance the case of the appellants. For the reasons recorded above, we uphold the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the Board and hold that the present appeal is not maintainable since the appellants are not persons aggrieved by the order impugned herein. There is no order as to costs.
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2009 (10) TMI 956 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... le in this court an affidavit with respect to the costs incurred by it for these present legal proceedings supported by the certificates from the advocates that they have received such costs for these proceedings under Section 30 and 33. This affidavit of the authorised signatory of Flowmore along with certificate of the counsel be filed within a period of four weeks from today and 75 of such amount (not 100 ) would be the costs of these proceedings which are awarded in favour of Flowmore and against the NTPC. 22. With these observations, the objection petition stands disposed of and the award dated 19.11.1996 is made rule of the court, subject to the modifications thereto as regards the reduced amount awarded to Flowmore being ₹ 13,93,095/- plus ₹ 19,35,826/- and interest being reduced to 9 per annum simple till actual payment of amounts as decreed. C.S.(OS) No.3022A/1996 In view of the above order passed in I.A.No.4430/1997, the present suit stands disposed of.
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2009 (10) TMI 955 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... for the purpose of coming to a positive conclusion on the bonafide need of the present landlord and the comparative hardship of the parties on the basis of the subsequent developments, as noted herein earlier, the matter needs to be examined on further evidence after restoring the Writ Petition before the High Court with a direction in the manner indicated above in view of the fact that the justice has already been delayed for a long time. 24. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the Judgment of the High Court and restore the Writ Petition and direct the High Court to decide the same in the manner indicated above. 25. Accordingly, the High Court is requested to decide the writ petition within 6 months from the date of the supply of a copy of this order to it without granting any unnecessary adjournments to either of the parties in the light of the directions made hereinabove. 26. The appeal is thus allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
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2009 (10) TMI 954 - SUPREME COURT
Offence punishable u/s 304B and u/s 498A IPC - Case of prosecution that accused Nos. 1 to 3 had been torturing the deceased Mangayarkarasi by demanding a car and money - wife of accused committed suicide due to tortures - whether it was dowry demand case? - Appellant Arulvelu has been convicted and sentenced to seven years rigorous imprisonment u/s 304B of IPC and further convicted u/s 498A IPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of ₹ 1,000/-, in default to suffer three months rigorous imprisonment - whether the appellant is guilty for compelling the deceased to commit suicide? - According to P.W.1 the father of the deceased, his daughter committed suicide because he could not give gold and a car as agreed before her marriage. The accused persons started torturing and harassing the deceased which ultimately led to suicide - conflicting judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court - High Court has reversed the judgment of acquittal passed by the Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Periyar District in Sessions Case and convicted the accused persons.
HELD THAT:- In our considered opinion, the approach of the High Court in the impugned judgment is not in consonance with the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. The High Court while reversing the judgment of the trial court observed that "in all probabilities, I am inclined to hold that there was demand of dowry and the deceased was harassed by the first accused and therefore, she committed suicide."
In criminal cases the conviction can be sustained only when there is clear evidence beyond reasonable doubt. The accused cannot be convicted on the ground that in all probabilities the accused may have committed the crime. The approach of the High Court is wholly fallacious and unsustainable in law.
Whether the view which has been taken by the trial court was a possible or a plausible view? - We have carefully perused the judgment of the trial court and the impugned judgment of the High Court. The trial court very minutely examined the entire evidence and all documents and exhibits on record. The trial court's analysis of evidence also seems to be correct. The trial court has not deviated from the normal norms or methods of evaluation of the evidence. By no stretch of imagination, we can hold that the judgment of the trial court is based on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it and consequently the judgment of the trial court is perverse.
We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that the discussion and appreciation of the evidence of the trial court is so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse and the findings rendered by the trial court are against the weight of evidence. The law is well settled that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the judgment of the trial court is perverse, the Appellate Court would not be justified in substituting its own view and reverse the judgment of acquittal.
The expression `perverse' has been dealt with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. and Ors. v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. and Ors. [2000 (11) TMI 1254 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] this Court observed that the expression `perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.
The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries like Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition - Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.
Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English - International Edition - Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition - Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. etc.
We have re-examined the entire case because of the conflicting judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court. On careful marshalling of the entire evidence and the documents on record, we arrive at the conclusion that the view taken by the trial court is a possible and plausible view. The judgment of the trial court cannot be termed as perverse.
The High Court ought not to have substituted the same by its own possible view. The impugned judgment of the High Court cannot stand the scrutiny of the well settled legal position which has been crystallized for more than 80 years since the case of Sheo Swarup [1934 (7) TMI 17 - PRIVY COUNCIL]. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained to set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court.
Consequently, these appeals filed by the appellants are allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court set aside and that of the trial court is restored.
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2009 (10) TMI 953 - JHARKHAND HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... However, that part of the order stating therein that bail bond of the petitioner shall be cancelled on account of non-observance of the direction contained therein is not sustainable in law as consequence of nonobservance of the direction has been contemplated under Section 14 of the said Act itself and as such, that part of the order dated 18.5.2009 where it has been stated that the bail bond of the petitioner shall be cancelled is hereby quashed. 30. Thus, respondent no. 3 never appears to have acted without jurisdiction in the matter of arrest of the petitioner nor the proceeding pending before the Special Judge (Economic Offences), Dhanbad including the order dated 18.5.2009 is bad except that part of the order wherein it has been stated that bail bond of the petitioner shall be cancelled on account of nonobservance of direction contained therein which part of the order stands quashed. 31. In the result, this application is allowed in part to the extent indicated above.
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2009 (10) TMI 952 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ion would be even stronger in their case. There is no allegation of force or fraud in this case. Hence it is difficult to accept the contention of the respondent while admitting that the document Ex.D-8 bears his signatures that it was signed under some mistake. We cannot agree with the view of the High Court on this question. On this ground alone, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and remand the matter to the High Court for expeditious disposal in accordance with law. All questions of law and fact, except the one decided by us hereinabove shall remain open for the parties to be urged before the High Court. We make it clear that we are making our observation that there was no mistake in the document Ex. D-8, which the parties have signed. Interim order of this Court dated 23.9.2004, as modified on 9.1.2006, shall continue to remain in operation till final disposal of the matter by the High Court. Appeal allowed. No order as to the costs.
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2009 (10) TMI 951 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
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... ... ..... practising company secretary of his choice to assist him and the remuneration fixed by him will be paid by the company. ( 16. ) After the election of directors, if the nominees of the RMS group gain majority in the board, the OPA group will have the option to sell their shares to the RMS group and vice versa. Once the option to sell is exercised, the same will be binding on the other side. The fair value of the shares shall be determined by an independent valuer. After the election of directors in the general meeting, and if one of the groups exercises the option to sell the shares to the other group, the parties are at liberty to approach this Board for appointment of a valuer to determine the fair value of shares. While appointing a valuer, further directions relating to the date of valuation, the number of shares/share capital to be taken into account to determine the fair value and the number of shares to which the said valuation would be applicable, etc., will be given.
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2009 (10) TMI 950 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... therefore, of the opinion that this is not a stage to interfere with the aforesaid notice under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. We, however, make it clear that it would be open to the petitioner to present its case before the AO in order to show that claim under section 147 of the Act was rightly made and allowed. 12. We may refer to a decision of this Court, at this stage, in the case of Consolidated Photo & Finvest Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT 2006 200 CTR (Del.) 433wherein it is held that under section 147 of the Act it is permissible even if AO gathered reasons to plea (believe) from the record as has been the subject-matter to complete proceedings. This judgment provides complete answer to the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner that no further material fact has been noticed apart from the material already placed in the IT returns, on the basis of which impugned notice has been issued. Giving this liberty to the petitioner, the petition is dismissed.
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2009 (10) TMI 949 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the vehicle in terms of Section 50 of the Act who is liable to satisfy the Award. But that definition in section 2 of the MV Act have to be read in the context in which it appears has escaped the notice of the Court. Therefore, the said judgment is per incuriam. Now coming to the facts of the present case, the defendant- appellant has admitted that both the parties have purchased the vehicle by contributing equal amount and are owner of the truck in equal shares. Therefore, though the registration of the vehicle is in the name of the appellant alone but the title of the movable property would vest with the plaintiff as well as entry in the registration certificate is not a condition precedent for ownership of the movable property. In view of the above, I do not find any patent illegality or irregularity in the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below, which may give rise to any substantial question of law for consideration of this Court in second appeal. Dismissed.
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2009 (10) TMI 948 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... applying, with respect, the “purpose test” evolved by the Supreme Court in Sahaney Steel (supra) and Ponni Sugars (supra). We hold accordingly and allow ground no.6 for the assessment year 1996-97 and ground no.7 for the assessment year 1998-99. 13. Ground No.1 to 5 in the appeal for the assessment year 1996-97 relating to the disallowance of the cost of failed tube wells, previous year’s expenses and depreciation on the tube wells are dismissed as not pressed. Similarly, in the appeal for the assessment year 1998-99 ground nos.1 and 3 to 6 questioning similar disallowances are also dismissed as not pressed. In this year, the assessee has also taken ground no.2 questioning the decision of the AO in not considering the revised statement of income filed in response to notice under Section 139(9). This ground is also dismissed as not pressed. 14. In the result both the appeals are partly allowed. No costs. Order pronounced in the open court 16th October, 2009.
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2009 (10) TMI 947 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... the facts in the case of the assessee . Since assessee had not filed any appeal against the registration order dated 27.9.2002 and no request for condonation of delay was made in application dated 28.11.2003 on the basis of which registration was granted to the assessee w.e.f. 1.4.2003 vide order dated 17.5.2004, the matter thus become final. Since the order passed by DIT(E) dated 27.9.2002 has become final, the condonation of delay in seeking registration cannot be granted subsequently when registration has been granted on the basis of application wherein no such condonation of the delay was sought for and registration has been allowed from the 1st day of April to the year in which the application was filed. Accordingly, in our considered opinion, the DIT(E) was justified in rejecting the grant of registration with effect from the date of creation of the trust. 5. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is dismissed. 6. Order pronounced in open court on 30/10/2009.
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2009 (10) TMI 946 - ITAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... ue in Asstt. Year 2005-06 in ITA No.645/Bag/2009 we are of the opinion that there is no reason to interfere with the findings recorded by CIT(A). CIT (A) has correctly directed to grant deduction u/s 10B as claimed in the return. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances in the case of assessee we find no merit in the grounds of appeal of revenue. 23. The grounds of appeal of revenue is dismissed. C.O.40/Bang/2009 - By the assessee - Assessment Year.2006-07 24. Similarly grounds raised in Cross Objection are identical to ground No.2 raised in appeal of assessee for Asstt. Year 2005-06 in ITA No.527/Bang/2009. For the detailed reasons given at para.13 there is no merit in the grounds of cross objection of assessee and same are dismissed. 25. In the result, assessee's appeal in ITA.527/B/09 is partly allowed, Revenue's appeals in ITA.493 and 645/B/09 are dismissed and the cross objection by the assessee is dismissed. Pronounced in the open court on 9.10.2009.
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2009 (10) TMI 945 - CESTAT, CHENNAI
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... ... ..... decision of the Tribunal in the case of Sudhir Engineering Co. Vs CCE Surat 2004 (164) ELT 211 (Tri.-Del.) . 5. On perusal of the Notification No.10/97-CE, we find that the exemption was extended to scientific and technical instruments, apparatus, equipment (including computers) and accessories and spares parts of aforesaid goods. There is no dispute that the goods were cleared to research institutes. It appears from the literature placed by the ld. advocate that the UPSS is equipment to protect perils such as spikes, surges, voltage fluctuations, black outs and other aberrations. UPSS is, therefore, in our view, covered under clause (a) of Sl.No.1 of the Table appended to the said notification. Hence there is no reason to deny the benefit of the exemption notification. 6. In view of the above discussions, the appeal No.E/566/03 filed by the Revenue is dismissed. Appeals filed by the assessee are allowed. (Operative part of the order was pronounced in open court on 29.10.09)
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2009 (10) TMI 944 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... o know the contents of those provisions prior to 1-5-1998. In order to apply any penal provision it is necessary that party should get the opportunity to defend its right in that regard. This proviso was not applied to the matter in hand at the original stage and on the basis of such amended provision, the Revenue wants to saddle appellants with the penalty. The same cannot be allowed unless it is established by the department that the appellants had opportunity to know the amended notification. 8. Applying the said ruling to the facts of the case, the appellants are justified in contending that the authorities could not have imposed penalty equal to the amount to the duty payable by the appellants and the impugned order to that extent is liable to be set aside. 9. The appeals accordingly succeed. The impugned order imposing penalty in exercise of power under Rule 96ZO(3) of the said Rules is hereby set aside. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed in the said terms.
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2009 (10) TMI 943 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ld be effectively done by challenging assessments. The Tribunal's finding that appeals are not maintainable, because the tax amount involved is below the threshold limit fixed by the CBDT circular is not applicable in these cases where the assessments are agreed assessments against which assessee has filed appeals. This is because, if assessee had not agreed for specific addition, the officer was not bound to maintain addition at the level agreed by the assessee. However, the assessee cannot be blamed for filing appeals because the officer levied penalty based on addition made in agreed assessments. It is obvious that the assessee agreed for specific additions in assessments to purchase piece and obviously no penalty could have been levied against assessee. In this view of the matter we dispose of these appeals by vacating the orders of the Tribunal, first appellate authority and by restoring assessments but by confirming cancellation of penalty orders for all the years.
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2009 (10) TMI 942 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... he show cause notice without considering the assessment order. As regards to another issue, i.e. verification of purchases as inflated by booking purchases for non-existence parties and thereby resolved into outsider credits in the final accounts, the AO has already considered this aspect and made addition of unaccounted purchases, if this addition is made, that will tantamount to double addition, which the AO has no power. Accordingly, we find no infirmity in the order of the Assessing Officer. Even otherwise the fact relating to these two connected issue as raised by the CIT in his revision order u/s.263 of the Act has already been dealt by us in ITA No.160/Ahd/2006 as above. Accordingly, we quash the revision order passed by the CIT u/s.263 of the Act and allow this appeal of the assessee. 15. In the result, assessee's appeal ITA No.160/Ahd/2006 is dismissed and that of assessee's appeal ITA No.1089/Ahd/2006 is allowed. Order pronounced in Open Court on 16/10/2009
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2009 (10) TMI 941 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Detention of goods - non-submission of Transit Declaration Form - Held that: - at the time of seizure neither the applicant nor the authorities appears to be aware of the amendment. At that point of time the downloaded Transit Declaration Form was the prescribed document for the aforesaid transit. However, it can also not be said that the goods were being transported by the transporter without any document at all - merely in absence of the downloaded Transit Declaration Form it cannot be said that the transporter did not possess any valid document to arrive at the conclusion that the goods were being transported from the outside the State of U.P. only for Sale in U.P. - revision allowed - goods seized shall be released upon furnishing the security other than cash or bank guarantee to the satisfaction of the seizing authority to the extent of demand raised i.e. ₹ 4,95,000/- - decided partly in favor of revisionist.
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2009 (10) TMI 940 - SUPREME COURT
Determination of Compensation for acquisition of land - HELD THAT:- Having regard to the large variance between the market value disclosed by the twelve sale deeds exhibited and relied upon by the claimants (average of which is ₹ 78/85) and the market value disclosed by Ex R2 (Rs.6/19 per sq.yd) relied upon by LAC and having regard to the fact that the value disclosed by Ex. R2 was even less than what was offered by the LAC, it has to be inferred that Ex R2 was either grossly undervalued or was a distress sale and has to be excluded from consideration, as being unreliable.
To determine the value of large tract of acquired land, it is necessary to make an appropriate deduction therefrom towards development cost. Having regard to the fact that all the acquired lands adjoin a State Highway (Gurgaon Alwar Road) and the proximate availability of facilities which can be easily accessed for development, it would be appropriate to limit the deduction to 40% towards development cost, instead of the usual higher percentage of deduction ranging from 50% to 67%. Thus, the market value would work out to be ₹ 59/34 per sq.yd (Rs.98/90 minus 40%) or ₹ 2,87,200/- per acre.
The percentage of deduction (development cost factor) will be applied fully where the acquired land has no development. But where the acquired land can be considered to be partly developed (say for example, having good road access or having the amenity of electricity, water etc.), then the development cost (that is percentage of deduction) will be modulated with reference to the extent of development of the acquired land as on the date of acquisition. But under no circumstances, the future use or purpose of acquisition will play a role in determining the percentage of deduction towards development cost.
Therefore, we allow these appeals in part and increase the compensation for the acquired lands to ₹ 2,87,200/- per acre. The appellants will also be entitled to all statutory benefits, that is solatium at 30% u/s 23(2), additional amount at 12% from the date of preliminary notification to date of award u/s 23(1A), and interest on the total compensation less the amount awarded by the LAC, at 9% per annum for one year from the date of taking possession and 15% PA thereafter. Parties to bear respective costs.
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