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1963 (9) TMI 43 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... than specified items. The concepts of dealer, goods and sale in the Central and State Acts comprehend all kinds of movable property. Section 8(3) read with section 8(1) and understood in the context in which those expressions have been used in the statutes, makes it apparent that a distributor of electricity is treated as a dealer. If that is not so, the object of section 8(3) cannot be achieved. It is true that the certificate of registration was applied for by and granted to the petitioner under section 7(2), as amended in 1958. But it should not be lost sight of that sub-section (2) of section 7, as amended, was introduced by the same Amending Act, which inserted also sub-section (3) of section 8. On this construction of the statutory provisions, the petitions must succeed. Quite apart from that, the same result must also follow my view that electricity is goods under the general law. The petitions are allowed with costs-one set. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petitions allowed.
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1963 (9) TMI 42 - HIGH COURT OF MYSORE
Winding up – Overriding preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... reasonable on the part of the company to withhold payment till an award had been made. The decision of an arbitrator like a decision of a court necessarily deals with the position as at the institution of the proceedings. His finding, for the reasons already stated, may be taken to indicate May 9, 1955, to be the proper date. The arbitrator having allowed six per cent, per annum on the earnest money, I think the appropriate rate for the withheld amounts should also be the same. I therefore make a declaration that out of the amounts found due and payable to the applicants by the arbitrator, a sum of Rs. 16,800 with interest thereon at six per cent, from May 9, 1955, should be paid in full to the applicants. The actual payment, however, will be deferred until the total figures relating to preferential payments and the available surplus are ascertained, for which appropriate action will be taken by the liquidator in the course of the next week. Parties will bear their own costs.
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1963 (9) TMI 33 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Balance sheet – Default in filing copies of ... ... ... ... ..... t. But taking into consideration the fact that the accounts were not passed for 1954 and 1955 and that they had to get the subsequent accounts audited, a lenient view of the matter can be taken. Accused No. 1 is the company, accused No. 2 is the managing director and accused No. 7 is the general manager. Their responsibility is greater than the other directors. I reduce the fine imposed on accused Nos. 1, 2 and 7 to Rs. 100 each and that on the other accused to Rs. 50 each. C.A. No. 577 of 1961 relates to the year 1959. The accounts for the period 1959 should have been prepared and submitted by November, 1960. There is no excuse whatever for the appellants for not complying with the requirements of section 220 before November, 1960. The convictions of the appellants are confirmed. There is no reason to reduce the sentences passed on accused Nos. 1, 2 and 7. Regarding the other accused, the fine is reduced to Rs. 100 each. Time for payment of fine is two months from this date.
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1963 (9) TMI 32 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Memorandum of association – Special resolution and confirmation by CLB required for alteration of
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1963 (9) TMI 31 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... gainst the petitioner by Punjab Province v. Pandit Tarachand AIR 1947 F.C. 23, in which it was held that the word wages in the article would cover also salary. Since on the date of the application for winding up, the petitioner s claim would thus seem to have been barred, his petition based on the notice of demand for payment and failure to comply with it, cannot be sustained. It is true that as found in the affidavit of the Registrar, the liabilities of the company far exceed its assets as in 1962. But it does not necessarily follow from it that the company is unable to pay its debts. A company may have liabilities more than its assets but still may have, in particular circumstances, the capacity to meet demands from its creditors. No evidence has been placed before me beyond the affidavit of the Registrar that the company is really unable to pay its debts. The second ground for a winding up order is, therefore, not made out. The petition is, therefore, dismissed with costs.
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1963 (9) TMI 30 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Oppression and mismanagement ... ... ... ... ..... g any other rights as such allottees of those shares. 13.I appoint Mr. Ajoy K. Basu, Barrister-at-Law, as administrator at a remuneration of 60 G. Ms. per month from the date he takes possession and charge. The remuneration of the administrator to be paid out of the assets of the company. The administrator would also be entitled to travelling expenses and costs of board and lodging if he visits the company s factory at Chasnala. 14.I appoint Mr. C. P. Mukherjee, Chartered Accountant of Messrs. P. K. Mitra and Co., to be the special auditor. The remuneration of the special auditor is fixed at Rs. 2,500 to be paid by the administrator out of the assets of the company. 15.The administrator, the special auditor, the official receiver and all parties are directed to act on a signed copy of the minutes upon the petitioners undertaking to have this order drawn up, completed and filed. The petitioners will be entitled to the costs of this application from respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4.
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1963 (9) TMI 7 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Import Trade Control - Precedent - Appeal/Writ jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... of the provisions in Article 14 of the Constitution. There is no substance in the contention of the Petitioner that the fine imposed is excessive. In that connection, the statement made on behalf of the Respondents that the margin of profit that the Petitioner would have earned on clearance of the goods was 200 per cent must be accepted as correct. The Petitioner s contention that the statement at the foot of the impugned order that the goods are liable to Customs duty is a condition of the order is also without any substance. This point has been considered in the case of Parmar and Co. v. V.R. Gupte, 61 B.L.R. 1482 at p. 1489. In view of the observations in that case, if necessary, I would have negatived this contention made on behalf of the Petitioner. 21. emsp Under the circumstances, the Petitioner is entitled to have the impugned order set aside. The order dated August 28, 1962, passed by the 1st Respondent is accordingly quashed and set aside. Respondents to pay costs.
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1963 (9) TMI 3 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Duty Liability (Central Excise) - Recovery - Demand - Evidence - Natural justice - Cross-examination
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1963 (9) TMI 2 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Brand-name/other mark - Duty liability ... ... ... ... ..... at person . Having read these definitions as well as the explanation I fail to see how any mark can be said to be used at all on the medicine in question which will attract the explanation. The underlying implication is that in so far as any particular mark is concerned, the person using it has acquired a species of right therein or that the mark serves to establish a connection between the dealer and the goods. The function of the mark must be to indicate the trade origin of the goods. The expression a connection in the course of trade has been left undefined even in the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. But it is clear that the service which the mark performs must be to enable a customer to identify the goods of a particular dealer from that of others. That result is not achieved in this case where only the name of the dealer is used. It follows that the explanation cannot apply. The petition is allowed. The rule is made absolute. There will however be no order as to costs.
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1963 (9) TMI 1 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Assessment made u/s 34(1)(a) - validity ... ... ... ... ..... la fide, and it was the duty of the assessee to show the income in the assessment year in his son s return. On the background of the facts stated above, we are of opinion that the finding made by the Tribunal in this regard was not justifiable. It is undoubtedly true that the finding of fact made by the Tribunal cannot be interfered with by this court, but we consider that a finding on question of fact regarding the aforesaid matter is open to attack under section 66 of the Act as erroneous in law, as we find that there is no evidence to support it, and it is perverse as it has been reached without due consideration of the several matters discussed above for such a determination. We are therefore of opinion that there was no non-disclosure of material facts truly and fully as contended on behalf of the department and therefore the question must be answered in the negative. The respondent will pay costs to the applicant. Certified for counsel. SANKAR PRASAD MITRA J.- I agree.
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