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1969 (4) TMI 76 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... the proposition that every proceeding before the Income-tax Officer is a legal proceeding within the meaning of section 446(1) of the Companies Act, 1956. In this case the Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether the proceeding before an Income-tax Officer under section 37 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922), could be said to be a proceeding in any court within the meaning of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Supreme Court by a majority held that section 37(4) of the said Act made the said proceedings before the Income-tax Officer judicial proceedings under section 193, Indian Penal Code, and the judicial proceedings must be treated as proceedings in any court for the purpose of section 195(1)(b), Criminal Procedure Code. This application, therefore, fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. The liquidator will, however, retain his own costs of this application out of the assets of the company in his hands.
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1969 (4) TMI 75 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Government company ... ... ... ... ..... cessary to examine the second and third contention of the learned Advocate-General, namely, that as the right claimed by the petitioners is not derived from the statute but is based on contract, no writ can be issued in their favour and that the seniority lists have been prepared rationally according to rules (not statutory) framed by the directors of the Bokaro Steel Ltd. and they do not infringe any right of the petitioners. I have refrained from expressing any opinion on these two points also because we have been informed that a suit filed by some of the direct recruits to the Bokaro Steel Ltd. involving these questions is pending and expression of opinion on these points by us is bound to prejudice one or the other of the parties. The petitioners in none of these applications are entitled to issuance of a writ against the respondents and their applications are dismissed. In the circumstances of the cases, there will be no order as to costs. S.N.P. Singh, J. mdash I agree.
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1969 (4) TMI 61 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up – Delivery of property to liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... Comp. Cas. 367 AIR 1963 Mad. 307., I am of the view that the expression at any time can only mean at such time within the bounds of the law of limitation. This application has been filed on November 30, 1968, and on that date the official liquidator cannot successfully prosecute a civil litigation for recovery of the amount and, if this is so, he cannot seek for directions as well, under section 468 of the Act. I am not persuaded by the argument that section 468 should be read independently of the Limitation Act. Both the Companies Act and the Limitation Act co-exist excepting for such rights specifically provided and kept alive under the Companies Act to the exclusion of the Limitation Act, the general law has to prevail. In these circumstances, I am unable to accede to the request of the official liquidator to pass a decree in the sum of Rs. 2,902.77 against Dr. S. R. Sarma, the respondent herein. The application is, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1969 (4) TMI 60 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Winding up - Unpaid dividends and undistributed liquidation account ... ... ... ... ..... an dividends payable to a creditor which had remained unpaid because they were unclaimed for six months after the declaration of the dividends as such. For these reasons, I do not consider that section 555(1)(a ) of the Act is attracted to the moneys in question. Further, in this peculiar case, as per the decree of the court, the moneys have to be disbursed and it would be a needless complication to treat these moneys as moneys under section 555(1)(a) of the Act and postpone the legitimate claims thereto. As such, the liquidator might proceed with his duties as liquidator under section 512 of the Act, with regard to the moneys in question under his control. The point raised before me is answered accordingly. The costs of these petitions will come out of the assets of the company. In the view that I have taken that the liquidator could proceed under section 512 of the Act with regard to the moneys in question under his control, specific directions as prayed for need not issue.
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1969 (4) TMI 58 - HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... of the company was made on 9th March, 1960, under the provisions of the Companies Act of 1956. There is therefore no force in the argument of Mr. Bhargava and I have no doubt that it cannot save the respondent from his liability under section 543. In the result it is declared that the respondent, Shyam Sunder Lal Patodia, has misapplied, or retained, or became liable or accountable for the sums of Rs. 2,07,832 and Rs. 19,588-4-6, making a total of Rs. 2,27,420-4-6. It is ordered that he shall repay to the official liquidator the said sum of Rs. 2,27,420-4-6. He shall pay interest at 6 per cent, per annum on the sum of Rs. 2,07,832 from 29th April, 1948, down to the date of payment. Similarly, he shall pay interest at the same rate on the sum of Rs. 19,588-4-6 from 5th November, 1963, which is the date of presentation of the present application down to the date of payment. The respondent shall also pay the costs of and incidental to this application to the official liquidator.
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1969 (4) TMI 57 - HIGH COURT OF MYSORE
Company – Incorporation of and Directors – Power of ... ... ... ... ..... esponding clause of exhibit R-34 which empowered the bank to take over the management of the business of the company, neither the mortgages nor the hypothecations are invalid for contravention of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 213 of the Companies Act, 1956, and that the said offending clauses are invalid and unenforceable. The said clauses in the document are severable. Hence, it cannot be said that they invalidate the transactions themselves. We are in agreement with the learned company judge on this point also, and reject the contention of the appellant. For the reason stated above both the appeals are dismissed. In view of the opinion expressed by us on the abovesaid points, Sri G. S. Ullal, the learned counsel for the respondents did not find it necessary to urge the cross-objections in O.S.A. No. 9/68. The appellant will pay the costs of respondent No. 1. The costs shall be paid in one set out of the assets of the company. We fix the advocate s fee at Rs. 250.
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1969 (4) TMI 56 - HIGH COURT OF MYSORE
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... d in the winding-up proceedings. The suit against the 2nd defendant cannot be proceeded with in the absence of the company. The power of the court to grant leave under section 446 is intended to be exercised in such circumstances and was never intended to prevent the prosecution against third parties of suits to which the company in liquidation was a necessary defendant. In our judgment, the discretion vested in the learned company judge has not been exercised in accordance with settled judicial principles governing the grant of such leave and, therefore, calls for interference in appeal. For the reasons stated above, we allow the appeal, set aside the order made by the learned company judge and make an order granting the leave prayed for, upon an undertaking by the appellant that he will not enforce against the company any decree which he may obtain without the leave of the court. In the circumstances of the cast , we direct the parties to bear their own costs in the appeal.
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1969 (4) TMI 54 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Fees in schedule x to be paid ... ... ... ... ..... the fee. But the Registrar never refused the services in fact, he has already rendered part of the services and if the services have not been completed it is only because the petitioner does not want them. The Registrar is, and has been, ready to perform the services for which the fee was paid and complete the registration, or, if the company cannot be registered under the provisions of the Act, to refuse registration. Whatever be the rights of a person who pays money under a contract for services to be rendered, but subsequently declines the services, we do not think that, in the absence of a provision to that effect in the statute concerned, a person paying a fee under a statute has the right to get back the fee because he no longer wants the services for which the fee was paid. Whether he would have a cause of action for damages or for compelling the services, if the services are improperly declined, is an altogether different question. We dismiss this petition with costs.
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1969 (4) TMI 53 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases, Savings of prosecutions instituted by liquidator or Court under section 237 of Act 7 of 1913
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1969 (4) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the misconduct or negligence is a mere motive for the order of reversion or termination of service or whether it is the very foundation of the order of termination of service of the temporary employee?
Held that:- In the present case the High Court was in error in holding that the reversion of the respondent from the position of officiating Income-tax Officer, class II, to a lower position as inspector of income-tax was tantamount to a reduction in rank and that the respondent was entitled to the safeguards provided in article 311 of the Constitution. Appeal allowed
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1969 (4) TMI 30 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the legislature possesses competence to pass a law imposing a tax on lands and buildings on the basis of a percentage of their capital value?
Held that:- The legislature not only equated the tax collected to a tax on lands and buildings, which it had the power to levy, but also to a rate giving a new meaning to the expression " rate " and while doing so it put out of action the effect of the decisions of the courts to the contrary. The exercise of power by the legislature was valid because the legislature does possess the power to levy a tax on lands and buildings based on capital value thereof and in validating the levy on that basis, the implication of the use of the word " rate " could be effectively removed and the tax on lands and buildings imposed instead. The tax, therefore, can no longer be questioned on the ground that section 73 spoke of a rate and the imposition was not a rate as properly understood but a tax on capital value. In this view of the matter it is hardly necessary to invoke the 14th clause of section 73 which contains a residuary power to impose any other tax not expressly mentioned.
Thus these appeals possess no merit after the passing of the Validation Act and must be dismissed.
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1969 (4) TMI 29 - SUPREME COURT
Bonus Shares ... ... ... ... ..... namely, Rs. 10,000 ? The High Court, following its own decision in Income-tax Reference No. 54 of 1950 decided on the same day, held in favour of the assessee. According to the High Court the bonus shares had to be taken to have cost according to their face value. The present appeal is filed against the decision of the High Court as stated above. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Gold Mohore Investment Co. Ltd. (Civil Appeals Nos. 1236-1237 of 1967) we have today decided that the correct method is the one stated in the majority opinion in the Dalmia s case. In other words, the Tribunal s method was the correct method in the case. We, accordingly, answer the question that the Tribunal s method was the correct method of spreading the price of the old shares over the old and the new shares and calculating the profit or loss accordingly. Our detailed reasons are given in the Gold Mohore Investment Co. Ltd. s case. The appeal will, therefore, be allowed with costs. Appeal allowed.
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1969 (4) TMI 28 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Madras Urban Land Tax Act, 1966 (12 of 1966) is constitutionally valid?
Held that:- In pith and substance the new Act in imposing a tax on urban land at a percentage of the market value is entirely within the ambit of entry 49 of List II and within the competence of the State Legislature and does not in any way trench upon the field of legislation of entry 86 of List I.
The Act envisages a detailed procedure regarding submission of returns, the making of an assessment after hearing objections and a right to appeal to higher authorities. We are hence unable to accept the contention of the petitioners that the provisions of section 6 of the new Act are violative of article 14 of the Constitution. The imposition of the tax retrospectively from 1st July, 1963, cannot be said to be an unreasonable restriction. We, therefore, reject the argument of the petitioners on this aspect of the case. The Madras Urban Land Tax Act, 1966 (Act 12 of 1966), must be upheld as constitutionally valid. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (4) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the method adopted by the Income-tax Officer in relation to the Fort Gloster jute shares is the method approved of by this court, namely, that where the shares are pari passu and the valuation is to be made at cost, the price of the original shares must be spread over the old and the new shares and they must be held to have been purchased at the average cost and that the profit or loss is to be calculated accordingly?
Held that:- This court held that the correct method to apply in cases where bonus shares rank pari passu is to follow the third method, namely, to take the cost of the original shares and to spread it over all the original as well as the bonus shares and to find out the average price of all the shares. The cases will be disposed of in the light of our observations by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal by calculating the profit and loss by spreading the cost over the original and the bonus shares and finding out the average cost per share. The appeals are allowed.
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1969 (4) TMI 26 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Transactions through high denomination notes - whether such transaction represented assessee's undisclosed income
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1969 (4) TMI 25 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Concealment of income - notice by the Income-tax Officer under section 271(1)(c) - penalty proceedings were later transferred to IAC, who also issued the notice - validity of notice - whether imposition of penalty is justified - jurisdiction of the respective officers
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1969 (4) TMI 24 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Under an agreement with foreign company assessee acquired certain rights to manufacture and sell in India products of " Simplex " design and to use the trade name " Simplex " on the terms and conditions therein mentioned - royalty paid for know-how and advice cannot be held to be of capital nature - allowable as deduction
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1969 (4) TMI 23 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Carry forward of unabsorbed reduction of rebate - question of vires of any of the provisions of the Income-tax Act, cannot be examined by the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Act or in a reference to the High Court or in an appeal therefrom to the Supreme Court
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1969 (4) TMI 22 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Whether the income-tax authorities are competent to commence or continue an assessment proceeding against a company in liquidation without obtaining leave of the court
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1969 (4) TMI 21 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
When no evidence is adduced that a debt was not recoverable, Whether the amount advanced by the assessee-firm can be allowed as a deduction in the computation of its business income either as a bad debt or as a business loss
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