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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 55 of 55 Records
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1956 (2) TMI 43 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tice required either under section 11A or under section 15 is a condition precedent to the exercise of the jurisdiction by the Sales Tax Officer and that if the notice is defective the condition pre- cedent is not complied with and the Sales Tax Officer has no jurisdic- tion to assess. In this case the defect in the notice is constituted by the failure on the part of the Officer to give a notice of sufficient dura- tion. Admittedly, the notice is short, it is not of the length of duration required by the rules, and as, in our opinion, that defect is fatal not only to the validity of the notice but to the validity of the assessment itself, the order of assessment passed by the Sales Tax Officer cannot stand. We, therefore, agree that this order of assessment should be quashed, but not, with respect, for the same reasons and on the same grounds as given by the learned judge below. The result is that the appeal must fail and is dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1956 (2) TMI 42 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er would have, because even if it can be said that the blocks were purchased by the appellants, it must be held that they were purchased not on their own account, but on their clients behalf. In our opinion, our decision in Messrs. Umeschandra Hariprasad v. The State of Bombay(1) (1) (1953) 3 Bom. S.T.T. S.D. 25. applies to the facts of this case. Similarly, in Bhogilal Kuberdas v. The State of Bombay(1), it was held that the appellant in that case had-not been shown to have been a buyer or a seller of any goods in which he dealt and that he was not, therefore, a dealer as defined under the Act. We, accordingly, hold that the decisions of the authorities below cannot be allowed to stand, as the mere fact of the receipt of the commission of 15 from the block-makers cannot be construed to mean that they either purchase the blocks or sell them as principals to their clients. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the orders of the authorities below are set aside. Appeal allowed.
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1956 (2) TMI 41 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g authority. If in fact the taxing officer has overlooked certain aspects of the case or failed to give due weight to the circumstances arising, as in this case, like the manipulation of accounts and suppression of sales and if it comes to the notice of the revising authority that these factors have not been given their due weight, it cannot be said that the order of assess- ment by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer could be either legal or proper and such legality and propriety can therefore be examined by the revising authority and corrected by passing such order as he thinks fit, as he has purported to do in this case. I am unable to find that the Commercial Tax Officer has exceeded the jurisdiction vested in him as a revising authority under section 12 and there is no error in the view taken by the learned Subordinate judge in upholding the validity of the order complained of. The result is this second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave. Appeal dismissed.
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1956 (2) TMI 40 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tax due according to the assessees return which was furnished late and (b) where the amount due was not paid within the prescribed time after assessment under section 11. As regards (a) Shri Kabe has informed us that the penalty leviable on the basis of three-fourth per cent. per month would come to Rs. 7-4-0. As regards (b) the demand notice after assessment was received by the assessees on 18th December, 1953, and the payment was made on 22nd January, 1954, i.e., the payment was late by a few days beyond the period allowed for payment. We do not wish to interfere with the rate of penalty at three-fourth per cent. per month on the assessment which has been levied by the lower authorities, although they have given no reasons for imposing the maximum rate, as the amounts due under (a) and (b) are small. We, therefore, allow the application, and direct that the order of the Additional Collector shall be amended in accordance with the direction given above. Application allowed.
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1956 (2) TMI 39 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent, directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... , the question of the liability of these two persons cannot now be agitated by the liquidator. The argument was somewhat metaphysical but metaphysics and businessmen seldom meet. Fraud practised on the company even by directors who are themselves the sole shareholders cannot, in my judgment, be expurgated by recourse to any such fanciful ratification. The contention fails and must be negatived. In the result the respondent will be directed to contribute to the assets of the company and pay to the applicant the sum of Rs. 2,61,700 with interest thereon at 4 per cent. from the date of the summons that is 28th February, 1955. Costs of these proceedings and interest on judgment at four per cent. Learned counsel for the applicant did not press the claim for interest from any earlier date. Costs will be on a long cause scale. Certificate under H.C. Rule 582 authorising Taxing Master to allow more than Rs. 1,000 as instruction charges if he thinks proper so to do. Counsel certified.
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1956 (2) TMI 33 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Dividend - Manner and time of payment of ... ... ... ... ..... acquired from the Bank of India to its shareholders need not necessarily militate against the contention that the transfer of such right in specie was the payment of dividend to the shareholders. In law there is no difference whatever between the company cashing this right and declaring a dividend in respect of the amount received by the company, and the company transferring this right itself which had a money value and which could have been cashed by the shareholders. The question that has been submitted to us does not really bring out the real controversy between the parties. As we have all the facts before us we propose to re-frame the question which will read as follows Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the distribution of the right to apply for the shares of the Bank of India by Navjivan Mills Ltd., in favour of the assessee amounted to a distribution of dividend ? To the question so re-framed our answer will be in the affirmative. No order as to costs.
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1956 (2) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the High Court was correct to set aside the order of the District Judge and order that the said shares should be sold in the open market and that the offer made by Pasavala should be taken as the minimum offer made for the purchase of the shares in question?
Held that:- Having regard, therefore, to all the circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the order made by the District Judge was right and the High Court was in error when it set it aside and directed that the said 1936 shares should be sold by public auction.
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1956 (2) TMI 31 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Name of Charitable or other company – Power to dispense with 'Limited' in and Power of court to rectify register of members
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1956 (2) TMI 30 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Shares – Power, to discount and Directors - Power of ... ... ... ... ..... ight do on September 12, 1949. The basis of the call and the basis of the liability of the defendant is the two resolutions on March 3 and June 22, 1948. If those resolutions are invalid, they cannot be rendered valid by the resolution of September 12, 1949. This is not a case where a valid resolution has been passed by some one lacking the necessary authority. In that case the persons with the requisite authority may adopt the resolution validly passed and thereby ratify it. But where the objection to the resolution is not the want of authority but illegality in the very making of it, in the very passing of it, then it is impossible to accept Mr. Engineer s contention that the doctrine of ratification can validate a resolution which when it was passed was invalid. Under the circumstances we are of the opinion that the call was not Validly made and the learned Judge below was right in dismissing the plaintiff s suit. The result will be that the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1956 (2) TMI 29 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up – Avoidance of transfer, etc., after commencement of ... ... ... ... ..... nnot be pretended that paying a creditor by assigning an asset of the company, especially after the commencement of the winding up proceedings, could be considered to be a bona fide transaction carried out or arising in the ordinary course of current business. What the learned Judges in that decision had in mind was any payment necessary for running a business may be excepted and in respect of that too the court must find whether it was a transaction conducted bona fide, but not, as in the present case, where there is a transfer of an asset, the result of which would be preferring one creditor to another which is not countenanced by the Act. It would have been open to the plaintiff to have applied for the sanction of the company court for such a transaction and in the absence of any such transfer, the view taken by the courts, that under section 227(2) the assignment is void is correct and does not require any interference. The second appeal is dismissed with costs. No leave.
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1956 (2) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in the circumstances of the case appeals lay to the Tribunal against orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner dismissing the appeals against the assessments for the years 1945-1946 and 1946-1947 in limine?
Held that:- The question referred must accordingly be answered in the affirmative. This appeal will therefore be allowed, and the order of the Court below set aside.
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1956 (2) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts of the case the assessee is entitled to registration under section 26A of the Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- The answer given by the High Court Iin negative to the question is correct. Appeal dismissed.
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1956 (2) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the income from the sale of milk received by the assessee during the accounting year is not 'agricultural income' within the meaning of the Income-tax Act?
Held that:- The appeal will be allowed and the answer given by the High Court will be set aside. The correct answer to the question referred will be that the income mentioned therein is not agricultural income within the meaning of the Income-tax Act.
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1956 (2) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Whether Chhotelal and Bansilal were partners in the firm, which was constituted on 23rd August, 1940?
Held that:- Whether the question is considered on the principles of Hindu law or on the provisions of the Excess Profits Tax Act, there was a change in the personnel of the firm on 17th October, 1944, and the matter falls within section 8(1) of the Act.
The order of the Excess Profits Tax Officer dated 23rd December, 1946, refers in terms to the order dated 28th September, 1946, passed in the proceedings for assessment of income-tax on the appellant, and the deficiency of profits is worked out on the basis of the loss of ₹ 15,771 as ascertained therein. We see no substance in this contention, which must accordingly be rejected.
On the facts as pleaded by the appellant, Chhotelal and Bansilal could not be regarded as partners in the old firm we may add that this contention does not appear to have been put forward before the Commissioner when notice was issued to the appellant under section 20 of the Act. If any such contention had been raised, it would have been open to the Commissioner to have taken action under section 19 of the Act. Appeal dismissed.
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1956 (2) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was legally competent to direct the Income-tax Officer to register the firm after obtaining the signature of Gokulchand both in the application for registration and in the deed of partnership?
Held that:- The only answer which the High Court could give was that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was not legally competent to direct the Income-tax Officer to register the firm after obtaining the signature of Gokulchand both in the application for registration and in the deed of partnership. Rule 2(c) above quoted did not empower the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to do anything of the sort and we are of the opinion that the answer given by the High Court in the negative was, therefore, correct. Appeal dismissed.
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