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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 249 Records
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1984 (1) TMI 287 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... case the court held that for an article to be qualified as chemicals within the meaning of entry 9 of Schedule II, Part A, to the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969, it must be an intermediary chemical product which can be utilised as such for producing other finished products and that the word chemicals should normally be understood as a chemical which could be used as an intermediary chemical product and not as an end-product . We find that the expression dyes and chemicals used in item 138 of the First Schedule is practically identical to the language considered by the Gujarat High Court. Here the commodity which is sold as an adhesive is not an intermediary product producing a chemical effect, but is an end-product which is to be used only as an adhesive and the use of which does not produce any chemical effect or bring about any chemical change. We have, therefore, to bold that the Tribunal has come to the right conclusion in these cases. The tax cases are therefore dismissed.
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1984 (1) TMI 286 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n was irrevocable in respect of the year in question as also in respect of the number of power crushers. The option was in respect of the entire unit which consisted of more than one crusher. The point which has arisen for consideration in the present writ petition was not before the Full Bench. Nothing in the Full Bench decision goes counter to the view taken by me in the present case. The decision is distinguishable. For the above reasons, the demand of purchase tax in respect of the second crusher which was not included in the unit for the purpose of exercising the option and which was not worked in fact as well, is legally untenable. The orders of the assessing officer and the appellate authority, therefore, deserve to be quashed. The writ petition is allowed. The demand notice dated 15th May, 1981, of the assessing officer and the order of the appellate authority (respondent No. 2) dated 29th June, 1982, are quashed. The petitioner shall get costs of this writ petition.
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1984 (1) TMI 285 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cover if the declared goods were assessed to tax more than once. As we have already pointed out, the matter is within the ken of the dealer himself and it is for him to decide whether he would not claim the benefit of section 11AA and ask for a refund or in future transactions delete the sales from his taxable turnover when he is not the last dealer liable to pay the tax. Therefore the retrospectivity of the Act does not make any difference. It is not contended before us that it was not within the competence of the Punjab Legislature to pass such an Act retrospectively. The defect pointed out is the self-same defect which was noticed in Bhawani Mills case 1967 20 STC 290 (SC). But that defect no longer exists. In fairness to the learned Judge, the aforementioned judgment of the Supreme Court was not cited before him, For reasons aforementioned, we allow this appeal, withdraw the writ issued by the learned single Judge and dismiss the petition with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 200.
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1984 (1) TMI 284 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ent and recovery of that tax in a number of cases. 10.. It may be mentioned that this very view was taken in three Bench decisions of this Court in Punjab Oil Mills v. State of Punjab decided by Mahajan, J., and myself on 16th April, 1967 Guru Nanak Oil Mills v. Punjab State decided by Mahajan and Tuli, JJ., on 1st December, 1970, and Bharat General Mills, Ludhiana v. State of Punjab decided by Mahajan and Tuli, JJ., on 3rd December, 1970. It may be stated that the learned counsel for the department submitted that the effect of section 20 of Punjab Act 7 of 1967 had not been noticed in any of these rulings. It is, therefore, that this contention had to be considered in the present case. For the reasons aforementioned, we answer the first question in favour of the petitioner and against the revenue. In view of the opinion expressed on question No. (1) it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on questions Nos. (2) and (3). The parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1984 (1) TMI 283 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d in bottles to confectioners and bakers. All the authorities below have held that sugar in the form of syrup prepared by the assessee cannot get exemption as simple sugar. It seems to us that the view taken by the authorities is not unreasonable. Entry 31-B means sugar and not any form of sugar or variety of sugar. Varieties of sugar may fall within the meaning of the word sugar , but not forms of sugar. Syrup is a form of sugar and certainly the assessee cannot claim the benefit of entry 31-B. The revision petitions are, therefore, dismissed.
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1984 (1) TMI 282 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on in this case. 19.. To finally conclude- (i) The answer to the question posed at the very outset is rendered in the negative and it is held that information envisaged by section 18(1) of the Act for purposes of reassessment need not necessarily spring from a source external or extraneous to the original record. (ii) That having second thoughts or a mere change of opinion by the prescribed authority on the same set of facts and materials on the record would not constitute information under section 18(1) of the Act for the purposes of reassessment. (iii) That with deference Satya Narainji Mills v. State of Bihar (C.W.J.C. No. 1400 of 1973 decided on 13th August, 1976-Patna High Court) does not lay down the law correctly and is hereby overruled. 20.. The meaningful legal issues having been settled as above, this set of civil writ jurisdiction cases will now go back to the Division Bench for a decision on merits in accordance therewith. SARWAR ALI, J.-I agree. JHA, J.-I agree.
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1984 (1) TMI 281 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... learned counsel, the grounds taken by him before the Sales Tax Officer, appellate court and the Tribunal were that stoneware pipes sold by the assessee, are used for purposes other than sanitary purposes. As the Tribunal proceeded on the footing that all types of pipes and pipe fittings are covered under the entry in serial number 7-B, it did not apply its mind to this aspect of the case and did not come to a specific finding as to whether stoneware pipes sold by the assessee are used for sanitary purposes. So, question No. (1) is answered in the following manner If the stoneware pipes, manufactured by the assessee, are used for sanitary purposes in that event only entry in serial number 7-B shall be attracted. The Tribunal will consider the materials produced before it and after rehearing the parties come to a definite conclusion whether stoneware pipes manufactured by the assessee are used for sanitary purpose. 5.. The reference is answered accordingly. MISRA, J.-I agree.
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1984 (1) TMI 280 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... iled any counter refuting the assertion made in the petition of the appellant (opposite party) praying for condonation of the delay. This is evidently an error apparent on the face of the record. The petitioner (respondent before the Tribunal), in fact, filed objection to the petition for condonation of delay on 11th July, 1970, before the Tribunal. The Tribunal did not consider this objection filed by the petitioner. Thus the order of the Tribunal is passed on non-consideration of the materials on record, i.e., the objection filed by the petitioner. The order of the Tribunal in condoning the delay is also vitiated for the above reason. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the argument of both sides, we answer question No. (2) in the affirmative and question No. (3) in the negative. As already observed, questions Nos. (1) and (4) were not pressed before us, so we decline to answer these two questions. There shall be no order as to costs. MISRA, J.-I agree.
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1984 (1) TMI 279 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Advocate-General, however, contended that this point could have been taken by the petitioners before the sales tax authorities. He fairly conceded that the case may be covered by the decision of the Supreme Court. In view of the Supreme Court, however, in my opinion, the preliminary point of the Additional Advocate-General cannot be sustained. If a notice on the face of it is bad because of the Supreme Court judgment, it is no answer to say that the Supreme Court judgment can be cited before the Assessing Authority for getting the relief. Now that the petitioners have come before us and the Supreme Court judgment in terms covers the proceeding, no useful purpose will be served by referring back the petitioners before the assessing authority for doing the same thing, which can be done here. In this view of the matter, the impugned notices stand quashed, and as such no final order can be passed, though hearing has already been completed. The parties will bear their own costs.
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1984 (1) TMI 278 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed the sales tax as well. There is no doubt that considerable control was exercised by the department and the goods were also subjected to inspection by the department, but that was because of the anxiety of the State Government to see that the bricks and tiles according to the specifications were manufactured within the time-limit. When the State Government was to purchase all the materials manufactured by the contractor-assessee, it was certainly reasonable to exercise the power of inspection and quality control. After considering all the terms and conditions of the contract, we have no doubt in our mind that the contract in the present case was one for sale of pucca bricks and tiles manufactured by the assessee and as the assessee had entered into a contract for sale of bricks and tiles he was a dealer within the meaning of section 2(f) of the Act. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue and against the assessee.
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1984 (1) TMI 277 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and condemned utensils from its customers of new utensils as a part of the price of the utensils sold. It (assessee) did not purchase old and condemned utensils independently for sale to other for profit. Since the assessee received old and condemned utensils in the course of its business of sale of new utensils, it had in the very nature of things, (sic) or who were intermediaries. Receiving old and condemned utensils in such circumstances cannot be deemed collecting within the meaning of this word as it is understood in common parlance. For the above reasons, the answer to the question of law is that the assessee is not covered under the definition of manufacture and its act does not fall within the definition of the term manufacture . The view of the Tribunal that the brass scrap consisting of old and condemned brass utensils was not taxable was, therefore, correct. In the result, both the revisions have no merit and are dismissed with costs which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1984 (1) TMI 276 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... vailable at Delhi. The contract pursuant to which the goods were moved had been finalised at Delhi. Under those circumstances, the movement of the goods from Faridabad to Delhi was held to be as a result of or an incidence of the contract of sale made in Delhi and would be an inter-State sale. In holding so, the Supreme Court recognised an exception in favour of cases where the goods are manufactured in the ordinary or general course of business and moved for being sold as and when the manufacturer receives offers for the purchase. We are of the opinion that having regard to the facts and the circumstances under which the goods have been moved in this case, it would fall within the exception recognised by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to earlier. We therefore hold that the turnover of Rs. 3,51,050.84 cannot be taken to represent inter-State sales effected by the assessee. The tax revision case is, therefore, allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1984 (1) TMI 275 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he ought to have brought that material on record in accordance with law. He ought to have communicated to the assessee the full particulars of the material he proposed to use against the assessee with an opportunity for the latter to have his say. That is the minimal requirement of natural justice which ought to have been complied with by the assessing officer. 10.. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the assessment regarding the addition of the suppressed turnover of Rs. 3,18,600 should be set aside with liberty to the assessing officer to redo the assessment. 11.. In the result, the petition is allowed, the addition of turnover as indicated above, is set aside and the matter is remitted to the assessing officer to redo the assessment in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this order. The assessment in other respects is kept undisturbed. The assessee shall appear before the assessing officer on 27th February, 1984, to receive further notice.
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1984 (1) TMI 274 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Gratuity ... ... ... ... ..... o. Ltd. v. CIT 1971 82 ITR 363 (Cal), it was held that whether the assessee is entitled to a particular deduction or not will depend on the provision of law relating thereto and not on the view which the assessee might take of its rights nor can the existence or absence of entries in the books of account be decisive or conclusive in the matter. It is not denied that the liability under the West Bengal Employees Payment of Compulsory Gratuity Act, 1971, was a statutory liability and did not depend upon the circumstance that a particular employer makes provision therefor in its books of account. Moreover, the Act came into force for the first time in the accounting period relevant to the assessment year in question. Hence, the claim for deduction could not be denied on this score. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. There will, however, be no order as to costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
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1984 (1) TMI 273 - SUPREME COURT
Amount of tax due on the basis of the quarterly return furnished by the petitioner has not been paid before the expiry of the last date of filing such return required by sub-section (3) of section 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir General Sales Tax Act, 1962
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The High Court was right on the facts of the present case in holding that the petitioner was liable to pay interest on the amount of tax in respect of which default was committed as it is the admitted position that tax due on the basis of quarterly return was not paid as required by sub-section (3) and the petitioner was, therefore liable to pay interest on the amount of tax in respect of which default was committed at the rate prescribed in sub-section (2) from the last date prescribed for filing quarterly return under the Act up to the date of payment.
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1984 (1) TMI 265 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Memorandum and articles of association - Registration of, Removal of Director ... ... ... ... ..... th respondent has not chosen to deny the allegations contained in the original petition against him, there is no other material in the case to hold that exhibit P-2 order is not one passed in the bona fide exercise of power vested in the Governor under article 18 of the articles of association of the company. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order, exhibit P-2 is not one issued by the Governor who alone is invested with power to withhold his pleasure as provided for in article 18 and hence the order is invalid. Exhibit P-2 order itself shows that it was issued by order of the Governor and was signed by the Secretary, Industries Department. There is therefore no substance in the contention that exhibit P-2 order is not one issued by the Governor withholding his pleasure for the continuance of the petitioner as a member of the board of directors of the company. The writ petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1984 (1) TMI 255 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Oppression and mismanagement ... ... ... ... ..... of the company in terms of the compromise with effect from the date mentioned in the compromise and they shall continue in office until the holding of the next general meeting of the company or for six months from the date of assumption of the office, whichever is earlier. Sri Lakshmi Chandra, the nominee of the financial institution, shall continue as a director unless changed by the financial institution in accordance with law (ii)the directors, mentioned in clauses 4.1(b) of the terms of the compromise shall cease to be the directors as soon as Sarvasri Durga Prasad Agarwal, Ajay Agarwal and Ashok Agarwal assume office as directors of the company, and (iii)an injunction is issued restraining the present board from transferring any assets of the company or creating any fresh encumbrance or incurring any fresh liabilities of the company except for wages, salary, electricity charges or any incidental expenses. The parties are directed to bear their own costs of this petition.
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1984 (1) TMI 247 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... leged by the bank but also in the public interest, more so when it has lost its substratum. In the result, I direct that the respondent company be wound up in the light of the discussion made above and for the reasons given above. The petitioner shall advertise the making of this order within fourteen days from this date, a notice in the prescribed form in one issue of Deccan Herald of Bangalore. Petitioner also shall serve a copy of the certified copy of this order on the Registrar of Companies in Karnataka, within one month from this date. The official liquidator attached to this court is appointed the liquidator of the respondent company. He shall take charge of all the assets of the respondent company which are not already in the possession of the Karnataka State Financial Corporation. All persons accountable as officers of the company shall render all assistance required under law to the official liquidator in the discharge of his duties as liquidator. Order accordingly.
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1984 (1) TMI 237 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... e motion, I see no good reason for any different course in the present case which is yet another round of fruitless and frivolous litigation. Moreover, once the court finds that there has been utter lack of bona fides, that there has also been blatant abuse of the processes of courts and that there has been resort to a vexatious litigation, it should then become its duty to nip it in the bud and put an end thereto mdash the earlier the better for people s confidence in courts and administration of justice. As in Landge s matter, the situation here also demands that the notice of motion be dismissed. In the result, Appeal from Order No. 3 of 1984, is allowed. The impugned order dated December 20, 1983, is set aside and the notice of motion is dismissed. In view thereof, no separate order is necessary in Appeal from Order No. 4 of 1984, save and except that the said appeal does not survive. This is a fit case for an order of compensatory costs and the same should be quantified.
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1984 (1) TMI 236 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... t a suit claim but a special type of claim under the special provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, is not governed by that article which governs suits for recovery of money as held by this court in an earlier case, Unico Trading and Chit Funds ( India) P. Ltd. v. S. H. Lohati 1982 52 Comp. Cas. 340 (Kar.). In these circumstances, the relevant article in the Limitation Act, 1963, is the residuary article mdash article 137. Under that article, the period to be computed is from the date from which the right accrues. Further, from the date of the winding-up order, the official liquidator has got 3 years plus one year added to it in terms of section 458A of the Companies Act. Thus, the application presented in June, 1983, is within four years from the date of the winding-up order and, therefore, the application should be held to have been filed in time. In these circumstances, this court is left with no choice but to allow the application as prayed for. It is ordered accordingly.
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