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Showing 41 to 60 of 77 Records
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1974 (11) TMI 37 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Accident Insurance, Estate Duty Act ... ... ... ... ..... re Magan, that the death in contemplation of law must precede the passing, and in In re Smith, that it is only when the person in question has expired, after the last breath has left the body that the property passes and the liability to estate duty arises . In that view of the position now settled by this decision of the House of Lords, it must be held that the valuation must be ascertained on the date immediately succeeding the date of the death, which, in the present case, would be the aforesaid two sums sought to be included by the revenue in the estate of the deceased. The result, therefore, is that we answer the question referred to us in favour of the revenue and against the accountable person. Our answer is that the aforesaid two sums received from the above mentioned two insurance companies were liable to estate duty under section 5 and/or section 6 and section 15 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. The accountable person shall pay costs of this reference to the revenue.
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1974 (11) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Transport Business ... ... ... ... ..... at there was any such transfer under the deed dated April 1, 1963. Though the deed is styled as a release deed, under that document the said Sena Munuswamy Mudaliar only agreed to make over the two buses with their route permits for a consideration of Rs. 60,000. There was in fact no valid transfer under that agreement itself. It might be in part performance of that agreement the said Sena Munuswamy Mudaliar handed over possession of the vehicles to the assessee. But that does not mean that there is actually a transf er effected. So long as there is no transfer of the certificate in the name of the firm, in law there was no valid transfer. The decisions relied on by the Tribunal were, therefore, not applicable. The objection for the registration, therefore, fails. In the result, we hold that the firm is entitled to the benefit of registration under section 185 of the Act and answer the reference accordingly. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee, Rs. 250.
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1974 (11) TMI 35 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Failure To File Return ... ... ... ... ..... ice under section 139(2) within the relevant assessment year, the period prescribed in sub-section (1) of section 139 was duly extended and no penalty could be levied for any default committed in respect of the provisions of section 139(1). For the reason stated above, I would answer the first question, as reframed above, in favour of the assessee and against the department, and hold that, once a notice under sub-section (2) of section 139 is duly issued during the relevant assessment year, there cannot be any penalty for failure to furnish the return, as required by sub-section (1) of section 139 of the Act. It automatically follows that the second question also must be answered in favour of the assessee and against the department, and it must be held that, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the period of default was rightly computed for one month. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs. S. N. P. SINGH C. J.-- I agree.
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1974 (11) TMI 34 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... t bonds and their sale proceeds is an allowable deduction under section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? In order to entitle a deduction under section 37, two conditions have to be satisfied (1) the expenditure should have been incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business and (2) such expenditure shall not be in the nature of a capital expenditure. The Tribunal considered the first question and did not consider the second. Therefore, the question of law which arises in this case, even as reframed by us, could not be answered without a finding by the Tribunal on the nature of the expenditure. However, the reference must be answered technically in favour of the assessee. But we want to make it clear that it would be open to the Tribunal now to consider the nature of the expenditure when it rehears the appeal under section 260(1) and, on recording, after hearing parties, a clear finding, decide the allowability of the same. There will be no order as to costs.
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1974 (11) TMI 33 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Income From Property, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... operty Ordinance, 1949, of Pakistan and more particularly on the question, whether the assessee continued to be the owner in view of the provisions of the Pakistan Ordinance. That decision cannot, therefore, be of any assistance to the petitioners before us and in our opinion the decision in D. M. Vakil s case on this point that the fact of the actual receipt of income from property is not at all conclusive of the question of liability of the owner of the self-occupied property to pay on its fictional or statutory income still holds the field as good law with which we are in respectful agreement. In that view of the matter, tax being on the, income from property, there is no question about the constitutional validity of the provisions contained in sections 22 and 23 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The third and fourth contentions of the learned Advocate-General must, therefore, fail. The result is that these petitions are dismissed with costs. Rule is discharged in each matter.
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1974 (11) TMI 32 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Revenue Receipt, Sales Tax ... ... ... ... ..... loan and only a sum of Rs. 6,230 went in discharge of the principal amount. Therefore, only this sum of Rs. 6,230 which formed part of Rs. 1,50,000 could have been dealt with under section 46(2). Thus, under section 46(1)(a), Rs. 1,43,770 would be disallowable and, under section 46(2), Rs. 6,230 had to be disallowed. The result would be, by the operation of section 46(1)(a) and 46(2), the entire consideration of Rs. 1,50,000 has to be disallowed. No part of the interest payable on the loan would be covered by the provisions of section 46(1). The total interest accrued in this case was Rs. 1,16,205. This could not be disallowed under section 46(1). But we have to point out, lest we may be misunderstood, that since out of this, a sum of Rs. 76,260 had already been paid before death, only the balance of Rs. 39,935 outstanding would come for allowance under section 44 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. We answer the reference accordingly. The parties will bear their respective costs.
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1974 (11) TMI 31 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s of law relating thereto and not on the view which the assessee might take of his rights nor on the existence or absence of entries in the books of account. The fact that in the instant case the assessee had adjusted this amount of sales tax only in the accounting year relevant, to the assessment year 1963-64 is, therefore, neither decisive nor conclusive. We would have considered the request of the learned counsel to look into the letter of the sales tax authorities and its enclosures which he wanted the Tribunal to send along with the stated can to this court, if we had considered them necessary. But, as already stated, neither on the ground of liability arising nor on the ground of the expenses relating to the income relevant to the assessment year 1963-64, the documents have any bearing. Therefore, it was not necessary for us to consider that question. In the result, we answer the reference in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 250.
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1974 (11) TMI 30 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Central Government, Managing Agent, Mercantile System ... ... ... ... ..... clusions thereof and differing with the, view taken by the Madras High Court in V. Devaki Ammal s case , I hold that section 34(1)(c) of the Estate Duty Act is not ultra vires article 14 or 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. For the reasons given above, there is no merit in this petition which is dismissed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs. The dismissal of this petition is on the basis that the assessment has been made in accordance with section 34 of the Act, that is, the value of the shares of the lineal descendants of Sadhu Ram was aggregated with the other estate of the deceased for the purpose of determining the rate of estate duty only and that no estate duty has been levied thereon and that the estate duty has been levied out the estate which passed or was deemed to pass on the death of Sadhu Ram. If the order of assessment is not in accordance with this rule, it shall have to be revised so as to bring it in accord therewith. A. S. BAINS J.--I agree.
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1974 (11) TMI 29 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mi Nadar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, if there is no material before the Income-tax Officer to justify the finding that income cannot be properly deduced from the assessee s regular method of accounting, the assessment made in pursuance of this proviso would be vitiated. For the reasons stated above, I must answer both the questions in favour of the assessee and against the department and hold that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the finding of the Tribunal upholding the rejection of the book profit shown by the assessee was vitiated by reason of its reliance upon suspicion, surmises as also irrelevant material. I also hold in the circumstances of the case that the finding given by the Tribunal that the sales made by the assessee during the relevant year were unverifiable is not based on the materials on record and is an arbitrary finding. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 100 only. S. N. P. SINGH C.J.--I agree.
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1974 (11) TMI 28 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Financial Year ... ... ... ... ..... close the amount. Section 271(1)(c) can be invoked if an assessee conceals an income which he was bound to disclose for the relevant assessment year and not in respect of an amount which is included by virtue of section 69A in the assessment for the said assessment year. The Tribunal has held that apart from the fact that the amount was included by virtue of the provisions of section 69A, there was no other material gathered by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner from which it could be inferred that the amount represented the income of the assessee for the year ending 30th June, 1963, and accordingly there was no concealment of income established. On the material on record it is clear that the Tribunal was right in, the view it has taken and cancelling the penalty. The question is accordingly answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee shall be entitled to the costs of this reference. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (11) TMI 27 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Service Of Notice ... ... ... ... ..... er section 34 on the assessee was invalid at law as copy of the notice was not affixed at any conspicuous place in the court-house or at any conspicuous place in the income-tax office. The matter for decision before the Full Bench was absolutely different. The learned counsel cannot derive any benefit from that case. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the opinion that the words issue and serve are interchangeable and that the word issue has been used in section 148 of the 1961 Act in the same sense in which the word serve has been used. It is stated that an appeal has been filed against the order dated March 21, 1974, of the Income-tax Officer and the same is still pending. The writ petition was admitted to interpret the word issue as occurring in section 148 of the 1961 Act only. The appeal will be decided by the appellate authority in accordance with law. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. MAN MOHAN SINGH GUJRAL J.--I agree.
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1974 (11) TMI 26 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Garnishee Order, Income Tax Act, Legal Representative ... ... ... ... ..... he petitioner was, therefore, liable to hold the entire amount due to the legal representatives for the satisfaction of the tax arrears of the deceased. As already noticed, it is not the case of the petitioner that he had allowed the legal representatives to withdraw the amount prior to the notice under section 46(5A). If he had paid the amount in spite of the notice under section 46(5A), he had done so at his own risk and he is now liable to pay the amount to the department. We do not, therefore, find any reason to interfere with the order of the learned judge in this appeal. It is made clear that the petitioner is liable only to the extent of Rs. 20,239.78 as it has been found by the learned judge that on the date of death, the deceased did not die possessed of Rs. 29,238-11-2, but after some adjustment only a sum of Rs. 20,239.78 was due by the firm to the deceased. In the result, the writ appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 250. Appeal dismissed.
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1974 (11) TMI 25 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Writ Petition Against Recovery Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... (ii) of section 3(1)(b). In my opinion, this requirement is for the future and not for the proceedings that had been taken before the Validating Act came into force, since this provision did not exist prior thereto. It has been stated in the return filed by the respondents that the intimation of the reduction in the amount of income-tax was given to the Tax Recovery Officer informing him to recover the reduced amount. The object of sections 3(1)(c) and 5 of the Validating Act is to validate all the proceedings for recovery taken against the assessee in default before its enforcement and since the proceedings for recovery of the tax had been taken against the petitioner before that date, any defect in those proceedings has been cured by sections 3 and 5 of the Validating Act and the petitioner cannot now challenge the validity of those proceedings. There is thus no merit in this petition which is dismissed but the parties are left to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.
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1974 (11) TMI 24 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Transport Business ... ... ... ... ..... is also distinguishable, inasmuch as the return filed in this case was under section 139(4) and not under section 139(2). I may state here that a clue to the interpretation is to be found in the Finance Act of 1972 by which clause (a) of sub-section (8) of section 139 was substituted and corresponding changes were made in sub-sections (1) and (2) both. After the amendment, interest is payable and chargeable whether or not the Income-tax Officer has extended the time for the filing of the return under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) beyond the specified date. Thus, from April 1, 1972, interest for delay or default in furnishing the return of income (in all cases) is chargeable from the expiry of the due date for furnishing such return voluntarily under section 139(1). For the reasons stated above, I answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. As the assessee has not appeared in this reference there will be no order as to costs. S. K. JHA J.--I agree.
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1974 (11) TMI 23 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Unclaimed Balances ... ... ... ... ..... nforce a debt does not by itself constitute cessation of liability within section 10(2A). In the J. K.Chemical s case it has further been clarified that neither remission nor cessation of liability could take place by a unilateral act on the part of the debtor, and that even if the amount was distributed by the company to its shareholders, it could not get rid of its liability when it was called upon to meet it either by the employees under the Industrial Disputes Act or by the Government under the Bombay Labour Welfare Funds Act. Mr. Joshi on behalf of the Commissioner very fairly stated that the question referred to us is concluded, as far as this court is concerned, by the said two decisions of earlier Benches of the court. It is, therefore, unnecessary for us to consider the matter any further, and I would answer the question referred to us in the negative. S. K. DESAI J.--I agree. By the Court Question answered in the negative. No order as to the costs of the reference.
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1974 (11) TMI 22 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... income. It was only that part of the income which accrued to or was received by the assessee under the trust that was held to be assessable as his income. The language of section 16(1)(c) contained the words all income arising to any person . Even when such an expression had been used, the Supreme Court held that only a part of the income was liable to be taken as covered by section 16(1)(c). Similarly, in the present provision it is only a part of the income that was liable to be included. We, accordingly, direct the Tribunal to go into the apportionment of the income assessable under section 64(iv) in the light of what we have expressed above. The question is answered as follows Only that part of the income of Rs. 12,650 that can be included in the total income of the assessee by the operation of section 64(iv) of the Income-tax Act which, as found above, is without adequate consideration. As neither party has succeeded in the reference, there will be no order as to costs.
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1974 (11) TMI 21 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... is court in Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Kumari Manna G. Sarabhai it is clear that it was an error apparent from the record of the case so far as the assessment of the beneficiary directly in respect of her interest in the trust properties is concerned. The decision of the Tribunal, therefore, rejecting the rectification application must be quashed and set aside. We, therefore, allow this special civil application and quash and set aside the order, annexure I to the petition. We direct that the Tribunal should rectify the mistake, the error apparent from the record, in the light of the observations which we have made in the course of this judgment. We direct the Tribunal to rectify the record of the case so far as assessment years 1961-62 to 1964-65 of the first petitioner is concerned by deleting from her total wealth the value of her interest in the two trust funds. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 will pay the costs of this reference to the petitioner. Rule absolute accordingly.
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1974 (11) TMI 20 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Income Tax, One Partner, Written Down Value ... ... ... ... ..... nd interest, inter alia, in the machinery in question to Manilal, and Manilal was to pay for the same. Before the Tribunal it was sought to be contended on behalf of the revenue that the machinery had been sold before the dissolution of the firm, but Mr. Joshi has not been able to point out to us any clause in the deed of dissolution, or in the deed of release, or an iota of other material which could lead to that conclusion. I have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the taking over of the assets by Manilal was a part of the transaction of the dissolution of the firm. On any view of the matter, therefore, having regard to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Dewas Cine Corporation s case and in Bankey Lal Vaidya s case the question referred to us must, in my opinion, be answred in the, negative. S. K. DESAI J.--I agree. By the Court Question answered in the negative. The Commissioner to pay the costs of the assessee. Question answered in the negative.
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1974 (11) TMI 19 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Service Of Notice ... ... ... ... ..... ly when the defaulter himself raised no objection thereto. The objector, being a third party, cannot assail the regularity or the validity of the notice served or alleged to have been served on the defaulter under rule 2, nor is the Tax Recovery Officer under any obligation to supply any information with regard to the validity of his proceedings against the defaulter to the objector. In the impugned order it was stated by the Tax Recovery Officer that the notice under rule 2 was served, on the defaulter on May 8, 1971, and if the petitioner intended to challenge the regularity or validity of that notice, he should have filed a suit in a civil court, as is provided in rule 11(6) of the Rules. This matter is not a fit one for investigation in a writ petition. Since on the date of attachment, that is, May 8, 1971, the petitioner had admittedly no interest in the property attached, this petition has no merit and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 300. Petition dismissed.
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1974 (11) TMI 18 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Accrual Of Income, Collaboration Agreement, Foreign Company, Indian Company ... ... ... ... ..... ing that there is no substance in the revenue s contentions which are the basis of this reference. There is certainly some, if not considerable, material to show that the operations which the foreign company carried out under the agreement had also to be carried out abroad as, for instance, when it had to communicate the latest developments in manufacturing processes in the United States of America to the Indian company which, on the material before the court, it certainly did. That being the position, I am not prepared to hold that the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal is perverse, or that there was no material before it on which it could come to the conclusion that the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 42 were attracted to the present case. The question referred to us must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative. S. K. DESAI J.--I agree. (By the Court) Question answered in the affirmative. The Commissioner to pay the costs of the reference to the respondents.
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