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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 64 Records
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1977 (5) TMI 24 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-B
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... ... ..... was exercised by the ITO of taxing the share income in the hands of the partners, he had no jurisdiction to tax the total income of the unregistered partnership firm in its hands. The reply given by the Departmental Representative to this contention was that w.e.f. 1st April, 1971 some amendment has been made in s. 67(1)(a) and these decisions would not be applicable. We find that in ITA No. 1508 of 1974-75, it was held that those decisions still held good. A copy of that order has been given. One of us was a party to it. Following the reasons given in that order, we hold that having once assessed the share income in the hands of some of the partners, the ITO could not have refused to grant, registration to the firm. Our findings, therefore, are that it was a genuine partnership firm which had come into existence and the legal requirements had been duly complied with and it was entitled to registration. We, therefore, direct the ITO to register the firm and allow the appeal.
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1977 (5) TMI 23 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-A
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... ... ..... other two partners of Nanhoomal Jyoti Pd. had also been able to file their IT and WT returns after Dec. 1971 only. All these facts support the contention of the assessee that the books of the firm Nanhoomal Jyoti Pd. were closed only toward the end of 1971. The fact that there were serious disputes between the partners of Nanhoomal Jyoti Pd. has also been accepted in the appeals filed by the firm against the penalties levied for delay in the filing of Income-tax returns. We, therefore, agree with the AAC that the delay in the filing of the returns was for a reasonable cause and the levy of penalties was not justified. In this view of the matter it is not necessary for us to consider the additional claim of Sri Jain that penalties for the asst. yrs. 1967-68 and 1968-69 could be levied with reference to the rates as they stood before their amendment on 1st April, 1969. In view of the above, the order of the AAC cancelling the penalties is upheld and the appeals are dismissed.
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1977 (5) TMI 22 - SUPREME COURT
Dutiability - Exemption for captive use ... ... ... ... ..... the learned Additional Solicitor General now appearing for the Revenue does not do so either. 8.The said notification applies to the use of goods falling under Tariff Item 68 (which is not in dispute) which are manufactured in a factory and are intended to be used in that factory. The parts that the assessee manufactured in its factory and used in its factory in the repair of old transformers were, therefore, entitled to the benefit of the said notification. 9.Insofar as parts which were purchased from the market and upon which excise duty had already been paid are concerned, there was no obligation to pay excise duty over again. 10.The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the Tribunal, insofar as it deals with parts used in the repair of old transformers, is set aside and it is ordered that the assessee is not to be made liable to pay excise duty on the value of parts that it used in the aforestated manner in the repair of old transformers. 11.No order as to costs.
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1977 (5) TMI 21 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Oil colours dutiable under Tariff Item 14D ... ... ... ... ..... on are outside the scope of this tariff entry on the ground that these are not used in any dyeing process therefore fails. The second contention of the petitioners that the demand in question could be issued only in accordance with rule 10 and not rule 10A is however a valid one. Government accordingly direct that the demand should be worked out for the period of three months under rule 10. Subject to this modification, the R.A. is otherwise rejected.
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1977 (5) TMI 20 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Seizure of books of accounts and records - Time limit for issue of show cause notice ... ... ... ... ..... the ground of limitation, according to me, have got no substance. Regarding the question of violation of principles of natural justice and that too on the basis as mentioned hereinbefore, it appears to me that such submissions are also devoid of any substance. From a reference to the successive orders and more particularly the orders in Annexures B and C, it would appear that the petitioner asked for inspection of the documents and in fact inspection of some of the documents was taken by them. But suddenly they changed their mind and refused to take inspection. When inspection was afforded and the said firm has taken recourse to such opportunity, it cannot but be held that there was no violation of any principles of natural justice. 7. In view of the above, the arguments of Mr. Chakraborty fail, so also the Rule. The Rule is thus discharged. There will be no order as to costs. Let it be recorded that apart from the grounds as mentioned hereinbefore, no other point was argued.
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1977 (5) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Valuation - Batteries - Held further ... ... ... ... ..... not be a part of the sale price and no excise duty can be held to be exigible thereon. 6. Mr. Chatterjee, appearing for the petitioner, made a further submission that the revisional authorities in passing the order proceeded solely on the basis that since the free supply of the containers were not a trade discount, they were not allowable under the Explanation to Section 4 of the Act. The authorities did not advert to what is the manufacturing cost as defined by the Supreme Court. This contention of Mr. Chatterjee is also in my view sound and be accepted. 7. In the view that I have taken, the impugned order dated 4th October 1975 must be quashed by a Writ of Certiorari and the respondent must be directed by a Writ of Mandamus to forbear from giving effect to the said order in any manner whatsoever. The respondent would be at liberty to proceed according to law. 8. There will be no order as to costs. 9. The operation of my order is stayed for a period of four weeks from date.
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1977 (5) TMI 18 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Valuation - De-husked Barley ... ... ... ... ..... ment of India observe that the de-husked barley is packed in gunny bags of 25 kgs. to 100 kgs. This packing cannot be considered as packing in a unit container ordinarily intended for sale. In this view of the matter the Revision Application is allowed.
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1977 (5) TMI 17 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Valuation - Post manufacturing expenses - Exclusion of - Wholesale cash price - Scope of - Old Section 4 - Scope of. - Connotation of. - Excise duty - Taxable event
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1977 (5) TMI 16 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, one-fourth share of the deceased in the joint family properties, to which she was entitled under section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, was correctly included in her estate as property deemed to pass on her death under section 7 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 ?
Held that:- By virtue of the provisions of the Act of 1937 a Hindu widow undoubtedly possesses a coparcenary interest as contemplated by section 7(1) of the Act and she is also a member of a Hindu coparcenary as envisaged by section 7(2) of the Act. On the death of Smt. Alladi, therefore, there was clearly a cesser of her interest and her interest merged in the coparcenary property and by reason of the inclusive part of sub-section (1) of section 7, it must be taken to have passed on her death and was hence exigible to estate duty. Since Smt. Alladi was a member of the coparcenary, this interest of her's which passed on her death was liable to be valued in accordance with the method provided by section 39 of the Act.
The interpretation of section 40 of the Act is not free from difficulty, but as the present case squarely falls within the ambit of section 7(1), latter part, and sub-section (2) of section 7 of the Act which attracts section 39, it is not at all necessary for us to enter into the complex domain of the scope and ambit of section 40 of the Act in this case.
The result is that the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the question referred to the High Court is answered in the affirmative
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1977 (5) TMI 15 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
A Partner, Assessment Proceedings, Two Partners ... ... ... ... ..... interpretation that the view favourable to the assessee might be accepted. In Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Kripashankar Dayashanker Worah 1971 81 ITR 763 (SC) the Supreme Court pointed out as follows It is true that a taxing provision must receive a strict construction at the hands of the courts and if there is any ambiguity, the benefit of that ambiguity must go to the assessee. But that is not the same thing as saying that a taxing provision should not receive a reasonable construction. In every case it is the duty of the judge to consider which is the more reasonable view and accept that which is more reasonable. As I said, it is only where a judge finds that both the views are equally reasonable that he may resort to the rule of interpretation favouring the assessee. I am in clear agreement with the view expressed by Sharma J. BY THE COURT In view of the majority judgment, the question referred to the Bench is answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessees.
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1977 (5) TMI 14 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
HUF Property, Hindu Law, Income Of HUF, Rental Income, Revised Returns ... ... ... ... ..... uct that the property did not belong to a Hindu undivided family and had, therefore, been rightly offered to be assessed as income in his hands. It is not the assessee s case that there was a mistake and in fact, if it were so, the assessee would certainly have taken steps for revising the return for each of these years. When the dispute is as to whether the assessee had discharged the burden of establishing that the Hindu undivided family owning the property was in existence, the assessee s conduct in offering one-third of the rental income to be assessed in his own hands certainly goes a long way to negative the assessee s contention. A number of other authorities had been cited before us, but on the analysis we have presented above, we are satisfied that the matter should be concluded against the assessee-petitioner without reference to those other authorities. Each of the writ applications accordingly fails and is dismissed. We make no order as to costs. DAS J.--I agree.
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1977 (5) TMI 13 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Assessment Proceedings, Income Tax Act, Notice Of Reassessment, Original Assessment, Reassessment Proceedings, Writ Petition
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1977 (5) TMI 12 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... the revenue and against the assessee. We express our opinion in the affirmative in regard to the question referred to us in each reference. The assessee shall pay costs of each reference to the revenue. For the purposes of record, it may be stated that learned counsel for the assessee cited Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax 1966 59 ITR 767 (SC) and H. H. Setu Parvati Bayi v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax 1968 69 ITR 864 (SC), during the course of his argument, but in the view that we are taking, the principle laid down in the aforesaid decisions will not have any bearing on the question referred to us for our opinion and, therefore, we need not enter into any discussion pertaining to the principle laid down therein. For similar reasons, we do not propose to discuss the principle enunciated either in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sitaldas Tirathdas 1961 41 ITR 367 (SC) or in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sri Jagannath Jew 1977 107 ITR 9 (SC).
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1977 (5) TMI 11 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Appeal Against Assessment, Registration Of Firm ... ... ... ... ..... t has been clearly found The Income-tax Officer pointed out that there was no application for the assessment year 1968-69, as required under the provision of section 184(8) of the Act. An application in Form No. 11 A was submitted on February 5,1971, along with a petition for condoning the delay in the making of the application. The application was rejected and assessment was completed treating the firm as an unregistered one. Learned standing counsel has produced the original order of the Income-tax Officer at the time of hearing and we clearly find that there is actually a rejection. Once there was a refusal in the matter of registration, an appeal lay and the assessee having chosen not to prefer that appeal, this court declined to interfere in the matter in the reported decision. We see no scope for interference in the matter in the circumstances indicated. The writ application must accordingly fail and is dismissed. There would be no direction for costs. DAS J.--I agree.
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1977 (5) TMI 10 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Audit Objection, Income Escaped Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... any new information which came into the possession of the Income-tax Officer subsequent to the original assessments. In Raj Kumar Shrawan Kumar v. Central Board of Direct Taxes 1977 107 ITR 570 (All) a Division Bench of this court (of which one of us was a member) held that an information coming from the audit department of the Ministry of Law would amount to information within the meaning of section 147 of the Income-tax Act. In view of this ruling, we are unable to accept the contention of Sri Jagdish Swarup, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the Income-tax Officer had no information on the basis of which he could form a belief that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment and that he proceeded merely on a change of his earlier opinion. Thus, none of the impugned notices under section 147 of the Act is shown to be illegal. In the result, this petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1977 (5) TMI 9 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Unquoted Shares ... ... ... ... ..... company advances loan to the shareholder less than the accumulated profit, then the entirety of the loan to the extent the company has accumulated profit would be treated as dividend in the hands of the shareholder. Considering the point involved in this reference in the light of the above observation, it appears to us that the advance made to the assessee in the assessment year 1952-53 to the extent of the accumulated profit of that year, viz., Rs. 4,003, and not to the extent of 25 per cent. (being the one-fourth share of the assessee) of the said amount of accumulated profit would be taxable as dividend under section 2(6A)(e) read with section 12(1B) of the said Act in the assessment year 1955-56. In the above view of the matter, the decision of the Tribunal cannot be supported. Therefore, our answer to the question referred is in the negative and in favour of the revenue. In the fac ts and circumstances of this case, we do not make any order as to costs. DEB J.-I agree.
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1977 (5) TMI 8 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Unquoted Shares ... ... ... ... ..... lth-tax Rules by the Wealth-tax (Amendment) Rules, 1967, were applicable to pending assessments of the assessees even though such assessments related to assessment years prior to the date of coming into force of those rules and the relevant valuation dates were also prior to that date. As a result of the foregoing discussion we answer the question referred to us in each of these cases against the assessee and in favour of the revenue and as follows On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was not justified in holding that rules 1C and 1D introduced by the Wealth-tax (Amendment) Rules, 1967, by notification dated October 6, 1967, do not apply for valuation of the unquoted shares of the assessees in pending assessment proceedings for the assessment years 1965-66 and 1966-67 as the relevant valuation dates for those years preceded October 6, 1967. In the circumstances of these references, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1977 (5) TMI 7 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Assessment Proceedings, Hundi Loans, Original Assessment, Reassessment Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... t permission for the issue of a notice under section 148, but in the instant case, the permission was granted by the Additional Commissioner of Income-tax and, accordingly, the notice was invalid. This argument is devoid of any merit, for section 2(16) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, defines the word Commissioner as meaning a person appointed to be a Commissioner of Income-tax under sub-section (1) of section 117, and includes a person appointed to be an Additional Commissioner of Income-tax under that sub-section. No other point has been argued on behalf of either party. In view of the discussion made above, we set aside the judgment of the learned trial judge and discharge the rule. The appeal is allowed, but there will be no order as to costs. Let the operation of this judgment remain stayed for a period of six weeks from date, as prayed for by the learned advocate for the respondent, so as to enable the respondent to prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court. SHARMA J.--I agree.
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1977 (5) TMI 6 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Assessment Proceedings, Hundi Loans, Original Assessment, Reassessment Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... ce Act, 1959, reads thus In addition, in the case of a company referred to in clause (ii) of the preceding proviso which has distributed to its shareholders during the previous year dividends in excess of 6 per cent. of its paid-up capital, not being dividends payable at a fixed rate........ The expression used is a a company which has distributed to its shareholders...... dividends . The words has distributed cannot mean has declared . Further, the aforesaid expression is unambiguous and it connotes the idea that, after the declaration of dividends, the company has actually or constructively distributed the dividends to its shareholders. Though Rs. 1,05,000 was declared as dividends, Rs. 47,000 was only distributed by the company. Therefore, the Tribunal was right in holding that Rs. 47,000 and not Rs. 1,05,000 was distributed as dividends. We accordingly return our answer in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. PYNE J.-I agree.
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1977 (5) TMI 5 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appeal Against Assessment, Registration Of Firm ... ... ... ... ..... nal is directed to ascertain the terms and conditions of the contracts in question, if any, in respect of supply of materials and determine whether the assessee bid for such contracts taking into account such materials which were in fact supplied. If it is found on such facts that there was an element of profit involved in the materials supplied then the profits of the assessee will be estimated on the gross receipts of the assessee computed by including the value of the materials supplied to the net receipts. The Tribunal will be at liberty to take further evidence in the matter and will afford opportunity to the parties to adduce further evidence and to make further representations in the matter. We make it clear that the remand is in respect of only the assessment year 1962-63. In the other assessment years the assessee having succeeded in its cross-objections the matter appears to be concluded. In the facts and circumstances we make no order as to costs. DEB J.--I agree.
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