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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 64 Records
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1968 (7) TMI 50 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as a succession in the business, is satisfied in the instant case and even the fact that the business is carried on in the same premises as before, is explained by the fact that the landlord has recognised the first petitioner-firm as his tenants and it is not by virtue of any transfer of tenancy rights by Kailas Oil Mills to the first petitioner-firm that the business is carried on in the same premises as before. It is, therefore, clear that the respondent had no jurisdiction to proceed to recover the sales tax dues of M/s. Kailas Oil Mills from the first petitioner-firm. In the result, we allow this special civil application and issue a writ of certiorari quashing the notice and the assessment orders, annexure C to the petition, and also issue a writ of mandamus permanently restraining the respondent, his servants and agents, from enforcing or executing the said notice and the assessment orders as against the petitioners. Rule made absolute with costs. Application allowed.
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1968 (7) TMI 49 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt made on that basis without invoking best judgment, section 12 does not authorise the revenue to levy penalty. This principle has been laid down by this Court in Bata Shoe Company (P.) Ltd. v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer 1968 21 S.T.C. 135. which applies squarely to this case. The tax case is allowed. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1968 (7) TMI 48 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ndered by the respondents and drop any further proceedings in this behalf. I emphasise and it is worth emphasising that no officer of the Government, however high or exalted he may be, can take upon himself the responsibility of judging the correctness or validity of an order of any Court and, if he honestly and bona fide, in the discharge of his functions, feels that the order is erroneous or requires any modification, the only remedy open to him is to approach that Court by way of review or modification or a higher Court by way of appeal or otherwise. Apart from that, it is not open to him to take upon himself the responsibility of judging the order and take any action contrary to or inconsistent with the same on the basis of his own judgment. If once an officer is permitted or allowed to do any such thing, that will mean the end of the very principle of rule of law on the basis of which the entire fabric of our democratic society has been constructed. Ordered accordingly.
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1968 (7) TMI 47 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Additional super-tax on the undistributed income - liability to pay super-tax under section 23A of the IT Act, 1922
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1968 (7) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT
Karta of HUF was partner in a firm representing his family, was appointed manager of firm - salary paid to Karta could not be treated as income of HUF - Revenue's appeal dismissed
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1968 (7) TMI 45 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Court – Jurisdiction of and Payments of certain debts out of assets subject to floating charge in priority to claims under the charge
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1968 (7) TMI 37 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Circumstances in which a company may be wound up, Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Winding up - Appeals from orders, General
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1968 (7) TMI 36 - IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
Transfer of Shares – Power to refuse registration and appeal against refusal ... ... ... ... ..... me considerable trouble, as indeed it appears to have troubled Penny-cuick J. when he said that he was not concerned with exceptional cases. Section 78 of the Act of 1948 makes it a criminal offence if a transferee is not sent notice of a refusal to register within two months after the date when the transfer was lodged with the company. There is in that section no escape proviso such as unless some reasonable cause be shown. The point which gives me difficulty is how it can be said that there are exceptional cases when it would be reasonable for the time for the exercising of powers such as those under article 8 to exceed those two months, when it would yet be a criminal offence if the notice has not been given in less than those two months. That, however, is a problem which I am glad to say does not arise in the present case. Solicitors Wright, Bull and Laytons, for Emsley, Collins and Co., Leeds and Wetherby Denis Hayes and Co., for Stanley N. Walton and Hardy, Darlington.
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1968 (7) TMI 34 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Power of court trying offences under the act to direct filing of documents with registrar ... ... ... ... ..... nce, the quantum of sentence, in any event, appears to be severe. The learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respondents have in their fairness left the matter of sentence entirely to the court. Law is good but justice is better and it is expedient in the interests of justice that the sentence as passed in this case should reasonably be reduced, in the exigencies of the case. In the result, I uphold the order of conviction dated the 23rd November, 1966, passed by Sri A. Sengupta, Presidency Magistrate, 5th Court, Calcutta, in Case No. C/1453 of 1966, on the three accused-appellants under section 614A(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 but I reduce the sentence of fine as passed thereunder to a fine of Rs. 100 each, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two weeks each and I further direct under section 626 of the said Act that one-third of the fine, if realised, shall be applied towards the payment of the costs of the proceedings. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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1968 (7) TMI 33 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Circumstances in which a company may be wound up, Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Cost and expenses payable out of assets in a winding-up by Court
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1968 (7) TMI 15 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... e did not accept this suggested interpretation. We agree with him. The expression without spinning plants being an attribute should relate to the nearest noun factories and not to the remote noun manufacturer The interpretation suggested by counsel for the appellant necessitates the transference of the expression without spinning plants to the beginning part of the rule or the addition of certain words in order to give the rule more grammatical form. But that is not the proper method of interpretation. Nor does it appear to us to be necessary to overstration the language of the rule in that way. The natural construction should be accepted. According to the natural constructions the expression without spinning plants should qualify the nearest noun factories Accordingly the company rightly applied to the Collector for availaing of the Artificial Silk Fabrices in the factory which has got no spinning plants. There is no force in this appeal. Accordingly is dismissed with costs.
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1968 (7) TMI 14 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Procedure For Recovery, Winding Up ... ... ... ... ..... roceeding for the recovery of any sum payable under this Act shall be commenced after the expiration of three years from the latest day fixed for payment in the notice of demand served under section 30 or where the assessee has been treated as not being in default under the proviso to section 40 pending his appeal, after the expiration of three years from the date on which the appeal is decided. That proceedings for recovery are barred by reason of the above provision is not disputed, and cannot be disputed. But Ex. P-3 also threatens the petitioner with penalty proceedings in case of default in paying the tax. I have not been shown any provision in the statute which places an embargo on imposing penalty beyond a certain time from the date of the assessment. I, therefore, allow this O.P. to the limited extent of quashing Ex. P-2 in so far as it seeks to recover the amount due from the petitioner by revenue recovery proceedings, and dismiss it otherwise. No order as to costs.
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1968 (7) TMI 13 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Writ petition against the order of the Munsif - production of the statement - neither the repeal of the Income-tax Act of 1922 nor the enactment of the Income-tax Act of 1961 nor indeed the omission of section 137 from the Act of 1961, had obliterated the obligation imposed by section 54. The income-tax authorities as also the petitioner were justified in their stand that the statement in question could not be produced in court and the learned Munsif was not right in insisting upon its production
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1968 (7) TMI 12 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Can the AO assess one of the persons for his share income in one of the businesses and again assess the AOP for the income of the same business - Held, no - because Association of Persons and the members of the association are distinct and different entities. The Income-tax Officer had an option either to assess the AOP or its members individually and not both the entities for the same income
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1968 (7) TMI 11 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
An application for reference was not made to the Tribunal within the time limit specified - In such a case, can a direct reference be made to the High Court - Held, No
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1968 (7) TMI 10 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Valuation of the assets - balance-sheet, relevant to the valuation date - assessee adopted the written down value in its return for wealth-tax and claimed, a deduction of the difference between the written value and the book value of the assets - held that, Tribunal proceeded on the wrong basis that, once the global method u/s 7(2)(a) is adopted, the balance-sheet could not be departed from and individual assets cannot at all be separately valued for any reason
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1968 (7) TMI 9 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
In view of loss incurred by assessee company its managing agent relinquished their right to remuneration - Assessee company subsequently made profits and paid to its managing agent Rs. 60,000 over and above their usual remuneration - held that Tribunal was right in disallowing the payment of Rs. 60,000 u/s 10(2)(xv) and/or section 10(1)
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1968 (7) TMI 8 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Re-opening of assessment - jurisdiction to issue the notice u/s 148 ... ... ... ... ..... be decided is whether the impugned order or notice is passed by the officer concerned in exercise of his lawful jurisdiction under any statute, then such incidental matters as has been referred to by the revenue cannot prevent the court from issuing a rule if the facts and circumstances justify it. It is thus seen that the impugned notice was sought to be issued by the respondent without jurisdiction and, in the ultimate analysis, he could not forward such a notice to the petitioner in the light of the election made in the earlier proceedings by the revenue. On these two grounds it is clear that there is a patent lack of jurisdiction which is apparent on the face of the record and the petitioner is, therefore, entitled to a writ of prohibition restraining the respondent from making any assessment as proposed by him in the impugned notice as against the petitioner. The rule nisi is, therefore, made absolute and this writ petition is allowed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1968 (7) TMI 7 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Rectification order made u/s 35 - limitation ... ... ... ... ..... directions of the superior tribunal, yet held that no manifest injustice resulted from such refusal. It must be remembered that the order of the Tribunal dated April 22, 1954, was not under challenge before the Judicial Commissioner. That order had become final and binding on the parties, and the respondent could not question it in any way. As a matter of fact, the Commissioner of Income-tax had made an application for a reference, which application was subsequently withdrawn. The Judicial Commissioner was not sitting in appeal over the Tribunal and we do not think that, in the circumstances of this case it was open to him to say that the order of the Tribunal was wrong and, therefore, there was no injustice in disregarding that order. As we have said earlier, such a view is destructive of one of the basic principles of the administration of justice. It follows that there are no merits in this writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1968 (7) TMI 6 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Trust - public religious and charitable trust - exempt u/s 4(3)(I) of the IT Act, 1922 ... ... ... ... ..... income of the trust property, except for a sum of Rs. 900 per year, may be exempt under section 4(3)(i) of the Act. And we answer the reference in that manner but we make it quite clear that we express no opinion as to whether the funds were in fact applied and accumulated for the aforesaid purposes or not, in any year or in the particular year of assessment. That matter is not covered by the reference and, therefore, we propose not to answer that question and we answer the reference that has been made in the following manner Except for clause (d) the trust is for public religious and charitable purposes and except for a sum of Rs. 900 per year the said income, if properly applied or accumulated, would be exempt under section 4(3)(i) of the Act. The assessee will get the costs. The first question thus being answered in the aforesaid manner, the second question does not arise and we decline to answer the second question as this is unnecessary. SANKAR PRASAD MITRA J.- I agree.
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