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Showing 41 to 60 of 411 Records

• 1996 (8) TMI 531
  
  Issues:
  1. Whether market fee is chargeable from traders by Mandi Samitis for the services rendered.
  2. Interpretation of the principle of quid pro quo in relation to fees charged by public authorities.
  3. Whether the High Court's decision to remit the matter back to the Mandi Samitis was appropriate.
  
  Analysis:
  1. The Supreme Court analyzed the issue of whether market fee is chargeable by Mandi Samitis from traders for services rendered. The High Court had remitted the matter back to the Samitis to adjudicate on the claim of traders that no fee should be charged as no services were provided. The Court noted that the Samitis had averred to providing various services like electric light, water, amenities, tents, culverts, and future infrastructure development. The High Court's decision was criticized for creating a conflict between the Samitis and traders based on the principle of quid pro quo, emphasizing a near-balance between fee demanded and services rendered, which the Court deemed incorrect. The Court held that the High Court should not have left the matter with the Samitis, as they would be judging in their own cause, which is undesirable.
  
  2. The Court referred to the judge-made law in M.C.D. and Ors. v. Mohd. Yasin and Anr., emphasizing that a fee need not have a direct relation to services rendered, and a casual relation may suffice. The Court highlighted that the primary motive is regulation in the public interest, and a broad co-relationship is sufficient, without the need for meticulous balancing of costs and fees. The Court reiterated that the strict quid pro quo principle is not the sole indicator of a fee, and it may not be necessary for the fee payers to receive a direct benefit.
  
  3. The Court further discussed the evolving concept of quid pro quo in fees, citing City Corporation of Calicut v. Thachambalath Sadalinan and Ors. to emphasize that the traditional concept is transforming. The Court stated that the fee must have a relation to services rendered or advantages conferred, but this relation need not be direct, and a general benefit received by the fee payers satisfies the element of service required for fee collection. The Court clarified that it is not essential for the fee payers to receive a special benefit for the payment of fees.
  
  4. Applying the principles from the above decisions to the present case, the Court found that the Mandi Samitis do provide services to traders and others, and it is not necessary to prove that the fees collected are spent directly for the benefit of fee payers. The Court criticized the High Court's decision to remit the matter back to the Samitis, stating that the High Court should have either verified the authenticity of services rendered by the Samitis or accepted their claim without opening avenues for prolonged disputes. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's orders, and dismissed the writ petition without costs.

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• 1996 (8) TMI 530
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Power to levy development fee under the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973.
  2. Legality of demands for malva charges (stacking charges) and water charges.
  3. Requirement of bank guarantees for development charges.
  
  Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Power to levy development fee under the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973:
  The Supreme Court examined whether the appellants had the authority to levy development fees under the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 (the "Act"). The High Court had previously ruled that there was no provision in the Act or the Rules to demand and collect the development fee. The Supreme Court analyzed various sections of the Act, including Section 4, which allows the State Government to constitute a Development Authority for any development area, and Section 7, which outlines the powers and objects of the Development Authority, including the provision of amenities and execution of works necessary for development.
  
  The Court noted that Section 33 of the Act empowers the Development Authority to provide amenities or carry out development at the cost of the owner in the event of default and to levy cess in certain cases. Additionally, Section 56 gives the Authority the power to make regulations for the administration of its affairs, including the collection of development fees. The Court concluded that the Act specifically provides the power to levy development fees, and the High Court erred in holding otherwise. The Court emphasized that the levy of fees is a compulsory exaction for services rendered as quid pro quo, and the Development Authority is enjoined under the Act to undertake planned development of the area.
  
  2. Legality of demands for malva charges (stacking charges) and water charges:
  The High Court found that the demands for malva charges and water charges were violative of the principles of natural justice, as they were levied in advance before the commencement of construction. The Supreme Court agreed with this finding, stating that the Authority has no power to levy charges for stacking materials or using water in advance. The Court clarified that such charges should be levied only when the materials are actually stacked on public streets or places, or when water is used for construction. The requirement for prior permission and payment of necessary fees should be based on actual usage.
  
  3. Requirement of bank guarantees for development charges:
  The Supreme Court addressed the issue of bank guarantees required by the Agra Development Authority for development charges. The High Court had directed the respondent to provide a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs. 180 per sq.mtr. and to undertake to pay the balance amount upon succeeding in the appeal. The Supreme Court noted that the respondent's counsel had agreed to provide a bank guarantee for the amount demanded at the rate of Rs. 500 per sq.mtr., which totaled Rs. 17,33,245. The Court directed that, after deducting the amount already covered by the initial bank guarantee, the respondent should provide a bank guarantee for the balance amount. The Agra Development Authority was instructed to release the sanction of the plan for execution upon receipt of the bank guarantee. The bank guarantee should remain in force until the development is completed and a satisfactory completion certificate is issued by the competent authority.
  
  Conclusion:
  The appeals were allowed, with the Supreme Court holding that the Development Authority has the power to levy development fees under the Act. The Court upheld the High Court's decision regarding the illegality of advance demands for malva charges and water charges. The requirement for bank guarantees was affirmed, with specific instructions provided for the respondent to comply with the demand. The appeals were allowed without costs.

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• 1996 (8) TMI 529
  
  Issues Involved: Determination of whether bamboo mat qualifies as forest-produce under the Indian Forest Act, 1927, and the legality of the order of confiscation of bamboo mat belonging to the appellant.
  
  Issue 1: Definition of "Forest-produce"
  The definition of "forest-produce" under the Indian Forest Act includes various items found in or brought from a forest, such as timber, charcoal, and natural varnish. The High Court's decision was based on interpreting the definitions of "timber" and "tree," concluding that even a fashioned bamboo would be considered a tree, thus categorizing bamboo mat as forest-produce. This interpretation differed from a previous ruling by the Gujarat High Court.
  
  Issue 2: Interpretation of Definitions
  The appellant argued that the High Court erred in relying on the definition of "timber" to classify bamboo mat as forest-produce, as the definition pertains to wood and not trees. It was contended that bamboo mat, being a distinct commercial product, should not fall under the definition of forest-produce. The respondent, however, argued that excluding bamboo mat from the definition would hinder the Act's objective of protecting forest resources.
  
  Issue 3: Judicial Interpretation
  Upon considering the arguments, the Supreme Court found that the High Court's interpretation was flawed. The Court agreed with the appellant that the definition of "timber" does not encompass fashioned bamboo, as the second part of the definition pertains to wood, not trees. The Court emphasized that the legislative definition of forest-produce must be adhered to, and any gaps or ambiguities should be addressed by the legislature, not the judiciary.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court ruled that bamboo mat does not qualify as forest-produce under the Indian Forest Act. The Court held that a product like bamboo mat, which is distinct from bamboo and commercially recognized as such, falls outside the scope of forest-produce. By overturning the High Court's decision, the Supreme Court declared that the order of confiscation of the bamboo mat was not in accordance with the law.

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• 1996 (8) TMI 528
  
  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals based on the principles settled in Union of India v. Cibatul Ltd. (1985). No costs were awarded. (1996 (8) TMI 528 - SC)

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• 1996 (8) TMI 527
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Pollution by Tanneries and Other Industries
  2. Implementation of Pollution Control Measures
  3. Legal Principles: Precautionary Principle and Polluter Pays Principle
  4. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
  5. Enforcement of Government Orders and Standards
  6. Compensation and Restoration of Damaged Environment
  7. Monitoring and Future Directions
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Pollution by Tanneries and Other Industries:
  This public interest petition u/s Article 32 of the Constitution of India was filed by Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum against pollution caused by the discharge of untreated effluent by tanneries and other industries in Tamil Nadu. The untreated effluent is discharged into agricultural fields, waterways, and open lands, ultimately polluting the river Palar, the main water source for the residents. The Tamil Nadu Agricultural University Research Center reported that nearly 35,000 hectares of agricultural land have become unfit for cultivation due to pollution. An independent survey revealed that 350 out of 467 wells used for drinking and irrigation purposes were polluted.
  
  2. Implementation of Pollution Control Measures:
  The Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board (the Board) stated that out of 584 tanneries, only 33 had set up Effluent Treatment Plants (ETPs). Despite various orders and subsidies for constructing common effluent treatment plants (CETPs), most tanneries failed to control pollution. The Supreme Court issued several orders, including the closure of non-compliant tanneries and directions to set up ETPs by specific deadlines.
  
  3. Legal Principles: Precautionary Principle and Polluter Pays Principle:
  The Court emphasized the principles of "Sustainable Development," "Precautionary Principle," and "Polluter Pays Principle." The "Precautionary Principle" requires the State to anticipate and prevent environmental degradation, and the "Polluter Pays Principle" holds polluters absolutely liable for compensating victims and restoring environmental damage.
  
  4. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions:
  The Court highlighted Articles 21, 47, 48A, and 51A(g) of the Constitution, which mandate the protection and improvement of the environment. Relevant legislations include the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1974, the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1981, and the Environment Protection Act 1986. The Environment Act empowers the Central Government to take measures to protect and improve the environment.
  
  5. Enforcement of Government Orders and Standards:
  The Court noted the Government Order GOMs No. 213 dated March 30, 1989, which imposes a total ban on setting up highly polluting industries within one kilometer of certain water sources. The Court directed strict enforcement of this order and upheld the standards for total dissolved solids (TDS) stipulated by the Board and justified by NEERI.
  
  6. Compensation and Restoration of Damaged Environment:
  The Court directed the Central Government to constitute an authority under Section 3(3) of the Environment Protection Act to assess and recover compensation from polluters for environmental damage and to compensate affected individuals. The authority is to implement the "precautionary principle" and the "polluter pays" principle.
  
  7. Monitoring and Future Directions:
  The Court suspended the closure orders for tanneries until November 30, 1996, to allow them to set up pollution control devices. The Court requested the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court to constitute a special "Green Bench" to monitor environmental matters. The Court also appreciated Mr. M.C. Mehta's assistance and directed the State of Tamil Nadu to pay Rs. 50,000 towards his legal fees and expenses.

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• 1996 (8) TMI 526
  
  The Supreme Court allowed the appeal against the Central Administrative Tribunal's order directing payment of interest on arrears. The Court held that the claim was barred by constructive res judicata and Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. The appeal was allowed with no costs.

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• 1996 (8) TMI 525
  
  Issues:
  1. Validity of land acquisition for a public purpose
  2. Interpretation of educational agency under the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act 1973
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  Issue 1: The main issue in this case is whether the land acquisition is for a public purpose. The High Court held that since the institution is run by an individual and not a registered society, the acquisition does not serve a public purpose but only a private interest. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, citing Article 45 of the Constitution which mandates the State to provide free and compulsory education to children up to 14 years. The Court emphasized that education is a fundamental right and the State cannot impart education by itself, relying on the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act 1973. The Court noted that the educational institution in question was established in 1929 and was receiving grant-in-aid, making it an instrumentality of the State imparting education on behalf of the State. The Court concluded that the acquisition, funded by public funds, was for a public purpose as it aimed to provide education to middle school children, upholding the decree of eviction with a condition that the institution shall not be evicted once the land is acquired.
  
  Issue 2: The interpretation of "educational agency" under the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act 1973 was crucial in this case. The Act defines "educational agency" as any person or body permitted to establish and maintain a private institution. Section 5(1) of the Act requires the educational agency of every private school to seek permission to establish the school. However, since the institution in question was established in 1929 and was already receiving grant-in-aid, it did not fall under the Act's definition of educational agency. The Court clarified that an educational institution receiving aid is considered an instrumentality or education agency of the State, responsible for imparting education on behalf of the State. This interpretation was pivotal in determining the public purpose served by the land acquisition, as the institution's status as an educational agency influenced the Court's decision in allowing the appeal and dismissing the writ petition.
  
  In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, emphasizing that the land acquisition was for a public purpose to provide education to children, and dismissed the writ petition challenging the acquisition.

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• 1996 (8) TMI 524
  
  Issues involved:
  The issues involved in the judgment are the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain an application for enhancement under Amendment Act 68 of 1984 and the validity of the delay in filing the special leave petition against the original order.
  
  Jurisdiction of High Court to entertain application for enhancement:
  The Supreme Court considered whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the application for enhancement under the Amendment Act 68 of 1984. It was clarified that claimants are entitled to enhanced solatium and interest only if proceedings were pending before the Land Acquisition Officer or Court. The Court emphasized that the question of jurisdiction arises when the appellate Court has to amend the decree and grant enhanced compensation by way of solatium and interest under relevant sections of the Act. It was established that if the Court lacks jurisdiction, the action is considered a nullity and can be challenged at any stage.
  
  Validity of delay in filing special leave petition:
  The counsel for the respondents argued that the delay in filing the review application and special leave petition was justified. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the delay in filing the special leave petition against the original order was significant, amounting to 3379 days. The Court found no merit in the argument that the delay was properly explained, emphasizing that the orders of the lower courts were not vitiated by any error of law.
  
  Conclusion:
  In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the award of enhanced solatium and interest. The original order of the High Court dated July 24, 1984, which awarded compensation at a specific rate with solatium and interest, was restored. The Court highlighted that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for enhancement under the Amendment Act 68 of 1984. The appeals were allowed without costs.

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• 1996 (8) TMI 523
  
  Issues involved: Jurisdiction of Consumer Disputes Redressal Forums over pricing disputes involving a Gram Panchayat claiming subsidy for electricity consumption.
  
  Summary:
  The Supreme Court, in a judgment concerning the jurisdiction of Consumer Disputes Redressal Forums over pricing disputes involving a Gram Panchayat claiming subsidy for electricity consumption, condoned the delay and granted leave to appeal against the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission's order. The Court noted the contention that the pricing issue did not fall within the purview of the Forums due to the short period and the party being a Gram Panchayat. However, the Court emphasized that lack of jurisdiction cannot be overlooked based on such factors and held that if a court lacks jurisdiction, it must be so declared. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order under appeal, and dismissed the respondents' claim before the State Commission. No costs were awarded in the matter.

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• 1996 (8) TMI 522
  
  Issues involved: Challenge to validity of land acquisition notification u/s 4(1) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Availability of alternative lands and suitability for construction; Compliance with procedural requirements of notification publication u/s 4(1); Lapse of notification u/s 4(1) due to limitation period.
  
  Validity of Land Acquisition Notification u/s 4(1): Appellants challenged notification acquiring land for a Cooperative Society, alleging mala fide intent due to prior acquisitions. Court held providing house sites for society members is a valid public purpose. Previous acquisitions not deemed mala fide.
  
  Availability of Alternative Lands and Suitability for Construction: Appellants argued alternative lands exist and current lands are unsuitable. Single Judge negated this, stating it's a case-specific factual matter. No merit found in this contention.
  
  Compliance with Procedural Requirements of Notification Publication u/s 4(1): Appellants raised concerns about procedural irregularities in notification publication. Court noted publication in newspaper preceded Gazette publication due to administrative oversight. Emphasized purpose of notification is to inform landowners of proposed acquisition, which was achieved despite procedural irregularity. Compliance with Section 4(1) requirements upheld.
  
  Lapse of Notification u/s 4(1) due to Limitation Period: Appellants argued notification lapsed due to limitation period and pending legal proceedings. Court ruled writ petitions filed promptly after notification publication, excluding time taken for legal proceedings from limitation period calculation. Notification not deemed lapsed; Government directed to proceed with objections consideration and declaration publication if public purpose persists.
  
  Conclusion: Appeals dismissed with direction for Government to address objections and publish declaration within specified timeline. No costs imposed.

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• 1996 (8) TMI 521
  
  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in the case with citation 1996 (8) TMI 521 - SC. Justices S.P. Bharucha and S.B. Majumdar presided over the order.

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• 1996 (8) TMI 520
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Detention and Allegations of Carrying Atomic and Defence Secrets
  2. Framing of Charges and Subsequent Legal Proceedings
  3. Allegations of Fraud and Misrepresentation
  4. Petition u/s 340 Cr.P.C. Against Attorney General and Chief Vigilance Officer
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Detention and Allegations of Carrying Atomic and Defence Secrets:
  The applicant, a retired Captain from the Indian Navy, was detained at Sahar International Airport, Bombay, on May 30, 1988, for allegedly carrying atomic and defence secrets. His successive bail applications were rejected by various courts, and an order granting him bail on "medical grounds" was cancelled by the Supreme Court.
  
  2. Framing of Charges and Subsequent Legal Proceedings:
  After obtaining consent u/s 26(2) of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, and authorization from the Chief Vigilance Officer, the applicant was committed to stand trial in the court of Sessions. Charges were framed under sections 3/6 of the Official Secrets Act and sections 18/19 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962. The applicant's revision application against the framing of charges was dismissed by the Bombay High Court. The Sessions Judge later discharged the applicant due to the absence of sanction u/s 197 Cr.P.C., and the High Court converted this discharge into an acquittal. The Supreme Court, however, reverted the acquittal back to a discharge and awarded the applicant costs of Rs. 25,000.
  
  3. Allegations of Fraud and Misrepresentation:
  The applicant filed a criminal miscellaneous petition alleging that the charges against him were vitiated by 'fraud' committed by the State and the Public Prosecutor. The High Court entertained this application and granted the prayer for failure of the State to file a counter affidavit. However, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, stating that the allegations of fraud were made without necessary foundation and that the High Court had misapplied the law.
  
  4. Petition u/s 340 Cr.P.C. Against Attorney General and Chief Vigilance Officer:
  The applicant filed a petition u/s 340 Cr.P.C. against the then Attorney General of India and the Chief Vigilance Officer, alleging that their "consent" and "authorization" for his prosecution were "false statements" and amounted to giving "false evidence." The Supreme Court dismissed this petition, stating that the applicant was under a grave misconception of law and facts. The Court found no prima facie material to suggest that the respondents had given "false evidence" or "fabricated false evidence." The application was deemed misconceived, untenable, and without merit.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's petition, emphasizing that finality must attach to some stage of judicial proceedings and that the applicant's continuous litigation was an abuse of the judicial system.

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• 1996 (8) TMI 519
  
  Issues Involved:
  The issues involved in this case include the execution of a pre-emption decree, the constitutionality of relevant provisions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, and the binding nature of decrees that have become final.
  
  Execution of Pre-emption Decree:
  The land in question was transferred to the appellant in 1980, and a suit for pre-emption was decreed in 1983, with subsequent appeals being dismissed. The respondent sought execution of the decree, which was initially objected to on the grounds of partial transfer. The High Court, however, allowed the civil revision application, emphasizing the entitlement of the decree-holder to physical possession of the specific land as per the Code of Civil Procedure.
  
  Constitutionality of Punjab Pre-emption Act:
  The appellants argued that the relevant provisions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in a previous case. They contended that the decree in the pre-emption suit should be deemed null and void. However, the High Court rejected this objection, citing the binding nature of decrees that have become final as per the Supreme Court's direction.
  
  Binding Nature of Final Decrees:
  The Supreme Court clarified that decrees which have become final and binding inter-parties, as in this case, are not affected by subsequent declarations of unconstitutionality. The High Court's decision to uphold the pre-emption decree despite the constitutional issue was deemed in line with the Supreme Court's directive in a previous case. The introduction of a new provision in 1995 was found to be prospective and did not impact the validity of the earlier decree.
  
  In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the High Court's decision to uphold the pre-emption decree based on the binding nature of final decrees and the lack of impact from subsequent legislative changes.

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• 1996 (8) TMI 518
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Negligence and Deficiency in Service by the Bank
  2. Forgery and Fraud Allegations
  3. Interpretation of ICC Rules
  
  Summary:
  
  Negligence and Deficiency in Service by the Bank:
  The respondent entered into a contract with a French firm for the supply of cotton grey sheeting. The goods were shipped, and Bills of Exchange were drawn on the Buyer. These documents were sent to the appellant bank, which forwarded them to the French Bank. The documents were returned unpaid multiple times. The respondent claimed the entire amount of the Bills of Exchange from the appellant, alleging negligence and deficiency in service for not obtaining co-acceptance by the French Bank. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (Commission) held the appellant liable, directing it to pay the respondent French Francs 4,10,000/- with interest and costs.
  
  Forgery and Fraud Allegations:
  The appellant sought a review of the Commission's judgment, alleging that the respondent had forged a letter dated 26th August 1991 (No. 2776) to include instructions for co-acceptance by the French Bank, which was not present in the original letter (No. 2775). The Commission did not decide on the forgery allegation, stating that even without the disputed letter, the appellant was still liable under the ICC Rules. The Supreme Court, however, found overwhelming evidence that the letter No. 2776 was forged by the respondent to obtain a favorable judgment. The Court emphasized that authorities have the power to recall judgments obtained by fraud.
  
  Interpretation of ICC Rules:
  The Supreme Court analyzed the ICC Rules, particularly Articles 2, 3, and 15, which outline the responsibilities of the remitting bank, collecting bank, and presenting bank. The Commission had misinterpreted these rules by treating the appellant as both the remitting and collecting bank. The Court clarified that the responsibility for obtaining co-acceptance lies with the presenting bank, not the remitting bank. The Court found that the appellant had no obligation to obtain co-acceptance since the original letter (No. 2775) did not include such instructions.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the Commission's judgments dated 16.11.1993 and 13.12.1994, and dismissed the respondent's original complaint with costs of Rs. 25,000/-.

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• 1996 (8) TMI 517
  
  Issues:
  1. Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the Assessing Officer's adjustments under section 143(1) were erroneous and deleting the additions made?
  2. Whether section 143(1A)(a) applies when the assessee's declared loss is reduced due to adjustments under section 143(1)(a) but does not result in income?
  
  Analysis:
  Issue 1:
  The case involved an appeal by the revenue challenging the Tribunal's decision to delete adjustments made by the Assessing Officer under section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal found the Assessing Officer's actions to be erroneous and deleted the adjustments. The assessee had initially declared a loss of Rs. 17,30,98,382 for the assessment year 1989-90. The Assessing Officer made adjustments of Rs. 3,22,34,994 under section 143(1)(a), which the assessee sought rectification for. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal further reduced the adjustments, leading to the revenue's appeal. The Tribunal held that the claim of the assessee was bona fide and not liable for inclusion in the adjustments. The High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, stating that undisputed amounts should be deleted for tax purposes, and the Assessing Officer's actions were deemed patently erroneous.
  
  Issue 2:
  Regarding the application of section 143(1A)(a), the Tribunal's decision to cancel the additional tax levied on the assessee was challenged. The Tribunal concluded that section 143(1A)(a) does not apply when the loss declared by the assessee is merely reduced due to adjustments under section 143(1)(a) without resulting in income. The High Court did not provide a specific ruling on this issue as it found in favor of the assessee on the first issue, rendering the consideration of the second issue unnecessary. The High Court disposed of the application without recording an answer on the second question, in line with the applicant's submission and the non-applicant's lack of dispute.
  
  In conclusion, the High Court ruled in favor of the assessee, upholding the Tribunal's decision to delete the adjustments made by the Assessing Officer under section 143(1). The High Court found the Assessing Officer's actions to be erroneous and supported the Tribunal's decision based on the bona fide nature of the assessee's claim. The High Court did not delve into the application of section 143(1A)(a) as the first issue was resolved in favor of the assessee, rendering the consideration of the second issue unnecessary.

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• 1996 (8) TMI 515
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Interpretation of "storage" within the meaning of the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1965.
  2. Whether goods found in a moving vehicle amount to "storage" under the Order.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Interpretation of "storage" within the meaning of the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1965
  
  Section 3(1) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 empowers the Central Government to regulate or prohibit the production, supply, and distribution of essential commodities. Section 3(2)(d) specifically allows for regulating the storage, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition, use, or consumption of any essential commodity. Section 7 makes contravention of any order made u/s 3 punishable.
  
  The Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1965, issued u/s 3 of the Act, mandates that no person shall act as a dealer without a licence. Clause 3(2) of the Order deems any person storing rice or paddy in quantities exceeding ten quintals to be a dealer. The term "dealer" is defined in clause 2(b) to include anyone who purchases, sells, or stores rice or paddy in wholesale quantities.
  
  Issue 2: Whether goods found in a moving vehicle amount to "storage" under the Order
  
  The appellants were found transporting paddy in excess of the permissible limit without a licence and were convicted u/s 7 of the Act. The High Court upheld the conviction, interpreting "storage" to include goods in transit in a moving vehicle.
  
  The Supreme Court examined two sets of judicial opinions: one following the Orissa High Court's decision in Balabhadra Raja Guru Mohapatra v. State, which held that goods in transit amounted to "storage," and another following Prem Bahadur v. The State of Orissa, which held that possession of stock in a moving vehicle does not amount to "storage."
  
  The Court referred to dictionary definitions of "store" and concluded that "storing" implies an element of continuity and keeping goods for future use. Transporting goods in a vehicle does not per se constitute "storing," although a vehicle can be used as a store in certain circumstances. The Court emphasized that transporting and storing are distinct acts as per Section 3(2)(d) of the Act.
  
  The Court found itself in agreement with the view expressed in Prem Bahadur's case, which stated that "storage" connotes continued possession and is connected with a regular place of storage. Transshipment in a moving vehicle does not amount to "storage."
  
  The Court also referred to the principle of strict construction of penal statutes, as stated in Tolaram v. State of Bombay and Sanjay Dutt v. The State through C.B.I., Bombay, emphasizing that penal provisions should not be stretched to impose penalties.
  
  The Court distinguished the present case from S.K. Amir v. The State of Maharashtra and Swantraj & Others v. State of Maharashtra, noting that the facts and statutory contexts were different.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The Supreme Court held that merely finding goods in a moving truck does not amount to "storing" within the meaning of the Order. The appellants were not liable to be convicted or sentenced u/s 7 of the Act. The appeals were allowed, the convictions were set aside, and the appellants were acquitted. Their bail bonds were discharged.

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• 1996 (8) TMI 514
  
  The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in a land acquisition case for construction of Getalsud Dam in Bihar. The Court set aside the compensation awarded by the lower courts and determined the appropriate market value at Rs. 6,000 per acre. Separate value for tank and well was denied. Additional amount under Section 23(1-A) was also set aside. The claimants were granted interest, solatium, and additional amount on the enhanced compensation. The appeals were allowed without costs.

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• 1996 (8) TMI 513
  

  Termination of service from Central Public Works Department - whether the appeal has been competently laid? - whether the delay has been properly explained in filing the special leave petition? - Held that:- It is not disputed and cannot be disputed that the Union of India can lay the suit and be sued under Article 300 of the Constitution in relation to its affairs. The appeal came to be filed by the Secretary, though wrongly described. The nomenclature given in the cause title as Secretary instead of Union of India, is not conclusive. The meat of the matter is that the Secretary representing the Government of India had filed the appeal obviously on behalf of Union of India. Accordingly, we reject the first contention.

  Proper explanation for 217 days has accordingly been given in the affidavit filed in support of the SLP. We find that the explanation offered by the appellant is well acceptable and is accepted. Accordingly, the delay is not in our view a bar to consider the matter on merits.

  Dismissal order was the foundation for cause of action. After dismissal of the Departmental’s appeal he laid the suit Accordingly, the suit came to be filed within limitation.

  The employer is entitled to terminate the services of its employee in terms of the order of appointment which confers power to take action in terms thereof. As seen, Rule 5 of Rules clearly gives power to terminate the services of the temporary servant in terms of the order of appointment. Until the temporary service matures into a permanent, he has no right to the post. At any point of time before that right accrues, it is open to the employer to terminate the service in terms of the order of appointment. The High Court wrongly applied the principle of dismissal followed by conviction for misconduct and acquittal thereof. Appeal allowed.

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• 1996 (8) TMI 512
  

  Application of investor company (IC) - (a) Whether in view of the provisions of India-Mauritius double tax avoidance agreement, can it be construed that the applicant does not have a permanent establishment (PE) in India ?

  (b) Whether the applicant be liable to tax in respect of the management fees received from the CT ?

  (c) Whether the applicant be liable to tax in respect of the carried interest received from the CT ?

  (d) Whether there be a withholding tax liability on the CT, in respect of the payment of management fees and carried interest to the applicant ?

  Application of investment manager (IM)

  Whether the applicant would be assessed in respect of its proportionate share of income earned by the contributory trust as per the provision of section 161 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) ?

  Whether the contributory trust would be regarded as a ‘see through’ or‘transparent entity’ vis-a-vis the applicant; i.e., to say, the applicant willbe taxed in respect of its proportionate share of income under section 161 of the Act ?

  Whether it is held that the provisions of section 161 do not apply to the incomeof the applicant from the contributory trust because of the power vestedin the trustees to add to the list of the beneficiaries on the terms laiddown in the indenture of trust and the contribution agreement, then ifsuch power is deleted, would the assessment of the applicant in respectof its proportionate share of income of the trust be made in accordancewith section 161 ?

  Whether if it is held that the shares of the additional beneficiaries are indeter-minate whether the capital gains arising to the applicant will be chargedto tax at the rate of 20 per cent. as prescribed in section 112 of the Act ?

  Whether will there be any tax withholding by the investee companies at the time of distribution of income to the CT ?

  Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case,the character of the applicant’s proportionate share in the income of thecontributory trust will be same as in the hands of the contributory trust?

  Whether the applicant’s share in the dividend earned by the contributorytrust will be chargeable to tax and if so at what rate?

  Whether the applicant’s share in the interest earned by the contributory trustbe chargeable to tax at the rate of 20 per cent. ?

  Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances ofthe case, the applicant’s share in the capital gains earned by the contribu-tory trust will be chargeable to tax ?

  Whether there would be any withholding tax liability on the CT in respectof the distributions made to the applicant ?

  Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances ofthe case, the applicant’s proportionate share in the surplus arising on therealisation of the investments made by the contributory trust would constitute capital gains ?

  Whether, in case the answer to question No. 11 is in the negative, the proportionate share of the applicant in such surplus will be chargeable to income-tax in India in the applicant’s hands ?

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• 1996 (8) TMI 511
  

  Whether, relying upon clause (5) pf Section 35, an Income tax Officer could rectify the assessment of a person a who was a partner in a firm when the assessment of the firm was completed before 1st April, 1952?

  Held that:- By reason of the said Notification issued on 30th March, 1974, with effect from 1st November, 1971, Rule 18(5)(ii) has to be read as barring the commissioner (or other authority to whom power in this behalf has been delegated by the commissioner) from revising of his own motion any assessment made or order passed under the Act or the rules if the assessment has been made or the order has been passed more than six years previous to 1st November, 1971, Put conversely, with effect from 1st November, 1971, Rule 18(5)(ii) permits the Commissioner (or other authority) to revise of his own motion any assessment made or order passed under the Act or the rules provided the assessment has not been made or the order passed more than six years previously. This being the plain meaning, the said Notification must be given full effect. Full effect can be given only if the said Notification is read as being applicable not only to assessments which were incomplete but also to assessments which reached finality by reason of the earlier prescribed period of four years having elapsed. Where language as unambiguous as this is employed, it must be assumed that the legislature intended the amended provision to apply even to assessments that had so become final: if the intention was otherwise, the Legislature would have so stated.

  In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order under appeal is set aside. The respondents shall be entitled to proceed upon the notices dated 7th November, 1974, issued to the 1st respondent reopening its assessments for Assessment years Chaitra Sudi 2023 and 2024.

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