|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 583 Records
-
2006 (9) TMI 584 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... ual delay is to the extent of more than 870 days. There is no satisfactory explanation given in the application which merit condonation of such delay. As such we are unable to condone the delay and the appeal is not admitted.
-
2006 (9) TMI 583 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d not mean that the decree is vitiated by collusion. Though, generally there is reluctance on the part of the litigants to come forward with the truth in a Court of law, we cannot accede to the argument that they are not entitled to admit something that is true while they enter their plea. We are, therefore, satisfied that there is no merit in the challenge of counsel for the contesting defendants to the decree in Civil Suit No. 398 of 1980. 18. The courts below have held that as a family arrangement the relinquishment had followed and on that basis the decree in the earlier suit recognising that arrangement did not require registration. In the face of that, the High Court was justified in answering the substantial question of law formulated by it in favour of the plaintiff and against the contesting defendants. We, thus find no merit in this appeal. We confirm the judgments and decrees under appeal and dismiss this appeal. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
-
2006 (9) TMI 582 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
... ...
... ... ..... date of this order. Till the rectification is effected, the 10th respondent shall not exercise any voting rights on the impugned shares and till then the respondents shall maintain status quo as of date of all the fixed assets of the company. 18. Since the present proceeding has revealed that the relationship among the parties has soured to such an extent that they may not be able to carry on the affairs of the company collectively, I give an option to the respondents, being in minority, to go out of the company if they so desire by selling their shares to the petitioners on a fair value to be determined by an independent valuer. In case the respondents exercise this option, the same shall be binding on the petitioners. In case, the respondents decide to go out of the company, they may make an application to this Board for appointment of an independent valuer to determine the fair value of the shares. This option should be exercised within a month of the date of this order.
-
2006 (9) TMI 581 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the Arbitral Tribunal itself. In this view of the matter, I do not see any reason why an Arbitrator shall not be appointed in terms of the arbitration agreement of the parties by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction Under Section 11(6) of the Act. 3. The Respondent is a company having its registered office at Bombay. The Petitioner herein is a German company. the contract provides and as agreed to by Mr. A.S. Bhasme, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the arbitration proceedings are to be held at Bombay. In that view of the matter, Justice S.N. Variava (a former Judge of this Court) is appointed as an Arbitrator for resolution of the disputes and differences between the parties. 4. The learned Arbitrator is requested to complete the arbitration proceedings within a period of four months. Fees and other expenses of the learned Arbitrator requisite for conducting the arbitration proceedings may be fixed by him. 5. This application is allowed on the aforementioned terms.
-
2006 (9) TMI 580 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... inted out earlier, we are afraid that the learned Trial Judge did not attach sufficient importance to the mandatory requirement of Sub-section (2) of Section 235 of the Code. 23. Apparently the lower court has committed serious error by awarding death sentence to the accused-appellant without providing effective opportunity of hearing and therefore, extreme penalty awarded to the accused-appellant is not tenable in the eye of law. Apart from it, the case in hand also does not fall within the category of ''rarest of rare cases" as laid down in a decisions of Apex Court reported in AIR 1980 page 898 (Supra) and (Surja Ram v. State of Rajasthan). 24. In the result, the sentence of death awarded by the lower court to the accused/appellant is hereby set aside and is commuted into the sentence of life. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed with above modification in the order of sentence. The death reference is also answered in negative in a manner said above.
-
2006 (9) TMI 579 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... dity of the compromise in view of Rule 1A of Order XLIII of the Code." The aforesaid judgment has been followed by learned single Judge in Durga Prasad Tandon v. Gaur Brahmin Sabha 11. The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant that instead of filing a miscellaneous appeal, a regular appeal under Section 96, C.P.C. was filed and therefore the same was not maintainable needs to be noted. However, he could not dispute that even if a miscellaneous appeal would lie before the Court below and there will not be change of forum of the appellate court may be a regular appeal or a miscellaneous appeal. Assuming for a moment that the said argument of the appellant has some force it will not make any difference as it has been firmly established that mere mention of a wrong section will not make any difference if the Court had the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the appeal. 12. In view of the above discussion I find no merit in the appeal. The appeal is dismissed.
-
2006 (9) TMI 578 - SUPREME COURT
Partition of ancestral property - Interpretation of the statutes - Right of Son in the property of her parents etc. - Sections 6 and 8 of The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 ("the Act") as amended by Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 - right of a coparcener in the property - retrospective and retroactive statute - HELD THAT:- The Act indisputably would prevail over the old Hindu Law. We may notice that the Parliament, with a view to confer right upon the female heirs, even in relation to the joint family property, enacted Hindu Succession Act, 2005. Such a provision was enacted as far back in 1987 by the State of Andhra Pradesh. The succession having opened in 1989, evidently, the provisions of Amendment Act, 2005 would have no application. Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act governs the law relating to succession on the death of a coparcener in the event the heirs are only male descendants. But, proviso appended to Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act creates an exception. First son of Babu Lal, viz., Lal Chand, was, thus, a coparcener. Section 6 is exception to the general rules.
It was, therefore, obligatory on the part of the Plaintiffs-Respondents to show that apart from Lal Chand, Sohan Lal will also derive the benefit thereof. So far as the Second son Sohan Lal is concerned, no evidence has been brought on records to show that he was born prior to coming into force of Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
Thus, it was the half share in the property of Babu Ram, which would devolve upon all his heirs and legal representatives as at least one of his sons was born prior to coming into force of the Act.
Except to the aforementioned extent; in our opinion, the courts below are correct in applying the provisions of Section 6 of the Act and holding that Section 8 thereof will have no application. The appeal is allowed in part and to the aforementioned extent. The decree would be modified accordingly.
-
2006 (9) TMI 577 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ion for eight months, quashed the order of detention, and ordered release of the detenu forthwith. Inasmuch as in the case on hand the detention order was passed on 30. 12. 2005, we are of the view that the above said direction is also applicable. We therefore hold that it is just and proper to quash the impugned order of detention and direct for the release of the detenu forthwith provided if he is not required in any other case or cause. ( 10. ) Since same grounds have been raised in HCP. Nos. 197 and 200 of 2006 and the date of detention is 30. 01. 2006, the detenus in the said petitions are also directed to be released forthwith, provided if they are not required in any other case or cause. In the result, all the habeas corpus petitions, viz. , HCP. Nos. 53, 197 and 200 of 2006 are allowed. The impugned detention orders dated 30. 12. 2005 and 30. 01. 2006 are quashed and the detenus are ordered to be set at liberty forthwith unless they are required in any case or cause.
-
2006 (9) TMI 576 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... ch relief can be given. Under this section directing an investigation is only analogous to the issue of a fact finding commission by a civil court for looking into the accounts or making an investigation and does not amount to a judgment within Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, 1865, so as to enable an aggrieved party to appeal. An order of investigation is not an end by itself, it is only a means to find out the full facts of the acts complained of. It is nothing but an exploratory measure to be proved or disproved with reference to the facts later on ascertained. This discretionary power of the Company Law Board has to be exercised in good faith. An investigation may be ordered when public interest is involved or detriment to the interest of the shareholders had been caused surreptitiously. Such investigation should not be taken lightly. Unless proper grounds exist for investigation into the affairs of the company investigation cannot be ordered. Hence, this petition fails.
-
2006 (9) TMI 575 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... has been explained but also as to whether it is a requirement of justice to condone or ignore such delay. The Supreme Court concluded As such, whenever the bar of Section 468 is applicable, the court has to apply its mind on the question, whether it is necessary to condone such delay in the interests of justice. While examining the question as to whether it is necessary to condone the delay in the interest of justice, the Court has to take note of the nature of offence, the class to which the victim belongs, including the background of the victim. 22. In this context, it must be observed that the learned Additional Sessions Judge after examining the matter in detail, has thought it fit to condone the delay and I find that in its examination of the case for the purposes of condensation of delay there is no warrant for this Court to interfere. 23. In view of the foregoing discussion, there is no merit in the revision petition filed by the petitioners and the same is dismissed.
-
2006 (9) TMI 574 - COMPANY LAW BOARD NEW DELHI
Oppression and mismanagement - jurisdiction under Sections 397/398 - director removed from the board - family company - Whether the letter of the petitioner could have been treated as a letter of resignation - seeking declaration that the allotment of shares is bad in law - HELD THAT:- Admittedly, the company took over the business of partnership firms in which the petitioner was a partner and thereafter, he continued to be a whole time director of the company. Thus, the petitioner has a vested right to continue as a director. There is no mention about directorship nor the letter has been addressed either to the company or to the board of directors. There is not even a mention of "resignation". Therefore, by treating this letter as the letter of resignation and ousting the petitioner who was a partner in the earlier firm the business of which the company had taken over, and continued as a whole time director of the company, the respondents have acted highly oppressive to the petitioner.
It is seen that all the 598676 shares proposed to be allotted on the two occasions had been allotted only to the members belonging to the respondents' group and thus they have consolidated their position in the company. There is no evidence that for the first allotment, shares were offered to the petitioner and the respondents have admitted that in respect of the second allotment, no offer was made to the petitioners. Thus, the petitioners are justified in claiming that by the said allotments, not only the respondents have enriched themselves but also reduced the percentage holding of the petitioners.
Considering the fact that the petitioners' holding in the company is only around 10% and that the company is engaged in a profitable business, winding up of the company would be against the interest of the shareholders as well as the company. Therefore, since in terms of section 397 the acts complained of should be put an end to, I could direct the company to take back the 1st petitioner as a director and also direct the allottees of the shares to transfer such number of shares to the petitioners which would bring their share holding to the original percentage. However, I do not propose to do so. It is the understanding of the respondents that the desire of the petitioner in saying "good bye" amounted to resignation. He had actually desired to say "good bye" to the business association and partnership. It would mean that he did not desire to have any association with the respondents.
This being the case, his business association can be terminated by purchasing his shares in the company so that the respondents would have truly acted not only in spirit but also in terms of that letter. Even otherwise, since the relationship between the petitioners and the respondents has soured, in the interests of all concerned, the petitioners, being in minority, their shares could be purchased either by the company or the respondents as the case may be at the option of the respondents. This would not only put an end to the disputes but also would be in the long term interests of all concerned. By another order of even date, in respect of another company in which the same shareholders are parties, I have given the option to the respondents, who are in minority, to go out of the company.
Therefore, in terms of Section 402, I consider it appropriate that the final goodbye should be by way of exist of the petitioners as members of the company by directing the respondents/the company to purchase the shares held by the petitioners on a fair value to be determined by an independent valuer. such fair value will also take care of the allegation of the petitioners that the respondents have issued shares to themselves at par value when the fair value was much higher.
Accordingly, I order so. The parties will appear before me to suggest a mutually acceptable valuer to determine the fair value. The valuation of the shares shall be on the basis of the balance sheet, being the proximate to the date of the petition.
-
2006 (9) TMI 573 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... cumstances, we are of the opinion that interest of justice would be sub-served if respondent No.1 herein is directed to furnish security to the extent of ₹ 5 lakhs. Such security should be furnished to the satisfaction of the learned Single Judge. The security, other than the deposit of the amount in cash, should be furnished within 12 weeks from the date. Plaintiff-Appellant would be entitled to press his application for passing a decree on admission. Defendant-Respondent No.1 would also be entitled to file his objection as to why a decree under Order XII Rule 6 shall not be passed. Such a cause, if not already filed, must be filed within 8 weeks from date. The Court shall consider the matter, upon hearing the counsel for the parties, on the expiry of said period of 12 weeks on merits, if the said defendant-respondent complies with this order, failing which the decree passed by the trial court shall stand. This appeal is allowed to the extent aforementioned. No costs.
-
2006 (9) TMI 572 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... hough, ordinarily we would not have interfered with the impugned order, we are of the opinion, in the interest of justice, the explanation furnished by appellant may be accepted, and delay be condoned in filing the appeal before the High Court. However, the appellant should be put on terms. 4. Learned Additional Solicitor very fairly states that he would have no objection if the amount of costs which may be directed to be paid by this Court be paid to the National Legal Services Authority. 5. We, therefore, allow this appeal subject to the condition that appellant shall deposit a sum of ₹ 20,000/- before the Member Secretary, National Legal Services Authority within two weeks. 6. We would request the High Court to consider the desirability of disposing of the appeal as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 7. The appeal is allowed subject to the aforestated condition.
-
2006 (9) TMI 571 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ld. We may notice that a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. Shramik Sena & Ors. (1999) 6 SCC 439 observed as under (SCC p.449, para 22) " We hold that the workmen of a statutory canteen would be the workmen of the establishment for the purpose of the Factories Act only and not for all other purposes." See also Municipal Council, Sujanpur vs. Surinder Kumar JT 2006 (5) SCALE 505 . As the respondents did not hold any post, in our opinion, they are not entitled to any scale of pay. However, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we may observe that the State should take steps to fill up the vacant posts, if any, as expeditiously as possible, in which event, the cases of the respondents may be considered together with other eligible candidates. However, age bar, if any, to the extent they had worked with the appellants may be relaxed. The appeal is allowed on the above terms. No costs.
-
2006 (9) TMI 570 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... before he was called upon to make his defence. 'Adam', says God, 'where art thou' has thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that 'thou should not eat'." Since then the principle has been chiselled, honed and refined, enriching its content. In Mullooh v. Aberdeen 1971 (2) All E.R. 1278, it was stated "the right of a man to be heard in his defence is the most elementary protection." Natural justice is the essence of fair adjudication, deeply rooted in tradition and conscience, to be ranked as fundamental. The purpose of following the principles of natural justice is the prevention of miscarriage of justice. On that score alone, the appeal deserves to be allowed. The order passed by the learned Single Judge in the Civil Revision and the Review Application are accordingly set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits after due notice to the appellant. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
-
2006 (9) TMI 569 - SUPREME COURT
Advertisement for appointment of 225 posts of Live Stock Assistants in the Animal Husbandry Department - selection process completed - appointment letter sent to Respondent asked to join the post within fifteen days - failed to join - again requested Director to issue an appointment letter - State in its Counter Affidavit categorically raised a contention that the panel remained valid only for one year - HELD THAT:- It may or may not be that Respondent herein had actually received his appointment letter. It was, however, expected that he would make enquiries thereabout; particularly when on his own showing those who were below him in the selection list had already been permitted to join. Admittedly, he came to know thereabout in 1994. He allegedly filed a representation and although no reply thereto was given, he did not take any step soon thereafter. He filed another representation only in 1995. He filed the writ petition after a long period i.e. in 2001 when his purported representation filed in the year 1999 was rejected.
In the aforementioned situation, in our opinion, he did not have any legal right to be appointed. Life of a panel, it is well known, remains valid for a year. Once it lapses, unless an appropriate order is issued by the State, no appointment can be made out of the said panel. It may be true that the appointment letter was sent by ordinary post; but even in relation thereto a statutory presumption arises. It is also well known that postal delay by itself may not be a ground to take a sympathetic view In Maruti Udyod Ltd. v. Ram Lal and Others [2005 (1) TMI 671 - SUPREME COURT].
Thus, in our opinion, the High Court should not have allowed Respondent herein to join his services only on the basis of sympathy. It is now also well settled that in absence of any legal right, the Court should not issue a writ of or in the nature of mandamus on the basis of sympathy.
We, therefore, are of the opinion that the High Court committed a manifest error in allowing the writ petition of Respondent. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. However, no recovery shall be made for the period he has actually worked.
-
2006 (9) TMI 568 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... view that amount of deferred tax though retained shall be deemed to have been paid within the meaning of s. 43B and would be eligible for allowance as per law. 7. In CIT vs. Bhagwati Autocast Ltd. (2002) 178 CTR (Guj) 98 (2003) 261 ITR 481(Guj) the Gujarat High Court has also held that amount of unpaid sales-tax is not to be disallowed. Following the decision of Gujarat High Court, the Punjab and Haryana High Court in view of the amendment in Sales-tax Act treating amounts retained as actually paid has observed that amounts retained under scheme cannot be disallowed under s. 43B. 8. In view of the above discussion, we find no substance in the Revenue's appeal. The appeals are dismissed but with no order as to costs. This order be retained in IT Appeal No. 40 of 2004 and a copy each be placed in the record of connected Appeal No. 41 of 2004, IT Appeal No. 44 of 2004, IT Appeal No. 55 of 2004, IT Appeal No. 56 of 2004, IT Appeal No. 57 of 2004 and IT Appeal No. 70 of 2004.
-
2006 (9) TMI 567 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
... ...
... ... ..... ssee-firm and as such the provisions of the section 40A(2) are not applicable. 6.4 It is also not the case of the revenue that the commission paid has come back to the assessee-firm or any of its partners in any form after having been paid to S/Sh. Neeraj Goel and B.M. Goel. 7. In view of the matter, we do not have any hesitation in upholding the order of Ld. CIT(A) holding that the commission paid the by assessee to Sh. Neeraj Goel and Late Sh. B.M. Goel was a genuine business expenditure and the Assessing Officer was not justified in making the impugned addition." 7. No material which may not have been taken into account by the Tribunal has been indicated nor it is shown that the finding recorded by the Tribunal is vitiated by misreading or by taking into account non-existent material. 8. We are unable to hold that the findings recorded by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal are perverse. 9. Question is, accordingly, answered against the revenue and in favour of the assessee.
-
2006 (9) TMI 566 - CESTAT CHENNAI
... ...
... ... ..... dated 16-10-1998 by Notification No. 15/2002-S.T., dated 1-8-2002 is retrospective in operation. This issue was considered by this Bench in Stay Order No. 145/2006, dated 21-2-2006 2006 (4) S.T.R. 214 (T) which was passed in the case of S.B. Billimoria & Co. Appeal No..S/99/2005 and it was prima facie held that the above amendment had no retrospective effect and accordingly waiver of pre-deposit and stay of recovery were allowed in respect of similar demand of tax. After examining the impugned order and hearing both sides, we find that the above stay order of this Bench was also considered by learned Commissioner (Appeals) in the impugned order but no comments were made thereon. 2. For the present, we are inclined to follow the above stay order which was passed in a similar case of another firm of Chartered Accountants. Accordingly, there will be waiver of pre-deposit and stay of recovery in respect of the Service Tax amount. (Dictated and pronounced in open Court)
-
2006 (9) TMI 565 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ed by the Assessee” the expression as occurring in section 32(1) of the Income Tax Act means the person who having acquired possession over the building in his own right uses the same for the purposes of the business or profession though a legal title has not been conveyed to him consistently with the requirements of laws such s the Transfer of property Act and the Registration Act, etc., but nevertheless is entitled to hold the property to the exclusion of all otners. 10. In the light of the law down by the apex court and in the light of the material available on record including the affidavits filed by the appellant and his wife, we have no hesitation to hold that the exemption is available to the appellant. 11. In the circumstances, we deem it proper to accept. This Appeal, and we accordingly do so. Order of the Tribunal is set aside. We direct the authorities to provide exemption in terms of this order. Question of law is answered in favour of the assessee. No Cost
........
|
