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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 459 Records
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2000 (2) TMI 842 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pears that the compulsions of the situation have prevented the MPEB for not extending priority for Escrow coverage to any liquid fuel project. The decision to give priority to the two coal based and one hydel power projects was not taken with a view to favour them. Nor does it imply giving up an optimum mix policy. In the result, the appeals filed by ITPL out of SLP (C) Nos. 8654-8657/99 , Jindal (out of SLP (C) Nos. 9796-9797/99), Bhilai (out of SLP (C) Nos. 10799-10802/99). SPPL (out of SLP (C) No. 14853/99), Madhya Bharat (out of SLP (C) No. 14792/99) and GBL (out of SLP (C) No. 9678/99) are dismissed and the appeals filed by STI (out of SLP (C) Nos. 9770-9772/99) are partly allowed. The decision to give priority to Pench is quashed and the MPEB is directed to take a fresh decision for giving priority for Escrow Coverage after considering its Escrowable capacity and other relevant factors. The MPEB shall do so within two months from the date of this order. Partly allowed.
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2000 (2) TMI 841 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... treated and dealt with as payment of income-tax by the assessee. Its character is in noway different from the tax paid pursuant to notice of demand under s. 156 by an assessee. Any tax refundable pursuant to the appellate order has to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of ss. 240 and 244. There is no scope for invoking the provisions of s. 214 in such a situation. 4. Thus, the only exception is that the interest under s. 244(1A) cannot be paid in addition to the interest under s. 214(1A). The tax which has been paid by way of self-assessment under s. 140A gets adjusted against the assessed tax and thus partakes the character of tax paid in pursuance of the assessment order. The Tribunal therefore, was right in directing the AO to allow the interest under s. 244(1A) of the Act after considering the self-assessment tax paid by the assessee also as tax paid in pursuance of the assessment. The reference is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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2000 (2) TMI 840 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... gle Judge. The decision of this Court in Dr. Sharmas case (supra) thus does not lend any assistance to Mr. Mishra in support of quashing of the criminal complaint. Some other decisions have also been cited but we do not feel it inclined to refer to the same except one noted above since they do not advance the case of the respondents in any way whatsoever. Considering the factual aspect of the matter, we unhesitatingly state, however, that the issue involved in the matter under consideration is not a case in which the criminal trial should have been short circuited. We, thus, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case allow the Appeal and set aside the impugned order of the High Court and restore the complaint. The learned trial Magistrate shall proceed with the complaint and dispose of the same in accordance with the law with utmost expectation. Be it clarified however that observations as above in this judgment be not taken as an expression of opinion of ours.
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2000 (2) TMI 839 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... ncurred by the taxpayer whatever the source of the finance with which he intends to meet it.” And in Customs and Excise Comrs v Faith Construction Ltd 1990 1 QB 905, 921 Bingham LJ said “If the payments are to be disregarded the commissioners would, I think, have to show them to be a sham, and this they have not sought to do. If, as I have concluded, these were in law good contractual payments, then I do not think we are entitled to disregard their legal effect and treat them as some thing else.” 97. Therefore I consider that the payment of interest by WIL was a real payment and not an artificial transaction, and accordingly that the Ramsay principle is not applicable to it. Accordingly I would dismiss the appeal. Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough My Lords, 98. I agree that this appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given by my noble and learned friend Lord Hoffmann. Appeal dismissed with costs. Solicitors Solicitor of Inland Revenue ; Ashurst Morris Crisp.
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2000 (2) TMI 838 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... en dismissed in default and the complaint having not been restored, the second complaint would not lie. The interest of justice, in our opinion, cannot be defeated by this rule of technicality. The rules of procedure. as has been laid down by this Court a number of times, are intended to serve the ends of justice and not to defeat the dispensation of justice. The respondent had suffered loss which was squarely covered by the Policy of Insurance granted by the appellant. Since his claim is not being questioned before us on merits and is being sought to be defeated on the technical plea referred to above, we are not prepared to interfere with the orders passed by the District Forum, the State Com-mission and the National Commission, particularly as it is stated before us that the whole of the claim amount has already been paid to the respondent. Finding no merits in the contention raised by the counsel for the appellant, we dismiss the appeal but without any order as to costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 837 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... n is dismissed on the ground of delay as well as on merits.
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2000 (2) TMI 835 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he is released on bail. Nothing has been brought to my notice to have a reasonable apprehension that the petitioner will flee from justice if he is released on bail. From the materials placed on record, it is clear that the petitioner is an established businessman with roots in the society. I am not inclined to refuse bail to the petitioner on the ground that he is accused of a serious economic offence. Having regard to the entire facts and circumstances of the case, I do not find any justification for detaining the petitioner in prison any longer. 16. In the light of the discussion above and in view of the facts and circumstances of this case there will be a direction to release the petitioner on bail on his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of ₹ 50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court. However, the petitioner shall not leave the country without the prior permission of the trial court. 17. The petition stands disposed of.
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2000 (2) TMI 834 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t of the learned Single Judge can be sustained. Consequently, on the question of chargeability of interest from the Assessees, the judgment of the learned Single Judge is to be set aside. It is observed that the respondent-Department had a right to claim interest from the assessees. We have already found out that the assessees are liable to pay tax. No reduction can be claimed by them. They are liable to pay penalty and interest. These findings result into the total negation of relief to the assessees in the writ petition. 25. Since, the factual matrix has to be gone into by the Department, we are not going into the details of the extent of the liability. Such question may be decided by the Department Authorities when the assessees file their reply to the notice of assessment. 26. In the result, the appeals of the Department are allowed. The appeals of the Assessees are rejected. This results in dismissing the writ petition of the petitioners before the learned Single Judge.
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2000 (2) TMI 833 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... le opportunity to plead all the relevant facts in support of their contentions in view of the specific plea taken by the petitioners in the writ petition. No other factor has been pleaded, canvassed to rebut the contention of the petitioners in this regard. 20. In these circumstances this Court is not inclined to relegate the petitioners, to pursue adjudication on this aspect of the mater, to an alternative Forum, merely as a ritualistic exercise. In the premise this contention of the respondent-Corporation has been rejected and this Court has proceeded to adjudicate upon this question in these proceedings. 21. In the circumstances above, this Court declares that the claim of the respondent-Corporation that the petitioners are due an amount of ₹ 2,46,218.70 pursuant to the term loan advanced to them in the year 1971 is barred by limitation and cannot be recovered under the provisions of the A.P. Revenue Recovery Act. 22. The writ petition is allowed as above. No costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 832 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ri, JJ. ORDER The appeal is dismissed.
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2000 (2) TMI 831 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... itation prescribed by Section 20 of the Act. The impugned order directing dropping of the proceedings is based on an erroneous view of Section 20 of the Act and hence is liable to be set aside. The appeal is allowed, the impugned order is set aside. The proceedings are restored to the file of the High Court which shall hear the parties and then proceed ahead in accordance with law. Before parting, we may make it clear that during the course of hearing we had asked the learned counsel for the parties about the result of the main writ petition wherein the undertaking was given on behalf of the respondents. The learned counsel for the parties were not duly instructed to assist this Court on this aspect. The findings arrived at by the Court in the main case, if the same has been disposed of, would have a material bearing on the discretion of the Court to proceed or not to proceed ahead with the proceedings for contempt. We leave that aspect to be taken care of by the High Court.
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2000 (2) TMI 830 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 523) that deals squarely with the said Act. In any event, this judgment also notes "Whenever a commodity undergoes a change as a result of some operation performed on it or in regard to it, such operation would amount to processing of the commodity. But it is only when the change or a series of changes take the commodity to the point where commercially it can no longer be regarded as the original commodity but instead is recognised as a new and distinct article that a manufacture can be said to take place. Manufacture thus involves series of processes." This judgment, therefore, itself would lead to the conclusion that when the appellant produces as a result of a series of processes biscuits, bread and cake, using, inter alia, wheat flour and milk powder, it manufactures the same and that its industry does not process animal or vegetable products. 7. The civil appeals are, therefore, allowed. The order under appeal is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 829 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 2 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965 is quoted herein below in extenso 302. Every councillor and every officer or servant of a Council, every contractor or agent appointed by it for the collection of any tax and every person employed by such contractor or agent for the collection of such tax, shall be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. A Municipal Councillor was prosecuted for having committed an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the said conviction and sentence was upheld in appeal by the High Court, but this Court in the aforementioned decision, 1985(3) SCC 606, set aside the conviction and sentence on a finding that Municipal Councillor cannot be held to be a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. In the aforesaid premises, we see no infirmity with the impugned judgment of the High Court to be interfered with by this Court. The appeals fail and are dismissed.
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2000 (2) TMI 828 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
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... ... ..... manipulation. As held by the Bombay High Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Glaxo India Ltd. 1999 98 Comp Cas 378 such disputes cannot be a case exclusively pertaining to rectification which could be decided by the CLB. The petitioner himself has made a request that the signature of the petitioner on the disputed documents may be sent to an expert for comparison. He has also prayed that the bank manager who had attested the signature on the transfer deed and Shri D.P. Bansal who is said to be the witness be summoned and their statement be obtained. We are of the opinion that such matters cannot be decided by us in this summary jurisdiction and if the petitioner is so advised he could approach the civil court. 11. In view of the above we refrain from making any observation regarding the merits of the other arguments raised by learned counsel for the parties so that the case of the parties are not prejudiced. 12. As a result, this petition fails, but no order as to costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 827 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... petitioner which admittedly he has not invoked, the petitioner was not entitled to agitate this issue by way of a suit for injunction before the learned trial Court. I am further of the view that right to remove a director by a share holder is available under the Act of 1956 which also lays down the mechanism for exercise of its rights. From the scheme of the said Act, it is also clear as well that matters of internal management of the company which in my considered view should be dealt with in accordance with law and the procedure laid down under the said Act. Hence, the civil courts could not interfere in such matters relating to internal management of the company. I am fortified in my observations from the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the matter of Khetan Industry v. Manju Ravindra Prasad Khetan , The same view was taken by this Court in the matter of Rajkumar Bahel v. FCI , 1990 (1) WLN 313. 11. As a result of above discussion, the revision petition is dismissed.
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2000 (2) TMI 826 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rohibition as is imposed by the impugned amendment in the Rules helps in achieving the object of the Act. We are also of the opinion that a delegated power to legislate by making rules 'for carrying out the purposes of the Act' is a general delegation without laying down any guidelines; it cannot be so exercised as to bring into existence substantive rights or obligations or disabilities not contemplated by the provisions of the Act itself, For the foregoing reason, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The proviso inserted into sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1973 by the notification dated 4.4.1986 (published in the Himachal Pradesh Government Gazette dated 26.4.86) and the circular order dated 21.8.90 issued by the Registrar, District Kangra at Dharmshala are declared invalid and struck down as ultra vires the powers of the H.P. Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972. No order as to the costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 825 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... filed by the Department as against the bail application was not a matter which engaged the attention of the detaining authority while passing the detention order. 11. Regarding the remaining ground the broad features have been presented before us that the detenu was a law graduate, that he had visited Singapore on a prior occasion (the present was his 2nd visit to Singapore), and that he collected foreign exchange from a resident by name Bhaskar at Singapore and that electronic goods worth about ₹ 16 lakhs have been detected from his baggage. It is not for the court to substitute its satisfaction but it is only a scrutiny to be made to ascertain whether the detaining authority had really arrived at the satisfaction that the detenu has to be preventively detained in public interest. We do not think that the detaining authority had no good reason or compelling reasons to pass such an order in the aforesaid circumstances. 12. In the result, we dismiss this writ petition.
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2000 (2) TMI 823 - SUPREME COURT
Applicability of Rules 10 and 10A of the Central Excise Rules - Held that:- In the case in hand Rule 10 or Rule 10A is neither a “Central Act” nor a “Regulation” as defined in the Act. It may be a Rule under Section 3(15) of the Act. Section 6 is applicable where any Central Act or Regulation made after commencement of the General Clauses Act repeals any enactment. It is not applicable in the case of omission of a “Rule”.
In the present case, as noted earlier, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act has no application. There is no saving provision in favour of pending proceeding. Therefore action for realisation of the amount refunded can only be taken under the new provision in accordance with the terms thereof.
From the contents of the provisions in the Rules it is clear that it did not contain any saving clause for continuance of the proceeding initiated under the rule which was deleted/omitted. There is also no provision in Section 11A or in any other Section of the Act saving the proceedings initiated under the deleted/omitted provision. The consequential position that follows is that the proceeding lapsed after 6th August 1977 and any order passed in the proceeding thereafter is to be treated as non-est. In case the notice was issued after Section 11A was introduced in the Act, the proceeding will continue and will not be affected by this decision.
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2000 (2) TMI 822 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the notice in question issued under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Act was valid or not?
Held that:- In the notice in question the "said amount" i.e. the cheque amount has been dearly stated. Respondent No. 1 had claimed in additional to the cheque amount, incidental charges and notice charge. These two amounts are severable. In the notice it was clearly stated that on failure to comply with the demand necessary legal steps will be taken up. If respondent No. 1 had paid the cheque amount he would have been absolved from the criminal liability under Section 138. Appeal dismissed.
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2000 (2) TMI 821 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ndent is not such an authority. Therefore, the impugned orders levying penalty are without jurisdiction. There is one more aspect which deserves to be noted. If it is construed that the Deputy Commissioner has the authority to levy penalty under section 7-A(2), the assessee will be left without remedy to question the same in appeal, inasmuch as section 21(1) does not provide for an appeal against the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner under section 7-A. The obvious reason for not providing such appeal is that the Legislature never intended that the Deputy Commissioner should assume the power of the assessing authority under section 7-A(2). We are, therefore, of the view that the impugned orders levying penalty are without jurisdiction and beyond the competence of the second respondent. We, therefore, quash the same. However, it is open to the competent authority to proceed further in the matter in accordance with law. The writ petition is allowed accordingly. No costs.
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