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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 112 Records
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1969 (2) TMI 130 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the proper interpretation of the contract between the applicant and the Executive Engineer, C.P.W.D., Ajmer, regarding the providing and fixing of the steel windows to the Accountant-General's Office, Jaipur, and looking to the terms of the transaction of the type undertaken by the applicant the Board were justified in holding that the contract was divisible between two parts representing the sale of the windows and the labour charges in fixing the same and thus partly liable to sales tax?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. In the present case, the specifications of the windows were set out in the contract. The primary undertaking of the respondent was not merely to supply the windows but to "fix" the windows. This service is not rendered under a separate contract, nor is the service shown to be rendered customarily or normally as incidental to the sale by the person who supplies window-leaves. The "fixing" of windows in the manner stipulated required special technical skill. If the windows were not properly "fixed" the contract would not be complete, and the respondent could not claim the amount agreed to be paid to it. We agree with the High Court that it was only upon the "fixing" of the window-leaves, and when the window-leaves had become a part of the building construction that the property in the goods passed under the terms of the contract.
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1969 (2) TMI 128 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the notice in Form XVI that was served on the applicant was invalid and therefore the assessment of the applicant on the basis of that notice was bad in law?
Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the applicant was a dealer during the assessment period under the Act and the imposition of purchase tax on him under section 7 of the Act was in order?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The High Court of Bombay held that the society was not supplying ice with the intention of carrying on business in ice, and on that account the society was not a "dealer " within the definition of that term in section 2(11) of the Act in regard to the supply of ice by it to its members. In that case the taxing authority did not seek to impose purchase tax: he sought to bring to tax the difference between the price paid by the society for purchasing ice and the charges which it made from its members for supplying ice, and the High Court held that in supplying ice the society was not carrying on business in ice, and on that account was not a "dealer". Whether in a particular set of circumstances a person may be said to be carrying on business in a commodity must depend upon the facts of that case and no general test may be applied for determining that question.
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1969 (2) TMI 127 - SUPREME COURT
Whether respondent-company was not a "dealer" within the meaning of section 2(viii) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The juxtaposition of the word "manufacture" with "agriculture" and "horticulture" is significant and cannot be lost sight of. The intention in employing the word "produced" obviously was to introduce an element of volition and effort involving the employment of some process for bringing into existence the goods. The respondent in the present case has not been found to have done anything towards the production of the trees and even the cutting has been done by the contractor. The respondent therefore cannot possibly be regarded as a person who sells goods produced by him by agriculture, horticulture or otherwise.
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1969 (2) TMI 103 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Investigation of company’s affairs in other cases ... ... ... ... ..... ances existed, it is not necessary for us to go into the other question raised by the parties in this appeal. We accordingly refrain from expressing any views on the question of the validity of the Central Government s orders appointing the new inspectors and extending the time to make the report by the inspectors so appointed, by reason of the delegation of the powers of the Central Government to the Company Law Board. In our view the refusal of the Central Government to disclose the reasons for the formation of the opinion and the failure on its part to prove the existence of any circumstances that enabled it to form the opinion with regard to the matters set out in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii ) are sufficient for striking down the impugned order. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Certified for two counsel. All interim orders are vacated. Operation of this order will remain stayed for six weeks from today, as prayed for. Sinha C. J. mdash I agree.
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1969 (2) TMI 102 - COURT OF APPEAL
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... ly be used as a set-off, or (as it has often been said) as a shield and not as a sword. The other small matter to which I would refer is that at page 500 of the 13th ed. 1957 of Buckley on the Companies Acts, in the notes to section 231 of the Companies Act, 1948, there appears this If a company in liquidation brings an action the defendant may without leave counterclaim for unliquidated damages , and, as authority for that proposition, there is cited Mersey Steel and Iron Co. v. Naylor. 9 QBD 648. That note, in my judgment, goes very much too far and is much too wide. It might be more accurate if the note were to say In such case the defendant may without leave set up a cross-claim for liquidated or unliquidated damages, but only to the extent of a set-off for the purpose of reducing pro tanto or extinguishing the plaintiff company s claim. Apart from that, I do not desire to add anything to what has been said by my Lord, with which, as I have already said, I entirely agree.
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1969 (2) TMI 100 - CHANCERY DIVISION
Winding up – Disclaimer of onerous property, etc., after commencement of ... ... ... ... ..... efit. The result, therefore, is that in the present case neither party can claim the benefit of those provisions of the lease which arise only at the end or other sooner determination of the lease, and that is the main point of the case. The chief judge Bacon C.J.J, therefore, was in my opinion, right in holding that the tenant had lost his right to be paid for the cottages and tillages, and, on the other hand, that the landlord had lost his right to take the hay and straw at feed prices, or at any other than the market price. Bowen L.J. said, at page 429 I agree that after a surrender of this kind mdash a statutory surrender mdash neither party can claim the benefit of those provisions of the lease which come into effect only at its expiration or other sooner determination. In these circumstances the applicants claim under clause 2(10)(b ) of the lease must, in my judgment, fail. As has been agreed, I will refer the question of dilapidations for trial by an official referee.
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1969 (2) TMI 84 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up - Distribution of property of company ... ... ... ... ..... ed as resulting from the exchanges therein referred to since the exchange is treated by statute as merely a change of form, the new property received shall, for the purpose of determining gain or loss from a subsequent sale, be considered as taking the place of the old property given up in connection with the exchange. Such an aid to interpretation of the letter and spirit of section 12B of the Act has to be brought to light in the instant case and if the principle is so understood and applied, it follows that the first transaction, which only reflected a distribution and refund of assets on liquidation to a contributory, cannot and would not be characterised as a transfer or sale. For the reasons above stated, we are of the view that the Tribunal was not right in holding that the sum of Rs. 95,944 is liable to tax under section 12B of the Indian Income-tax Act. The question is therefore answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1969 (2) TMI 82 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
Meetings and proceedings – Manner of taking poll ... ... ... ... ..... to the discretion of the chairman by the articles of association as well as by section 185 of the Act. In view of the above, therefore, I feel that there was no illegality in the procedure followed by the chairman in taking the poll and this petition has, therefore, to be dismissed. I may, however, add that, though, technically speaking, the chairman is not bound to take votes by a secret ballot when a poll is demanded, yet, in an institution like the club, which is not a commercial concern, it is highly desirable, in order to maintain the proper atmosphere in the club and to inspire complete confidence in the management that, whenever a, peril is demanded, the chairman should normally have the voting done by ballot which would not indicate the name of the person voting in any particular manner. In other words, it is highly desirable that the voting should be taken by a secret ballot. With these observations, I dismiss his petition leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
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1969 (2) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in the view that it took that the writ petition was not maintainable against the company the High Court could still grant the said declaration?
Held that:- Once the writ petition was held to be misconceived on the ground that it could not lie against a company which was neither a statutory company nor one having public duties or responsibilities imposed on it by a statute, no relief by way of a declaration as to invalidity of an impugned agreement between it and its employees could be granted. The High Court, in these circumstances, ought to have left the workmen to resort to the remedy available to them under the Industrial Disputes Act by raising an industrial dispute thereunder. The only course left open to the High Court was therefore to dismiss it. No such declaration against a company registered under the Companies Act and not set up under any statute or having any public duties and responsibilities to perform under such a statute could be issued in writ proceedings in respect of an agreement which was essentially of a private character between it and its workmen. The High Court, therefore, was in error in granting the said declaration. Appeal allowed.
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1969 (2) TMI 63 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Prosecution (Customs) ... ... ... ... ..... 66 and now to prolong this prosecution still further by allowing the prosecution to adduce additional evidence, would cause harassment to the accused. In my view, therefore, prayer for permission to allow additional evidence cannot be granted. It is, therefore, obvious that the charge levelled under section 126 H(2)(d) r.w. rule 126P(2)(iv) and under Rule 126 I(10) punishable under rule 126P(2)(ii) of the Defence of India. Rules, 1963, have also not been satisfactorily proved. The appeal, therefore, must be allowed. 22.The appeal is allowed, the order of conviction passed against the appellant is set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the charges made against him. Since the accused does not claim 7 slabs of gold seized in this case, it is needless to make any order as to the disposal of this property. As for the cash of Rs. 1,340, it should be returned to the accused, if not already returned. Bail-bond is cancelled. Fine, if already recovered, be refunded to the accused.
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1969 (2) TMI 62 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Writ jurisdiction - Classification for purpose of I.T.C. Schedule and licence ... ... ... ... ..... tress on the technical or scientific aspect in preference to the ordinary or popular aspect in the context of the description in the remarks column of the Schedule. It is well known that dictionary meanings reflect the popular and ordinary meanings of the words and in the case of binoculars and opera glasses, the Dictionary meaning which is the popular and ordinary meaning is no way different from the scientific and technical meaning recorded in the Encyclopaedia. Further, in the intrinsee particulars contained in the Remark column, to which I have made reference, in regard to the distinction between monoculars and binoculars and prismatic and non-prismatic binoculars also, the authorities were really having in mind the position that opera glasses are only one form of binoculars and not different from them altogether. For the above reason, I see no grounds to interfere with the decision of the Revenue, in these writ petitions. 8. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed.
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1969 (2) TMI 61 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
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... ... ..... o goods seized by the Customs Officers and liable to confiscation under the provisions of the Customs Act, at least before the launching of the criminal proceedings. 11.The question whether after the launching of proceedings, the Magistrate has jurisdiction to make orders with respect to the disposal of goods, seized and liable to confiscation under the provisions of the Customs Act, does not arise in this case and no opinion is expressed on this question. 12.The learned Counsel for Tilak Raj, respondent had submitted that this Court may, in exercise of its inherent powers under section 561A, Criminal Procedure Code, order the return of the car on spurdari to Tilak Raj, respondent as the car was deteriorating. The extraordinary inherent powers of the Court are to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only. The present case is not such an exceptional case. 13.The result is that the revision petition is allowed. The order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate is set aside.
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1969 (2) TMI 60 - SUPREME COURT
Whether appellant was not liable to be assessed to tax on expenditure incurred in respect of property not "under his personal control and direct enjoyment"?
Held that:- Parliament in the present case having made the Expenditure-tax Act applicable to Hindus governed by the law of the joint family, but not including Mappilla families who are governed by the Mappilla marumakkattayam Act has not made any discrimination and the charging section is not liable to be struck down on the ground that the Mappilla family may have to pay tax at a lower rate, whereas a Hindu undivided family, by reason of the amalgamation of the expenditure of all the members of the family, may have to pay tax at a higher rate. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (2) TMI 59 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Assessee is a resident-company - failure to deduct tax from the payment made to a non-resident - order u/s 18(7) passeddeeming the assessee to be an assessee in default - person who is to deduct the tax at the time of making payment to a non-resident is not an agent and is not deemed to be an assessee for all the purposes of IT Act - such order cannot be treated as assessment order - period of limitation prescribed u/s 34(3) not applicable to impugned order
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1969 (2) TMI 58 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that an assessment under section 23(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, could not be made unless there has been a default on the part of the assessee not only under section 22(2) of the said Act but also under section 22(3) thereof - question must be answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue
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1969 (2) TMI 57 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Notice u/s 147 - reason recorded by revenue - validty of notice ... ... ... ... ..... assessment in the years to which the impugned notices relate. In the result, this petition must succeed and we make the rule absolute in terms of prayer (i) of the petition. The respondent must pay the petitioner s costs of this petition. At this stage, Mr. Natu applies orally for a certificate under article 133(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution for the purpose of filing an appeal to the Supreme Court from our decision. There is no material before us as far as clause (b) of article 133(1) is concerned and we cannot grant a certificate under that clause. We are prepared to give Mr. Natu an opportunity of filing an affidavit for that purpose, but we are asked to decide the application, as it stands. As far as clause (c) of article 133(1) is concerned, it is not every question of law decided by a High Court that would bring the matter within that clause and we are unable to certify that the present case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court within the terms of clause (c).
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1969 (2) TMI 56 - ASSAM AND NAGALAND HIGH COURT
Claim for exemption from tax under section 11(1) on the ground that the trust created under the deed provided for the disposal of the surplus funds for charitable purposes
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1969 (2) TMI 55 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, was the company entitled to the allowance of the rent paid to the landlord for the new building - question referred to us is answered in the negative
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1969 (2) TMI 54 - ASSAM AND NAGALAND HIGH COURT
Petitioner has prayed be set aside and quash notice issued - primary facts as appearing from the return were disclosed to the ITO and as such petitioner conduct cannot be come within the ambit of clause (a) of section 147 - as such the ITO acted without jurisdiction in issuing a notice u/s 147(a)
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1969 (2) TMI 53 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
For payment of amount by the Bombay firm the assessee drew hundies from time to time directing the firm of Bombay to pay the sum specified in Hundies - claim for the benefit of the provisions of the Part B States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1950, contending that the amount of Rs. 1,58,537 accrued to him in the former State of Gwalior and not in the then taxable
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