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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 355 Records
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1995 (11) TMI 442 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... re '15' is found to be valid in so far as it imposes liability to pay entertainment tax on Hindalco. The exact amount has, however, to be worked out again in accordance with the number of residential units (4000 or 8000) which are provided with the facility of Cable TV Net Work. 19. In view of above discussion, the writ petition is partly allowed and while upholding the right of the State Government to realise entertainment tax from Hindalco, the demand (sic) vide Annexure 15 is quashed. The matter is remanded to the District Magistrate to decide the question about the number of residential units of the workmen, within a period of three months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order before him, after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. The District Magistrate will also get actual residential units inspected in the presence of representatives of the petitioner, before passing fresh order. 20. Petition partly allowed.
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1995 (11) TMI 441 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the original order for amendment of it under Section 151 or Section 152 of the CPC, as, when enhancement of compensation was made in revision in 1984, the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 could not apply as held by this Court in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (1989) 3 SCR 316 and K.S. Paripoornan II v. State of Kerala (1995) 1 SCC 367 . This Court in catena of decisions, to name a few, Union of India v. Smt. Pratap Kaur Deed through Lrs. & Anr. etc. JT 1955 (2) SC 569 , State of Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawan Hatkar JT 1995 (2) SC 583 , State of Punjab & Anr. etc. v. babu Singh & Ors. C.A. Nos. 3287-95 of 1995 decided on February 28, 1995 and State of Punjab & Anr. vs. Jagir Singh etc. C.A. Nos. 9911-12 of 1995 decided on October 30, 1995, has laid the above ratio and the same are applicable to the facts of the case. The appeals are dismissed accordingly. The Executing Court shall now proceed with the execution in accordance with law declared hereinbefore. No costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 440 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... odi. Since we have come to the conclusion that the application dated October 20, 1982 and January 19, 1983 submitted by respondent No. 5 were both pre-mature the same were liable to be rejected and the order of the Central Government dated March 18, 1987 as well as judgment dated April 4, 1991 of the learned Single Judge and the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court dated July 18, 1994 cannot be upheld and have to be set aside. The order of the State Government dated July 3, 1984 is restored. In the result the appeal is allowed and the order dated March 18, 1987 passed by the Central Government, the judgment dated April 4, 1991 passed by the learned single judge in Writ Petition No. 1064 off 1987 and the judgment dated July 18, 1984 passed by the Division Bench in D.B. Special Appeal No. 167 of 1991 are set aside and the order dated July 8, 1984 passed by the State Government is restored. In the circumstances, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 439 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... vants shall be such as may be prescribed by the Chief Justice or his nominee authorised by him to make rules; the approval of the Governor is necessary only if the rules relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pension. This provision also shows that officers and servants of the High Court are also under the exclusive control of the Chief Justice and not the Government. If that be the relationship between the officers and servants of the High Court vis-avis the Government, it is difficult to imagine a master and servant relationship between the Government and Judges of the High Court. We have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the relationship between the Government and High Court Judges is not of master and servant. They cannot be said to be holding a post under the Union/State. For the above reasons we are of the view that the Central Administrative Tribunal was right in the view it took in this behalf. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal with costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 438 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... namally Highway road. The total extent of the land under Survey No. 167/1B is 7 acres 81 cents. Out of which 1 acre 50 cents in a contiguous place towards north-east is directed to be released from the acquisition so that the respondents would be able to construct their own residential houses for their personal residence in a compact block. The order of the High Court is set aside and the notification stands upheld except to the above extent. The notification of withdrawal in respect of excluded land be issued under Section 48(1) within three months from the date of receipt of the order. This order of exclusion is not to be treated as a precedent. Only as a special case, in view of the special fact that large number of persons in two families require personal accommodation, we have given the above directions - that too on an undertaking that the respondents would use the same only for the personal residence. The appeal is accordingly disposed of in the above terms. No costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 437 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... normally exceed the cost of the administration of justice because. possibly there could be no justification with the State to enrich itself from high court fees of to secure revenue for general administration. The total receipts from the Court fees should be such as by and large can cover the cost of administration of justice. There should also be some measure of uniformity in the scales of Court fees through out the country as there appears to be a vast difference in the scales of court fees in various States of the country. The feasibility of a fixed maximum chargeable fee also deserves serious consideration. 23. In the facts and circumstances discussed above the impugned judgment of the High Court con not be sustained and has to be set aside. 24. In the result the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The writ petition No.1390/1987 is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their respective costs in both the matters.
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1995 (11) TMI 436 - SUPREME COURT
Whether and, if so, in what circumstances, a medical practitioner can be regarded as rendering 'service' under Section 2(1)(o) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986?
Whether the service rendered at a hospital/nursing home can be regarded as 'service' under Section 2(1)(o) of the Act?
Held that:- The ground on which the writ petitioners are seeking to assail the validity of the provisions of the Act is that the composition of the Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies and the procedure to be followed by the said Agencies is such that it is not suitable for adjudication of the complex issues arising for consideration. We have already considered this grievance urged on behalf of the medical profession and have found that the composition of the Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies as well as the procedure to be followed by them does not preclude a proper adjudication of the consumer disputes arsing out of complaints relating to deficiency in service rendered by medical practitioners and hospitals. In our opinion, on case is made out that the Act suffers from the vice of arbitrariness or unreasonableness so as to be violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. There is, therefore, no merit in the Writ Petition and it has to be dismissed.
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1995 (11) TMI 435 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the arbitration clause, if held to be operative, could be invoked for the purpose at hand ?
Was the reference to the arbitrator barred by limitation ?
Held that:- The complaint from the customers, particularly Defence Department, came to be known by the appellant in early 1985 whereafter the matter was taken up with the respondent and the tests ultimately were done in July, 1985. If these facts be correct, it has to be held that the cause of action to claim damages really accrued by July, 1985 which was thereafter made by a letter of November, 1987 followed by appointment of arbitrator in May, 1988. The arbitration was thus not "manifestly barred" as contended by Shri Desai. We do not propose to say anything more on this aspect at this stage.
No threshold infirmity in the invocation of clause 19 and to the reference of the dispute to respondent No.3. Shri Desai submits that respondent No.3 may not be required to arbitrate inasmuch as he being an appointee of the Chairman and Managing Director of the appellant himself, respondents' case may not be fairly examined. He prays that any retired High Court Judge may be appointed as an arbitrator by us. We have not felt inclined to accept this submission, because arbitration clause states categorically that the difference/dispute shall be referred "to an arbitrator appointed by the Chairman and Managing Director of IPDL" (Indian Drugs & Pharmaceutical Limited) who is the appellant. This provision in the arbitration clause cannot be given a go-bye merely at the askance of the respondent unless he challenged its binding nature in an appropriate proceeding which he did not do. Allow the appeal and leave the appointed arbitrator to deal with difference/dispute in accordance with law.
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1995 (11) TMI 434 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... vant. Why should the company 39 s occupation of the building trigger a self-supply charge, which by reason of paragraph 5(3)(b) would not have applied if it had originally sold the freehold? Mr. Milne submitted as an alternative argument that if your Lordships were of the view that the literal meaning of paragraphs 5 and 6 was inconsistent with the Sixth Directive, it might be possible to adopt a European method of construction which brought them into harmony. He referred to the decision of this House in Litster v. Forth Dry Dock and Engineering Co. Ltd. 1990 1 AC 546, in which he said that such a method of construction had been adopted. But the Litster case was a dispute between private persons to which the Directive itself could not be applied since Directives do not have horizontal effect. This is a dispute between the taxpayer and the commissioners, in which it is conceded that if there is inconsistency between the Directive and Schedule 6A, the Directive must prevail. I
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1995 (11) TMI 433 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the learned Sessions Judge was justified, at the stage of taking cognizance of the offence, in discharging the accused, even before the trial was conducted on merits, on the ground that the provisions of Section 50 of the Act had not been complied with?
Held that:- The evidence collected in a search in violation of law does not become inadmissible in evidence under the Evidence Act. The consequence would be that evidence discovered would be to prove unlawful possession of the contraband under the Act. It is founded Panchnama to seize the contraband from the possession of the suspect/accused. Though the search may be illegal but the evidence collected, i.e., Panchnama etc.. nonetheless would be admissible at the trial. At the stage of filing charge-sheet it cannot be said that there is no evidence and the Maeistruie or the Sessions Judge would be committing illegality to discharge the accused on the ground that Section 50 or other provisions have not been complied with. At the trial an opportunity would be available to the prosecution to prove that the search was conducted in accordance with law. Even if search is found to be in violation of law, what weight should be given to the evidence collected is yet another question to be gone into. Under these circumstances, the learned Sessions Judge was not justified in discharging the accused, after filing of the charge-sheet holding that mandatory requirements of Section 50 had not been complied with.
As more than ten years have passed and the contraband seized is not of a considerable magnitude, we think that it is not a lit case to remit at this stage for trial but non-remittance on facts of this case should not be used as precedent in future cases.
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1995 (11) TMI 432 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e trial on the basis thereof does not get vitiated. Each case is to be considered on its own back drop. The learned Additional Sessions Judge did not accept the evidence of the police officers on the ground that it was open to them, at the time of the search, to take in writing from the accused that they had no objection to the search being conducted and that they were informed of their right and they waived the search in the presence of a gazetted officer. It is a matter of appreciation of evidence and that having considered the totality of the facts and circumstances, the learned Additional Sessions Judge was not inclined to accept the prosecution case in the absence of anything in writing. The view expressed by the Additional Sessions Judge cannot be said to be unwarranted or unjustified. Under the circumstances, we are constrained to confirm the order of acquittal though the High Court unfortunately did not deal with the case properly. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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1995 (11) TMI 431 - SUPREME COURT
Power and jurisdiction of an Arbitrator to award interest for the period between the making of the reference to the arbitrator and his entering upon the reference (prereference period) after the coming into force of The Interest Act, 1978?
Held that:- The law is now well settled that the arbitrator has the power and jurisdiction to grant pre-reference interest in references made after the coming into force of the Interest Act, 1978. The division Bench of the High Court was thus clearly in error in holding that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award interest from 1.4.84 till 8.2.1985 (pre-reference period ) in the post Interest Act, 1978 era. So far as the grievance of the appellant pertaining to the dis-allowance of the claim of ₹ 23,685/- under Clauses 1, 3 & 4 is concerned, we do not find any error to have been committed by the High Court. The above view of the division Bench therefore, cannot be sustained.
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1995 (11) TMI 430 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... under section 2(i) of the Act in violation of article 301. Since in doing so, it has not complied with the provisions of article 304(b) or article 255 it is declared to be void. As such, it is not necessary to go into the other points urged in support of the challenge against the validity of the Act. 49.. There will be no order for cost. ORDER In view of the judgment of the majority, the application is dismissed and the interim order dated April 28, 1994 stands vacated. No order is made for costs. After the judgment is delivered, Mr. Asit Chakraborty, Advocate, submits on behalf of Mrs Chandrima Bhattacharjee, learned advocate for the applicants, that the operation of the judgment and order may be stayed for four weeks for preferring an appeal. Mr. J.K. Goswami, learned State Representative appearing for respondents, opposes the prayer for stay. After hearing both sides, we grant the stay of operation of the judgment and order for four weeks from now. Application dismissed.
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1995 (11) TMI 429 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er. That being so, the matador was not liable to be treated as tax-paid goods . 6.. The assessee has not appeared in this reference application to contest the question and urge that the matador is correctly held as tax-paid goods and the assessee is entitled to deduction under section 2(r)(ii) of the Act. The definition noted above, is sufficient indication of the fact that the purchase is required to be made from a registered dealer. This is not the case here. 7.. In the result, we find that the matador cannot be treated as tax-paid goods . 8.. Accordingly we answer the question in the negative, i.e., against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. 9.. The question is answered accordingly. A copy of the order shall be sent to the Tribunal under the seal of the High Court and signature of the Registrar in terms of section 44(5) of the Act. 10.. The reference application stands disposed of accordingly, but without any orders as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1995 (11) TMI 428 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the State Government or the respondents to dispose of the matter when an application has been filed praying for refund of taxpaid in excess, however, for the reasons best known to them the matter has been kept pending for a long period. Law cannot countenance to this state of affairs. 6.. In view of the above, I dispose of this petition with a direction to the respondents to dispose of the matter, as early as possible, at any rate, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of this order. Dr. Saraf further submits that the petitioner is also entitled to receive interest for the delay in refunding the amount paid in excess. The authority shall decide whether the petitioner is entitled to receive interest as per provision of law and if he is entitled, the authority shall pay the interest also. 7.. With the above observation the petition is disposed of. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs. Petition disposed of accordingly.
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1995 (11) TMI 427 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dra and on the basis of the information supplied by M/s. Mahendra and Mahendra the return was filed thereby it was found that there was concealment of the turnover. Therefore, in these circumstances the Tribunal imposed the penalty and the assessee was dealt with leniently because of the peculiar facts of the case otherwise still a higher penalty could have been imposed. 5.. In these circumstances, all the questions which have been raised by the assessee are purely the questions of fact and the Tribunal after due application of mind, found that the penalty which has been levied is not excessive because the maximum penalty for this kind of breach was up to 150 per cent but the authorities had levied the penalty to the extent of 60 per cent only. 6.. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that all these questions are questions of fact and not of law. We are, therefore, not inclined to call the reference from the Tribunal. The application is rejected. Petition dismissed.
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1995 (11) TMI 426 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... July 5, 1984 passed by the Appellate Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Khandwa in Case No. 6/KGN/81-Provincial, does seem to answer the question about the jurisdiction one way or the other. All that is noted in the order is as reproduced below 8.. There is no conclusion reached on this. 9.. In our view, the questions raised do arise out of the order passed by the Tribunal and as such, are required to be referred for our opinion. 10.. In the result, we are not satisfied that the refusal was justified and accordingly we require the Tribunal to state the case and refer it to us with regard to the questions noted above for our opinion in terms of section 44(3) of the Act. 11.. This reference application is accordingly allowed and the Tribunal is directed to state the case and refer the questions without unnecessary delay. 12.. Let a copy of this order be transmitted to the Tribunal under the seal and signature of the Registrar of this Court, for compliance. Application allowed.
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1995 (11) TMI 425 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ne area as well as the plant, fall within the premises of the factory. The limestones are extracted from the company s own mines which are situated in a different local area though within factory area and they are transported to the factory for manufacture of cement. Since the mines as well as plant both fall within the premises of the assesseefactory/company but they fall in different local areas, i.e., mine is in one local area and plant is another local area, but that is not the decisive of the matter. If the mining operation which is being undertaken, falls in different local area and the limestone is brought by the company from one local area to other local area then it will be exigible to entry tax. Therefore, the Tribunal has rightly assessed the liability of the assessee for entry tax. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that both the aforesaid questions are answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. Reference answered in favour of Revenue.
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1995 (11) TMI 424 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d those which were not separately charged for are liable for assessment. This question has got to be decided on the basis of the facts available in case. In the present case, the assessee was unable to produce evidence for claiming exemption as prayed for in the assessment proceedings. Inasmuch as the legislative competence to enact the abovesaid provisions was not challenged and inasmuch as it is not shown under what article of the Constitution of India, the abovesaid provisions are to be held as ultra vires, the writ petition is not maintainable. Accordingly, the petitioner has not made out a ground to declare section 2(n), section 2(g) and section 2(j) as unconstitutional. In that view of the matter, this writ petition is dismissed. No costs. 6.. W.M.P. No. 23131 of 1991. In view of the dismissal of the writ petition itself today, the interim injunction granted on November 1, 1991 in the above W.M.P., is vacated and this W.M.P., is also dismissed. Writ petition dismissed.
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1995 (11) TMI 423 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ards as taxable, and not merely authority to tax only those transactions which are, on a true view of the facts and the law, taxable. We are, therefore, of the view that the petitioners should avail of the statutory remedy of appeal provided under the Act. 7.. For all the above reasons, we are inclined to dispose of the writ petitions with liberty to the petitioners to approach the appellate authority. The petitioners shall file their appeals within a period of four weeks from today and the appellate authority will dispose of the same without raising any question of limitation. Collection of tax was stayed during the pendency of these writ petitions. We direct, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, that there shall be stay of collection of tax pending disposal of the proposed appeals. The appeals, if filed within the aforementioned time, shall be disposed of expeditiously. The writ petitions are disposed of accordingly. No costs. Writ petitions dismissed.
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