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1989 (3) TMI 364 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... as to costs. Reference answered accordingly. ANNEXURE FORM I Form of appeal under section 31 (See rule 27) To The Appellate Assistant Commissioner The day of 19 1. Name(s) of appellant(s) 2. Assessment year 3. Authority passing the original order in dispute 4. Date on which the order was communicated 5. Address to which notice may be sent to the appellant(s) 6. Relief claimed in appeal- (a) Turnover determined by the assessing authority (b) If turnover is disputed - (i) Disputed turnover (ii) Tax due on the disputed turnover (c) If rate of tax is disputed- (i) Turnover involved (ii) Amount of tax disputed (d) Any other relief claimed 7. Grounds of appeal, etc. (Signed) Appellant(s) (Signed) (Authorised representative, if any) VERIFICATION I/We the appellants) named in the above appeal do hereby declare that what is stated therein is true to the best of my/our knowledge and belief. Verified today the day of 19 (Signed) Appellant(s) (Signed) (Authorised representative, if any)
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1989 (3) TMI 363 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... R.C. Nos. 35, 36 and 37 of 1987, filed by the assessee. (2) uphold the order of the Tribunal dated 5th October, 1982 in T.A. No. 102 of 1978 and dismiss T.R.C. No. 101 of 1983, filed by the Revenue. (3) set aside the judgment of the learned single judge rendered in O.P. No. 5767 of 1986-J and allow W.A. No. 681 of 1986. (4) quash exhibits P1 to P3 notices and allow O.P. No. 1344 of 1987. There shall be no order as to costs in all the cases. Immediately after the judgment was pronounced, the learned Advocate-General prayed for a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court of India. We are satisfied that the cases involve a substantial question of law of general importance and in our opinion the question involved needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. We, accordingly, certify that these are fit cases for being heard and disposed of by the Supreme Court. Certificate granted, accordingly, in all these cases. Order on C.M.P. No. 4278 of 1987 in O.P. No. 1344 of 1987. Dismissed.
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1989 (3) TMI 362 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... n that the authority had actually classified the rayon yarn as goods falling under entry 24 and was attempting to change the classification itself by saying that it fell under entry 147. This contention, in our opinion, is also patently untenable. As can be seen from the assessment order the assessing authority has clearly stated that the turnover which is the subjectmatter of assessment as well as reassessment was rayon yarn. There is no reference to rayon yarn in entry 24 of the Second Schedule whereas synthetic fibre is expressly referred in entry 147 of that Schedule and it is not disputed that rayon is synthetic fibre. Subsequently when the authority found that it had committed a mistake in the matter of rate it initiated action under section 12A of the Act, for which it was perfectly within its power. 12.. In the result, we find no substance in these petitions. 13.. The petitions are dismissed with costs. 14.. Consolidated advocate s fee Rs. 2,000. Petitions dismissed.
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1989 (3) TMI 361 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... sed the words order of reassessment and it is more clear by the expression used in the second proviso until the reassessment is finalised . It, therefore, clearly stipulates that whenever there is an order for initiation of a reassessment proceeding until the said proceeding is finalised claim of refund cannot be allowed. Issuance of a notice on the assessee under section 12(8) of the Act cannot but be an order for reassessment and therefore, during the continuance of such proceeding until the same is finalised, the second proviso to section 14 would apply and claim of refund cannot be allowed. In this view of the matter, there is no infirmity in the order of the assessing officer passed in annexure-4 as well as in the order of the Commissioner passed in annexure-5. 9.. In the result, we do not find any merit in this writ application which is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances without any order as to costs. V. GOPALASWAMY, J.-I agree. Writ application dismissed.
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1989 (3) TMI 360 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ng of an appeal in the Tribunal, and as this remedy has been availed of by the petitioner, this Court should not interfere under article 226 of the Constitution. Before concluding I would like to record a concession of the learned counsel for the respondents. On 7th January, 1988, the recovery of tax was stayed by this Court on the petitioner depositing Rs. 25,000 and furnishing security for the balance amount. It is stated by the learned counsel for the respondents that if this interim order has been complied with by the petitioner, then the appeal will be restored to the file of the Tribunal. I accordingly direct that if the petitioner has complied with the interim orders passed by this Court, then the appeals shall stand restored to the file of the Tribunal, who will dispose of the same on merits. No further relief can be granted to the petitioner. The writ petition accordingly stands disposed of. There will be no orders as to costs. Writ petition disposed of accordingly.
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1989 (3) TMI 359 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... proved that he would suffer irreparable injury in case the demanded tax would be realised from him. 12.. In case, tax is not realised, administration is likely to suffer. In case tax is realised from the person from whom it is demanded he alone would suffer. Balancing both the inconveniences I am inclined to hold that the convenience lies in realisation of tax than in staying it. 13.. On account of failure of the plaintiff, on the point of balance of convenience and irreparable injury, I need not go into the question of prima facie case although the learned Standing Counsel for the commercial tax department appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that section 22 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act is a bar to the suit. This will be taken into consideration at the time of trial. 14.. In the result, the appeal is allowed. Order of injunction is set aside. Plaintiff-respondent shall pay the costs to the appellant. Hearing fee assessed at Rs. 500 (five hundred). Appeal allowed.
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1989 (3) TMI 358 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... se what has been challenged before me is the correctness of the order of the learned single Member of the Tribunal holding that the assessments relating to the financial years 1972-74 and 1974-76 for Rajasthan sales tax and Central sales tax as time-barred. When I have held that this finding of the learned single Member of the Tribunal is not incorrect then the request for a direction to issue fresh notices under section 12(1) of the Act as regards the escaped turnover will result in giving a direction which is not necessary for the disposal of the case before this Court. It will be unjust after the expiry of 12 years to issue direction of fresh notices to be issued for reassessment when the assessee has already undergone the agony of two assessments, two appeals and two second appeals and still facing these proceedings before this Court. In the result, I find no force in these petitions and they are dismissed. The costs of these petitions shall be easy. Petitions dismissed.
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1989 (3) TMI 357 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Film/paper processor - Customs exemption ... ... ... ... ..... e goods imported. 6. emsp We observe that it is not in dispute that the equipment imported processes the films and is also used for processing the paper. This Tribunal had taken note of this fact and held as under in the case of Andhra Patrika (supra) ldquo (i) it should be an automatic film processor falling under heading No. 90.10 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 and (ii) it should be imported for use in the printing industry. We find that both these conditions are fulfilled in the case before us. If, in addition to film processing the machine can perform the other function of paper processing as well, the exemption cannot be denied. Accordingly, we allow the appeal with consequential relief to the appellant. rdquo 7. emsp We find no reason to depart from the decision of the Tribunal. No other decision contrary to this has been brought to our notice by the learned Departmental Representative. Following the decision of the Tribunal above, we dismiss the appeal of the Revenue.
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1989 (3) TMI 356 - SUPREME COURT
Constitutional validity of the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1982 challenged by which the Legislatures of the States were empowered to levy sales tax on certain transactions described in sub-clauses (a) to (f) of clause (29-A) of article 366 of the Constitution
Whether the power of the State Legislature to levy tax on the transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of works contracts referred to in sub- clause (b) of clause (29-A) of article 366 of the Constitution is subject to the restrictions and conditions contained in article 286 of the Constitution?
Held that:- As declared that sales tax laws passed by the Legislatures of States levying taxes on the transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract are subject to the restrictions and conditions mentioned in each clause or sub-clause of article 286 of the Constitution. We, however, make it clear that the cases argued before and considered by us relate to one specie of the generic concept of "works contracts". The case-book is full of the illustrations of the infinite variety of the manifestation of "works contracts". Whatever might be the situational differences of individual cases, the constitutional limitations on the taxing-power of 'the State as are applicable to "works contracts" represented by "building contracts" in the context of the expanded concept of "tax on the sale or purchase of goods" as constitutionally defined under article 366(29-A), would equally apply to other species of "works contracts" with the requisite situational modifications.
Thus civil appeals filed against the orders of the High Courts, however, shall be placed before the appropriate Bench hearing tax matters to decide the other questions raised in them including the validity of any statutory provision or rule in the light of this judgment.
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1989 (3) TMI 355 - SUPREME COURT
Taxability on ayurvedic drugs and medicines, including arishtams and asavas - Held that:- Appeal allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court on each writ petition are set aside and the sales tax authorities are directed to reassess the turnover of the arishtams and asavas at the rate mentioned in item No. 95 and to refund to the appellants the amount of tax paid in excess. The appellants, in their turn, on obtaining such refund will, within one month thereof, serve notice on the customers from whom such excess has been recovered to obtain a refund from the appellants of such corresponding excess. In the event of any balance of the excess remaining unrefunded by the appellants to the customers upon the expiry of three months from such notice, the balance will be paid over by the appellants to the Arya Vaidya Rama Varier Educational Foundation of Ayurveda.
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1989 (3) TMI 342 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Company – Incorporation of ... ... ... ... ..... ointed as receiver and manager of a company also sometimes could be appointed as a receiver. The reason is obvious. The company is a corporate body. Therefore, the appointment of a company as a receiver is clearly illegal. As stated earlier in article 51 of the memorandum and articles of association, M.A. Rajendran has been named therein as a managing director for an initial period of five years and, thereafter, for another period of five years until he voluntarily resigns or becomes incapable of acting as the managing director. Therefore, the appropriate order would be that M.A. Rajendran, managing director, shall be appointed as a receiver in the place of a company as such. The order of the court below is, accordingly, modified. M.A. Rajendran shall be the receiver and he shall follow the directions referred to hereinbefore as given by the court below in the impugned order. With the above modification, the appeal is allowed in part. But, in the circumstances, without costs.
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1989 (3) TMI 332 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Meetings and Proceedings – Circulation of members’ resolution, Explanatory statement to be annexed to notice, Directors - Right of person other than retiring director to stand for directorship
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1989 (3) TMI 331 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Company – Membership of, Compromise and arrangement, Winding up – Avoidance of transfer, etc., after commencement of
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1989 (3) TMI 330 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Accounts - To be kept by company ... ... ... ... ..... hat there is no misappropriation of the funds of the company. Balancing the equities between the parties and being conscious of the fact that Mr. Anand had a statutory right to inspect the records of the company, I think it would be proper if Mr. Anand is allowed inspection of the following books 1.Bank statements from July 22, 1988, till date. Bank statements mean the statements furnished by the bank from time to time showing the debit and credit entries, cash reconciliation statement, bank reconciliation statement 2.The accounts of the banks, financial institutions and private parties from whom loan, if any, has been taken by the PSCL or has been advanced, contained in the ledger for the period from April, 1988, till date and 3.The register of movable assets, if any. Mr. Anand had admittedly inspected the minute books of directors and shareholders meetings from 22nd April, 1988, till date and fixed assets register. I order accordingly. This is only a prima facie view point.
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1989 (3) TMI 307 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Proxies, Oppression and Mismanagement – Right to apply under section 397 and 398, Company when deemed unable to pay its debts
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1989 (3) TMI 306 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Oppression and Mismanagement – Right to apply under section 397 and 398 ... ... ... ... ..... hold that the petition filed by the respondents under sections 397 and 398 was not maintainable. As noticed above, the appellants had also prayed for winding up of the company as an alternative relief. The application for winding up, in our view, could continue. It was not much disputed by learned counsel for the appellants that a joint application under sections 397 and 398 and for winding up could be filed. The impugned order was, however, liable to be quashed because the plea of winding up was an alternative plea and there was nothing to indicate whether the impugned order appointing Justice P.N. Khanna as the chairman of the board was on the basis of the averments relating to the prayer under sections 397 and 398 or otherwise. In conclusion, we accept the appeal and set aside the impugned order. Learned company judge would treat the petition as a petition for winding up only and dispose of it according to law. The appellants are entitled to costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 1,000.
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1989 (3) TMI 293 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Wool waste - Goods imported not to be considered as yarn merely because of its being in hank form
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1989 (3) TMI 292 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Rectification of mistake ... ... ... ... ..... 8-D, dated 17-2-1988 decided a completely different issue than what was discussed and decided by the Collector in the case before us. Instead of that, both sides to the appeal represented that the present case was fully covered by the said earlier decision. A copy of the said order dated 17-2-1988 was filed by Shri Santhanam in the open court before this Bench on 30-8-1988. Therefore, the record did not warrant to take a view that the said order dated 17-2-1988 fully covered the present case. There is, therefore, exceptional circumstances and an error apparent on record crept in when the operative part of the order was orally pronounced on 1-9-1988. The ratio of the judgment relied on by Shri Santhanam is not, therefore, applicable to the facts of the present case. 9. In view of the foregoing discussions, we recall the operative portion of our order, which was orally pronounced on 1-9-1988 and direct the Registry to list this appeal for hearing on merits as early as possible.
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1989 (3) TMI 291 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Import policy ... ... ... ... ..... matters. Why we say that there was lack of diligence is that apart from not filing a counter-affidavit in W.P. No. 10162 of 1984, there was no such reservation asked for before the learned single Judge. 12. emsp Even after the order of the learned Officiating Chief Justice granting four more weeks rsquo further time, not a little finger was raised. Therefore, we find that there was total lack of BONA FIDES. To say the least, somehow the respondent had been deprived of its hard-earned fruits of judgment of V. Ramaswami, J., which had stood the test of time, repeatedly approved and approbated both in the order made in the contempt applications as well as in the order of the Lordships of the Supreme Court. For these reasons, these are matters in which there cannot be any stay as that would put a premium on lack of diligence and lack of BONA FIDES on the part of the appellants-petitioners. 13. The stay petitions, namely, C.M.P. Nos. 972 and 973 of 1989 are, therefore, dismissed.
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1989 (3) TMI 290 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Pre-deposit of duty and penalty ... ... ... ... ..... Collector and also failed to furnish the bank guarantee for the balance of the duty amount till 28-2-1989 the appeal is liable to be dismissed under Sec. 35-F of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 which is in pari-materia to Section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962 in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Navin Chandra v. Excise and Customs, Central Board, Delhi 1981 (8) E.L.T. 679 (S.C.) - AIR 1971 SC 2280. However, before doing so we think it expedient in the interest of justice that a notice be given to the applicants to show cause as to why their appeal be not dismissed for non-compliance of the stay order passed by the Tribunal, as modified by the Hon rsquo ble Bombay High Court, before we dismiss the appeal. We order accordingly. 13. Shri S.K. Mehta, learned counsel for the applicants who has argued the case takes the said notice. 14. Case to come up for hearing on 7-4-1989. No notice as the parties take the notice of the said next date of hearing.
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