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Showing 41 to 60 of 310 Records
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1995 (7) TMI 403 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assessing authority has only undertaken such an exercise in the present case on hand. The question as to whether in a particular case the authority who has issued show cause notice had pre-conceived notions or views or conclusions is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case and there cannot be any hard and fast rules or any general principle of universal application the same being a mere question of appreciation of facts. On the facts of the case on hand and on going through the notice challenged in this case, we are satisfied that the notice contains only proposals and the respondent-authority could not be accused of or attributed with any pre-conceived ideas or notions about the merits of the claims of the case. Consequently, we do not think that the judgment of the Division Bench has any relevance to the facts and circumstances of this case. The writ appeal therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed. No costs. Writ appeals dismissed.
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1995 (7) TMI 402 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tating that the rate of alleged handling charges collected differs slightly from one bill to another . But, from this observation about slight difference from one bill to another alone, the learned counsel cannot build up an argument that the Tribunal erred in law in dealing with the abovesaid question, particularly in the light of the above referred to other features mentioned by the Tribunal. The Tribunal also gives certain other reasons. But, there is no necessity to go into those reasons, since in these tax revisions under section 38 of the Act, we have only to see whether any error of law has been committed by the Tribunal. Once we find that no material evidence has been overlooked by the Tribunal as contended by learned counsel for the assessee, we are unable to see any error of law in the order of the Tribunal below. 10.. In the result, we dismiss both the tax case revisions. However, in the circumstances of the case there is no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1995 (7) TMI 401 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t purchase on the goods already. Since the material placed before the Tribunal did not provide an answer to this question, the Tribunal considered that this matter should go back to the file of the assessing authority for verification. In that view of the matter, the appeals were remitted back to the file of the assessing officer for verification whether Alangudi dealers have paid the tax already on their purchase. 5.. Inasmuch the appeals filed before the Tribunal were remitted back for verification and disposal on such verification in accordance with law and on merits we consider that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal in the case of each of the assessee to warrant interference by this Court. Accordingly, we are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal in remitting back the appeals for through examination and verification of the relevant records. 6.. In the result, all the tax cases are dismissed. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1995 (7) TMI 400 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... passed by the Deputy Commissioner under section 32 of the Act. 3.. The fact remains that the assessee is having an ice cream parlour and selling ice cream in glass cups and the customers used to consume the ice cream there itself and they are not carrying the ice cream away from the ice cream parlour. Since the ice cream is supplied in the glass cups the customers are bound to return the cups after consuming the ice cream. This fact was ascertained by the assessing officer himself on his personal visit. Since there is service element is involved in the present case, the sale turnover is not taxable as per the decision reported in 1978 42 STC 386 (SC) and 1980 45 STC 212 (SC) Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor o Delhi . Accordingly, we see no infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal in setting aside the revisional order passed by the Deputy Commissioner under section 32 of the Act. In the result, the revision is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1995 (7) TMI 399 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e in all the writ petitions one of the grounds by way of challenge to the detention order is that procedure requisite for issuing a warrant of arrest and ordering detention, as postulated by rule 119 of the Land Reforms Rules, has not been followed and we have held that failure to do so vitiates the detention, it is not necessary to narrate the facts of these cases. As noted above, Mr. Dholakia, learned counsel for the respondents had conceded before us that there was nothing on record to show that any such exercise was undertaken. Consequently, we quash the warrants of detention already issued or proposed to be issued, against each of the petitioners on the basis of recovery certificates issued for the entire demand due from them at the relevant time when the last recovery certificate in form No. ST-17 was issued and make the rule absolute. 27. For the foregoing reasons, all the writ petitions are allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Writ petitions allowed.
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1995 (7) TMI 398 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and wrong by virtue of the retrospective operation of the Amendment Act. But such a result is necessarily involved in the legal fiction about the retrospective operation of the Amendment Act. 11.. At the time the assessing officer was asked to rectify the error, he had necessarily to read the Act as prescribing the rate of 10 per cent for these assessment years. The assessment order made on basis that rate was 15 per cent was clearly not in accordance with the statute and was a error of law apparent from the face of the record. The submission by the counsel for the petitioner that the mistake of law is apparent on the face of the record is sound and must be accepted. The impugned orders are therefore quashed. The respondents shall carry out the necessary rectification in the assessments, in the light of the altered law and grant such relief as the petitioner may be entitled to in the circumstances of the case. The writ petitions are allowed. No costs. Writ petitions allowed.
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1995 (7) TMI 397 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 85 156 ITR 323 wherein it was held Where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a manifestly unjust result which could never have been intended by the Legislature, the court might modify the language used by the Legislature so as to achieve the intention of the Legislature and produce a rational result. The period of limitation in any statute confers a very valuable right on any litigant. Interpreting the provision, as contended by the learned Government Pleader, would take away that right of the limitation from the litigant and thus produces unjust result. In this view of the matter we are unable to sustain the order under revision. The order of the Tribunal dated August 17, 1987, in Tribunal Appeal No. 16 of 1983 is set aside and the order of revision passed by the Deputy Commissioner is held to be beyond the period of limitation. The tax revision case is accordingly allowed but, in the circumstances of the case, without costs. Petition allowed.
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1995 (7) TMI 396 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sitation in holding that the impugned order cannot be sustained both on facts as well as on the principle of law thus stated. If, as submitted by the learned Government Pleader, the purpose of attachment is to ensure that there should be enough security for the recovery of the tax, that has been secured, though to some extent only, by the order of the Additional Commissioner and Joint Commissioner requiring the petitioner to give bank guarantee for half of the amount in question. Therefore there is no need again to issue the impugned order. Be that as it may, even if all other requirements of section 17-B are satisfied, in our view the impugned notice cannot be sustained while the conditional order of stay granted by the competent authority is in force and the petitioner has complied with the conditions of that order. For the above reason we hold that the impugned order is illegal, and quash the same. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No costs. Writ petition allowed.
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1995 (7) TMI 395 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y of the petitioner-company to pay purchase tax and other taxes as per the law in existence at the relevant time. There is further agreement between the parties that the returns will be filed within 60 days and no question of limitation with respect to the returns will be raised. The Assessing Authority will decide the tax liability under the law as then applicable in the light of the decision of honourable the Supreme Court in Jagatjit Sugar Mills case 1995 96 STC 344 JT 1994 (6) SC 534. In view of the decision given by honourable the Supreme Court no answer is required to be given in these writ petitions as the questions posed have been rendered academic. All the contentions are kept open. The Assessing Authority is directed to dispose of these matters expeditiously. The petitioners will be at liberty to apply for any direction if a need arises. In view of the observations made above, the writ petitions stand disposed of accordingly. Writ petitions disposed of accordingly.
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1995 (7) TMI 394 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pect to certain turnover was legally correct. Therefore, that decision was rendered on the facts available on record. Following the decisions of the Supreme Court in 1965 16 STC 875 (State of Kerala v. Cheria Abdulla and Company), 1976 38 STC 1 at page 7 (Ram Kanai Jamini Ranjan Pal Pvt. Ltd. v. Member, Board of Revenue) and the decision of this Court rendered in 1970 26 STC 176 (Velayutha Raja v. Board of Revenue), we hold that the Additional Deputy Commissioner has got no jurisdiction to make an assessment after issuing notice and hearing the assessee. The question of limitation does not arise in the present case. The Additional Deputy Commissioner exceeded the jurisdiction under section 32 of the Act. Therefore, we find that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal in setting aside the suo motu order passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner under section 32 of the Act. In that view of the matter, the revision is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1995 (7) TMI 393 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the delay in filing the petition. It is under such circumstances the abovesaid order was passed by the Division Bench of this Court. Therefore, the above judgment would not render any assistance to the respondent herein to contend that a fresh opportunity should be given to the department to file additional affidavit to explain the sufficient cause for condoning the delay. Such a contingency does not arise according to the facts arising in this case, because the department has already given a reason for the condonation of delay which is not acceptable as per the earlier pronouncements of the Supreme Court and various High Courts including a Division Bench of this Court, on this aspect. Accordingly, we consider that the Tribunal was not correct in condoning the delay of 209 days in filing the enhancement petition by the department. In that view of the matter, the order passed by the Tribunal stands set aside and this case (revision) stands allowed. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1995 (7) TMI 392 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tax at the rate of 7 per cent. Mr. Bharatji Agrawal has raised objection to the submission pointing out that this plea was never taken by the department at any stage either before assessing authority or before the appellate authority and the department had taken consistent stand that the items are unclassified. The objection raised by Mr. Agrawal is borne out from the record. I do not find such plea having been raised or considered by the assessing authority or the appellate authority. Therefore, this objection is upheld and the contention raised by the learned Standing Counsel is hereby rejected. 7.. For the aforesaid reasons I uphold the finding and judgment recorded by the Tribunal that the items in question are classified ones covered by entry No. 31 notified by Notification No. ST-II-7040/X-6(17)-76-U.P. Act-XV/48Order-77 dated September 30, 1977. There is no merit in this revision which is liable to be rejected. 8.. The revision is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1995 (7) TMI 391 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... -cake. If that is not proved by the assessee, necessarily it should be inferred that there was an implied sale of gunny bags also. No doubt in the decision in A. Prakasam Pillai and Sons v. State of Tamil Nadu 1993 91 STC 95 (Mad.) 1992 (2) MTCR 117, it has been held that there was no sale of container when jaggery was sold in the container since the value of the container was of insignificant value. Mat is not so in the present case. As we have already pointed out, the value of container was not of insignificant value. 5.. So, the net result is that we have to hold that without any evidence, the Tribunal has held that the sale of gunnies in the present case cannot be separated from the sale of oil-cake. Therefore, we set aside the order of the Tribunal in so far as the abovesaid turnover of Rs. 31,196 is concerned and confirm the order of the assessing officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in relation thereto. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1995 (7) TMI 390 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... asons mentioned above, we hold that the order, annexure P6, passed by the Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner (Appeals), Ambala, suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of it and it deserves to be set aside with a direction to the said authority to hear and decide the appeals filed by the petitioners on their merits. We further direct that the appellate authority shall consider and decide the applications filed by the petitioners under section 39(5) within a period of two months of the receipt of a certified copy of this order and till then proceedings for recovery of tax, penalty and interest from the petitioners shall remain stayed because the same remained stayed during the pendency of this writ petition. The writ petition is allowed in the manner indicated above but the parties are left to bear their own costs. The Registry of the court is directed to send a copy of this order to the Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner (Appeals), Ambala. Petition allowed.
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1995 (7) TMI 389 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt provision of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, which is also identical to the definition of the same term under the Central Sales Tax Act This definition is in two parts. The first part says that sale price means the amount payable to a dealer as consideration for the sale of any goods. Here, the concept of real price or actual price retainable by the dealer is irrelevant. The test is, what is the consideration passing from the purchaser to the dealer for the sale of the goods. It is immaterial to enquire as to how the amount of consideration is made up, whether it includes excise duty or sales tax or freight. The only relevant question to ask is as to what is the amount payable by the purchaser to the dealer as consideration for the sale and not as to what is the net consideration retainable by the dealer. (Emphasis supplied) 6.. We, therefore, see no merit in this revision and accordingly it is dismissed with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 1,000. Petition dismissed. Here italicised.
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1995 (7) TMI 388 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... State trade and commerce. The power in this behalf vests exclusively in the Parliament and unless the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, are amended, the fiction introduced under the State Act by the Haryana Legislature would not permit the levy of sales tax. (iv) Review Application No. 147 of 1993 filed by the petitioner is allowed. The order of assessment dated January 14, 1992, a copy of which has been appended as annexure P1 with C.W.P. No. 337 of 1992, is set aside. (v) Review Application No. 205 of 1993 filed by the State of Haryana is dismissed. (vi) Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 14757 and 14758 of 1993 and 4502 of 1995 are allowed. The orders of assessment impugned in C.W.Ps. Nos. 14757 of 1993 and 4502 of 1995 are set aside. (vii) The cases are remitted to the assessing authority for a fresh decision in accordance with law and the conclusions recorded above. In the circumstances of these cases, we make no order as to costs. Petitions disposed of accordingly.
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1995 (7) TMI 387 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ware of the expression glass bottles since in the First Schedule there was entry 54 (as already noted) charging specifically glass bottles Here italicised. to tax at single point, and that after the deletion of that entry 54, when entry 102 was introduced, in the year 1974, if the Legislature really wanted to include glass bottles also, for taxing as a single point commodity, the Legislature would have used the expression glass bottles specifically in the 1974 amendment itself. But the Legislature did not do so not only in 1974, but subsequently in 1983 also. Only in 1987, the term glass bottles once again appeared in entry 102. Therefore it is clear that prior to the 1987 amendment, glass bottles could not be brought into entry 102. The net result is, there is no reason for our interference with the impugned orders of the Tribunal in both the cases. 10.. Accordingly, these two revision petitions are dismissed. In the circumstances, no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1995 (7) TMI 386 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... compounding scheme under section 7-D of the Act. Benefit of the scheme under section 7-D was denied to the petitioner on the ground that the works carried out by the petitioner are not civil works. The respondents cannot blow hot and cold together. When the nature of the works undertaken by the petitioner is not that of civil works for the purposes of section 7-D, how can it be said that the works carried out by the petitioner are of the nature of civil works under clause (6) of the notification. Before us, counsel for the petitioner clearly stated that benefit of scheme under section 7-D is not sought and, therefore, we do not go into that question. The petitioner confines its case only to section 8-D of the Act. On the premises, the petition succeeds and is allowed and respondent No. 3 is directed not to deduct any amount from the running bill of the petitioner relating to his works of colouring and painting under a works contract dated January 24, 1995. Petition allowed.
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1995 (7) TMI 385 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y of penalty under section 12(5)(ii) was held to be not called for on the following reasoning ..........There is no time-limit prescribed for filing the revised return. In the absence of any time-limit prescribed for filing the revised return under the Act or the Rules, the question that the revised return has been filed belatedly would not arise. That being the position, the levy of penalty under section 12(5)(ii) is not called for. In view of the said decision in 1992 87 STC 508 (State of Tamil Nadu v. Dunlop India Ltd.) there is no error in the order of the Tribunal below in so far as the deletion of penalty under section 12(5)(ii) of the Act. 17.. The net result is, on the aforesaid question of levying tax on the abovesaid baling charges incurred by the assessee and on the question of levy of penalty under section 12(5)(iii) of the Act, the decision of the Tribunal is set aside. To that extent, the tax case (revision) is partly allowed. No costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1995 (7) TMI 384 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hird Edition , the Supreme Court held that in section 14(i) of the Central Act, the Parliament, by using the word coke , had no intention to give it a meaning other than the ordinary dictionary meaning which would cover petroleum coke. It was further observed the language employed in the expression was so wide that petroleum coke, which was a form of coke, could not possibly be excluded merely by reference to coke. There the question was whether petroleum coke would fall within the meaning of the said expression, namely, coke in all its forms . From the above discussion it follows that the expression coke in all its forms embraces stoker coke . Thus stoker coke falls within the meaning of entry 1 of the Third Schedule and consequently the turnover relating to its second sale would be exempted. For these reasons, we do not find any illegality in the order of the Tribunal to warrant our interference. The tax revision case is, therefore, dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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