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Showing 61 to 80 of 1318 Records
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2023 (12) TMI 1258 - ITAT INDORE
Revision u/s 263 - as per CIT AO has not conducted due inquiry on the issue of applicability of provisions of section 115BBE in respect of surrendered income on account of excess stock found during the survey - HELD THAT:- AO has issued a limited query to verify the quantum of surrendered income declared during the proceedings u/s 133A and in reply also the assessee has given details of the total amount of income declared by the assessee. As it is apparent and manifest from the show cause notice issued u/s 142(1) as well as reply filed by the assessee that the AO has not taken up the issue of higher rate of tax u/s 115BBE of the Act while passing the assessment order. The assessment order is completely silent about any such query raised or inquiry undertaken by the AO.
During the course of survey proceedings the assessee in the statement has surrendered this amount on account of excess stock and also promise to pay the due tax as per provisions of Income Tax Act. The Authorised Officer of survey though calculated the tax liability on the surrendered amount at normal rate of tax however, if the said calculation is not in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act the same would not be binding on the decision of the AO while passing the assessment order.
The surrendered income on account of excess stock was declared by the assessee under the head ‘other sources’ and the same was assessed by the AO as income from other sources. There is no quarrel on the point that if the AO has raised the query on this issue of applicability of provision of section 115BBE which was replied by the assessee then question of lack of inquiry does not arise. However, in the case of the assessee the AO has not even taken up this issue despite the income was assessed as income from other sources and therefore, this case does fall in the category of complete lack of inquiry on the part of the AO.
Pr. CIT has referred and relied upon various decisions including the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in case of CIT vs. Deepak Garg [2007 (5) TMI 186 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT] Accordingly in the facts and circumstances of the case we do not find any error or illegality in the impugned order of the Pr. CIT setting aside the order of the AO on the issue of applicability of the provisions of section 115BBE as there is a complete lack of inquiry on the part of the AO on this issue. The decisions relied upon by the Ld.AR of the assessee will not help the case of the assessee when there is a complete lack of inquiry on the part of the AO. The AO shall consider and decide this issue in accordance with provisions of section 115BBE of the Act after considering relevant facts and in accordance with law. We have not expressed any view on the merits of the issue.Appeal of the assessee is dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1257 - ITAT SURAT
Validity of reopening of assessment - addition u/s 69A - mandation of disposing objections of assessee - assessee has demanded during the assessment proceedings, by way of a letter stating that he was filing Income Tax Return regularly and therefore reopening of his case under section 147/148 of the Act, is not valid - HELD THAT:- Assessee had objected reopening of assessment u/s 147/148 of the Act. Therefore, it was the duty of the Assessing Officer to dispose of the objections raised by the assessee in respect of reopening of his case u/s 147/148 of the Act. However, I note that Assessing Officer did not dispose of the objection raised by the assessee, by way of passing speaking order, in writing and therefore re-assessment proceedings should be quashed on this count only.
Assessee had objected reopening of assessment u/s 147/148 of the Act. Therefore, it was the duty of the Assessing Officer to dispose of the objections raised by the assessee in respect of reopening of his case u/s 147/148 of the Act. However, we note that Assessing Officer did not dispose of the objection raised by the assessee, by way of passing speaking order, in writing and therefore re-assessment proceedings should be quashed on this count only.
Reasons were recorded by the Assessing Officer in an arbitrary manner and there is no application of mind by the AO. For example, the reasons stated that assessee has deposited an amount in his bank account to the tune of Rs. 14,55,300/-, whereas the actual amount deposited in the bank account by the assessee was to the tune of Rs. 21,54,800/- hence reasons were recorded on arbitrary basis and there is no application of mind by the AO.
Therefore, respectfully following the binding precedent of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd [2002 (11) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT] quash the reassessment proceedings. Decided in favour of assessee.
Addition u/s 69A - as per AO considering the smallness of the amount of cash deposit a suitable addition, say, @ 5% of the total cash deposit in the bank account of assessee may be sustained in the hands of assessee - HELD THAT:- Admittedly, AO during the assessment proceedings made addition on account of cash deposited aggregating to Rs. 2,64,500/-, as well as amount deposited by cheques is to the tune of Rs. 4,20,355/-. The amount deposited by way of cheques in the bank account is out of known sources, hence addition should not be made in the hands of the assessee, hence addition to the tune of Rs. 4,20,355/- is hereby deleted.
Cash deposit it would be in the interest of justice that only profit eliminate @ 5% should be considered on total cash deposits of Rs. 2,64,500/-. Therefore, the Assessing Officer is directed to consider net profit @ 5% of total cash deposits. Accordingly, the addition is restricted in the hands of the assessee to the tune of Rs. 13,225/-. This assessee`s appeal is therefore, partly allowed in above terms.
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2023 (12) TMI 1256 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Direction for investigation into the affairs of the company - reference the matter of SFIO on the request of the official liquidator - Application filed by an Ex-Director of the Company in liquidation to recall the order passed by this Court - Money Laundering - diversion of funds - HELD THAT:- It is not denied by the Official Liquidator that it has a panel of Chartered Accountants through whom the inspection and inquiries may be ordered. The sole purpose for which the Official Liquidator has sought for referring the matter to the SFIO was for detection of diversion of assets/funds of the company in liquidation. It is not denied by the Official Liquidator that the balance sheet, other books of account and documents are in possession of the official liquidator as well as the statement of affairs filed by the ex-Director on behalf of the company in liquidation.
Learned counsel for the applicant is right in saying that there was no material in the Official Liquidator’s report to demonstrate that there was any intention of the Ex-Director to defraud the creditors, members or any other person or that the management of the company was guilty of fraud and misfeasance or other misconduct towards the company or towards any of its members and, therefore, referring the matter to the SFIO is uncalled for.
As a matter of fact, the allegation against the company in liquidation by the Official Liquidator regarding a web of intrigue employed by the company and other groups of companies for defrauding the investors and creditors and diversion of funds of the company, could have been substantiated by the specific references to the entries made in the balance sheet and other books of account of the company in liquidation, which has not been done. To insinuate that the office of the Official Liquidator does not have the capacity or ability to detect diversion of funds of the company in liquidation, is not acceptable given the fact that a panel of Chartered Accounts is admittedly available to assist the Official Liquidator in discharge of its duties.
The provisions of the Act, 1956 and the Act, 2013 though, do not prohibit investigation to be initiated where the company has passed a special resolution for voluntary winding up or where other proceeding for winding of a company are pending before the Tribunal, however, the same may not applicable in the case of the company in liquidation, inasmuch as the winding up order of the company in liquidation was passed by the Court much prior to the report of the Official Liquidator filed before this Court seeking investigation by the SFIO.
It is not the case of the Official Liquidator that the powers conferred on it by virtue of the aforesaid provisions are inadequate for purpose of detection of the irregularities like the allegation of diversion of funds, etc. that caused it to move this Court for referring the matter to the SFIO. It should not appear to the Court that the Official Liquidator seeks referral of the matter to the SFIO for the reason that it finds itself inadequate to exercise the powers conferred on the Official Liquidator by the aforesaid sections of the Act.
The order dated 13.12.2019 is recalled and the Recall Application No.235 of 2020 is hereby allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1255 - SUPREME COURT
Qualification of Resolution Applicant - Promotor of the company - Application for Resolution Plan dismissed on the ground that the promoters could not have presented the plan - ineligibility to continue as a Resolution Professional - ineligibility to be considered as Board is liquidator of the corporate debtor - whether the appellant had erred in putting up a plan that was not in consonance with law for consideration of the adjudicating authority?
HELD THAT:- As per the factual scenario on record, there is no per say disqualification under Section 29A - it is pointed out that the plea based on Section 240A needs the opinion of this Court as there are a number of such cases arising and the orders earlier passed are being followed.
The common submission thus, is that while interpreting Section 240A, the reason for carving out an exception in micro, small and medium industries is set out on the date of application for making the bid as the crucial date. The submission is that while for some other aspects the initiation of the CIRP proceedings would be the cut off date, the same would not apply in the case of Section 240A, in view of the statement by the Minister themselves while introducing the amendment Bill.
The statement of the Minister is looked into for purposes of a cut off date that “there is no other specific provision providing for cut off date” which submits that it should be the date of application of making a bid. Thus, to opine that it is the initiation of the CIRP proceedings which is the relevant date, cannot be said to reflect the correct legal view and thus, it is constrained to observe that the law laid down in DIGAMBAR ANANDRAO PINGLE VERSUS SHRIKANT MADANLAL ZAWAR, SHRIKANT MADANLAL ZAWAR, VANDANA GARG LIQUIDATOR M/S PINGLE BUILDERS PVT. LTD., STATE BANK OF INDIA, VIJAYA BANK, M/S SOORAJMULL BAIJNATH PVT. LTD. [2021 (7) TMI 456 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL , PRINCIPAL BENCH , NEW DELHI] case by the Tribunal is not the correct position in law and the cut off date will be the date of submission of resolution plan - Thus, even on this count, the plan submitted in question will not incur the disqualification.
The petition before the Adjudicating Authority would stand restored to National Company Law Tribunal for reconsideration
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2023 (12) TMI 1254 - ITAT COCHIN
Penalty u/s 271D and 271E - period of Limitation u/s. 275(1)(c) - HELD THAT:- The relevant date, is neither the date of assessment order, as contended by the appellant in Grihalakshmi Visions [2015 (8) TMI 1214 - KERALA HIGH COURT] or the date of initiation of penalty proceedings by issue of notice under section 274 – which though can only be by a competent authority, as contended by the Revenue in that case.
But the date on which action for imposition of penalty stands initiated. This action is to be understood as the date on which reference is made to the competent authority for initiation of penalty proceedings. In the instant case/s, this is on 01.01.2008, vide letter issued. The limitation period would thus be up to 31.07.2008, being the later of 31.3.2008 and 31.7.2008. The penalty orders are thus not barred by time, i.e., going by the assessee’s own case as made out, and we admit with merit.
Further, it is nobody’s case, nor could possibly be, that reference to the Jt. CIT by the AO on 01.01.2008, being after the completion of the assessment proceedings on passing the assessment order and issue of demand notice on 13/12/2017, is not valid in law inasmuch as it was after 13.12.2017.
In a given case, the Joint/Addl. CIT may himself be the AO, in which case he, noticing and recording violation of sections 269SS/T, may, accordingly, propose to initiate penalty, in which case that would be the relevant proceedings. Why, in a given case, penalty proceedings may be initiated at the instance of the first appellate authority. The date of assessment order may thus not be relevant. Shri Raghunathan would before us seek to bolster his case by arguing that the Jt. CIT may well ‘sleep’ over the matter, issuing notice u/s. 274, in an extreme case, after years, indefinitely postponing the proceedings, and, which cannot be the intent of the Legislature.
While this may be a possibility, even if remote, we do not think it necessary to, given the clear language of the provision, seek to decipher or probe the rationale behind prescribing the time of ‘action for initiation of penalty’ in its wisdom by the Legislature as against that of ‘initiation of penalty’, which could well have been so stated had that been the legislative intent. The words ‘action for imposition of penalty has been/is initiated’, in s. 275(1)(c), could only be on the reference to the competent authority in the matter, i.e., proposing initiation of penalty u/s. 271D/E of the Act, in collateral proceedings. The ‘sleep over’ would, rather, defeat the levy of penalty inasmuch as action for the imposition of penalty precedes the date of its initiation.he assessee, for the reasons afore-stated, fails in it’s challenge on limitation. We decide accordingly.
Reasonable cause’ u/s. 273B - We have given our careful consideration to the matter, which may have implications beyond the instant case, the financial impact of which, at an aggregate of Rs. 231.24 cr., also emphasised by Shri Raghunath, is not insubstantial. The default being admitted, reference to the enhanced limit of Rs. 2 lakhs, up from Rs. 20,000, in sections 269SS/T, for a PACS, w.e.f. the previous year commencing 01.04.2023, as pointed out by Shri Das, so made, as explained by him, with a view to provide relief to the low income groups in rural areas and facilitate easier conditions of business operations in such areas, may not add any further strength to the Revenue’s case; the burden to prove reasonable cause being in any case on the assessee.
In our view, looking at the entirety of the facts and circumstances, the assessee deserves to succeed in the conspectus of it’s case.
Assessee is involved in both, i.e., borrowing, through acceptance of deposits, as well as lending, with the only difference that the members of the public are entitled to deposit their monies as well as borrow monies on becoming nominal members by paying a nominal sum upon filling an application form, permitted by it’s governing Act and bye-laws. It is this that led to the denial of deduction u/s. 80P in assessment.
The assessee-society, though registered as a PACS under the Kerala Act, is legally dealing with members and non-members, i.e., public at large, without restriction as to area, i.e., at par with a commercial or cooperative bank, excluded from the ambit of ss. 269SS/T. In our view there is thus a reasonable cause for the assessee, who has a past history of operating in such a manner, being so for over three decades post 30.06.1984, i.e., since when sections 269SS/T of the Act are on the statute, for having violated the said provisions, and is thus not liable to penalty under sections 271D/E of the Act in terms of s. 273B. We may also clarify; the same having also been duly considered and factored into our decision, that no doubt at any stage, including before us, has been expressed by the Revenue as regards the maintenance of proper records, including qua KYC, by the assessee. This is as, where so, this would have warranted remanding the matter back to identify such suspected cases inasmuch as there could be a transgression of the provisions of the PMLA, with the assessee using it’s status, reach and clout as a bank to deal in illicit money or otherwise with customers without proper antecedents. Appeal of assessee allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1253 - ITAT DELHI
Assessment u/s 153A - Unexplained share capital - Addition u/s 68 - incriminating material found during search or not? - HELD THAT:- The entire issue stands settled by the judgment of M/s. Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd. [2023 (4) TMI 1056 - SUPREME COURT] wherein held that in case no incriminating material is unearthed during the search, the AO cannot assess or reassess taking into consideration the other material in respect of completed assessments/unabated assessments. Hence, respectfully following the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court, we hold that no addition can be made in the case of the assessee sans seized material u/s 153A.
Hence, keeping in view, the pertinent facts of the case, we affirm the order of the ld. CIT(A) to the extent of non- availability of relevant seized material which could have lead to the addition by the AO, hence, the appeal of the revenue stands dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1252 - CESTAT KOLKATA
Refund of SAD - SAD had been paid, not in cash, but by utilising the DEPB scrip - HELD THAT:- The said issue came up before the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of ALLEN DIESELS INDIA PVT. LTD. VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [2016 (2) TMI 247 - DELHI HIGH COURT], wherein it was held that Although it is sought to be projected that the circulars which are subject matter of the challenge in the present petitions were issued to streamline the procedure and to remove ambiguities, in fact what the circulars seek to amend is Notification No. 102/2007-Customs itself by introducing an additional condition for being entitled to refund, which condition does not find place in Notification No. 102/2007-Customs.
As the issue is no more res-integra in view of the judicial pronouncement of the Hon’ble High Court and the Tribunal and the ld. Commissioner (Appeals) has followed the same - there are no infirmity in the impugned order and the same is upheld.
The appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1251 - SC ORDER
Interim measure to deposit an amount of Rs. 3.22 crores with the Registrar of Company, Delhi towards fees for delay in filing Form SH-7 - HELD THAT:- This amount has not been deposited. The petitioner has also not taken out any application seeking condonation of delay in making such deposit or permitting him to deposit in instalments.
A petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India has a discretionary element for this Court to consider. Because of the petitioner’s conduct, we do not think such discretion ought to be exercised in favour of the petitioner. Otherwise also, we are also not satisfied with the petitioner’s case on merit.
Petition dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1250 - NATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING AUTHORITY
Professional misconduct - Auditor's conflict of interest with the auditee company - Acting as statutory auditor of SKNL while holding or controlling shares of SKNL in violation of section 141 of the Companies Act 2013 & section 226(3)(e) of the Companies Act 1956 resulting in failure to maintain independence of auditor - Non-compliance with para 7 to 9 of Standard on Auditing (SA) 705 - penalties and sanctions - HELD THAT:- It is clear that CA Shyam Malpani had violated the Companies Act 1956, the Companies Act 2013, SQC1, SA 220 and SA 705 by performing this audit despite having serious conflict of interest and in not giving appropriate audit opinions. It is therefore concluded that CA Shyam Malpani has committed Professional Misconduct as defined under Section 132 (4) of the Companies Act 2013 in terms of section 22 of the Chartered Accountants Act 1949 (CA Act). As per the clause 7 of Part I of the Second Schedule of the CA Act, an EP is guilty of professional misconduct if he "did not exercise due diligence and was grossly negligent in the conduct of his professional duties" - Since the EP compromised his independence and failed to recognize and report the pervasiveness of the deficiencies of the financial statements, his conduct undoubtedly falls into the category of lack of due diligence and gross negligence. Therefore, the charge of professional misconduct on the part of the EP on this account is proved.
Internationally also, similar cases of Auditor's conflict of interest with the auditee company has been viewed seriously.
In this case the audit done by the EP related to SKNL which was a large public listed company and involved interest of large number of shareholders and other stake holders such as banks, creditors etc. It is critical that the auditor and the EP performed their job with due diligence to give assurance to the investors and stakeholders on true and fairness of the financial statements and thereby protect public interest. Any default on this account impacts and jeopardizes the larger public interest which needs to be considered while determining the quantum of punishment.
Considering the nature and seriousness of violations and principles of proportionality, in the exercise of powers under Section 132 (4) (c) of the Companies Act, 2013, the sanctions ordered - a monetary penalty of Rupees Five Lakh imposed upon CA Shyam Malpani. In addition, CA Shyam Malpani is debarred for a period of Five years from being appointed as an auditor or internal auditor or from undertaking any audit in respect of financial statements or internal audit of the functions and activities of any company or body corporate.
Application disposed off.
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2023 (12) TMI 1249 - SUPREME COURT
Condonation of delay in filing an appeal before NCLAT - whether the appeal was instituted within limitation? - Maintainability of application under Section 7 of the IBC - HELD THAT:- On the facts of the case, the Court noted that the appeal was barred by limitation as the appellant did not even attempt to secure a certified copy and only relied on the date of uploading the order on the website. Significantly, in the case, there was a pronouncement on the date mentioned on the order and the appellant did not dispute his presence before the NCLT when the order was pronounced in open court.
The date on which the limitation begins to run is intrinsically linked to the date of pronouncement. The question that arises in the facts of the present case, therefore, is when is an order deemed to be pronounced. The National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 [NCLT Rules] provide guidance in this regard. Rule 89(1) of the NCLT Rules indicates that when NCLAT registry publishes its cause list, a distinction is drawn between cases listed for pronouncement of orders and other cases.
In the present case, the cause list for 17 May 2023 placed on record by the appellant indicates that the case was listed for admission and not for pronouncement. Further, on a specific query of the Court, it is not in dispute between counsel for the appellant and the respondent, that no substantive order was passed on 17 May 2023 by the NCLT. In these circumstances, limitation would not begin to run on 17 May 2023 which was the date on which hearings concluded. As no order was passed before 30 May 2023, there was no occasion for the appellant to lodge an application for a certified copy on 17 May 2023. Time for filing an appeal would commence only when the order appealed from was uploaded since prior to that date no order was pronounced.
The period of limitation began to run on 30 May 2023. The 30- day limitation period provided in Section 61(2) of the IBC concluded on 29 June 2023. Though the appeal was filed beyond the period of thirty days, it was within the condonable period of fifteen days - the appeal should be restored to the NCLAT for reconsidering whether the appellant has shown sufficient cause for condoning the delay beyond thirty days.
Appeal disposed off.
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2023 (12) TMI 1248 - SC ORDER
Maintainability of section 9 application - HELD THAT:- The present appeal is dismissed - It is clarified that the impugned judgment and the dismissal of the present appeal will not be construed as an expression of opinion on whether the petition under Section 9 of the IBC is within time.
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2023 (12) TMI 1247 - SC ORDER
Submission of claim before COC - HELD THAT:- The pleas and contentions of Kamal Kant Dewan and Bharat Food and Agro Products, as well as the contentions of White Water Hospitality Private Limited, will be examined by the adjudicating authority.
The impugned judgment set aside - appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1246 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL , PRINCIPAL BENCH , NEW DELHI - LB
Dismissal of Section 9 application - pre-existing dispute - HELD THAT:- The email sent by the Corporate Debtor indicate the entire issue raised between the parties, where the Corporate Debtor denied any outstanding amount. Further, the receipt which was claimed by the Corporate Debtor was the receipt of the diamonds received on behalf of the Appellant, which were all before the date when Demand Notice was issued. This indicate that at the time when Demand Notice was issued, there were dispute between the parties.
The Adjudicating Authority has rightly rejected the Section 9 application there being a pre-existing dispute - Appeal dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1245 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL , PRINCIPAL BENCH , NEW DELHI
Seeking condonation of delay of 15 days in filing of the appeal - existence of sufficient reasons for delay or not - HELD THAT:- In the present case, the appeal has been filed on the last date i.e. 15th day i.e. 45th day. The reason given in para 3 of the application for condonation of delay appears to be a halfhearted attempt on the part of the Appellant for condonation the delay of 15 days because it is mentioned therein that the appellant took time for procuring relevant documents and as such the counsel for the Appellant could not receive instructions on time. However, in the additional affidavit, the Appellant has mentioned that it had to obtain several documents which could not be procured in time. However, it is not denied that the appeal was filed on 17.04.2023 and then an application was filed on 08.11.2023 for placing on record the additional documents.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Spot Exchange Limited Vs. Anil Kohli [2021 (9) TMI 1156 - SUPREME COURT] held that the delay beyond the period of 15 days cannot be condoned by the Tribunal and even under Article 142 of the Constitution of India which makes the provision very stringent and lays responsibility on the Appellant to be vigilant enough to file the appeal within the prescribed period. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, there are no merit in the application and the same is hereby dismissed - The application for seeking condonation of delay in re-filing has become infructuous and the same is hereby dismissed.
Condonation of delay of 15 days in filing the appeal and for condonation of delay of 162 in refiling the appeal - HELD THAT:- In the present case, the appeal has been filed on the last date i.e. 15th day i.e. 45th day. The reason given in para 3 of the application for condonation of delay appears to be a halfhearted attempt on the part of the Appellant for condonation the delay of 15 days because it is mentioned therein that the appellant took time for procuring relevant documents and as such the counsel for the Appellant could not receive instructions on time - the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Spot Exchange Limited Vs. Anil Kohli, [2021 (9) TMI 1156 - SUPREME COURT] held that the delay beyond the period of 15 days cannot be condoned by the Tribunal and even under Article 142 of the Constitution of India which makes the provision very stringent and lays responsibility on the Appellant to be vigilant enough to file the appeal within the prescribed period - there are no merit in the application and the same is hereby dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1244 - SC ORDER
Arrest of appellant - HELD THAT:- Even during the course of investigation, the appellant was not arrested.
The interim order dated 16th October, 2023 is made absolute on the same terms and conditions - Appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1243 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Seeking grant of anticipatory bail - Money Laundering - proceeds of crime - statement recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA, 2002 - HELD THAT:- The co-accused persons Shesh Nath Chauha, Ashok Kumar Singh and Pramod Kumar Singh have been granted anticipatory bail in the present case - The complaint states that the applicant was working as a Junior Engineer; the applicant is aged about 63 years and besides the alleged Scheduled offence, he is not involved in any other case. He has already been granted anticipatory bail in the Scheduled offence and three co-accused persons have been granted anticipatory bail in the present case.
The applicant is also entitled for anticipatory bail in the present case - In the event of arrest/ appearance of applicant-Ashok Kumar Singh before the learned Trial Court in the aforesaid case crime, he shall be released on anticipatory bail on his furnishing personal bond and two solvent sureties, each in the like amount, to the satisfaction of S.H.O./Court concerned on the conditions imposed - bail application allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1242 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
Levy of service tax - Declared Service - relinquishment charges under section 66E (e) of the Finance Act - charges are in the nature of consideration received towards rendition of the declared service i.e. tolerating of relinquishing access rights - HELD THAT:- It is well settled that the amount paid in the nature of compensation/damages on account of breach or non-performance of contract would not be considered in lieu of any service and, therefore, would not be leviable to service tax.
In view of the decision of the Tribunal in South-Eastern Coalfields Ltd. [2020 (12) TMI 912 - CESTAT NEW DELHI], it has to be held that relinquishment charges are not consideration received towards rendition of a declared service under section 66E (e) of the Finance Act.
It would not be necessary to examine the alternative submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that in any view of the matter, the relinquishment charges recovered by the appellant are part of the electricity transmission service and, therefore, would be covered under the Negative List under section 66D (k) of the Finance Act.
The order dated 04.03.2021 passed by the Principal Commissioner cannot be sustained and is set aside - Appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1241 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
Levy of service tax - Declared service or not - Recovery of penalty/liquidated damages recovered from customers and contractors - agreeing to the obligation to recover from an Act or to start an Act or a situation, or to do an Act - HELD THAT:- After considering the various provisions of Indian Contract Act therewith, it has been held that liquidated damages/ compensation for the breach of contract can be awarded to make good the loss or damage which actually arises or which the parties knew when they made the contract, “to be likely to result from the breach”. Hence it cannot be concluded that sum received is synonymous to “tolerating”. It is absolutely wrong to say that in breach of contract one appellant tolerates an Act or a situation, hence, the view taken by the Commissioner (Appeals) that the liquidated damages as have been received by the appellants towards “consideration” for “tolerating the Act” are leviable to service tax under section 66 E(e) of Finance Act is not at all sustainable.
In the fact of both the present appeals, it is found that the facts are almost identical. There appears nothing for us to differ from the above observations in the afore-mentioned final order of the said Tribunal. Respectfully, following those findings it is held that the amount in question cannot be called as consideration towards declared service as defined under Section 66E (e) of the Finance Act. The confirmation of tax demand qua said amount is therefore not sustainable.
Appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1240 - CESTAT MUMBAI
Refund claim - refund rejected solely on the ground that the TR6 challan, evincing payment of duty, had not been furnished - HELD THAT:- The issue of documentation prescribed under section 11B of Central Excise Act, 1944 for claiming of refunds came before the Tribunal in MAHARASHTRA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD VERSUS COMMR. OF C. EX., NAGPUR [2004 (4) TMI 368 - CESTAT, MUMBAI] and it was held therein that The respondent has no case that the appellants have claimed refund of duty unduly or with any oblique purpose. The appellant is a public body and it can have no oblique motives. The orders of the lower authorities are set aside in so far as the refund claims in question are concerned. The claims are allowed.
The issue is the same as that in the dispute of the appellant for similar refund. It would appear that the lower authorities had erred in insisting upon the original document as proof of discharge of duty liability even though available with the central excise authorities - the impugned order is set aside and the application restored to the original authority for fresh determination of the application for sanction in consequence of judicial determination of non-excisability.
The appeal is allowed by way of remand.
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2023 (12) TMI 1239 - CESTAT KOLKATA
Levy of Central Excise Duty - inclusion of sales tax concession retained by the assesses in the assessable value or not - extended period of limitation - penalty - HELD THAT:- The issue is no more res integra as the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, JAIPUR-II VERSUS M/S. SUPER SYNOTEX (INDIA) LTD. AND OTHERS [2014 (3) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT], has held that the sales tax concession retained by the assesses is required to be added in the assessable value for the purpose of levy of Central Excise duty. By relying on the above decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we hold that the sales tax concession retained by the Appellant is required to be added in the assessable value for the purpose of levy of Central Excise duty.
Since the Appellant has not collected the duty separately from the customers, the amount collected is to be treated as inclusive of duty - the demand for the normal period is to be computed by taking the amount collected as cum-duty.
Penalty - HELD THAT:- The appellant cannot be faulted for not including the same in the assessable value. In the impugned order, the adjudicating authority while agreeing that extended period not invocable in this case, imposed penalty equal to the duty confirmed under Section 11AC of the CEA, 1944 - the adjudicating authority has not given any proper finding for imposing penalty under Section 11AC. Accordingly, the penalty imposed under Section 11AC not tenable.
Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- In the present case, it is observed that the Adjudicating Authority has failed to show any positive act of suppression on the part of the Appellant. The details of VAT collected and retained by the Appellant are reflected in the audited Profit & Loss account and balance sheet of the impugned periods. Accordingly, by following the above Circular issued by the Board, it is held that extended period not invocable in this case and for the same reason penalty under Section 11AC of the CEA, 1944 also not imposable.
The appeal is disposed by way of remand for calculating the duty, payable for the normal period of limitation, with consequential relief, if any, as per law.
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