... ... ... ... ..... ties during the period in question is not even 2 of the total production of the U-Foam blocks produced by the petitioners and that the product had been sold outside to a very few parties. The order-in-appeal does not give any clear or considered finding based on an analysis of facts on record leading to the aforesaid conclusion. In the circumstances the Government remand the case to the Appellate authorities for passing a speaking order on the merits of the case.
Stilboestrol injection is liable to duty under Item 14E of C.E.T.
... ... ... ... ..... t (Stilboestrol injection) at that time but because their appeal was pending for a very long time in the meantime they had decided not to manufacture and market the same. They also do not intend to manufacture the same in future and they are not interested in this case. 4. The Government of India has considered the submission of the party, and observes that whether the party intends to manufacture Stilboestrol Injection or not, the product is excisable under Tariff Item 14E of Central Excise Tariff inasmuch as Stilboestrol is appearing as powder form in British Veterinary Codex and not as injection and hence the injection is P or P medicine falling under Tariff Item 14E. In view of above, the Government of India, in exercise of powers under section 36(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, sets aside abovesaid order of the Appellate Collector of Central Excise, Bombay and restores the order of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Bombay IV Divn. mentioned above.
Valuation - Value of dumper body is includible in assessable value
... ... ... ... ..... umper body is in fact not a specialised material handling equipment and is more in the nature of a part of the dumper as correctly held by the Appellate Collector. The petitioners have also argued that in cases of commercial vehicles like trucks, the duty on the cab and the body is not charged and have further urged that the question that the manufacturers of motor vehicle do not fix the body portion on the trucks before clearance is not relevant. This contention of the petitioners is not factually correct. Govt. observe in case that trucks are cleared after the body is fitted with them, the assessable value includes the value of the body portion. In the circumstances the revision application fails and is accordingly rejected.
Aluminium strips from duty paid aluminium wire rods - Liability to duty
... ... ... ... ..... as stipulated in the notification. The Government observe that according to the tariff entry sub-item (a) has two parts one is for aluminium in any crude form including ingots, bars, blocks etc., and the other includes wire bars, wire rods and castings not otherwise specified. The tariff entry thus makes it clear that wire rods are different from aluminium in any crude form and for which there is another sub-item. From this position the Government hold that since the wire rods are not aluminium in and crude form the exemption provided under Notification No. 46/70 is not available to the goods manufactured by the petitioners. The Government, therefore, reject the revision application.
... ... ... ... ..... ree partners together with a member of their family and three outsiders formed and incorporated a company which started production at Bhubaneswar. There is absolutely no basis for the finding that these two manufacturers the firm and the Company are two units of the Hindu Undivided Family. There is no indication that the three strangers who are shareholders in the Company are name lenders or the share money came from the family of the partners and the dividend, if any, goes to them. In the circumstances, the finding of the Assistant Collector is clearly erroneous. In fact, there is no material which would justify the conclusion. 9. We accordingly allow the writ application, quash the order of the Assistant Collector and hold that the petitioner would be entitled to the exemption in question provided other requisite conditions in the Government notification and appropriate Rules are satisfied. The petitioner shall have its costs. Hearing fee is assessed at rupees one hundred.
Whether the agricultural implements which were manufactured in the State's Implements Factory fell within the purview of Item 26AA as they were forged or extruded during the process of manufacturing the agricultural implements?
Held that:- The rods and bars in question not "produced or manufactured" in the State Government's Implements Factory. They could not therefore be subjected to the levy of excise duty. It is true that the rods and bars were utilised for the manufacture of agricultural implements like shovels and spades, but those agricultural implements were not of the description specified in Item 26AA of the First Schedule with reference to Section 3 of the Act. Section 3 of the Act could not therefore be invoked to levy excise duty merely on the ground that the "pre-excise stock" of rods and bars was utilised for the purpose of manufacturing agricultural instruments. There is therefore nothing wrong with the view which has prevailed with the High Court in this respect. Appeal dismissed.
Capital Asset, Capital Gains, Income Tax Act, Personal Effects
... ... ... ... ..... e trust, the initial gift was entitled to exemption the same manner in which subsequent gifts to the fund would be. We are in entire agreement with the reasoning and conclusions of the learned judges of the Bombay High Court and do not think it necessary to separately express our opinion. The reference is, therefore, rejected. The respondent will get the costs of reference, which are assessed at Rs. 250.
... ... ... ... ..... R 313 (AP) the learned judges, upon construction of the respective deeds of gift, held that there was nothing to indicate that the gift was being made in any capacity other than as husband. When the Tribunal found in the present case that the case of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, Jana Veera Bhadrayya v. Commissioner of Gift-tax 1966 59 ITR 176 (AP) concluded the matter, we take it that the Tribunal was satisfied that there was nothing to indicate that the gifts had been made by Jai Chand in any capacity other than as husband. We might have called for a supplemental statement of the case on the question, but we do not think that it is desirable to do so at this stage, having regard to the time that has already elapsed and having regard to the fact that a supplemental statement had already been called for at an earlier stage, but not on the question now urged before us. The reference is, therefore, rejected. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
Capital Gains Tax, Income Tax Act, Registered Firm
... ... ... ... ..... d with a company as defined in section 2(17) of the Act. Such a firm cannot, therefore, derive any benefit from the above-mentioned section. In K. I. Viswambharan and Brothers v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1973 91 ITR 588 (Ker) FB , a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court has said that for purposes of assessment to tax, the Act treats a registered firm as an entity distinct from the partners. Under the specific provisions of the Partnership Act relating to the property of a firm and the judicial pronouncements on the matter, a firm is legally competent to own or hold property and also to deal with such property. Any profit or gain derived by a firm in pursuance of the sale of a capital asset owned or held by the firm is exigible to tax in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Act. We are in respectful agreement with this view. For the reasons mentioned above, we answer the question in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. There would be no order as to costs.
... ... ... ... ..... given to the assessee in a sum of Rs. 3,000. In the net result a sum of Rs. 4,000 was added to the income of the assessee. The assessee has filed an application under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, to require the Tribunal to state a case. The learned counsel for the assessee, relying on a decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Daulat Ram Rawatmull 1973 87 ITR 349 (SC), urges that some more evidence is necessary to hold that the amount is the income of the assessee than the fact that the assessee has not been able to explain the cash credit. In view of section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the argument is no longer sustainable. Section 68 provides that where any sum is found credited in the books of an assessee and the assessee offers no explanation about the nature and source thereof or the explanation offered by him is not satisfactory, the sum so credited may be charged to income-tax as income of the assessee. The application is, therefore, rejected. No costs.
... ... ... ... ..... he subsistence of the partnership no partner can deal with any part of the property as his own. The observations of the Supreme Court throw no light on the question whether the share of a partner in the goodwill of a firm passes or does not pass on the death of the partner. If the share of a partner in goodwill does not pass because no partner can deal with any portion of the property as his own during the subsistence of the partnership, the same argument may be made to apply to the share of the partner in the other assets of the firm also. We do not think that we can accept such an argument. We are of the view that Ved Parkash Jain s case 1974 96 ITR 303 (Punj) was wrongly decided. We express our respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Madras High Court in S. Devaraj v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax 1973 90 ITR 400 (Mad). In the result, the question referred to us is answered against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order regarding costs.
... ... ... ... ..... him is much narrower and it has to be exercised in accordance with the well-known principles of law. In the instant case, the very documents which are sought to be produced before him had been considered and accepted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in penalty proceedings against the assessee in regard to the same amounts. That being the position, I am not in a position to understand how the Appellate Assistant Commissioner could have, in appeal proceedings before him, refused even to look at these documents. Consequently, the impugned orders, exhibits P-1, P-2 and P-3, in so far as they have disallowed the production of additional evidence before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, are wrong and are so declared. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner is directed to make a further enquiry on the basis of the additional evidence or direct the assessing authority to make such an enquiry and pass appropriate orders. The original petition is accordingly allowed. No costs.
... ... ... ... ..... which has to be made is that there has been no change in the constitution of the firm or the shares of the partners since the last day of the previous year relevant to the assessment year 19...... 1 9... up to the last date of the previous year relevant to the assessment year 19...... 19... or to the date (...... 19 ... ) of dissolution of the firm . While these observations appear to support the view expressed by us, later in the judgment, Untwalia C.J. made the observation Without a fresh partnership deed, the old partnership could not be continued for the purposes of the Income-tax Act , which appears to be against the view expressed by us. For the reasons mentioned by us, we think that the existence of a deed of partnership currently in force is not necessary for the continuation of registration of a firm already registered in accordance with the provisions of section 184 of the Income-tax Act. The question referred to us is answered in favour of the assessee. No costs.
... ... ... ... ..... was justified in deleting the penalty of Rs. 10,000 levied under section 140A(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? Shri Awasthy, learned counsel for the department, argues that the levy of penalty is automatic on the commission of a default by the assessee under section 140A. There is no substance in this submission. There is a proviso to section 140A(3) expressly providing for reasonable opportunity being given to the assessee before the levy of any such penalty which would become meaningless if levy of penalty is automatic. Shri Awasthy lays stress on the words shall be liable to pay . But what the assessee is under an obligation to pay as penalty is such amount as the Income-tax Officer may direct. That necessarily implies that it is open to the Income- tax Officer to levy a penalty or not at all. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us against the revenue. We are not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case. The reference is answered accordingly. No costs.
... ... ... ... ..... ns of the business is undoubtedly properly allowable, but where a liability to make a payment arises not in the course of the business, not for the purpose of carrying on the business, but springs from the closure of the business, it is not, in our judgment, a properly debitable item in its profit and loss account as a revenue outgoing , the above judgment will directly cover the present case also. Section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, corresponds to section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and the Supreme Court with reference to that provision also has rejected the claim of the assessee in that case. This will apply a fortiori to a case of closure of business and, therefore, the above decision of the Supreme Court will cover the case on hand. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the conclusion of the Tribunal is correct and we answer the questions referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessees. There will be no order as to costs.
... ... ... ... ..... er and enable the assessee to claim the rebate in fall before the appellate authority. As already indicated by us, from the clear language of section 34(3)(a) of the Act, we are of the opinion that any amendment of the accounts or creation of the reserve subsequent to the order of the Income-tax Officer will not be of any avail so long as the necessary reserve was not properly, validly and legally created at the time when the Income-tax Officer disposed of the matter and that no change made subsequently will have the effect of rendering the order of the Income-tax Officer erroneous so as to enable the appellate authority to interfere with that order on that ground. In view of this conclusion of ours, as a result of the construction of the relevant statutory provisions, it is needless to refer to the various decisions cited before us. Under these circumstances, we answer the questions referred to us in the negative and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
