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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 553 Records
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1999 (9) TMI 965 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to appreciate how the operation of a judgment rendered by the Court can be held in abeyance indefinitely when there is no appeal or review against the same. Prayer a in the petition is unsustainable and it cannot be countenanced by this Bench. As regards prayere, directions were being given by this Court again and again ever since Hussainara Khatoon and Others vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81 to the State Governments and it is mandatory duty of all the State Governments to take appropriate steps to comply with such directions. If the State Governments are interested in the proper administration of justice, they should fulfill their constitutional obligations, as repeatedly pointed out by this Court in its earlier judgments. 9. In the result, the only clarifications which are required to be made are found in the order of Justice Thomas and I express my concurrence with the same. Neither prayer a nor prayer can be granted as stated by my brother Justice Shah.
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1999 (9) TMI 964 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s had concurrently held that one lac bricks were produced in five days. Without declaring the size of the brick kiln or without holding that some alteration/addition were made in the brick kiln it was not proper for the authorities below to have increased the capacity of the brick kiln and to have fixed the per day production at 29 thousand bricks by the Assessing Authority or 22,500 bricks by the Tribunal. 9. There is no material showing that brick kiln was run in the second season. Even if, the books of accounts were rejected on the ground stated by the assessing authority the firing period could not have been increased to 98 days. The First Appellate Authority has given cogent reasons for fixing the period of 54 days. 10. In this view of the matter, the revision is partly allowed. The judgment and order of the Tribunal is set aside and the case is remanded to the Tribunal for refixation of the taxable turnover and the tax liability considering the observations made above.
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1999 (9) TMI 963 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and that too becasuse respondent No. 1 had agreed to that course being adopted. The power which is available to this Court under Article 142 is not available to the High Courts, as observed by this Court in Sanchalakshri & Anr. v. Vijayakumar Raghuvirprasad Mehta & Anr. JT (1998) 8 SC 55. As the High Court did not exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution without properly appreciating the nature of its jurisdiction, the impugned judgments deserve to be set aside. However, in view of the fair stand taken by the appellants that these appeals have been filed as test cases only and in view of long lapse of time they will not recover the amounts already paid to the respondents, we do not think it necessary to set aside the impugned judgments because that may again expose the appellants to actions in Civil Courts by the persons claiming to be the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased. With the observations made above, we dismiss all these appeals.
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1999 (9) TMI 962 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... handawat that the Tribunal has erred in law in not appreciating the fact that the proviso to Section 44AD(2), which allows deduction of salary and interest paid to its partners, refers to computation of income made under Section 44AD(1) whereas the assessment was finalised under Section 44AD(5). The proviso has no application to the assessment completed under Section 44AD(5). 5. It is submitted by Mr. Ojha that reference to the aforesaid provision is not relevant as the said question was not raised before the Tribunal by the Revenue. He has also submitted that Sub-section (5) of Section 44AD is no bar for allowing deduction as claimed by the respondent. 6. In view of this submission made by Mr. Ojha, the contention raised by Mr. Bhandawat, learned counsel for the Revenue, cannot be entertained. 7. No referable question of law arises out of the order of the Tribunal and, accordingly, both the applications filed under Section 256(2) at the instance of the Revenue are rejected.
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1999 (9) TMI 961 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e ought not to have been dismissed on the ground of limitation, as the purity of election process is required to be maintained. There is no quarrel with the proposition that it is the duty of the Courts to maintain the purity of election promess but at the same time there is no gainsaying that the law of limitation may harshly effect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes. The Courts cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds more particularly in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act. Since, it is a common ground that the election petition in the instant case had been filed one week after the expiry of the period of forty five days, it was clearly barred by time. The High Court was, under the circumstances, fully justified in dismissing the election petition on that ground. We do not find any merit in this appeal which accordingly fails and is dismissed but with no order as to costs.
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1999 (9) TMI 960 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tion is for an offence referred to in clause (e) of sub- section(1) of Section 13, the pecuniary resources or property for which the accused person is unable to account satisfactorily. The interpretation given by us in respect of the power of seizure under Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code is in accordance with the intention of the legislature engrafted in Section 16 of the Prevention of Corruption Act referred to above. In the aforesaid premises, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court of Bombay committed error in holding that the police officer could not have seized the bank account or could not have issued any direction to the bank officer, prohibiting the account of the accused from being operated upon. Though we have laid down the law, but so far as the present case is concerned, the order impugned has already been given effect to and the accused has been operating upon his account, and so, we do not interfere with the same. o p /o p
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1999 (9) TMI 959 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and in the circumstances mentioned in Section 21. Question Nos. 1 and 2 framed above are, therefore, answered accordingly. 21. In the instant case, the Tribunal has fell in error in observing that after the notice under Section 21 of the Act was dropped, the Original assessment order merged into the order passed under Section 21 of the Act. The finding of the Tribunal that the learned Deputy Commissioner (Executive) has initiated the proceeding with object in the mind that no other remedy was available was without any basis. The Tribunal also fell in error in holding that escaped turnover cannot be made basis for initiation of proceeding under Section 10-B because the remedy by way of initiation of proceeding under Section 21 of the Act is available. Therefore, the order passed by the Tribunal cannot be sustained. 22. The revision is allowed and impugned order passed by the Tribunal is set aside and the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner (Executive) is hereby restored.
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1999 (9) TMI 958 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... aid reasons, we are of the view that the finding of the High Court regarding malice or the absence of reasonable and probable cause cannot be accepted, notwithstanding the fact that such a finding was the basis for granting pecuniary damages in B & C schedules which decree has become final. If that be so, the respondents can sustain the dismissal of the suit in regard to the non- pecuniary damages in A schedule. We hold in favour of the respondents and against the plaintiff appellant on the Point 2. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal filed by the plaintiff seeking damages in respect of the non-pecuniary damages in the A schedule is dismissed and the decree of dismissal of the first appeal in regard to the said A schedule is sustained without going into the question of proof of damage due to pain or loss of reputation etc. The decree for the pecuniary losses in B and C schedule items remains. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.
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1999 (9) TMI 957 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... s dismissed on the ground of delay as well as on merits.
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1999 (9) TMI 956 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Insofar as the credit for the stamp duty paid is concerned, though the petitioner has not made any claim for stamp duty before the assessing officer, the petitioner would be entitled to the said relief under section 18A of the Gift Tax Act as then existing during the relevant assessment year in question. Though the petitioner has not claimed the same before the Gift Tax Officer the relief under section 18A of the Gift Tax Act is a statutory relief under the provisions of the statute and, therefore, irrespective of the question whether a specific claim was made by the petitioner or not for the credit for the stamp duty paid on the instrument of gift, the petitioner would be entitled to the relief available under section 18A of the Gift Tax Act. The second respondent is directed to pass orders in conformity with the judgment. 24. Subject to the modifications indicated earlier, the writ petition is disposed of. However, in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1999 (9) TMI 955 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... btained by way of sale consideration for the purpose of meeting the cost of the new asset. 6. A reading of sections 53 and 54 of the Act would make it clear that a special provision is made in respect of capital gains arising out of transfer of particular type of capital asset, namely, house property which was being used by the assessee or a parent of his for the purpose of their residence. Entitlement of the exemption under section 54 relates to the cost of the acquisition of a new asset in the nature of a house property for the purpose of his own residence within the specified period. The three decisions relied on by the learned standing counsel for the revenue have no application to the issue raised in this appeal. The statutory provision is clear that it does not call for a different interpretation from what has been given to it by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal. 7. We find no merits in the contention raised in the appeal and, therefore, it stands dismissed.
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1999 (9) TMI 954 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 0-1992 for the assessment 1992-93. We are fortified by the view taken in the decision of the Supreme Court in Deputy Commr. Andaman v. Consumer Co-op. Stores Ltd.- AIR 1999 SC 696. Learned Government Pleader relied on the decision reported in M/s. Raj Sheel v. Commercial Tax Officer, Hyderabad - AIR 1999 SC 1580. That was a case where sales tax was realised from the customers and it was included in the turnover of the applicant. Collections made from the customers were paid to the State. When the question of refund came, the supreme Court held that the State can forfeit the amount so collected and the relief was not granted. That case stands on a different footing. 6. In the above view of the matter, we modify the judgment of the learned single Judge and direct the respondents to refund of the turnover tax paid by the appellant from 29-10-1992. The refund shall be made within six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Writ Appeal is disposed of as above.
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1999 (9) TMI 953 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... . Separate penalty of ₹ 10,000/- each has been imposed on Shri R.K. Luther and M/s. Atul Fasteners. In the case of U.K. Thampi v. C.C.E., Cochin 1988 (33) E.L.T. 424 , the Tribunal in para 12 of their order had observed that in case of a prop. concern, no separate penalty on the prop. was called for. Although in the present case, in addition to M/s. Atul Fasteners which was the prop. concern of Shri R.K. Luther, two other units M/s. K.P. Fasteners and M/s. U.K. Machine Tools are also involved and the allegation of surrophilious removal had also been proved in the Kirti Wire Products, in the circumstances of the case, we set aside the penalty imposed on Shri R.K. Luther. Penalties on M/s. Atul Fasteners and M/s. Kirti Wire Products in addition to the demand of Central Excise duty as ordered by the adjudicating authority, are confirmed. 18. Thus while setting aside the penalty imposed on Shri R.K. Luther, the appeals are otherwise rejected. Ordered accordingly.
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1999 (9) TMI 952 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dra Nath Singh & Anr., AIR (1976) Calcutta 471 have correctly laid down the law; the opinion to the contra expressed by the High Court of Calcutta in Ram Krishna Tarafdar v. Nemai Krishna Tarafdar & Ors. AIR (1974) Calcutta 173 is wrong. Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application; Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act is also inapplicable to an execution petition. If the time is reckoned not from the date of the decree but from the date when it is prepared, it would amount to doing violence to the provisions of the Limitation Act as well as of Order XX and order XXI Rule 11 C.P.C. which is clearly impermissible. In the result, we hold that the period of limitation under Article 136 of the Limitation Act runs from the date of the decree and not from the date when the decree is actually drawn up and signed by the Judge. We, therefore, do not find any illegality in the impugned judgment of the High Court. The appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1999 (9) TMI 951 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rmissible course and the express prohibition contained in Article 20(1) of the Constitution is not a bar for resorting to the corresponding sub-section in TADA 1987. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the court gets jurisdiction to award the alternative sentence of imprisonment for life as for the offence under Section 3(1) of TADA 1985. On the fact situation of this case and in view of the distance of time, particularly in view of the long period of 13 years during which appellant was languishing in jail under the spell of death penalty, we are persuaded to award the lesser alternative i.e. imprisonment for life. We, therefore, confirm the conviction of the appellant of the offences under which he stands convicted by the Designated Court as per the impugned judgment. But the sentence as for the offence under Section 3(2) of TADA 1985 is altered to imprisonment for life. The other sentences will remain undisturbed and will run concurrently with the main sentence.
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1999 (9) TMI 950 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... against the appellant had failed and was held by the Enquiry Officer to be a farce and not having been laid with the permission of the Chief Justice. We have also noticed that there was absolute non- consideration of the statements of defence witnesses, namely, Dr. Naranje and Mr. Bapat, advocate, by the Disciplinary Committee. This factor in itself was sufficient to vitiate the findings recorded by that Committee contrary to the findings of the Enquiry Officer. For the reasons stated above, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment dated 21.6.1996 passed by the Bombay High Court by which the appellant's Writ Petition was dismissed. We hereby allow the Writ Petition and quash the order of dismissal dated 08.11.1993 passed by the State Government with the direction that the appellant shall be reinstated in service forthwith with all consequential benefits, including all arrears of pay which shall be paid to him within three months. There will be no order as to costs.
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1999 (9) TMI 949 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s made by the Assessing Officer by drawing an inference from the seized materials?" 2. The Tribunal considering the decision of this Court in the case of N.R.PAPER & BOARDS LTD. reported in 234 ITR page 733, by a common judgment, has rejected the application. 3. We have passed an order in ITA No.266 of 1999 covering the question raised in this application. In view of the decision rendered in ITA No.266 of 1999, this application is required to be rejected and the same is, therefore, rejected. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs.
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1999 (9) TMI 948 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... takes care of the objection raised by Mr. Mishra. This argument has not been considered by the learned designated election Judge as presumably the occasion to raise it did not arise but be that as it may, we would not like to express any opinion on this question. It would be open to the returned candidate to raise all such pleas as are available to him in taw, including the plea above noticed, during the trial of the election petition before the learned designated election Judge. Equally, it would be open to the appellant to resist all such pleas in accordance with law. Alt such pleas shall be decided by the learned designated election Judge, as and when raised, in accordance with law. Thus, for what we have said above the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 3.10.1997 is set aside. The election petition shall be tried on merits by the learned designated election Judge expeditiously. There shall be no order as to costs insofar as this appeal is concerned.
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1999 (9) TMI 947 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... en of the seal sent to the Forensic Scientific Laboratory also tallied with the seal on the packet sent to it. Therefore it is not possible to hold that the seal which was found on the packet was different and therefore a doubt arises whether the material which was seized from the appellants was the same as was examined by the Forensic Scientific Laboratory. 7. It was lastly contended that in view of the enmity between the appellants and one Ram Swarup Das they were falsely involved. Even if enmity is assumed there is no material to show that the Police and the Panchas were in any way under the influence of Ram Swarup Das or there was any reason for them to oblige Ram Swarup Das by falsely implicating the appellants. It is also not believable that at the instance of Ram Swarup Das the Police had planted such a big quantity of charas worth ₹ 85,000/- to falsely implicate the appellants. 8. As we do not find any substance in this appeal the same is accordingly dismissed.
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1999 (9) TMI 946 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... spiracy to cheat the State Government particularly when the accused growers accepted the position that they have sold quantities of appeals as entered in the records and received the amount as price thereof. But the crucial factor is that they denied allegation that the stock brought by them to the procurement and destruction center was not grown in their orchard. This crucial factor is sought to be proved by drawing an inference from the evidence of Shri Panwar. As noted above Shri Panwar's evidence is beset with many unsatisfactory features which renders it clearly unreliable and in any case inadequate to establish the charges leveled against the accused persons. 22. On a close scrutiny of the entire case we have no hesitation to hold that the High Court was right in taking the view that the prosecution has failed to establish the charges against the accused persons and rightly acquitted them of the same. In the result, the appeals being devoid of merits are dismissed.
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