|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 1385 Records
-
2020 (10) TMI 1345 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL NEW DELHI PRINCIPAL BENCH
Seeking exclusion of the time wherein liquidator could not pursue other remedies available for liquidation of the company - HELD THAT:- When the liquidator represented that the company for long not working therefore there is no scope to consider this company as going concern and to sell it as going concern, in view thereof, this Bench on 18.05.2020 recorded the same letting the liquidator to sell the assets in a way that is beneficial to the Stake Holders, for the time lost in not proceeding to sell the assets of the corporate debtor, at request of the liquidator, the period from 05.11.2019 to 18.05.2020 is hereby excluded from the liquidation period.
Application stands disposed of.
-
2020 (10) TMI 1344 - SC ORDER
Liquidation of Corporate Debtor - HELD THAT:- There are no substantial question of law involved in the matter.
The civil appeal stands dismissed.
-
2020 (10) TMI 1343 - ITAT MUMBAI
Disallowance of Provision on Foreseeable Losses u/s 115JB - HELD THAT:- Upon perusal of the order dated 01/03/2018, it is quite discernible that a finding has been rendered by the bench in the order that the determination of foreseeable loss was fair, proper and justified. Finally, the matter was concluded in assessee’s favor in wherein it was held that claim of provision for foreseeable losses for Rs.201.01 Lacs was an allowable claim. This being so, the provisions could not be termed as unascertained liabilities for the purpose of computing Book Profits u/s 115JB. Therefore, the same was not to be added back while computing Book Profits u/s 115JB. Ground stands allowed in assessee’s favour.
-
2020 (10) TMI 1342 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Rectification application u/s 254 - period of limitation - Tribunal rejected the application filed by the Department u/s 254(2) on the finding that the same was beyond prescribed period of limitation, i.e. beyond six months from the end of the month in which the order was passed - HELD THAT:- Petitioner No. 1 has not been able to show that the application was within time and not beyond the time.
In that view of the matter, we do not find any infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal. The petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.
-
2020 (10) TMI 1341 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, NEW DELHI
Seeking to withdraw the instant appeal with liberty to agitate the grounds therein in another appeal - HELD THAT:- The appeal is accordingly dismissed as withdrawn. The Appellant shall be at liberty to pursue the legal remedy in respect of the impugned orders as may be available under the law.
-
2020 (10) TMI 1340 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Seeking grant of Default Bail - default committed by the investigating agency in completing the investigation within the stipulated time - Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. - default bail sought on the ground that police failed to complete the investigation within the stipulated period of 90 days and filed only preliminary charge-sheet within the prescribed time - whether filing a preliminary charge-sheet without completing the investigation would defeat the right of the accused to claim default bail under proviso (a) to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.?
HELD THAT:- It is relevant to note that the Parliament in its wisdom, considering the right of the accused to speedy investigation, stipulated period of time in proviso (a) to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. stating that in all offences which are punishable with death or life imprisonment or with 10 years imprisonment, the investigation is to be completed within 90 days and in other offences, the investigation is to be completed within 60 days. The Code clearly envisaged that if the prosecuting agency fails to complete the investigation within the said stipulated period of time as contemplated under the Code, the accused is entitled to claim default bail. The said right conferred by the statute on the accused is an indefeasible right and he is entitled to bail as a matter of right on account of the default committed by the prosecuting agency in completing the investigation within the time stipulated by the statute.
It is significant to note that a plain reading of proviso (a) to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. makes it manifest that what is required to claim for default bail under proviso (a) to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. is failure on the part of the Investigating Agency to complete the investigation within the stipulated period of time - when the Investigating Agency files only preliminary charge-sheet within the said stipulated time keeping the investigation pending or without completing the investigation, it will not under any circumstances defeat the right conferred on the accused to claim for default bail. By mere filing a preliminary charge-sheet without completing the entire investigation and filing a final and full-fledged charge-sheet, the prosecuting agency cannot vanquish the indefeasible statutory right of the accused to claim for default bail.
A plain reading of Section 167 Cr.P.C. makes it abundantly clear that it is not the intention of the legislation that charge-sheet is to be filed within the stipulated period. The intention of the legislation is that the investigation is to be completed within the stipulated time. Nowhere in Section 167 Cr.P.C. it is stated that the charge-sheet is to be filed within the prescribed period of time. All that it is stated in Section 167 Cr.P.C. is that the investigation is to be completed within the said stipulated period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be - A preliminary charge-sheet filed without completing the entire investigation cannot be allowed to serve as an impediment to come in the way of exercising the statutory right of the accused for default bail.
After analysing the law on the point, it would be more in consonance with the legislative mandate to hold that mere filing preliminary charge-sheet without completing the investigation will not defeat the indefeasible statutory right of the accused to claim for default bail - when the law mandates that the Magistrate could authorise detention of the accused in custody up to a maximum period as indicated in the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 Cr.P.C. any further detention beyond the period when, the investigation is not completed and the final charge-sheet is not filed on completion of the entire investigation by the Investigating Agency would be a subterfuge and would not be in accordance with law and in conformity with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, it could be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
The petition filed by the petitioner under proviso (a) to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. stands allowed. The petitioner is ordered to be enlarged on bail on execution of self bond for Rs. 50,000/- with two sureties for like sum each to the satisfaction of the IV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada, Krishna District.
-
2020 (10) TMI 1339 - SC ORDER
Maintainability of Special Leave Petition - HELD THAT:- There are no reason to interfere in the matters. The special leave petitions are dismissed.
-
2020 (10) TMI 1338 - ITAT DELHI
Unexplained jewellery - Contention of assessee that if the correct quantity of jewellery (i.e. 671.53 gms is considered instead of 771.83 gms) and if the credit for jewellery in the hand of his son is also given then there would remain no excess jewellery - HELD THAT:- We find that CIT(A) has noted that total jewellery of 771.83 gms valued at Rs. 31,27,296/- was found from the possession of the assessee and his wife. The figure of 771.83 gms noted by the CIT(A) appears to be incorrect as in the copy of the panchnama which has been placed by the assessee in the paper book shows the total weight of the jewellery found to be 671.534 gms with the value of Rs 31,27,296/-. CIT(A) has given credit of jewellery of 600 gms (500 gms for the wife of the assessee and 100 gms for the assessee) and no credit has been given for jewellery to the son of the assessee. The fact that the family of the assessee consists of himself, his wife and son is not disputed.
We find that CBDT vide instruction no. 1916 dated 11.05.1994 has issued guidelines which inter alia states that in case of person not assessed to wealth tax, gold jewellery ornaments to the extent of 500 gms per married lady, 250 gms per unmarried lady and 100 gms per male member of the family need not to be assessed.
In the present case, we find that CIT(A) has given credit for jewellery only to the assessee and his wife and no credit has been given to assessee’s son. If the credit for 100 gms of jewellery to the son of the assessee is granted, then there would remain no unexplained excess jewellery in the hands of the assessee and therefore no addition is called for. We, therefore, direct the deletion of addition upheld by the CIT(A). The ground of assessee is allowed.
-
2020 (10) TMI 1337 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Maintainability of application - Seeking stay on further proceedings of the Arbitral Tribunal consisting of 2nd, 3rd and 4th Respondents with regard to the dispute between the Applicant and the 1st Respondent - section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act - whether or not leave is required to continue the Arbitral Proceedings?
HELD THAT:- Though the Eleventh Schedule of IBC was amended, Section 279 of the Companies Act 2013, which is correspondent to Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956 has not been deleted or amended. As per sub-Section 2 Clause (94A) the definition of the term “winding up” means winding up under this Act or liquidation under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, as applicable. The word “applicable” indicates that the Eleventh Schedule not confined to Insolvency and Bankruptcy alone and also applicable to winding up took place under the Companies Act - Section 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 states that ‘the provisions of this Code shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law’, the provision is exhaustive. Thus, whenever a special law gives out a specific provision which is clear and unambiguous and on the same subject there is a different provision in the general law and there is an inconsistency between the two, the special law will prevail and the principles of harmonious construction will have no role to play.
The time frame in winding up on just and equitable grounds is not an important condition. The very object of introducing the IBC 2016 and restricting its operation to solvency of the Company alone and provision for revival of the company within time fixed and keeping the liquidation as last resort makes it clear that time frame is important under the Code while it is not so under Section 279 of the Companies 2013 Act - An Adjudicating Authority that commences exercising of its power by entertaining a petition by a creditor on account of default by the Corporate Debtor enters into the sphere of resolution process which again deals with money and money alone ends up under liquidation. If there is a suit for title pending before the civil court. Adjudicating Authority normally would not be able to reject the leave in such cases. It is to be noted that the tribunals of limited tribunals of limited jurisdiction do not have power to issue declaratory decrees.
The definition of the word "claim" is found in Section 3(6), Section 3(11) defines "Debt", Section 3(12) defined "default" and Sections 3(13) to 3(18) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 deals with financial aspects. Therefore the very word ‘claim' is relatable to a right of payment. Such right of payment may arise on account of debt or on account of any breach of contract provided such breach gives right to a payment. In such circumstances the provisions of Companies Act which deals with cases of winding up generally cannot be read harmoniously with IBC which is a Special Law.
Section 33(5) of the IBC Code has to be interpretted on its own language. Further, as discussed, when there is no inconsistency IBC would prevail over. Such view of the fact no leave is required to continue of pending proceedings - Any order passed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act upsetting the view of the tribunal taken, amounts to sitting over the order of the Tribunal ruling same amount to its jurisdiction. The purpose of Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is not to upset any order passed by the Tribunal. When the Tribunal has passed an order rejecting the contention of the claimant questioning the jurisdiction to continue the proceedings. Such order is amenable to challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, while challenging the Award.
This Court is of the view that interim orders cannot be granted. The Court is also aware of the limitation to intervene the arbitral proceedings. Section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act also indicated that no judicial authority shall intervene in the arbitral proceedings except where provided in this part - Application dismissed.
-
2020 (10) TMI 1336 - CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT
Condonation of delay in filing appeal - petition rejected on the ground of the same having barred by limitation - HELD THAT:- The undisputed factual matrix of the case is that the Adjudicating Authority had passed the order on 26.06.2019, there is no dispute so far as the order being communicated to the petitioner and as such the appeal ought to have been filed by 26.09.2019 that is three months' period provided u/s 107 of the Chhattisgarh GST Act of 2017. The appeal in the instant case has been filed on 16.12.2019 that is even after the three months from the date limitation expired. Sub-section 4 of Section 107 of the Chhattisgarh GST Act confers the Appellate Authority with the power to condone the delay, if the appeal is filed within a period of one month from the date limitation stood expired.
The fact that there is an upper limit of one month provided in the statutes itself for preferring an appeal beyond the prescribed period of three months itself establishes the fact that beyond that extended period of one month after the expiry of period of limitation, the Appellate Authority becomes functus officio and would not be in a position to entertain the appeal nor does he have the power to condone the delay.
The issue so far as condonation of delay is concerned beyond the limit permissible under the statutes came up for consideration before the Supreme Court recently in the case of M/s N.V. International vs. State of Assam and others [2019 (12) TMI 1515 - SUPREME COURT]. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court though under the provisions of Arbitration Act had considered the aspect whether the authority could condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under the statutes, disallowing the contention and dismissing the appeal observed that once when the period is prescribed beyond the said period, the authority does not have the power to entertain the application for condoning the delay or else it will defeat the statutory purpose.
This Court does not find a strong case made out by the counsel for the petitioner in the instant case calling for an interference to the order passed by the Respondent No. 3 - Petition dismissed.
-
2020 (10) TMI 1335 - SC ORDER
Whether the statement made by the officer of the petitioner was without any power or authority and does not bind the petitioner? - HELD THAT:- The petitioners must be made to pay for the judicial time they have consumed but seeing our approach in the earlier matter, learned senior counsel himself was circumspect from beginning and thus, it is considered appropriate to only impose Rs.10,000/- as costs on the State Government for having approached this Court. The cost be recovered from the officer who took such a decision to come to this Court without taking any action against the officers and that too belatedly or responsible for the delay.
The costs be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee within a period of four weeks and a certificate of recovery be filed in this Court within the same period of time.
SLP dismissed on the ground of delay.
-
2020 (10) TMI 1334 - APPELLATE AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE, MADHYA PRADESH
Input Tax Credit - Purchase of Lift would be available to Hotel as it has been used in the course or for the furtherance of business - lift installed is a part of immovable property, or not - capital goods are used in providing taxable services - compliance with the requirements of section 16 of CGST Act 2017 - Blocking of credit in terms of section 17(5) (d) of CGST Act, 2017 - HELD THAT:- As per the Section 17 (5) of CGST Act mentioned above, the Input tax credit shall not be available on the goods and services or both received by a taxable person for construction of an immovable property (other than plant or machinery) on his own account including when such goods or services or both are used in the course or furtherance of business - The definition of immovable property is not provided under GST Act. According to section 3 (26) of the General Clauses Act, 1882, “Immovable property shall include land, benefits to arise out of land and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth”. According to section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, “Immovable property does not include standing timber, growing crops or grass”.
The impugned item 'lift' merits classification as 'plant and machinery' and since 'plant and machinery' is excluded from the term 'immovable property', for the purpose of 17(5) (d), again appellant has pleaded that the plant and machinery includes certain foundations and structures however certain structures and foundations are excluded from Plant and Machinery and these are, land, building or any other civil structures, telecommunication towers and pipelines laid outside the factory premises - the lift installed in the building for the purpose of furtherance of business cannot be deemed to be a part of the building or an immovable property just because of the fact that it was fastened in the civil structure of the building by way of nuts, bolts and fasteners. Further, the lift so installed in his Hotel is not a customized lift but a pre-designed lift. These lifts require a specified area in a building and can easily be installed by fastening nut and bolts and other fasteners in the building and no specific modification or alteration is required in the building structure. Thereafter these lifts can be disassembled without causing any structural damage to the building and reassembled on need and can be resold in open market.
Lift purchase does not qualify as goods but is works contract resulting into an immovable property. High rise buildings' sanctioned plan includes lifts or escalators as fixtures - the appellant has not made any statement regarding capitalization of lift expenses.
Thus, the ITC is not admissible on purchase of Lift as per the Section 17(5) (d) of CGST Act, 2017.
-
2020 (10) TMI 1333 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Money Laundering - Validity of summons issued - violation of the provisions contained in Section 160 Cr.P.C. - HELD THAT:- The respondent submits presence of the petitioners is being sought for seeking some queries from them and they have been summoned as witness(es) and the interest of justice shall suffice if the petitioners, all residents of Karnataka, in this pandemic situation, may be directed to join the enquiry through Video Conferencing. The date and timing of such Video Conferencing shall be shared by the investigating officer with the petitioners so that there should not be any inconvenience for anyone in joining such enquiry.
List on 19.11.2020 and in the meanwhile, petitioners shall cooperate in the enquiry through video conferencing and their personal appearance shall not be insisted upon till the next date of hearing.
-
2020 (10) TMI 1332 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL MUMBAI
Non- compliance of the provisions of Regulation 16(1) of Securities and Exchange Board of India (Issue of Listing of Debenture Securities) Regulations, 2008 - Penalty on the appellant imposed under section 15A(b) and 15HB of the SEBI Act - Appellant is a housing finance company, and at present, is undergoing corporate insolvency resolution process - HELD THAT:- As the adjudicating authority by order declare moratorium for prohibiting the institution of suits or continuation of pending suits or proceedings against the corporate debtor including execution of any judgement or order in any court of law, tribunal, arbitration panel or other authority.
In our view, the provision is clear and explicit and needs no further elaboration. Pursuant to a moratorium declared under section 14 the institution of suits or proceedings against the corporate debtor is prohibited or continuation of a suit or proceedings. Further, execution of any judgement or order in any court of law, tribunal, arbitration panel or other authority is also prohibited.
Thus, where a moratorium has been declared under section 14 of IBC, the authority which in the instant case is SEBI/AO will have no jurisdiction to institute any proceedings. Where a proceeding has already been instituted and during the pendency of the proceedings a moratorium order is passed under section 14 then the authority is prohibited from continuing with the proceedings. This is clear from a bare reading of the provisions of section 14(1) of the IBC.
The contention of the respondent that the word 'proceedings' depicted in section 14(1) has to be given an expansive meaning cannot be considered either by the adjudicating officer as it would amount to contempt of court. In any case, the prohibition is on the institution of a proceeding. In the instant case, the moratorium kicked in when the petition was filed on November, 2019 under Rule 5(a)(i) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Insolvency and liquidation proceedings of financial service provider and application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2019 and thereafter it was admitted on 3rd December, 2019. The adjudicating officer issued notice subsequently on 24th December, 2019. It is quite clear that the proceedings was initiated by the adjudicating officer after the moratorium had come into effect. In our view no proceedings could be instituted in view of section 14(1) of the Act.
We are also of the opinion that external aid can only be considered when there is an ambiguity in the provision. In this regard, the provision of section 14 is very clear and explicit and there is no room for any ambiguity. Further, the Supreme Court has categorically explained the effect of section 14 of the IBC. We, therefore, find that the adjudicating officer could not have considered the report of the insolvency committee to come to the conclusion that he had the power to proceed under SEBI law inspite of a moratorium having come into effect under section 14 of the IBC.
For the reasons stated aforesaid, the impugned order imposing a penalty and proceeding to recover under section 28A of the Act upon failure to pay cannot be sustained and is quashed. Since the proceedings could not be instituted, we also quash the show cause notice and the entire proceedings. The appeal is allowed.
-
2020 (10) TMI 1331 - SC ORDER
Import of prime quality SS CR coils - exemption denied on the ground that the goods are not of prime quality - Benefit of N/N. 12/2012-Cus dated 17.03.2012 (Sr. No. 330) - HELD THAT:- List the Civil Appeal in the first week of February 2021.
-
2020 (10) TMI 1330 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Penalty proceeding u/s 271AAC - unexplained income u/s 69 (A) - action of the Respondent Income Tax Officer in rejecting the explanation offered by the petitioner - petitioner, argues that the order passed is cryptic in nature as also the Officer has not assigned any reason for carrying out re- assessment in the case of the petitioner - HELD THAT:- We are of the considered view that all material facts necessary for adjudication were recorded and considered by the Officer and as such the order cannot be said to be in violation of principles of natural justice, even though it may be short in nature.
Since disputed questions of fact are raised before us, we refrain from adjudicating the same, reserving liberty to the petitioner to prefer a statutory appeal which is an equally efficacious remedy.
As such, present petition stands disposed of.
At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that limitation may not come in the way of adjudication of the appeal.
Shri Rishi Raj Sinha, learned counsel for the Income Tax Department, states that if an appeal is preferred within a period of four weeks from today, the issue of limitation shall neither be raised nor allowed to come in the way of adjudication of the appeal on merits, more so keeping in view current Pandemic Covid-19.
Statement is accepted and taken on record.
Shri Rishi Raj Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the Income Tax Department, states that as on date no coercive action stands taken against the petitioner in terms of the demand raised pursuant to the passing of the impugned order and that position would be allowed to be maintained if the petitioner were to file an appeal within a period of four weeks from today.
-
2020 (10) TMI 1329 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Exotic species - inclusion of vulnerable exotic animals/birds species in the definition of “exotic live species” in Part I (a) of the Advisory for dealing with import of exotic live species in India - nature and extent of immunity contemplated by the Advisory as also whether it would cover other vulnerable exotic live species which are not mentioned in the Appendices to the CITES - HELD THAT:- It appears that a Voluntary Disclosure Scheme has been introduced by the Central Government which gives an option to all the citizens of India to voluntarily declare their stock of exotic species enumerated in Appendices I, II and III of the CITES – International Convention, if at all they are in possession thereof, within six months from the date of issuance of Advisory i.e. w.e.f. 11th June, 2020 (Annexure P-2 collectively to the memo of this writ petition). As per the Scheme, the declarer will submit themselves to the provisions of the Scheme and thereafter maintain a statutory record as prescribed under the Scheme for any addition or reduction in the declared stock of exotic species, which will enable the Government to have a unified information system for the stock of exotic species at the State or Central Government level.
The window of six months for voluntary disclosure by allowing immunities only to those declarers who opt to file their voluntary disclosure declaration within six months from the date of issuance of the Advisory. Immunity is not provided to the declarers opting to disclose the stock once the period of six months is over from the date of issuance of the Advisory. The immunity contained in Clause I (b) of the Advisory as stated hereinabove for the declarers is not further clarified in the said Advisory. The petitioner is seeking directions so far as immunity is concerned, under the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme that there shall be no investigation into the acquisition or possession of exotic species once the declarer voluntarily discloses as per the Scheme - Once the immunity is granted under the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme, the respondent cannot investigate about the ownership, possession, trade, transportation, breeding, act of keeping, buying, selling and exhibiting such exotic animals/birds which are voluntarily disclosed by the declarer. The declarer would not be required to produce any documentation in relation to the exotic live species if the same has been declared within six months from the date of issuance of Advisory as per Part I Clause (b) of the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme. After six months’ period is over, from the date of issuance of the Advisory the declarer shall be required to comply with the documentation requirement under the extant laws and regulations.
Voluntary Disclosure Scheme invites the declarers, in public interest, by conferring immunity to them for a limited period (here six months) to promote the voluntary disclosure. Once such voluntary disclosure is made within the time limit prescribed, no inquiry or action can be initiated by the respondent for possession, breeding or transportation of the exotic species within India by the officers of any Government agency or Department whether of Central Government or State Government. Such action of subsequent inquiry by the Government after voluntary disclosure would be wholly illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable, unsustainable and would defeat the very purpose of the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme.
In view of the Article XIV to be read with affidavit filed by the respondent No. 1, especially in para 8L and 8AA to 9A, it has been expressed by the respondent that suggestion of the petitioner to enlarge the scope of the Advisory to all exotic live species is acknowledged because there are still other vulnerable exotic live species which are not mentioned in the Appendices I, II and III to the International Convention – CITES. Thus, the further Advisory can always be issued by the respondent keeping in mind the provisions of Article 48A and to be read with Article 51A(g) of the Constitution of India which are about protection and improvement of the environment and to safeguard the forest and wild life of the country. This obligation of the State extends to protecting exotic live species, beyond the Appendix to the CITES - International Convention.
The respondents are not obliged to make laws only in terms of CITES and can widen the scope of restrictions, having regard to the local conditions and circumstances - writ petition disposed off.
-
2020 (10) TMI 1328 - ITAT JAIPUR
Appeal decided against dead person - Assessee expired after filing this appeal - no legal representative of the assessee has not been brought on record - HELD THAT:- None has appeared on behalf of the assessee when this appeal was called for hearing through video conference due to prevailing COVID-19 pandemic situation.
As noted that the assessee has already expired on 19.02.2019 after filing this appeal however, till the date the legal representative of the assessee has not been brought on record. Accordingly, the appeal of the assessee is not maintainable and liable to the dismissed. Appeal of the assessee is dismissed.
-
2020 (10) TMI 1327 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
Seeking grant of Regular Bail - framing of charges - examination of PWs has not yet been commenced - HELD THAT:- Keeping in view the fact that the examination of PWs has not been commenced and that co-accused of the petitioner, namely, Nitish Singhal, has been granted regular bail by this Court vide order dated 26.8.2020 (Annexure P-10), it is deemed appropriate to grant regular bail to the petitioner.
Petition allowed.
-
2020 (10) TMI 1326 - ITAT CHENNAI
Condonation of delay - Levy of late filing fee under section 234E of the Act for belated filing of TDS returns - assessee had filed appeals beyond due date for the reason that at the time of introducing section 234E by the Finance Act, 2015, there was an ambiguity and no clear directions regarding levy of late filing fee under section 234E of the Act for belated filing of TDS returns - HELD THAT:- In case, the appeal is not filed within due date prescribed under the Act, then it is for the assessee to give sufficient reasons which prevented from filing of appeal within due date, but the reasons given by the assessee shall come within the expression 'sufficient cause'. Various Courts and Tribunals have explained the term "sufficient cause". As per the settled principle a case that arguable/favorable points/contention on merits should not be shut out on the presumption of limitation, leading to such a case being thrown out at the threshold itself in limine.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. MST Katiji and Others [1987 (2) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT] while laying down principles for considering matters of condonation of delay in filing appeals have stated that substantial justice should prevail over technical considerations.
ITAT, Bangalore Bench in the case of Dr. C. Fernandes Co-operative [2019 (1) TMI 1059 - ITAT BANGALORE] held that sufficient cause ought to be interpreted in a manner which subserves and advances cause of substantial justice. In this case, on perusal of record, we find that the reasons given by the assessee for not filing the appeals within the time allowed under the Act comes under the expression "sufficient cause" and hence, we are of the considered view that learned CIT(A) erred in not condoning the delay in filing appeals. Therefore, we condone the delay in filing appeals and restore the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) to decide the issues involved in these appeals on merits. Appeals filed by the assessee are treated as allowed for statistical purposes.
........
|
