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Showing 41 to 60 of 831 Records
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2010 (4) TMI 1198 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... any further. 31. Various judgments cited on behalf of the parties which have not been specifically referred to have been considered while rendering this judgment bearing in mind the salutary principle that a judgment is an authority for what is actually decided and the observations made therein would be applicable in the context in which they are made and what is binding is only the ratio decidendi of the decision which has to be gathered from the statements of legal principles set out in the facts of the case brought before the Court. 32. This Court is in respectful agreement with the opinion expressed by the Madras High Court in the two judgments cited on behalf of the parties. 33. Accordingly, it is held that the Tribunal was justified in law in excluding the excise duty at the time of valuation of the closing stock of finished goods at the end of the accounting period in light of what is stated hereinbefore. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.
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2010 (4) TMI 1197 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ase offence Under Section 324 IPC was committed on July 23, 1986 on which date it was compoundable with the permission of the Court. As the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 2005 is not applicable to the facts of the case, offence Under Section 324 IPC would be compoundable with the permission of the Court. In view of the statement, made by respondent Nos. 2 to 4 in their affidavit and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, permission to compound the offence deserves to be granted to the original complainant and the injured. 5. Hence, the appeal is allowed. The two judgments impugned in the appeal are set aside. The injured complainant and two other injured are permitted to compound the offence punishable under Section 324 IPC. In view of Sub-section (8) of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the composition of offence Under Section 324 IPC shall have the effect of an acquittal of the appellant with whom the offence has been compounded.
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2010 (4) TMI 1196 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at the end of accounting period?” (2) It is an admitted position that the controversy involved in the present case stands concluded by a decision of even date rendered by this Court in the case of the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Bharuch Circle Vs. Narmada Chematur Petrochemicals Ltd., in Tax Appeal No.852 of 2007. (3) In the circumstances, for the reasons stated in Tax Appeal No.852 of 2007, this appeal is also dismissed.
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2010 (4) TMI 1195 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o the year in question alone and the benefit was spread over five years. Therefore, he disallowed 4/5th of the expenditure, which were to be allowed in the subsequent four years and only allowed 1/5th of the expenditure in this year. The result being that the Assessing Officer disallowed the expenditure to the extent of ₹ 20,96,127/-. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) deleted the disallowance. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal also concurred with the view taken by the Commissioner, Income Tax (Appeals) and observed that once the Assessing Officer had accepted the position that the expenditure would be in the nature of revenue expenditure, there was no question of not allowing the entire expenditure particularly when the assessee was following the mercantile system of accounting. We see no reason to interfere with the findings of the Tribunal. No perversity has been pointed out. No substantial question of law arises for our consideration. The appeal is dismissed.
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2010 (4) TMI 1194 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, NEW DELHI BENCH
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... ... ..... el proceedings before two concurrent judicial authorities one proceeding is stayed in Order to avoid conflicting orders, but there is no bar on instituting such proceedings except where such proceedings are instituted with a view to abuse the process of courts. In the present case since the petition before the Bombay High Court has been filed prior to the filing of the petition before the CLB, to meet the ends of justice, the proceedings before the CLB are stayed for a period of six months as the parties have indicated their willingness to settle the matter on the respondent-company paying the petitioner-company a reasonable amount (including interest at reasonable rate) on reconciliation of the sums claimed have been paid towards promoters' equity. Since this composite petition is held to be maintainable, interim orders granted earlier shall continue to operate till further orders. Company Application No. 255/2008 is disposed of in the above terms. No orders as to cost.
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2010 (4) TMI 1193 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... gly, the special leave petition is dismissed. However, having regard to the issue involved, we would request the Company Law Board to dispose of the main petition (C.P. No. 114/2006) as expeditiously as practicable. It goes without saying that it will be open to the parties to urge before the Company Law Board all the issues, sought to be raised in these proceedings, and the petition will be decided on its own merits uninfluenced by any observation by the High Court in the impugned order. SLP(C) No. 161/2009 As per the office report, respondent No. 7 remains unserved. Let fresh notice issue to the said respondent. We may note that despite opportunity counter affidavits have not been filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 2,4,5,6 and 8. Office is directed to remove all the order sheets pertaining to SLP(C) No. 17522/2008(Pawan Goel vs. KMG Milk Food Ltd. & Ors.) and place on record the relevant orders passed in the present case, which unfortunately are missing from this file.
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2010 (4) TMI 1192 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... cash of ₹ 11,49,000/-. The AO nowhere in the assessment order had come to a conclusion that assessee was having cash in hand of ₹ 11,49,000 as on 31.3.2004. However, the contention of the assessee is that amount is explainable with reference to the statement of affairs filed along with the return of income. In view of these facts, we are of the considered opinion that the matter should be restored back to the file of the AO with the directions to examine the contentions of the assessee about the availability of cash with reference to the income admitted and the expenditure that would have been made by him for meeting his family expenses. He will also examine the genuineness of cash available with him as shown in statement of affairs. The AO will provide the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard. We order accordingly. 6. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes. 7. Order pronounced in open court on 30.04.2010.
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2010 (4) TMI 1191 - CESTAT CHENNAI
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... ... ..... ₹ 4 lakhs to ₹ 2,50,000/- (Rupees Two lakhs fifty thousand only). A fine of ₹ 1 lakh in lieu of confiscation of goods used to conceal the prohibited goods is quite reasonable and therefore does not call for any reduction. Penalty on the partnership firm is reduced to ₹ 75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand only) and the penalty on the two individuals namely Managing Partner and the Partner is reduced from ₹ 1 lakh each to ₹ 50,000/- each (Rupees fifty thousand only), in the totality of facts and circumstances of the case. 3. The appeals are thus partly allowed as above. ( Dictated and pronounced in open court )
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2010 (4) TMI 1190 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... to have issued notice u/s 153A instead of notice of reopening u/s 148. Hence he requested that direction may be given in this regard. 4.4 Upon careful consideration we find ourselves in agreement with the contention of the ld. counsel of the assessee that as per the clear prescription of section 153A assessment year 2006-07 was not to be the subject matter of assessment u/s. 153A on the facts of the case, based upon the date of search. Accordingly, we hold that assessment in this case u/s 153A is without jurisdiction and hence not unsustainable. Since we are quashing the assessment on the jurisdiction itself, the other issues raised in this appeal are not being adjudicated. Accordingly, this appeal filed by the assessee is allowed. 5. In the result the assessee’s appeal No. 3137, 3138, 3139 & 3140/Del/09 are partly allowed for statistical purposes and appeal no. 3142/Del/09 is allowed. Order pronounced in the open court on 12/04/2010 upon conclusion of the hearing.
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2010 (4) TMI 1189 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r of the respondent, which struck the petitioner‟s name off the Register of Companies, be set aside. 10. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The restoration of the petitioner company‟s name to the Register will be subject to the petitioner filing all outstanding documents required by law and completion of all formalities, including payment of any late fee or any other charges which are leviable by the respondent for the late filing of statutory returns. The name of the petitioner company, its directors and members shall then, as a consequence, stand restored to the Register of the Registrar of Companies, as if the name of the company had not been struck off, in accordance with S.560(6) of the Companies Act, 1956. 11. Liberty is granted to the respondent to proceed with penal action against the petitioner company, if so advised, on account of the company‟s alleged default in compliance with S.162 of the Companies Act, 1956. 12. The petition is disposed of.
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2010 (4) TMI 1188 - SUPREME COURT
Writ petitions challenging the orders - grant of regular permits to private operators - claim of STUs in gross violation of 1990 scheme as modified in the year 1997 and the provisions of Chapter VI of the Act - HELD THAT:- The power to cancel the Scheme or modify the Scheme rests with the State Government u/s 102 of the Act and the RTA and the Tribunal have committed a grave error in tampering with the Scheme as well as disturbing the ratio fixed by the Scheme by granting regular permits to the private sector from the quota earmarked for STUs. Once a scheme is approved and published, private operators have no right to claim regular permits to operate their vehicles in the notified area, route or portion thereof upsetting the ratio fixed. Since the scheme makes provision for partial exclusion, the private operators are not completely excluded, they may get regular permits on the notified route or portion thereof in accordance with the terms and conditions laid down in the scheme and within the quota earmarked for them.
In our view same is the situation in respect of a case where an STU inspite of grant of permit does not operate the service or surrenders the permit granted or not utilizing the permit. In such a situation it should be deemed that no application for permit has been made by the STU and it is open to the RTA to grant temporary permit if there is a temporary need. By granting regular permits to the private operators RTA will be upsetting the ratio fixed under the scheme which is legally impermissible.
A writ Court seldom interferes with the orders passed by such authorities exercising quasi-judicial functions, unless there is serious procedural illegality or irregularity or they have acted in excess of their jurisdiction. If there is any dispute on the proper implementation of the ratio or inclusion or exclusion of any route or area in the Scheme, the RTA can always examine the same, if it is moved. The direction given by the High Court to the RTA to grant regular permits to the private operators, is therefore, patently illegal.
We therefore, allow all these Civil Appeals as follows-
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2010 (4) TMI 1187 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... elay condoned. Appeals admitted. Hearing expedited.
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2010 (4) TMI 1186 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uing a public advertisement under the rules. Such a public advertisement would have very serious repercussions especially when the concern is a solvent, flourishing, running concern and the harm which would be done to such a concern by issuing the public advertisement would be almost irreparable and irreversible. That is why, the petitioners, who seek to get the winding up petition admitted must exercise scrupulous care and caution to come with absolute altogether candour by disclosing to the Court why they are pursuing the alternative remedies they have or which they may have availed of before filing such a petition. 18. The petitioner bank having initiated proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal for realization of its debt, has not stated anything in the petition as to why winding up of the respondent company is opted. 19. Therefore, this Company Petition does not deserve for admission and accordingly, the same is hereby dismissed at the stage of admission. No costs.
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2010 (4) TMI 1185 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Restoration of name of companies in the register maintained by ROC - Strike of name of company due to non filing of returns - HELD THAT:- A petition for restoration of the name of a company to the Register of Companies un/s 560(6) of the Companies Act, 1956 can only be made by the company, a member or a creditor. A creditor is entitled to maintain a petition for restoration only if he was a creditor at the time the name of the company was struck off from the Register of Companies.
Here, the arbitration award in favour of the petitioner was rendered on 14th March, 2007, i.e. before the date of the Gazette Notification notifying that the name of H.N. Explosives Pvt. Ltd. has been struck off the Register of Companies. It is clear that the amount claimed by the petitioner was against an incorporated company, which was a legal entity recognized under the Companies Act, 1956, and the arbitration award in question was also rendered against such a company. When H.N. Explosives Pvt. Ltd. was struck off from the Register of Companies by the respondent, it ceased to exist.
Although, the liability of persons falling within the ambit of the first proviso to Section 560(5), who were directors, managers, officers exercising any power of management and members of the erstwhile company can nevertheless be enforced; however, in this case, the liability in terms of the award is that of the company itself and not of any individual mentioned in Section 560(5). Consequently, under the circumstances, the petitioner, in whose favour the award has been rendered, is left without a remedy to effect recovery against the erstwhile company H.N. Explosives Pvt. Ltd.
Seeing that this petition was moved well within the stipulated period of limitation for initiation of proceedings under S.560, Companies Act, 1956, which is twenty years from the date of publication of the notice striking off the name of the company from the Register, this is a fit case for the exercise of the powers of this Court under S.560(6) of the Companies Act, 1956.
The name of the company H.N.Explosives Pvt. Ltd., its directors and members stands restored to the Register maintained by the Registrar of Companies, as if the name of the said company had not been struck off, in accordance with S.560(6) of the Companies Act, 1956.
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2010 (4) TMI 1184 - SUPREME COURT
Admissibility of an unregistered sale deed in evidence - oral agreement to sell the suit property - The plaintiff in the suit claimed for the reliefs of directing the defendants to execute a fresh sale deed with regard to the suit property in pursuance of an oral agreement for sale on or before the date that may be fixed by the court and failing which execution of the sale deed by the court. She also prayed for grant of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from disturbing with her peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property.
HELD THAT:- We are of the opinion that having regard to the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 (for short,1908 Act'), the trial court erred in not admitting the unregistered sale deed dated 27.02.2006 in evidence and the High Court ought to have corrected the said error by setting aside the order of the trial court.
Recently in the case of K.B. Saha and Sons Private Limited v. Development Consultant Limited [2008 (5) TMI 708 - SUPREME COURT], This Court culled out the following principles:-
"1. A document required to be registered, if unregistered is not admissible into evidence u/s 49 of the Registration Act.
2. Such unregistered document can however be used as an evidence of collateral purpose as provided in the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act.
3. A collateral transaction must be independent of, or divisible from, the transaction to effect which the law required registration.
4. A collateral transaction must be a transaction not itself required to be effected by a registered document, that is, a transaction creating, etc. any right, title or interest in immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards.
5. If a document is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, none of its terms can be admitted in evidence and that to use a document for the purpose of proving an important clause would not be using it as a collateral purpose."
To the aforesaid principles, one more principle may be added, namely, that a document required to be registered, if unregistered, can be admitted in evidence as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance.
The main provision in Section 49 provides that any document which is required to be registered, if not registered, shall not affect any immovable property comprised therein nor such document shall be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property. Proviso, however, would show that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by 1908 Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered may be received as an evidence to the contract in a suit for specific performance or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. By virtue of proviso, therefore, an unregistered sale deed of an immovable property of the value of ₹ 100/- and more could be admitted in evidence as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance of the contract. Such an unregistered sale deed can also be admitted in evidence as an evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered document. When an unregistered sale deed is tendered in evidence, not as evidence of a completed sale, but as proof of an oral agreement of sale, the deed can be received in evidence making an endorsement that it is received only as evidence of an oral agreement of sale under the proviso to Section 49 of 1908 Act.
If any issue with regard to the admissibility of unregistered sale deed dated 27.2.2006 in evidence has been struck by the trial court, obviously, such issue would be decided in accordance with law. Suffice, however, to say that looking to the nature of the suit, which happens to be a suit for specific performance, the trial court was not justified in refusing to admit the unregistered sale deed dated 27.2.2006 tendered by the plaintiff in evidence.
The argument of the respondents with regard to Section 3(b) of 1963 Act is noted to be rejected. We fail to understand how the said provision helps the respondents as the said provision provides that nothing in 1963 Act shall be deemed to affect the operation of 1908 Act, on documents. By admission of an unregistered sale deed in evidence in a suit for specific performance as evidence of contract, none of the provisions of 1908 Act is affected; rather court acts in consonance with proviso appended to Section 49 of 1908 Act.
The result is that appeal is allowed, The trial court shall mark the unregistered sale deed dated 27.2.2006 tendered by the plaintiff in her evidence and proceed with the suit accordingly.
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2010 (4) TMI 1183 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of lack of good faith and not even a reasonable care has been taken. It appears, on the other hand, that defendant No. 1 entered into contract of purchase of the property with open eyes. The reason for saying so is that the appellant does not enter into witness box to make out the case in pleading and second in his own plaint vide Exh. 36, he had made an averment and assertion that the shop and the property belonged to the joint family. This clearly shows that defendant No. 1 has had full knowledge of the property being owned by the family and not by defendant No. 2 alone. The appellant, therefore, could not be treated to be a bona fide purchaser. Although I find that the property is not a joint family property as such, all the same it is jointly acquired property in which each one of them has equal share. In the circumstances, there is no difficulty in confirming the judgment and decree as passed by the Court below. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. No order as to costs.
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2010 (4) TMI 1182 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s, it is clear that an application under Section 12 or for that matter, applications under Sections 18, 19, 20, 22 etc. of the Act, are required to be passed, like the orders are passed on an application under Section 125 and the related provisions. 4. It is clear that the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, are mainly made for giving relief to the affected women, due to domestic violence etc. The respondent in such case is not an accused, until he commits a breach of an order passed by the Court under the provisions of the Act. It is only after such breach, the respondent is treated as an accused under Section 31 of the Act. In other words, the proceeding under the Act are of the quasi civil nature and in such proceeding, the Court would have power to allow amendment in an application and written statement. 5. The petition should fail. It stands dismissed. The lower Court shall decide the application within six months at least from today.
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2010 (4) TMI 1181 - HIGH COURT GAUHATI
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... ... ..... d two decisions rendered by Andhra Pradesh High Court and Calcutta High Court. In both the decisions, the High Courts have emphasised on the need to assign detailed reasons while holding that it is not sufficient merely to show in the notice that the transfer is proposed to "facilitate the detailed and co-ordinated investigation". In the Andhra Pradesh High Court decision the said quoted portion, was assigned to be the reasons, which did not find favour of the Court. 14. In view of the above, the writ petition succeeds on both counts, i.e. non-issuance of notice to the petitioner and non-furnishing of reasons for transferring the matter from Guwahati to New Delhi. Consequently, the impugned order dt. 1st Aug., 2007 (Annex. B) stands set aside and quashed. The writ petition is allowed, however, without any order as to costs. 15. Setting aside of the impugned order may not preclude the respondents from proceeding with the matter in accordance with law, if so advised.
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2010 (4) TMI 1180 - ITAT AGRA
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... ... ..... pinion of the ld. Third Member. The ld. Third Member has agreed with the view of the ld. Accountant Member. Therefore, in view of the majority decision, the assessee’s appeal is partly allowed. 2. In the result, appeal of the assessee is treated as allowed in part. (Order pronounced in the open Court on 13.04.2010).
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2010 (4) TMI 1179 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... policy including the excess clause. It then proceeds to put an interpretation thereon which is contrary to the express words of the contract and opposed to the well recognised insurance practices and principles. Hence the award was rightly set aside by the High Court. 17. If the amount of each and every embezzlement had been separately recorded in the award of the Arbitrator, the court could have calculated the amount that was due, instead of remitting the matter to the Arbitrator for fresh decision. But that is not possible, as the particulars are not available. 18. In view of the above, we uphold the decision of the High Court and dismiss the appeal. If however the appellant is not interested in proceeding afresh before the arbitrator after all these years, and is willing to accept the sum of ₹ 29,000/-, offered by the insurer, it may inform the insurer accordingly in which event, the insurer shall pay the same to the appellant -Bank, if it had not already been paid.
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