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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 264 Records
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1986 (1) TMI 231 - CEGAT, MADRAS
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... ... ..... ith the probability that all the family members of the appellant rsquo s family who allegedly entrusted the appellant with jewellery were wearing ornaments of 24 carat purity which is an unusual feature. It is also relevant to point out that in none of the affidavits, it is mentioned or said that the ornaments which were given to the appellant were of 24 carat purity. Therefore, from any point of view the fact remains that the vital link between the entrustment of the ornaments and the resultant gold under seizure is missing. In the circumstances, I have no hesitation to hold that the plea of the appellant that he was entrusted with gold ornaments of his family members which were melted into gold bars is not acceptable. 8. emsp So far as the quantum of penalty is concerned, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I reduce the penalty from Rs. 5000/- to Rs. 2000/- (Rupees two thousand only). Except for reduction in the quantum of penalty, the appeal is otherwise dismissed.
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1986 (1) TMI 230 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
CLASSIFIACATION ... ... ... ... ..... ge between the two coils of the transformer is a part of the insulation process and not an end in itself. The catalogue makes it quite clear that insulation is the main function of the subject strips and not an incidental function. The Explanatory Note below rsquo heading 85.26 of the C.C.E.N. is, therefore, not applicable in the case of these strips. And since in the Scheme of the C.T.A., the statutory Note 2 to Section XVI lays down ldquo that the specific heading for the parts themselves has to take precedence over the heading for the machine or equipment of which it is a part, the goods are appropriately classifiable under heading 85.18/27(1) under which they have been assessed. Heading 85.01(1) canvassed by the appellants would be appropriate only if a specific heading for the parts them-selves was not in the Tariff. Such is not the case in respect of the subject goods. 5. Accordingly, we up-hold the classification decided by the lower authorities and reject this appeal.
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1986 (1) TMI 229 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
CLASSIFICATION ... ... ... ... ..... 38.19. 29. emsp It is well known that since the Customs Tariff is based on the C.C.C.N., the Explanatory Notes have considerable persuasive force. This is particularly so where highly technical aspects of composition and technology are involved. The view of the C.C.C., as found in the Explanatory Notes, the Alphabetical Index and the letter dated 6 July, 1984 from the Director of the Nomenclature and Classification Directorate of the C.C.C. (filed by Shri Sundar Rajan), has to be given due weight. 30. emsp In short, dodecylbenzene has to be excluded from Chapters 27 and 29 and would therefore fall within Chapter 38. 31. emsp For these reasons, I hold that the correct classification was under heading No. 38.01/19 (1), and thus concur in my learned brother rsquo s order. Per Raghavachari, Member (J) . - I have carefully perused the orders prepared by the Hon rsquo ble President and Shri H.R. Syiem (Member). I agree with their conclusion that all these appeals should be allowed.
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1986 (1) TMI 228 - CEGAT, MADRAS
... ...
... ... ..... e goods cleared for export under claim for rebate or in bond but not exported for any reasons to be returned to the same factory or any other factory for being remade, refined, reconditioned, or subjected to other similar processes in the factory subject to various conditions enumerated under the proviso. Evidently, remaking or reconditioning would certainly involve unpacking and repacking and merely because the word lsquo repacking rsquo is not used in the rule it cannot be contended that goods cannot be permitted to be brought back to the factory under Rule 173M with the permission of the authorities for purposes of repacking. Such an interpretation of Rule 173M, as contended by the learned SDR, viz. that repacking is not envisaged thereunder would defeat the very purpose for which Rule 173M has been provided for. I therefore, do not find any merit in the appeal and accordingly the impugned orders appealed against are confirmed as correct in law and the appeal is dismissed.
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1986 (1) TMI 227 - CEGAT ,MADRAS
Classification list-Non-approval appealable ... ... ... ... ..... hmetical verification of what the respondents have done with reference to the approved price list and classification list in computing the quantum of tax. Therefore, in the factual background of this case, the question of invoking the bar of limitation incorporated in Section 11A of the Act would not appear to be relevant at all. The Collector (Appeals) in the impugned order has proceeded on an erroneous impression as if the Department had approved the classification list of the respondents herein and that the respondents had effected clearances on the basis of such approved classification list and presumably, this misapprehension of the factual position on the part of the lower appellate authority has resulted in an error in the impugned order now appealed against. I, therefore, set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal. It is made clear that if the respondents have any other remedy under law, they would be at liberty to seek such relief before the appropriate forum.
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1986 (1) TMI 226 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Customs valuation ... ... ... ... ..... al was equal. 3. emsp On a perusal of the papers, hearing the counsel for both the parties and otherwise, it would appear that - (a) expenditure incurred towards O.T. charges that were paid to the Customs officers and staff, even if reimbursible by the appellant, are not obligatory but optional, casual and fortuitous rather than inevitable, immutable and ordinarily of daily occurrence (b) in the nature of things, such expenditure is not coequal to or on a par with stevedoring or port trust expenses which are invariably incurred and (c) in the premises, such expenditure cannot form part of the assessable value in terms of S. 14 (a) of the Act, defined to be ldquo the price at which such or like goods are ordinarily sold rdquo . If the expenditure is not ordinarily incurred, obviously, it cannot form part of the price are which such or like goods are ldquo ordinarily rdquo sold. 4. emsp In the result, the Revision heard as an appeal is allowed with consequential relief, if any.
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1986 (1) TMI 225 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
“Mod Agitator Assembly” ... ... ... ... ..... It is pertinent to note that in the written submissions, which were also reiterated during the course of the arguments, Shri Subramanian admitted that the returning mud item the hole under drilling is processed through Shale Shakers. Shale Shakers are mentioned as drilling equipments in the said Notification at Item No. 3 of the Schedule and are specifically exempted. The omission of Mud Agitator Assembly from the Schedule i annexed to the Notification is conspicuous. By implication and direct inference, non-mention of the ldquo Mud Agitator Assembly rdquo and mentioning of ldquo Mud-Pumps rdquo , ldquo Shale Shakers rdquo , Turbo drills, desilting equipment, gasoline, equipment, oil pumping sets, Bottom hole samplers, etc. would show that the intent and purpose of the Notification in question is not to exempt the ldquo Mud Agitator Assembly rdquo . 6. emsp In this view of the matter, we do not find any merit in appeal. Consequently, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
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1986 (1) TMI 224 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Remission of duty on loss caused by overflow and leakage, ... ... ... ... ..... akage could be foreseen. Therefore, the molasses lost by such overflow and leakage will not fall under the provisions of the proviso to Rule 49 of the Central Excise Rules as it cannot be attributed to natural causes of unavoidable accident. 5. emsp Merely because the quality of the goods produced had deteriorated it does not follow that the goods cease to become dutiable. Molasses is a specific item in the Central Excise Tariff Schedule and ones it is manufactured and comes into existence it becomes chargeable to duty. As observed by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Khandelwal Metal and Engg. Works v. Union of India (1985 E.L.T. 222 S.C.) even sub-standard goods produced during process of manufacture and which may have to be disposed of as rejects or scrap, are yet products of the manufacturing process. Hence, this argument of the appellant is unacceptable. 6. In the circumstances, the orders of the Collector (Appeals) are not sustainable. The appeals are allowed.
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1986 (1) TMI 223 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Demand - Extended period of five years when inapplicable ... ... ... ... ..... the demand of Central Excise duty would survive against the appellants on the strength of show cause notice dated 7-7-1983 and the whole demand of duty would have to be set aside as time barred. During arguments it was not disputed by the Revenue that if six months rsquo time limit were applied to the demand of duty, no part of the demand of duty would survive against the appellants. 10. emsp As for penalty, we have already said that no arguments were addressed by Shri Jagdeesan, Advocate for the appellants. It has also not been disputed that Hastelloys B and C fall under Tariff Item 68 and would have, therefore, required a licence under Rule 174 of Central Excise Rule 1944 read with Section 6 of Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The penalty is even otherwise modest. Considering all these no interference in this part of the order is called for. 11. As a result, demand of duty against the appellants is set aside. The penalty is upheld. 12. The appeal is thus partly allowed.
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1986 (1) TMI 222 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Demand-Time limit ... ... ... ... ..... o 30-7-1979. To use the words of the Appellate Collector ldquo however, subsequently these show cause notices were replaced by fresh 4 show cause notices issued in 1980. rdquo It is, therefore, clear that the show cause notice issued in 1980 was not by way of mere amendment to the earlier show cause notice but in the place of and in substitution of the earlier notice. That would mean the effective show cause notice so far as the present adjudication is concerned was dated 9-5-1980. In view of our finding, earlier duty could have been demanded under this notice for the six months preceding that date only. But as earlier noted the period of demand was 4-11-1975 to 30-7-1979. Thus, the period of demand fell entirely beyond six months preceding the date of the show cause notice. That would mean that no duty would be recoverable. 11. emsp In view of the above findings, this appeal is allowed and the orders of the lower authorities under which duty had been demanded, are set aside.
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1986 (1) TMI 221 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Seizure-Show Cause Notice ... ... ... ... ..... erits, but allowed the appeal on a preliminary ground that the show-cause notice was time-barred coupled with the fact that the respondent is also not available for arguments on merits of the case, we again have no alternative but to remand the case to the Collector of Customs (Appeals), New Delhi, with the direction to decide the case on merits in accordance with the law. We further make it clear that since we are remanding the case, we do not think it proper to decide the second submission made by the respondent in his written submissions to the effect that the entire adjudication proceedings conducted by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise were without jurisdiction. The respondent is free to take this objection before the Collector of Customs (Appeals), New Delhi, if so advised. 16. emsp In the result, the appeal is allowed and the case is remanded to the Collector of Customs (Appeals), New Delhi to decide the appeal on merits in the light of observations made above.
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1986 (1) TMI 220 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Condonation of delay ... ... ... ... ..... he Hon rsquo ble Allahabad High Court in the case of Sohan v. Abdul Hameed Khan reported in AIR 1976 (All.) 159. The relevant head note from the said judgment is reproduced as under ldquo In dealing with an application under Section 5 for condoning delay in filing appeal beyond the prescribed period it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations namely (1) the expiration of limitation for making appeal gives rise to a legal right in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties and this legal right should not be light-heartedly disturbed and (2) if sufficient cause for excusing the delay is shown the applicant is not entitled as a matter of right to condonation of delay but discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit appeal. rdquo 6. emsp Accordingly, we reject the application for condonation of delay. 7. emsp Since we are dismissing the application for condonation of delay, we dismiss the appeal as barred by time.
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1986 (1) TMI 219 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Cotton fabrics - Exemption to handloom fabrics ... ... ... ... ..... e available from the date of notification came into force. There is a material difference between this case and the one before us. In the case before the Allahabad High Court, the Assistant Collector rsquo s satisfaction was in respect of the initial investment. If the Assistant Collector was satisfied about the initial investment, the conditions of the notification stood complied with irrespective of the date on which the Assistant Collector arrived at his satisfaction. In the case before us, the approval of the appropriate authority being a condition precedent to the grant of the concession, such approval has to be there before the grant of the exemption. At best, as we have noted the approval could be related back to the date of application. 13. emsp Having regard to the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of the exemption during the material period. As such, the impugned order is upheld and the appeal is rejected.
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1986 (1) TMI 218 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Demand - Defence of non-existence of mens rea ... ... ... ... ..... nature of violation and that is why they themselves addressed the said letter dated 3-6-1981 to the Superintendent, Central Excise, Indore, for ignoring this excess removal. 8. emsp Lastly, Shri V. Sridharan also contended that penalty of Rs. 15,000 is excessive. We find that the appellant firm even before the issuance of the show-cause notice admitted that they had removed the goods in excess of the exemption limit without payment of duty on 19-5-1981 and 20-5-1981 vide their letter dated 3-6-1981 addressed to the Superintendent, Central Excise, Indore, and also deposited the duty on the goods so cleared on 22-5-1981. We think that under these circumstances the imposition of penalty of Rs. 10,000/-(Rupees ten thousand only) would meet the ends of justice. 9. emsp In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The findings of the Adjudicating Authority are affirmed, but the penalty is reduced from Rs. 15,000/-(Rupees fifteen thousand) to Rs. 10.000/- (Rupees ten thousand only).
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1986 (1) TMI 217 - CEGAT, , NEW DELHI
classification ... ... ... ... ..... hold that the subject fabrics come within the purview of the term of fabrics subjected to the process of ldquo printing rdquo . 25. emsp In the result, I would allow the appeal with a direction to the Collector to recalculate the duty liability of the appellant taking into account the above findings. In so far as the penalty levied on the appellant is concerned, I agree with the conclusion reached by brother Shri Rekhi. Order per V.T. Raghavachari . I have carefully perused the orders proposed by brother Shri K.L. Rekhi and Vice-President, Shri G. Sankaran. I agree with the reasonings as well the conclusions arrived at by Shri G. Sankaran and, therefore, concur with the order proposed by him. Order - In accordance with the majority judgment, the appeal is allowed with the direction to the Collector to re-calculate the duty liability of the appellants taking into account the findings in the majority judgment. The penalty levied on the appellants is reduced to Rs. 1 lakh only.
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1986 (1) TMI 197 - ITAT PUNE
... ...
... ... ..... cannot discriminate between two shareholders one of whom holds shares in a company which prefers to show advance tax as asset and another who holds shares in a company which prefers to show on liabilities side provision for tax less advance tax. We also find from the observation of the Supreme Court in Shree Sajjan Mills vs. CIT (1985) 49 CTR 193 (SC) that there cannot be differential treatment between two companies one of which makes a provision in accounts for gratuity and the other which does not, both not fulfilling the conditions of s. 49A(7). Their Lordships disapproved arguments favouring the latter. We accordingly hold that for uniformity of approach on taking the plain meaning of Explanation II(ii) (e), one has to deduct provision for tax as shown on the liabilities side of balance sheet less advance tax paid irrespective of the place where the advance tax payment is noted what would happen if a company shows tax deducted at source as an asset. 9. Appeal is allowed.
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1986 (1) TMI 196 - ITAT PUNE
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... ... ..... ayment of interest does not require to be reversed. There is no dispute that the assessee made repayment of the interest. The dispute is whether the repayment of interest made on the subsequent loans is to pay the old loans. There is no evidence that the assessee did not pay the old loans from the subsequent loans. If such evidence would have been brought on record by the ITO then there would have been a good case for him to disallow the deduction of the payment of interest on the subsequent loans. Merely saying that there is no nexus between the subsequent loans and the interest payment made on them to discharge the loans is not sufficient. If the ITO s version is to be accepted in this respect, there is no reason why the assessee s version also need not be accepted that he has raised fresh loans to discharge old loans. After all he had nothing in the beginning when he had started acquiring immovable property. 15. In the result, the Revenue fails and the appeal is dismissed.
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1986 (1) TMI 191 - ITAT NAGPUR
Advance Tax, Payment Of, Return Of Income, Not To Be Valid On Certain Grounds ... ... ... ... ..... On a reading of the section first limb of clause (c) of section 246 , it appears to us that where the liability to pay interest is being denied as such, such an appeal would be covered by the first limb of clause (c) of section 246 being an order in which the assessee, being a person by whom interest is payable, is denying his liability to the payability of that interest. But where such liability to pay interest as such is not being denied, but only the imposition is being challenged either being excessive or not being made in the regular course, such appeals, in our opinion, are not covered by the first limb being orders in respect of which the assessee can be said to be denying his liability to the payability of interest under the Act. 11. As the assessee denies his liability to the payability of interest, which denial is supported by the facts of the case discussed earlier, we hold that the appeal is maintainable, the AAC s order is set aside assessee s appeal is allowed.
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1986 (1) TMI 188 - ITAT MADRAS-A
Depreciation, Rate Of Assessee ... ... ... ... ..... nment servants were required at one time to furnish a certificate for claiming higher mileage allowance, the relevant portion of which reads as below Certified that I did not perform the journeys for which mileage allowance is claimed at the higher rates prescribed in S.R. 46 by taking a single seat in any public conveyance (excluding steamer) which plied regularly for hire between fixed points and charges fixed rates. In our view, the terms of the certificate provide complete answer to the contention of the revenue. The buses ply regularly for hire between fixed points and charge fixed rates. The passenger who takes a single seat pays the rate prescribed for the ticket which entitles him to have a single seat in the bus which is plying for hire. The result is that for reasons elaborated upon from that stated by the Commissioner (Appeals) the assessee is entitled to depreciation at 40 per cent on the buses in question. 5. In the result, the appeal of the revenue is dismissed.
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1986 (1) TMI 186 - ITAT MADRAS-A
Penalty, For Failure To Comply With Notice ... ... ... ... ..... ty invoking the law as it stood in the assessment year 1974-75. But at that time the default under section 18(1)(b) had not occurred. The default occurred only in 1978. But that time, the computation provision had changed. The penalty has to be computed according to the computation provision, which is applicable when the default took place. When the default took place, the computation provisions of section 18(1)(b)(ii) could not be applied on the facts of the present case. Therefore, the penalty, as imposed, has to be cancelled. 10. Before parting with the appeal, we may state that in a case like the present one, since no return has been filed the provisions of section 18(1)(a) would have been attracted, which, of course, is a separate default, but would cover the period of default for non-compliance of notice under section 16(4) also. 11. In the light of the conclusion that we have arrived at, it is unnecessary to go into the merits. 12. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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