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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 697 Records
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2001 (8) TMI 1412 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cannot overlook the sturdy evidence of the investigating officer who effected the recovery and that evidence is supported by the document contemporaneously prepared by him and proved in the case. The upshot of the above discussion is that the High Court has gone seriously wrong in interfering with the conviction passed by the trial court regarding A-2. We are of the definite opinion that the High Court should not have side lined Ext.P-66 judicial confession. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the order of acquittal passed by the High Court and restore the order of conviction passed by the trial court. However, we think that the lesser sentence of imprisonment for life is sufficient to be imposed on A-2 for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. Hence we sentence him so. We direct the trial court to take prompt steps to get second accused (Lakshmi Narasimhan Kutty) and put him back in jail for undergoing the sentence imposed on him now.
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2001 (8) TMI 1411 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... our conclusion should be that the stage at which the dead rent has to be fixed in the case of this nature has not arisen and, therefore, we shall not engage ourselves in an academic exercise of finding out whether the relevant rules are in conformity with the view expressed by this Court or not and such an exercise can be undertaken only in a case where it is necessary to do so. We also do not think that any mandamus can be issued to the respondents to process the application filed by the appellant in the light of the marble policy of the State Government that all applications pending on the date of coming into force of the. marble policy stood lapsed. The appropriate course for the appellant is to file fresh application to pursue this matter in accordance with law and it is only thereafter if he finds it necessary the question raised in this case can be agitated in an appropriate manner. 7. Subject to the aforesaid observations, the appeals shall stand dismissed. No costs.
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2001 (8) TMI 1410 - CESTAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... M. Rubber Co. Ltd. V.CC Vide Final Order No. 2547/98 dated 8-12-1998 wherein it was held that cess would not be applicable to the imported rubber. We also find that since the import of the goods was vide B/E dated 2-2-1996 and 4-4-1996 and the Ministry of Finance circular withdrawing their earlier circular dated 27-7-1997 was issued on 8-10-1998, therefore, effect of that circular would not be applicable to the goods imported almost two and half years earlier. Therefore, following the ratio of the final order dated 8-12-1998 noted above, we set aside the impugned order and allow the appeals with consequential relief if any as per law". 5. In the facts and circumstances of the case, since the issue has already been covered by the aforesaid decisions, we do not find any justification in imposing Cess on imported rubber. We accept the contention of the party and accordingly these appeals are allowed with consequential relief if any. (Pronounced and dictated in open court.)
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2001 (8) TMI 1409 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... correct or not. This was all the more necessary, when the property of the assessee was situated in a posh locality like Walkeshwar Mumbai and sale thereof by no stretch of imagination would have resulted in loss as observed by the AO. The decision in CIT v. S.I. Paripushpam (2001) 249 ITR 550 (Mad) will also not render any help to the assessee. In that case the amount of which addition was agreed to by the assessee was an amount which had been set out in an enclosure filed along with the assessee's return of income and it was in this background it was held that the assessee's agreeing to the addition of the amount by itself did not establish fraud or wilful neglect without something more. The facts of the assessee's case are totally different as set out earlier. 15. For the reasons aforesaid, we hold that the Revenue authorities were perfectly justified in imposing the impugned penalty and no interference is called for. 16. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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2001 (8) TMI 1408 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 1977, from NEL, it is clear that the payment was made by the assessee to NEL for rendering services by two of its employees. In fact, in the letter of the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Heavy Industry, there was approval of the Government to release foreign exchange in favour of the assessee to enable it to meet the expenses in connection with the visit of the two experts. The Tribunal, as a matter of fact, noted that the two experts were employees of the foreign concern which was not doing any business in India. The amount was not paid to the foreign concern for technical services and, on the other hand, as the factual position would go to show, the same was for payment to the two experts whose services were requisitioned while seeking guidance as well as consultation services. That being the factual position, the conclusions of the Tribunal are in order. The question is answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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2001 (8) TMI 1407 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ls that dispensing with the personal attendance of the accused would only be in the interests of justice. However, the magistrate who grants such benefit to the accused must take the precautions enumerated above, as a matter of course. We may reiterate that when an accused makes an application to a magistrate through his duly authorised counsel praying for affording the benefit of his personal presence being dispensed with the magistrate can consider all aspects and pass appropriate orders thereon before proceeding further. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by the Sessions Judge on 30.6.2000 (in Criminal Revision Petition 197/2000). However, this course is adopted without prejudice to the rights of the second accused to move a fresh application seeking relief under Section 317 of the Code. If any such application is filed the magistrate shall pass orders thereon before proceeding further in the light of the observations made in this judgment.
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2001 (8) TMI 1406 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the respondents in C.A. No.6299/97, the Corporation sought to justify the levy under Section 231 of the Act. Such a justification for levy during the course of correspondence cannot be a substitute of the notice as contemplated under Section 231 of the Act. In absence of such a notice, it was not open to the Corporation to demand any sewerage charges from the respondents in C.A. No. 6299/97. Admittedly, no notice at all under Section 231 of the Act was given to the respondents in C.A. No. 6300/97 and, therefore, the question of recovery of sewerage charges does not arise. We, therefore, reject the argument of the learned counsel. However, it would be open to the appellants to proceed under Section 231 of the Act against the respondents, in accordance with law. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in these appeals and the same are accordingly dismissed with costs, which we assess at ₹ 2,000/- and the same shall equally be received by both the respondents.
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2001 (8) TMI 1405 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hare application money could be considered and assessed in the hands of the assessee under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961?" 2. Factual aspects need not be noted in detail in view of the fact that question involved has been adjudicated by a Full Bench of this Court in CIT v. Sophia Finance Ltd. 1994 205 ITR 981. In view of that decision, inevitable answer is in the affirmative, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee.
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2001 (8) TMI 1404 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... that the decision of the Tribunal does not call for any interference. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed.
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2001 (8) TMI 1403 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn. at p 266, it is stated as follows o p /o p "Possession differs from ownership in another quite different respect. Ownership, as we saw, consists of a combination of legal rights, same or all of which may be present in any particular instance; and such rights imply the existence of legal rules and a system of law. With possession this is not so. o p /o p A possessor is not so much one who has certain rights as one who actually has possession. Whether a person has ownership depends on rules of law; whether he has possession is a question that could be answered as a matter of fact and without reference of law at all. According to us, there is no guideline on the basis of which this right can be valued. o p /o p Further, in this case, it cannot be said that any cost was incurred for acquiring possessory right. In the above view of the matter, we answer the question of law referred to us in the affirmative and against the Revenue. o p /o p
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2001 (8) TMI 1402 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s a mere expression of creative talent, which is part of freedom of expression. The other work, apart from acting, that is entrusted to them is only ancillary to the main work and thus the respondents are not workmen. The Labour Court has missed the essence of the matter and has gone on to deal with the aspects not germane to a case of this nature. Even a careful perusal of the documents which may regulate the terms on which they were employed and the emoluments to be payable to them and other kinds of work they have to do such as extension of hospitality by receiving and taking care of other artists are not factors which would weigh against the conclusion reached by us. The Labour Court, on the other hand, has relied on these aspects which are mere details. Thus we find that the preliminary objection raised by the appellant is valid and ought to have been upheld by the Labour Court. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order made by the Labour Court. No costs.
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2001 (8) TMI 1401 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ecause such inaction or action on the part of the conductors results in financial loss to the Road Transport Corporation. This Court was firmly of the opinion that in cases like the present orders of dismissal should not be set aside. Furthermore, we agree with the observations of the Single Judge in the present case that the Labour Court was not justified in interfering with the punishment of dismissal. Though under Section 11 (A) the Labour Court has jurisdiction and powers to interfere with the quantum of punishment, however the discretion has to be used judiciously. When the main duty or function of the Conductor is to issue tickets and collect fare and then deposit the same with the Road Transport Corporation and when a conductor fails to do so, then it will be misplaced sympathy to order his reinstatement instead of dismissal. For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal is allowed, the order of the Division Bench is set aside and that of the Single Judge restored. No costs.
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2001 (8) TMI 1400 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... p;For two reasons I hold that the impugned proceeding needs to be quashed. One is, that the taking of cognizance by the learned Magistrate on what is called supplementary complaint is not permissible in law since, in a case like the present one, the only manner in which additional accused can be brought in is by taking recourse to Section 319 Cr.P.C. at the appropriate stage. The second reason is that, Section 9AA, brought in in the year 1985, is substantive law creating specific offence against two categories of persons specified in sub-sections (1) and (2) of the said Section 9AA for the first time, and is not retrospective in operation, and invoking of the same as against the petitioners in respect of their acts of commission and omission during the period from 1-10-1975 to 28-2-1983 would be violative of Article 20(1) of the Constitution. 25. In the result, both the petitions are allowed and the impugned proceeding is quashed so far as the petitioners are concerned.
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2001 (8) TMI 1399 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and objects of the petitioner-society. The Commissioner of Income-tax has not at all referred to or considered the aims and objects of the society. In that view of the matter, we think that it is just and appropriate to direct the Commissioner of Income-tax, Vijayawada, to apply his mind to the material placed before him and take a decision in accordance with law by a reasoned decision. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we allow the writ petition. The impugned communications dated November 5, 1991/December 27, 1991, and January 20, 1992, are set aside and the Commissioner of Income-tax, Vijayawada, is directed to consider the applications of the petitioner made under section 80G of the Act and dispose of the same by a reasoned and speaking order. There shall be no order as to costs. The above direction shall be carried out within a period of three (3) months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. No costs. That rule nisi has been made absolute as above.
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2001 (8) TMI 1398 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... jit Singh,Adv. For the Respondent Mr. A.K. Ganguli, Sr. Adv.,Mr. Jay Savla.,Adv., Mr. N Menon, Adv.,Ms. Reena Bagga, Adv. ORDER The special leave petition is dismissed.
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2001 (8) TMI 1397 - AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULINGS
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... ... ..... tax deducted at source along with the amount of interest paid for belated payment of advance tax. Refund is to be availed in the manner laid down in the Act and following the prescribed procedure. For this purpose, a return of income will have to be filed claiming refund in accordance with law. It is to be seen whether there is any other source of income of the applicant in India. If the only source of income of the applicant is the consideration for sale of engineering drawings and designs under Purchase Order No. 19004, dated 11-12-1998 then the applicant will not be liable to pay any tax in India under article 12. In such a situation, it may be entitled to get refund of the amount deducted at source. If the amount has been paid with interest the applicant-company may claim that the amount be paid back to it along with that interest and also interest, if any, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVII of the Act. 34. Both the questions raised are answered as above.
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2001 (8) TMI 1396 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nt but it cannot be said that was the only land held by them and that was the only avocation carried on by them, the objectives of the cancellation of the land is not to deprive anyone of his livelihood but, on the other hand, it is the better management of the properties belonging to the charitable or religious institution or endowment. The incident that the same may result in hardship to some of the tenants will not be a ground to say that it deprives them of their livelihood. The next argument of the learned counsel based on Article 31A of the Constitution, in our view, is entirely unfounded. Article 31A provides for granting certain enactments immunity from attack under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. That is not relevant in the present context at all inasmuch as no such exercise has been undertaken by the State. Therefore, we find no merit in any one of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners. The writ petitions, therefore, stand dismissed. No costs.
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2001 (8) TMI 1395 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
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... ... ..... led to a confusion in his mind on the basis of which he held that the order passed by the Assessing Officer was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. In fact, there was no error in the order passed by the Assessing Officer. Similarly, with regard to cash credit in the account of the assessee with Rajput Jewellers, the same were properly explained by the assessee before the Assessing Officer an well as ld. Commissioner in proceedings under section 263. Therefore, taking into consideration the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that there was no sufficient ground with the Commissioner for cancellation of the assessment order framed by the Assessing Officer under section 143(3) on 8-5-2000. Accordingly, we cancel the order passed by the Commissioner under section 263 dated 8-3-2001 and restore that of the Assessing Officer dated 8-5-2000 and allow the appeal filed by the assessee. 5. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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2001 (8) TMI 1394 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... hy the addition cannot be sustained. The addition has been made on the ground that the amount of ₹ 1,70,000 will be taken as the assessee’s income from brokerage. The assessee’s assessments for the assessment years 1983-84 to 1986-87 were reopened under section 148 dated 8-9-1987 and in response thereto, the assessee furnished returns on the basis of which the assessments were completed on incomes of ₹ 24,865, ₹ 28,893, ₹ 37,570 and ₹ 55,050 respectively. It is common ground that these are all income from brokerage only. These assessments are sufficient indication of the assessee’s income from brokerage and it would be incongruous to hold, without any additional, new or special facts brought on record for the assessment year under appeal, that the assessee’s income suddenly shot up to ₹ 1,87,000. 12. For the above reasons, we cancel the addition of ₹ 1,70,000 made by the Assessing Officer and allow the appeal.
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2001 (8) TMI 1393 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f the Act and it is also provided as one of the grounds for forfeiture of the lease rights in the lease deed, not otherwise. (iv) The period of fixed term lease is ensured and remains protected except in the case indicated in preceding paragraph. With great respect therefore, in our view, the decision in the case of Dhanapal Chettiar (supra) has not been correctly construed in the case of Sri Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and it no more holds good nor the Full Bench decision following it, in the case of Bombay Tyres International Ltd. (supra). The earlier judgment of the full Bench of the High Court in the case of Sri Ramakrishna Theatres Ltd.(supra) lays down the law correctly. As a result of the discussion held above, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. The appeal is allowed and the judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there would however be no order as to costs.
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