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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 203 Records
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1981 (8) TMI 214 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es to be given by the Commissioner while disbursement of the amounts collected by him. This section cannot be relied upon by the respondents to contend that it is in conflict with section 5(1) of the Act. The right to collect tax in the order of priority as found in the Second Schedule, Part B, of Act 97 of 1976, could be applicable only when the Commissioner is approached for payment of the amount. In the instant case, the Commissioner has already rejected the claim of the third respondent on the ground that it has not been filed before 30th April, 1978. Therefore section 18 cannot be relied upon to contend that the right to collect sales tax from the undertaking of the Central Government is still preserved. Therefore, when on the main point itself it has been held that on the appointed day, the past liabilities of the company cannot be recovered either from the Central Government or the undertaking, the rule nisi issued is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (8) TMI 213 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... re is a completed transaction in respect of raw hides and skins and the assessee should be the last purchaser. This characteristic, if liable to be altered or changed subsequent to the provisional assessment, but well before the end of the assessment year, it would be premature to treat them as completed transactions, which come within the scope of item 7(a) of the Second Schedule, read with section 4 of the Act. In these assessments, only on presumptions, demand for tax has been made and hence the impugned demands are set aside. As stated earlier, if within the period of the provisional assessment, a finality had been reached in respect of any stocks of hides and skins, there can then be no impediment in demanding payment of tax from the concerned dealer in accordance with the provisions of the Act for instance, if raw hides and skins are converted as dressed hides and skins, etc. In this view, the impugned orders are quashed, resulting in rule nisi made absolute. No costs.
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1981 (8) TMI 212 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s had virtually entered into a new agreement and there was nothing to show that the said new agreement was in any way vitiated so as to make it null and void. Therefore, the decision in that case cannot be of any avail to the assessee in the present case where the terms and conditions of the original contract have not been in any way affected by the mere passing of the minute which we had held, cannot alter or vary the terms of the original contract. In the result, we hold that any component of the sale price including the transport charges in the present case has necessarily to be incurred by the assessee as an incident of sale which was, according to the contract, to be effected only at the harbour site. Accordingly, the assessee would not be entitled to the deduction of the transport charges under the head freight under rule 6(c)(i), from the total turnover. We, therefore, confirm the order of the Board of Revenue and dismiss this appeal with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1981 (8) TMI 211 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oducing, collecting, extracting, preparing or making any goods, it does not include such manufacture or manufacturing process, as may be prescribed. This definition is solely for making it plain that at certain places in the Act the word manufacture has the meaning given to it by the definition. However, the artificial concept given to the word manufacture by that definition cannot be read as making any process or manner of producing, collecting or extracting, etc., itself a manufacture in the sense of bringing into existence a new substance which is capable of being sold. In view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the two decisions referred to earlier on the meaning of the word manufacture used as a verb, it has to be held that the assessee is not a manufacturer. 5.. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the question, referred to us, in the negative. The assessee shall get the costs of this reference. Counsel s fee shall be at Rs. 75, if certified.
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1981 (8) TMI 210 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and made ready for immediate use, and the three yards pieces in question was prepared for a garment yet to be made or prepared. Applying this reasoning we are of the opinion that the collar-lining cannot be said to be an article, though prepared from cotton fabrics, which can be put to immediate use. If it has its use, it can be only to tailors for stiffening the collars of the garments. In that view of the matter, therefore, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the articles in question squarely fall within entry 37 of Schedule I to the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969, and the Deputy Commissioner was not justified in subjecting them to tax under the residuary entry 13 of Schedule III to the said Act. The result is that we have to answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the opponent-assessee and against the department. The State Government shall pay costs of this reference to the opponent-assessee. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1981 (8) TMI 209 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... preme Court held that dressed and frozen chicken was not a commercially distinct article from the original chicken. Killing, dressing and freezing a chicken was found not to result in a change of the commodity. It was no more drastic a change than the change which takes place in milk from pasteurizing, homogenizing, adding vitamin concentrates, standardising and bottling. 4.. Commercially prawns which are purchased by the assessee and prawns exported after processing for the purpose of such export are one and the same commodity as rightly held by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. We see no reason to interfere. The revision is dismissed. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner makes an oral application under article 134-A of the Constitution for certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of India. We see no substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court arising in the case. Leave declined. Petition dismissed.
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1981 (8) TMI 208 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cable to the instant case where there is no change in the form of paper. In the case referred to above there was at least reverting of the steel rolled sections. This Court in that judgment considered that the length of the rolled steel sections is not a part of their form and the mere cutting up of the rolled steel sections into smaller pieces, or if the rolled steel sections are joined together by reverting, they do not in any way change the form. Here it is a mere process of cutting newsprint reels into smaller reams and, therefore, it cannot be said to be any change in the form and, therefore, sale of those papers can certainly be said to be a resale to be covered under clause (i) of sub-section (26) of section 2 of the respective Acts. In view of the above discussion, we answer the reference in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the department. The department shall pay the costs of this reference to the assessee. Reference answered accordingly.
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1981 (8) TMI 207 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... application of the petitioner for registration according to law and in the light of the observations indicated in the above judgment. There will be no order as to costs. In re National jute Manufacturers Corporation Ltd., Unit Alexandra (3rd application). In view of my judgment delivered today in the case of M/s. National jute Manufacturers Corporation Ltd. (1st application), this rule must be made absolute. There will be a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 18th March, 1981, which is annexure H to the petition, and a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to forbear from giving any effect in any manner whatsoever. The respondents are also directed to dispose of the pending application of the petitioner for registration in accordance with law and in the light of the observations indicated in the above judgment. There will be no order as to costs. Stay of operation of the order is prayed for and is refused. Rule made absolute.
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1981 (8) TMI 206 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... forms from the selling dealer. From the notice dated 6th December, 1980, sent by the assessee-firm to the Paper Syndicate it is seen that M/s. Paper Syndicate was withholding the E-II forms on account of certain outstanding due from the appellant. In the circumstances, it is obligatory on the part of the appellant to settle the dues and produce the E-II forms from M/s. Paper Syndicate. The absence of issue of summons by the assessing officer to M/s. Paper Syndicate cannot be availed of by the appellant for raising the plea that there is a violation of the principles of natural justice in making the assessment. As no violation of principles of natural justice has been established in this case, the learned single judge of this Court is perfectly justified in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy provided to the appellant. We, therefore, see no reason to entertain this writ appeal and it accordingly stands dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1981 (8) TMI 205 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d been made and the petitioner had made no proper application for refund under section 14 within one year of the date of recomputation, the application would have been barred by time but if there is no recomputation the question of any limitation does not arise. Nothing has been decided in that unreported decision which is relevant for our present purpose. 6.. We are, therefore, of the view that the rejection of the refund applications for the reasons indicated in annexure-1 are untenable and irrelevant. With the setting aside of the assessments, the demand even for additional tax has been wiped out and the part payment made out of the demand which has been set aside has become refundable. The order under annexure-1 is quashed and a writ of mandamus shall issue to the Sales Tax Officer to refund the amount paid against assessments which have been set aside, in accordance with law to the petitioner. There will be no order for costs. DR. MISRA, J.-I agree. Ordered accordingly.
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1981 (8) TMI 204 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e turnover to the best of judgment. What method should have been adopted by him has been laid down by numerous decisions of this Court. Past history has always been considered to be relevant consideration. The assessing and the appellate authorities therefore in basing their decisions on the past history did not commit any error of law. What happened in earlier years could have been a guide for the year in dispute but non-taxability of the assessee in subsequent years could not reflect back. The revising authority was not justified in declaring the assessee non-taxable only because in subsequent years it was found that its turnover was below taxable limit. In the circumstances, both the revisions succeed and are allowed. The order passed by the Additional judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, is set aside. The Tribunal shall determine the turnover afresh in accordance with law. The Commissioner of Sales Tax is entitled to costs which is assessed at Rs. 50 one set. Petitions allowed.
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1981 (8) TMI 203 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... The learned counsel further urged that for failure of producing accounts at the time of survey its account books could not be rejected. It is not necessary to go into the controversy as admittedly the assessee did not produce its cash book. The revising authority found that cash book was maintained. It is primary book of account. In its absence sales and purchases of the assessee could not have been verifiable. The authorities therefore did not commit any error in rejecting the account books. In the result this revision succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the Additional judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, is set aside. The assessee is held nontaxable on manufacture of apple juice sold to M/s. Mohan Meakin Breweries. In respect of the turnover in excess over the disclosed turnover it shall be examined whether any evidence is on record to show that sale was made to customers. For this limited purpose the revising authority shall decide the revision again. Petition allowed.
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1981 (8) TMI 202 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... has been made, for it gives a respite of three months to every dealer including one who has admitted his tax liability. We are of the view that a charge of discrimination can be levelled only in case it works adversely against a person. It finds no quarter where the law grants a concession. Inasmuch as section 8(1-B) confers an advantage by way of a respite regarding liability of interest no hostile discrimination results. The decisions in the case of Suraj Mall Mohta 1954 26 ITR I (SC) and in the case of Anandji Haridas and Co. (P.) Ltd. v. S.P. Kushare, Sales Tax Officer, Nagpur 1968 21 STC 326 (SC) are not in point, as in those cases the situation which prevails in the present case did not exist. The petition fails, and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. This order will govern Writ Petition No. 247 of 1980 (Tax), Writ Petition No. 19 of 1980, Writ Petition No. 67 of 1980, Writ Petition No. 213 of 1980 and Writ Petition No. 214 of 1980. Petitions dismissed.
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1981 (8) TMI 201 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or charging or payment of interest which are to be found in sections 8(1) and (1-B) of the State law, have been adopted by the Central statute. The word charging introduced in section 9(2) of the Central Act, permits the charging provisions of section 8(1) and (1-B) to have full play. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to consider as to whether the decisions relating to penalty, which have been referred to earlier can be distinguished on the ground that the provisions for imposition of penalty under the State Act are inapplicable, inasmuch as section 10 of the Central Sales Tax Act contains an exhaustive enumeration of the grounds on which penalty can be imposed. We, accordingly, dismiss the petition and discharge the stay order. Parties to bear their own costs. This order will also govern Writ Petition No. 51 of 1980, Writ Petition No. 84 of 1980, Writ Petition No. 212 of 1980, Writ Petition No. 215 of 1980 and Writ Petition No. 216 of 1980. Petitions dismissed.
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1981 (8) TMI 200 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he most important of which is that the sale should be of forest coupes. A statutory fiction must not only be construed according to its terms, but it must be applied only where the facts required for its application are fully present. When the fiction in the explanation to entry 84 applies only to those who have purchased coupes, it is not for the taxing authorities to extend that fiction and apply it also to those who have not purchased coupes in coupe auctions, but only timber from Government depots. The order of the Tribunal states that the assessee had purchased the timber in question from the Government Timber Depot. On this finding, it is impossible to invoke the explanation to entry 84 of the First Schedule to the Act. In the result, the Tribunal s order is set aside and the assessment on the entire turnover of Rs. 86,255 assessed as deemed first sale of timber is set aside. The assessee will have its costs from the department. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition allowed.
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1981 (8) TMI 199 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eedings if a person approaches the recovery authority with an objection, stating that he was the owner of the property attached and the defaulter had no interest in it, then the authority was bound to hear the objection and decide it on merit. If the executing authority relies on certain evidence against the objector, the objector should be given an opportunity to correct or contradict it. This view is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. The Additional Collector who was conducting the sale proceedings was in error in thinking that he had no jurisdiction to hear or decide the objection on merit. He should have asked the petitioner to prove her title. The petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 24th February, 1976, dismissing the objection is set aside and the matter is sent back to the recovery authority to hear and dispose of the objection in accordance with law. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs. Petition allowed.
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1981 (8) TMI 198 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Compromise and arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... lowing terms I Appeal is dismissed for reasons which will follow hereafter. II Appellant will pay the costs of the respondents as also the workers. III Counsel for appellant orally applies for certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court of India. Certificate is refused as the matter does not involve any substantial question of law of general importance which in the opinion of this High Court needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. IV Counsel for the appellant applies for stay of the operation of the order dismissing the appeal in order to enable the appellant to appeal to the Supreme Court after obtaining special leave. We refuse the prayer for stay in view of the fact that Mr. K. S. Nanavati for respondent No. 1 makes a statement in the same terms as he made on 6-4-1981 in C. A. No. 21 of 1981, in O.J. Appeal No. 6/81 when the appeal was admitted and interim relief was refused which will hold good till expiry of fifteen days from the date of signing of judgment .
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1981 (8) TMI 190 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... stitutes just and equitable ground to wind up a company is to see whether a person who has a right to participate in the management has been excluded from the management unjustly or arbitrarily. On the facts of that case, exclusion of the director in question therein was legal. Nevertheless, the power exercised by the management in excluding him from the company was held to be a gross abuse of the power vested in it. The ground disclosed therein appears to be that the director was of the complaining type. That case is not of much assistance to the petitioner herein, because the facts are totally different. Here the director has been expelled and has ceased to be a director not on account of the abuse of power used by the board of directors of the 1st respondent-company but by operation of law as provided in the Companies Act. There is no case made out for entertaining this petition under section 433(1)(f) of the Companies Act. Therefore, it is rejected without being admitted.
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1981 (8) TMI 182 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up – Exclusion of certain time in computing periods of limitation ... ... ... ... ..... hat the extended period had to be limited to the one year, after 8th August, 1975. It is relevant to notice that the section unequivocally indicates that such exclusion of the aggregate of the two periods referred to therein is of universal application and that the said provision does not contemplate any qualification or exception to such calculation. It is not in dispute that if the aggregate of both the periods is taken, the claim is in time. Before concluding, it is necessary to point out that though the claim is presented in the form of an application, it is really a plaint and that, therefore, such application shall contain as in the case of a plaint all material necessary to sustain the claim as also the particulars regarding the claim being in time, particularly when an extended period of limitation is relied on by the applicant. In the result, there will be a decree in favour of the official liquidator as against the respondent for Rs. 9,901, as prayed for with costs.
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1981 (8) TMI 175 - ITAT PUNE
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... ... ..... gement, sales rose up very high. The ld. Deptl. Rep relied on the order of the authorities below. 3. I have heard the rival submissions and gone through the orders of the authorities below and the compilation filed by the ld. Deptl. Rep. At the very outset I must admit that the alleged guest house was not a guest house. In the true sense of the term it was only a room having 100 sq. ft area which by no imagination can be treated as guest house. The premises were used only for talks and negotiations and the principals of the companies who visited the assesses for business purpose were taken to different places for meals etc. Therefore the expenditure incurred by the assessee cannot be treated as expenditure u/s37(4). The expenditure was incurred only for business expediency and the result of which is seen by the sales having gone up very satisfactory. Therefore I hold that the assessee is entitled to deduction u/s 37(1). 4. In the result the assessee rsquo s appeal is allowed.
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